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INTRODUCTION 
The time has definitely come for the nations of the world to revise 
their old-fashioned and inaccurate notions about a great people which 
represents almost one-fifth of the entire human race. 
After eight long years of heroic and almost incredible courage and 
firmness in their self-defensive resistance against a mechanically much 
more powerful aggressor, the Chinese people have undoubtedly merited an 
important place in the new, peaceful world that the United Nations Organi-
zation promises us. 
It is a matter of fact that China, since she was forced to have her 
doors opened to the invading European powers, has been bitterly exploited, 
ill-treatea, underestimated, and despised. In one word, she has been 
misunderstood and forced to live at the mercy of powerful nations as their 
unofficial colony. Father Thomas Ryan, S.J., has tenderly but meaningfully 
written these following words in his popular booklet, China through 
Catholic ~: 
The story, however, of the coming of modern life 
to China is not pleasant reading, for it is a 
story of conflicting rights and of might used 
to decide them, of western aggressions and of 
attempts to exploit China, and it contains many 
unhappy episodes that are now best forgotten •••• 
all are agreed that many things happened which 
all nations now regret. 1 
1 China through Catholic Eyes by Rev. Thomas Ryan, S. J., New York, 1941. 
(The first edition of t~ooklet was printed in Hong-Kong, China, 1939.) 
i 
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However, thanks to God, things are finally changed for the better. 
"When the greedy flames of war inexorably spread in the Pacific following 
the perfidious attack on Pearl Harbor, Malaya and lands in and around the 
China Sea, and one after another of these places fell, the pendulum swung 
to the other extreme." 2 The world began to admire the successful 
resistance of China and to realise suddenly that the ability and spirit of 
a great people had for centuries been misunderstood and underestimated. 
China was named in the original "Big Four" and has become one of the leaders 
among the United Nations although practically speaking she is not yet 
ready for such a position. 
To quote the words of China's war-time Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, 
this sudden and rather unexpected rise of China is due to the fact that 
"a weak nation standing up against a strong has set up a record unprece-
dented in the annals of modern warfare," so that "the whole world recognizes 
. our position as champion of international justice and understands the 
value of ~ spiritual strength." 3 The source of this "spiritual strength" 
is to be found in the spirit of the people. Concerning this matter, we 
wish to cite the opinion of two well-known French authors, Paul Janet and 
2 Words of Madame Chiang Kai-Shek, quoted from her address to the U.S.A. 
Congress, February 26, 1943. Copied from the Chicago Sun, Feb. 27, 
1943. The ChicaJo Tribune also had the entire text published. (same date. 
3 Quoted from For iva fUll years An Address to the Chinese people on 
July 7, 1942:--Confer: All we are and all we have, a collection of 
Chiang Kai-Shek' s speeches translatecrinto Inglish and published by the 
Chinese News Service, Rockefeller Center, New York City. A copy of it 
has been given to the Library of the Graduate School of Loyola University 
of Chicago. 
Gabriel Seailles: 
The history of Ethics has, apart from 
the light lIhich it throws on Philosophy in 
general, an interest particular to itself. 
For, whilst Metaphysical. theories are often 
the 'WOrk of man not in close contact with 
practical life, the Ethical theories of a 
Pb.ilosopher, on the contrary, give nearly 
always an ideal interpretation of the custom 
and moral of his age. 
Moralists are in a sense the legislators 
of nations, for they in truth dictate laws 
to the nobler mind, lIhose 'ideal of conduct 
is not bounded by the narrow limits of mere 
legali ty. Ethical systems, no less than legal. 
codes, have for their foundation, as Plato 
says, not "rocks and oaks, but the customs 
of the State." (Rep. Book VIII, Ch. 2). 
And far more clearly than philosophy and 
science ~ reveal. ~ .1!! the character ~ 
spiri t ~ ~ nation to which they belong. 4 
iii 
Agreeing with this opinion, we are convinced that a new and objective 
lm.owledge of the Chinese spirit must be based on accurate and scientific 
knowledge of the teachings of Chinats authoratative moralists. Thus, 
lmder the positive suggestion and encouragement of Rev. Father John oJ. 
Wellmuth, S.J., then Chairman of the Department of Pb.ilosopb;y at Loyola 
Uni versi ty of Chicago, we bave undertaken as the topic of our dissertation 
~ moral. doctrine of Mo-tze, one of Chinat s most original. and most influen-
tial. moralists, Dose teachings are respected even more than those of 
Confucius by the present-dq rulers although Confucius 1s the only Chinese 
philosopher well knO'WIl to the western world. 
4 Quoted from: If A History of the Problems of Philosophy-" translated into 
English by Ada Manaham. MacMillan & Co., London, 1902. Vol. II page 1. 
(Italics ours.) (Parenthesis original.) 
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The practical influence of Mo-tze r s teachings on the philosophy of 
life in our modern China is ,to be seen in the similarity of the principles 
of the "New Life Movement" 5 with the doctrine of Mo-tze. The outstanding 
courage of our people in resisting a powerful en~ for eight long years 
is at least partially due to the teachings of lIo-tze which insisted on an 
all-out resistance to any aggressive power. 6 Manual labor is no more 
despised by' the intellectual class as, according to the opinion of Confucius, 
it should be. 7 Other characteristic points of Mo-tze r s teachings such 
as simplicity in funeral., economy in expenditures, universal love, condem-
nation of offensive war, and anti-fatalism 8 are in conformity with the 
"New Life Movement", which is, according to its authors, a kind of moral 
Renaissance. 
Although, as a matter of fact, Mo-tze is practically unknown to the 
Western public, he is nevertheless not ignored by Western sinologists. 
As can readily be seen from the bibliography given at the end of this 
essay, quite a few books about Mo-tze have already been written in different 
European languages. However, a study from the Scholastic standpoint of 
Mo-tze r s teachings as a whole and of his complete moral system is still 
5 "The New Life Movement" ~'£.::.t.·~'tDin1tiated by Chiang Kai-Shek in 1933. 
We shall discuss later,the influence of Mo-tze upon it. 
6 Mo-tze maintained "resistance to the last man" as we may see in his 
last twelve chapters which deal with warfare. 
7 Mo-tze did manual works himself and emphasized the value of labor in 
human life as we shall see in our discussion. Confucius considered 
manual labor as a low profession and not fit for intelligent people. 
8 We shall explain all these points later in t>ur dissertation. 
lacking. The work of Mr. Mei Yei-pao entitled Motse, the neglected rival 
!2! Confucius 9 is perhaps so far the most complete and extensive discussion 
on the matter. Nonetheless, it is still incomplete from the viewpoint of 
Scholastic philosophy, and besides, it is an extensive expose for those 
who can not read the original text of Mo-tze in Chmese rather than an 
intensive discussion of the philosophical value and qualities of Mo-tze's 
doctrine as a whole system of ethical teaching. The work of Madame 
Alexander David entitled Le .t'hilosophe Meh-ti !! l'idee de solidarite 10 
is a quite elaborate comparison between MO-tze's doctrine of universal 
leve and the Christian idea of solidarity. It is of course a special 
essay on a particular point of Mo-tze's teachings. Besides, the criterion 
used in the comparison is rather sentimental than philosophical. Other 
works in European languages are merely booklets whose purpose, as is often 
explicitly acknowledged by their authors, was to introduce Mo-tze to 
Westerners by' W8(f of a brief outline of his life and his teachings. 
On the other hand, Chinese authors have so far offered little in the 
way of properly philosophical studies on Mo-tze's doctrine; their efforts 
have been rather directed at elaborate discussions concerning the life of 
fio-tze and the authenticity of his works as we possess them in the present 
d~. And because of their lack of proper knowledge in Western philosophy, 
especially Scholastic philosophy, their criticism of Mo-tze is generally 
based either on common sense or on Confucian tradition. A few have tried 
to adopt the Views of modern pragmatic schools, and thus make Mo-tze a 
9 Published by Probatain, London, 1934. The work is done under the 
sponsorship of the School of Philosophy of the Uni versi ty of Chicago. 
10 Published in London, 1907. 
pragmatic or utilitarian; this interpretation we shall demonstrate to be 
rather a superficial judgment. 
The doctrine of Mo-tze, especially his teaching on universal Love, is 
qui te similar to teachings of Christian philosophy, namely the Scholastic 
philosophy 'Which is the traditional treasure of the Holy Catholic Church. 
It is regrettable that no Catholic philosopher has ever undertaken the 
task of discussing this similarity by means of a thoroughgoing analysis 
of Mo-tze I s doctrine. This is what we intend to try in these pages. It 
little matters to us whether this proves to be a whol~ successful attempt, 
for we shall be satisfied if our essay will provide help for some brilliant 
Catholic philosopher in working out a really valuable treatise on this 
matter. Such would be definitely a great help for the preaching of the 
Holy Gospel in the new post-war China, since a deep knowledge of Chinese 
moral philosophy is the key to the mass conversion which must be based on 
intellectUal conviction and not on charitable works alone. The root of 
the present Catholicism in China was planted by Father Matteo Ricci, S.J., 
solely on an intellectual. basis. This was possible because of the fact 
that Father Matteo had provided himself with a deep knowledge of the teach-
ings of Chinese moralists. It is quite regrettable that this policy was 
not taithf~ followed by the later missioners. 11 
Finally, we nsh to express our deepest gratitude to Dr. John McKlan 
whose patience and zeal in directing our research and in correcting our 
broken English knows no limit. 
11 For more details on this matter, confer China through Catholic ~ 
by Father Thomas Ryan, S.J. (See above note 1.) 
CHAPTER I 
PRELIMINARY NOTIONS ABOUT ID-TZE 
Since the topic of our dissertation is, generally speaking, quite 
unfamiliar to the Western public or even probably to their scholars, we 
believe that a condensed expose of the fundamental knowledge concerning 
Mo-tze and his time is indispensable. 
Thus, we shall devote our firs t chapter to complying with this 
important "conditio sine qua non," endeavoring to furnish the requisite 
information as bri~ as possible. Though our points must be completely 
and critically proved, we must necessarilY be concise, so that, to quote 
St. ~egory the Great, "Quatenus ejus expositio ita nescientibus fiat 
cognita, ut taman scientibus non sit onerosa". 1 We dare hope it may 
prove not.o~ "non onerosa", but m~ possib~y be considered pleasant 
reading. For that reason, rather than burden the text we have included 
much of our materials in foot-notes. 
In the interests of clarity and precision, we have arranged this 
introductory chapter under four subheadings, as folloW's: 
A) Biographical Notes. 
B) AuthentiCity of his Works. 
C) Baekgromd of his Teachings. 
D) Characteristics of his Doctrine. 
* * * 
1 Quoted from ItHomilia in Evange1iis·t Homilia 13. 
'1 
2 
A) BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 
"It is necessary to know the man and his time, before his teaching 
can be appreciated in its strong and simple verity." With these words, 
perhaps as an apology, L. Adams Beck opens a very long, but poorly authen-
ticated, account of the life of Confucius in his popular work, ~ Story 
2! Oriental Philosophy. 2 The quotation eJlPresses a sound principle; here, 
however, it is our intention only to present some important biographical 
details concerning Mo-tze as a means of acquainting our readers with him. 
Very little positive information is available concerning Mo-tae. The 
scarcity of written documents has resulted in various estimates as to the 
span of his life, agreement existing only in a limitation of this period 
to the interval. between 550 B.C. and 300 B.C. The most logical deductim. 
from available evidence would establish his birth at about 480 B.C., and 
his death at about 400 B.C. 3 In any event, it appears certain that MO-tze 
lived during theperiod between Confucius and Mencius. 4 This conclusion, 
2 Cont. 2l?. cit. pages 223-224 (The New Home Library Edition, New York, 1 
3 The most respected authorities on this matter are Liang Chi-Ts'ao 
and Hu-Shih t~11L. The former stated that Mo-tze was born between 468 
and 459 B.C. and died between 390 and 382 B.C. (Conf. A Critical study 
of Mo-tze, Shanghai 1921, in the appendix.) The latter-asserted that 
MO-tze was born between 500 and 490 B.C. and died between 425 and 416 
B.C. (Cont. An Outline 2!: Chinese Philosophical HiSto~ Shanghai, 
1928, Chapter ""VI, Section I, page 147, 14th Edition.) st Western 
writers followed the opinion of Dr. Hu-Shih. This is probably due to the 
fact that Hu' s work has been translated into English. 
4 ConfuciUS died 479 B.C.; Mencius, the greatest of all Confucianists, 
was probably born 372 B.C. (certainly not earlier than 375 B.C.). 
However, the time between those two philosophers, that 1s, the period 
during which Uo-tze lived, may extend from approximately thirty years 
before the death of Confucius until approximately thirty years after 
the birth of llencius. For, according to the custom of that time, no 
one was likely to make public appearances before he was nearly thirty 
years old. 
3 
in our opinion, is correct, despite the f'act that very ancient documents 
seemingly assert otherwise. 5 Our conclusion is based upon the f'olloWing 
simple f'acts: Confucius made no mention of' Mo-tze, whereas Mo-tze severely 
criticised Conf'ucius r doctrines; in like manner, Motze f'ails to mention 
Mencius, who, in def'ending Conf'ucian1sm, violently attacked Mo-tzars 
teaching as heretical and harmful to the morals of' the people. 6 This, we 
believe, is adequate proof' that the three philosophers were not strictly 
contemporaneous, and it likewise helps to determine their chronological 
sequence. 
There is no evidence which might of'f'er a clue as to Mo-tzers genealogy. 
The Chinese word "Mo", which literally signif'ies "black ink", does not neces-
sarily designate his proper f'amily or surname. It is, quite possibly, merely 
a nickname, given him in a f'ashion similar to the custom of' many countries. 7 
5 According to the f'amous Chinese historian Sze Ma-Ch 'en t!;~{1.45-186 A.D.), 
some authorities or some documents of' his time stated that Mo-tze was 
a contemporary of' Confucius. (Conf'. "She-Keen~~~by Sze Ma-Ch'en). 
However, according to Dr. Pei-Yuant~~, the f'amed editor of' the latest 
of'f'icia1 text of' Mo-tze, some ancient authorities have shown that Mo-tze 
was rather a contemporary- of' Mencius. These two opinions cause a 
dif'f'erence of' more than 200 years in the 1if'e period of' MO-tze. 
6 Conf'. "Book of' Mencius" Book III part 2, also Book VIr part 1, English 
translation by James Legge. (See bibliography) 
7 According to thecustom of' the time, it was not necessary to call a wise 
man by his surname. The typical example of' this would be the well-known 
naturalist-philosopher Lao-tze, whose f'ami1y name was "Lee ll , t- • Yet, 
he was never called "Lee-tze". The word "Lao" ~ mans. "old". This name 
was theref'ore very likely given to him in the later years of' his lif'e. 
Now, the word "Mo rr ~ which means "black ink" might be a surname given 
to our philosopher because of' his dark complexion. (Conf'. Text of' Mo-tze 
Ch. 48). Mr. Hu Wei-tchen~~t~ modern Chinese author, has even suspected 
that Mo-tze was not Chinese but rather an Indian because of' his darker 
complexion and also because of' the peculiarity of' his doctrine of 
Universal Love. However, this opinion was immediately rejected by all 
authori ties. Nevertheless, as a matter of' f'act, the word "Mo n as a f'ami1y 
name is very rare even in ancient China. There is no such-name nowadays. 
4 
"Tze" is a title of respect, bestowed in ancient China upon distinguished 
wise men; it is virtually the equivalent of the term "Doctor" in modern 
English. 8 His personal or given name was "Ti". 9 Were the English manner 
of address to be used, our philosopher would probably be called Tze Ti Mo, 
(as, for instance, TIr. John Jones.) The Chinese custom, however, reverses 
this process thus, Mo Ti Tze; and for brevity, Mo-tze. (i.e. Dr. Mo). 
Also in this regard, many variations are found in the spelling of his name 
by Western sinologists, resulting from different pronunciations of the 
alphabetic letters in different European languages, and the different accent 
and even pronunciations in different regions in China for the same Chinese 
8 The Chinese word "Tse" ..:::f- originally meant "the son". Then it became an 
honorary title given by the King to certain lower ranking officials of 
the court (practically the equivalent of the English title of "Sir). 
But, with the spirit of reverence towards the scholars who were becoming 
more and more influential in society during the later period of the 
Chou dynasty, this title was given by the people to all learned wise men 
of the time. It was not exactly an equivalent of the English term 
"philosopher" as many a Western author has believed, but it was commonly 
given to the.members of many kinds of learned professions, such as that 
of physician or architect •. Mencius has mentioned, for instance, a certa! 
Kung Sui-tze'L1~~, was was just a famous carpenter. It could be said 
that this title of "Tze" resembles very much the modern American title 
of "Doctor", except. that in ancient China there were no formal graduation 
nor examination to obtain such a title. It was rather bestowed by the 
people (!£! populi). 
9 In Chinese ~ "Ti If. No special meaning. 
.ord, i.e •. written character. 10 Throughout our dissertation, we shall 
use "Mo-tze". This spelling undoubtedly represents the ultimate in phonetic 
accuracy which can be attained in rendering the official Chinese national 
11 pronunciation into English. 
Mo-tze's birthplace was, most likely, in the state of "Lu". 12 That 
10 This is because Mo-tze is not as popular as Confucius and Mencius in 
the Western world. S. Holth has suggested a Latinization of Mo-~i as 
"Micius". But it has not yet been accepted by Western authorities. 
There are more than a score of different nameS (or rather different 
spellings) given to our philosopher by Western authors. In order to give 
an idea of the confusing situation, we cite some of them as samples: 
Micius (by Holth); Mo-Ti (by Vacca); Mo-tze (by Long); Mo-tseu (by 
H. Maspero); Meh-Ti (by David); Mo-tzu (by Latourelle); Mih-tzi or 
Mak (by W. Turner); Meh-tze (by Rosney); Mih-teih (by Cognatti, in his 
pamphlet: !fUn socialista cinese del vto secolo Av C.1I which is unfor-
tunately not available in this country); Mi-tze (by Harlez); Me-tzi 
and Mek-tik (by Hirth); Conf. bibliography for their respective works. 
However, it is easy to recognize our philosopher even under so many 
different names because of his doctrine of universal love and his 
opposition to the Confucianists' school. 
11 The official Chinese national pronunciation "\~ i~tI is an improved 
Peikinese (that is what the American public calls Mandarin) scientific-
ally set up by a group of specialists and scholars in their effort to 
unify the different pronunciations in different Chinese provinces. The 
Government of the Republic of China has officially adopted it as the 
standard pronunciation to be taught in all schools. As is well known 
to most Western scholars, technically speaking, China has no dialects, 
since the written language is the same everywhere; but the pronunciation 
varies locally to such an extent that an oral conversation is almost 
impossible between people from distant regions. 
12 China was at that time divided into many feudal states. The state of 
"Lu II ~t- was also the birth place of Confucius and of Mencius. This 
state is now a part of the province of Shan-Tung \I.j ~in the Chinese 
republic. However, there is another opinion which claims that Mo-tze 
was a native of the state of Sung ~. The famous historian Sze Ma-Ch'en 
(145-186 A.D.) recorded that our philosopher was a government official. 
of the state of Sung. In the text of Mo-tze (chapter 51), we read that 
Mo-tze had saved the state of Sung from the invasion of its larger 
neighbor state Ch 'u ~ • At any rate, the majority of Chinese scholars 
as well as historians would willingly assert that Mo-tze was a native of 
"Lu". Dr. Hu-Shih ~·cth.(conf. ~. cit. Ch. VI, sect. I, see above note 
3) asserted that the State of Lu iSlnost likely Mo-tze's birth place. 
T' ang Ching-Kaott~~in his Selected ~ of Mo-tze with Notes and 
6 
he studied under a disciple of Confucius may be judged from his deep knowl-
edge of Confucian doctrine and most especially, of the tenets of Confucius' 
direct disciples. However, he thoroughly disagreed with Confucianism, and 
bitterly eriticized it as wrong in principles and harmful in practice. 13 
Accordingly, he founded his own school of philosophy to promulgate his 
ideas. Mo-tze stated that he offered no new set of doctrines, but merely 
developed explanations of the traditional teachings of the ancient Sage 
Kings. 14 This, incidentally, was the favorite claim of all wise men of 
Introduction (Shanghai, 1934) 3rd Ed. in the Introduction.) cited two 
ancient documents and two medieval ones that stated Lu as Mo-tze's 
birth place, while on the other hand, he also pointed out one ancient 
document and three medieval ones which have asserted that the state of 
Sung was Mo-tze's birth place. T'ang himself favored Lu. Most authors 
simply state that the birth place of our philosopher was Lu, but notice 
immediately that there are some documents which recorded Sung as Mo-tze' 
home state. For instance, Ts 'ai Shan-Ssu\~"'.in his The Phi1oso of 
Life according to Lao-tze and Mo-tze (Shanghai, 1935, page 7. still 
other authors, considering the matter as practically bnimportant, do not 
even mention the birth place of Mo-tze. For instance, Ts'ai Huan-Peit~ 
~~ in his History of Chinese Moral Phi1osophZ (Shanghai, 1937, 
Chapter I, section 10;-page 45). 
13 According to the book of Huai Nan Tze n;\t~..,.." (about 200 B.C.), Mo-tze 
studied under a Confucian teacher, and he was well versed in the 
Confucian philosophy, rites and practices. (for English reference 
conf. S. Holth). As to his criticism against Confucianism, read the 
original text Chapter 39, which is entitled "Anti-Confucianism"; the 
same title has been given to Chapter 38; however, the text of this 
chapter (38) unfortunately was lost. Mo-tze also criticized Confucian 
practice in Chapter 49. 
14 The ancient sage kings, practically worshipped by the Chinese people of 
that time~ and considered exemplars of saintliness and wisdom, are: 
King Yao ~ ; King Seng .~ ; King Yu ~ ; which is incidentally a par-
ticular favorite of Mo-tze; King T'ang ~~ ; King Wen 3c... ; King Wu ~ ; 
and the Great Duke of Choum'4; (from about 2400 B.C., age of King Yao, 
to about 1100 B.C., time of the Great Duke of Chou). Almost every wise 
man (except Lao-tze, who apparently criticized the teachings of the 
ancient Kings), of the time before and after Confucius, has positively 
appealed to the sacrosant authority of these ancient sage kings in order 
to prove the orthodoxy and consequently the value of his own teachings. 
~c~ agDea~~ a~~eared very often both in the works of Confucius and 
1 
the time, including Confucius and Mencius. 
Like many of the other wise men of the age, Mo-tze journeyed throughout 
the feudal states of China, 15 preaching his doctrine to every one. In 
particular, he sought out those in authority, hoping that, by instructing 
them, he might terminate successfully the increasingly grievous crises 
of his time. 16 He supplemented his nreaching by an exemplary mode of 
living; his personal virtues and political courage won for him thousands 
of faithful followers and this made possible the founding of his great 
school, 11 which became, at a time, even more influential than the school 
15 China was then divided into many feudal states (see above note 12). 
Confucius, Mencius and other wise men of that time all travelled through 
out these feudal states teaching their doctrines. 
16 These crises are described by Mo-tze as very alarming in all fields of 
human activity--political, social and economic. However, he pointed 
out that the moral crisis should, as a necessary consequence, directly 
cause a crisis in the economic, social, political and international 
orders. We may see the expression of this opinion of Mo-tze throughout 
the original text of his works. (Conf. Original Text of Mo-tze, 
Chapters 14, 15, 16, 11, 18, 19, 26, 21, 28, and ~ --
11 The school of Mo-tze, which is opposed to the school of Confucius, was 
distinguished by its very strict organization under a dictator-like 
leader called flCh leu Tze n~ ~ If (i.e. the leader). Some writers have 
even considered this school a religion and have compared its head with 
the Pope of the Catholic Church. TIr. Hu-Shih tf\®-(conf. £E. cit. Ch. VI 
Sect. 4 page 114) stated: "Mo-tze was an earnest religious world-
savior, founder of religion •••• If Mohism had been placed in circumstance 
similar to those of medieval Europe, it certainly would have been able 
to develop a religious government, of which its 'Chu-Tzu's would have 
taken the place of the Pope". This English translation of Hu-Shih's 
statement is quoted from Micius, A Brief Outline of His Life and Ideas, 
(Shanghai 1935) a booklet by S. Holth, who quotedl5.r. Hu "Trlorder to 
support his own statement which reads as follows: "The Mohist sect had 
a politic-religious character. The head of the sect was called 
Chu-Tzu, an office resembling that of the Pope's in the Roman Catholic 
Church." (~. cit., page 21) 
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of Confucius. 
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Unlike the Sophists, and some of the ancient Chinese philosophers, who 
regarded the teaching of wisdom as merely an honorable and lucrative pro-
fession, Mo-tze realized, as did Socrates, that it was rather a fulfillment 
of a duty to mankind, having almost the status of a divine mission. 19 
18 A frank statement about the situation was made by none other than Men-
cius himself, who is often called by Western authors the Plato of 
Confucius. In his own words Mencius asserted: tIThe doctrine of Mo-Ti 
and that of Yang-Tzuif~,*(the archegoist) covered all the world; so 
that the people of the world, if they do not accept the teaching of 
Yang-Tzu, will certainly follow the doctrine of Mo-Ti." (Quoted from 
James Legge translation, Book III, Chapter 2, section 8.) In many 
other instances, Mencius has made similar statements which imply that 
the school of Mo-tze was more popular and more influential than that 
of Confucius. 
19 Mo-tze's frugality in seeking material contribution for his teachings 
may be illustrated by the following passage of the original text: 
"After Mo-tze had paid Kung Shan Kuo a visit, 
Kung Shang Kuo recommended him to the lord of 
Yeuh. The lord of Yeuh was greatly pleased, 
saying to Kung Shan Kuo 'Sir, if you can induce 
Mo-tze to come to Reuh and instruct me I shall 
offer him five hundred Li square of land lying 
in the former state of Wu.'. Kung Shan Kuo 
promised to try, and so fifty wagons were made 
ready to go to Lu and welcome Mo-tze. Kung Shan 
Kuo told him 'When I tried to persuade the 
lord of Yeuh with your principles, he was quite 
pleased and said to me that if I could induce 
you to come to Yeuh and instruct him, he would 
offer you five hundred Li square of land lying 
in the former state of WU'. Mo-tze said to 
Kung Shan Kuo: 'As you observe it, what is the 
intention of the lord of Yeub? If the lord of 
Yeub will listen to my word and. adopt my way, 
I shall come, asking only for food according to 
the capacity of my stomach and cloth according 
to the stature of my body. I shall just be one 
of the ministers. What is the use of any commission? 
On the other hand, if the lord of Yeub will not 
listen to my word and adopt my way and I shall 
, 9 
In personal appearance, he was described by his disciples as being of 
dark complexion, thin, and negligently clothed. He ate and drank frugally, 
and, in general, led a very mortified life. 20 He labored with his own 
hands to provide the necessities for his existence, thus teaching by his own 
example the nec:essity and the value of labor, which was an important point 
of his economic doctrine. 21 No hardship was too great for him to undertake 
go nevertheless, I should then be selling ~ right-
eousness." (Cont. original text, Mei translation, 
Ch. 49.) 
20 Conf. the original text, Mei translation, Chapters 47 and 48. Also 
Chuang-Tze ~~ wrote in his book, only a few years after the death of 
Mo-tze, that Mo-tze and his disciples, "wear short serge jackets and 
straw sandals, and toil day and night without stopping, making self-
mortification their end and aim." (Conf. The Book of Chuang-Tze, Chapte 
33, quoted from H. Giles' translation, London,~6, see bibliography). 
21 Again, we wish to use the testimony of Chuang-Tze, who was a contempor 
of the direct disciples of Mo-tze. Chuang-Tze has described the 
extremely labor-loving spirit of Mo-tze as follows: 
"Mih-tzu (after H. Giles' translation) argued in favor 
of his system as follows: 'Of old, the great Yu 
(one of the ancient sage kings) drained off the flood 
of waters, and caused rivers and streams to flow 
through the nine divisions of the empire and the part 
adjacent thereto, three hundred great rivers, three 
thousand branches, and streams without number; with 
his own hands he plied the bucket and dredger, in 
order to reduce confusion to uniformity, until his 
calves 'and shins had no hair left upon them. The 
wind bathed him, the rain combed him; but he marked 
out the rations of the world, and was in every truth 
a sage. And because he thus sacrificed himself to 
the commonwealth, ages of Mihists (disciples of Mo-tze) 
to come would also wear short serge jackets and straw 
sandals, and toil day and night without stopping making 
self-mortification their end and aim and say to them-
selves, 'If we can not do this, we do not follow the 
Tao (i.e. doctrine) of Yu, and are unworthy to be 
called Mihistsft. (quoted ibidem. The translator, 
H. Giles, is Professor of Chinese at Cambridge 
University, England. 
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in furtherance of his principles. On one occasion he journeyed by foot 
for ten days and ten nights to reach a certain powerful ruler, who was 
about to attack a small neighboring state. Mo-tze arrived at the palace 
of this ruler almost completely exhausted, with blood flowing from his worn 
2 feet, but sucoessfully persuaded the ruler to abandon this aggressive war. 
In addition to his scholarly knowledge, Mo-tze was also a mechanical 
engineer of the first class. He invented several types of mechanical 
equipment, suited only to the defense of cities, not for the purposes of 
attaok. 23 Thus, not only in theory, but in practice as well, he did his 
utmost to abolish aggressive warfare, which was, in his own opinion, the 
chief cause of social and moral crises of his time. 
The place and manner of his death is unknown. 
22 Conf. original text of Mo-tze Chapter 51. That Mo-tze had worn out 
his feet, and had to tear out a piece of his jacket in order to give 
first aid to his bleeding feet, is recorded in the document named 
Selected Classics ~~~. In completing the narration of this event the 
Comment~ ~ the Selected Classics is considered by scholars to be a 
trustworthy document. 
23 Conf. the original text of Mo-tze, Chapter 51 and sqq. to the end of 
the book. Mei did not translate these final chapters, and there is no 
English translation as yet. But, at any rate, Mo-tze had, in those 
twelve final chapters, explained his plans for a defensive war which 
included many mechanical devices as well as technical military strategy. 
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B) AUTHENTICITY OF HIS WORKS 
Very probably Mo-tze wrote some books, though there are none extant. 24 
The so-called Book 2! Mo-tze 25 inherited by posterity, is evidently the 
work of his disciples; it gives no indication of the master's personal 
participation in composing it. 26 In its original form, it must have 
24 The above mentioned document, the Selected Classics~~~(see above note 
23) and another document named Selected Ancient Historical Facts, 
... ~ t\ j both recorded that Mo-tze went to Yin 'i r (name of a city) 
and offered books to King Wei~. L. The king accepted the books, and 
having read them he exclaimed: "These are good books". We noted that 
both documents have recorded this fact in exactly identical words. 
This shows that they may both depend on a more ancient document or 
simply that the later one of them copied the former. At any rate, 
they are both quite trustworthy documents. One may also notice that 
the documents did not state that Mo-tze was the author of those books, 
but it can be supposed so, since usually no one in ancient China, 
particularly no philosopher, would present a king with books written 
by someone else. 
25 This book is generally known under the title Mo-tze; it was the custom 
of ancient China that the books were called after the name of their 
authors. Thus, the names 'rtfen-tze", "Chuang-tze", "Huai Nan-tze" 
and "Mo-tze" may indicate the books or their authors, or even if. the 
book is written by disciples, the master's name is nevertheless used 
for the identification of the book; for the book contains the teachings 
of the master. In order to make it more explicit in English, we have 
referred to the book as the book of Mo-tzeor the text of Mo-tze instead 
of simply saying Mo-tze as we do in Chinese. 
26 This is because at that time the custom was that disciples published 
their records on the teachings of their master only after the death 
of the master. Such was the case of Confucius and Mencius. Thus, as 
an obvious consequence, the books of those ancient masters were always 
written in the third person (i.e. referring to Mo-tze's teaching in 
an indirect style beginning vd th "1I4:o-tze said: II). 
12 
contained at least seventy-one chapters, 27 possibly even more, of which 
the text of fifty-three chapters has survived to our days. The arrangement 
of material is as follows: The chapters are generally grouped in sets of 
three, each set devoted to one point of Mo-tze's teachings, and each 
chapter presenting the sa~ary of that point. Thus each set of chapters 
contains three summaries, more or less Similar, of the same point of Mo-tze' 
doctrine. The exact reasons for this peculiar and unique arrangement are 
unknOlm. One opinion is that the contents are actually the works of three 
disciples, as each of them made an individual record of Mo-tze's teaching, 
and these records later were combined into a single boot. Another opinion 
holds that, during the later division of Mo-tze's followers into three 
different sects, each sect in transcribing a then existing account of 
Mo-tze's doctrines, made some alterations in the original work, and the 
extant text, which we possess now, is merelY the compilation of the three 
transcriptions. We favor the latter opinion, for we believe that the text 
as a whole book is obviously written by one and the same hand; its literary 
style is more than similar, it is one and the same throughout. Had it been 
written by three different hands, it seems to us that a difference rather 
27 According to the General Index ~ Literature ~ the Han ~asty ;\ i ~ 
3tt~, the text of the Book of Mo-tze contains l51bQoks diVided into 71 
chapters. We would li~o-note that the term chapter is not univer-
sally used by Western authors to indicate the divisions of the original 
text of Mo-tze. For example, H. Maspero called them "s ections" , 
while Wilhelm Richard called them "books II • However, generally_speaking, 
the Chinese term ~ is translated "chapter" and ~ is translated as 
"book" • Thus Mencius had 7 books; and so Mo-tze had 15 books with 71 
chapters. Recently, some Chinese scholars stated that the original 
text of Mo-tze must have had even more than 71 chapters. ThiS, 
according to us, is quite possible and even quite probable because of 
the persecution of She-Wang-Ti. (See below note 30). 
than an identity of style would be the logical result, as in the case of 
the four Gospels. 28 
It is quite important to mention, at this first opportunity, that the 
existing text is not equally valued as to authenticity in the case of each 
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28 This matter is brought out by only a few authors. It is unnoticed or 
rather considered as of little importance by many authoritative writers 
so that they do not even mention it. For instance Dr. Hu-Shih, Liang 
Chi-Tslao, Tslai Yuan Bei .• Among the Westerners Henri Maspero is the 
only one who has ever discussed it. T'ang Ching Kao ~~'~(conf. £E. 
cit., page 5, see above note 12) favored the first opinion on this 
matter. Watanabe, professor of Chinese Philosophy at ~~E;)~ University, 
Japan, favored the latter opinion. (Conf. his Introduction ~ ~ 
History of Chinese Philosophy, Shanghai, 1926, page 133.) We favor 
the latter opinion because if we study the differences existing between 
three analogical chapters we find that they consist chiefly in the fact 
that one chapter may contain a statement or an episode from the life 
of Mo-tze which the other failed to record and vice-versa. But whenever 
a statement or an episode is recorded by both or by all three chapters, 
we notice that the same description, same construction of sentences, 
and even the same words are often used. Henri Maspero, the noted 
French sinologist, has noticed this sjmilarity of style; however, he 
has wrongly stated that the text was therefore written by Mo-tze 
himself. Against this opinion we have critical reasons unanimously 
supported by all Chinese scholars and almost all Western authors alike. 
Nevertheless, Maspero's opinion merits a quotation thereby: 
"lIs (les 53 sections) sont ai nettement du meme 
style, de la meme main, et ce style est si particulier, 
qulil est impossible de ne pas admettre qulils represent 
les ecrit du Mo-tseu lui-meme •••• Il faut evidement 
y voir les reductions dissemblables appartenant aux 
trois ecoles entre les quelles les disciples du 
Mo-tseu se.. partagerent au III ieme siecle.1t 
-(quoted from La Chine Antique, by Henri Maspero, Paris, 1927, page 475.) 
Against Maspero's belief that Mo-tze wrote these chapters himself, we 
have the unanimous opinion of all Chinese writers. In fact, we can not 
find a Single Chinese author who has doubted that the extant text of 
Mo-tze was written by his disciples. Maspero is really the only one 
who made such a daring statement. Chinese authorities on this matter 
further point out that some of the chapters were not even written by 
the innnediate disciples of .our philosopher, dating these chapters at 
about two centuries later. (Conf. Hu-Shih, ~. ~., page 151 and sqq.) 
We shall discuss this point in the immediately follOwing text and will 
bring out the classification of Dr. Hu.) 
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of the extant 53 chapters. By authenticity, we do not mean that the text 
is necessarily written by Mo-tze himself; we only intend to assert that 
it is reliable as representing faithfully the authentic teachings of Mo-tze. 
Modern authorities, after careful studies, have found good reasons to 
suspect the objective value of certain chapters. As usual in matters of 
this kind, unanimous agreement as to the exact number and nature of the 
chapters believed spurious cannot be obtained. However, most authorities 
would consent easily to the following general classification, made by 
Dr. Hu-Shih. 
Class A text, believed authentic; that is, written by direct disciples of 
Mo-tze. 
Chapters 8 to 39, and 47 to 61. A total of forty chapters. 
Class B text, believed less authentic; that is, probably written by the 
disciples of disciples of Mo-tze. 
Chapters 40 to 45. A total of six chapters. 
Class C text, believed spurious; that is, probably written by later 
followers of Mo-tze, either at the very end of the Chou 
dynasty or at the beginning of the Han dynasty. 
Chapters 1 to 7. A total of seven chapters. 29 
Since authenticity of source is recognized as a necessary condition 
to the acceptance of any material as genuine, this general classification 
is quite important as a determinant of the genuine doctrine of Mo-tze. 
29 Conf. Hu-Shih (~. cit., page 151 and sqq.) We remark here that in 
addition to the fifty-three chapters of text, we also have the titles, 
but not the contents, of the following chapters: 22, 23, 24, 29, 30, 
33, 34 and 38. Thus our readers will not be surprised to find that 
~he/~ofa1 nymber of chapters from chapter 8 to 39 and from chapter 47 
"LO 0.1 15 only .forty chapters. 
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Other factors, too, must be considered in this particular matter, as even 
the most authentic chapters must have suffered some alterations in expression, 
if not in substance because of the many transcriptions necess~ for preser-
vation during that long period of more than twenty centuries. 
Of prime importance is the lethal menace to strict authenticity occasioned 
by the notorious persecution of scholars and ruthless destruction of books 
during the dictatorship of She Wang Ti, first Emperor of the Ch'in dynasty. 30 
Like Adolph Hit1er,this extremely fascist-minded Chinese Emperor ordered all 
books other than those which dealt with merely empirical sciences, such as 
mathematics, medicine and agriculture, to be burned. 31 Thus, the "Book 
of Mo-tze", (possibly the last ten chapters, dealing with war strategy and 
war equipment were spared) no doubt shared the same fate as the books of the 
other ancient philosophers including those of Confucius. Consequently, 
serious alterations could hardly have been avoided, considering the obstacles 
encountered by those engaged in the work of restoration during the early 
30 She Wang-Ti~t~(221 B.C. to 210 B.C.) (duration of his dictatorShip). 
Some historians believed that it was from the name of this dynasty, "Ch'in", 
that the European name "China" or "Chine" has been given to the Middle 
Kingdom, as we Chinese call our nation "tllU". If this is true, it 
implies necessarily that Europe had known the existence of China as early 
as before 200 B.C. For the Chlin dynasty lasted merely a few years 
after the death of She Wang-Tie As a matter of fact, it was the shortest 
dynasty in Chinese history. She Wang-Tils son, who succeeded him as the 
Great Emperor of Chtin, was killed by a revolutionary ~ formed by the 
people. 
31 On the tenth of May, 1933, many books, including the Holy Bible, were 
condemned by the Nazi leader and publicly and officiallY put to flames. 
This was She Wang-Tits futile attempt to destroy all political theories 
and ideas contrary to his absolute dictatorship. For most of the Chinese 
ancient books, such as the book of Mencius and that of Mo-tze, do contain 
democratic ideas. We will show this later in our dissertation. 
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period of the Han. dynasty. No matter how well-intentioned the efforts at 
restoration, accuracy would surely suffer, considering the means available at 
that time for restoring the books. 32 
However, the restored text of Mo-tze obviously still contained -- as we 
noticed above -- seventy-one chapters. Further, by reason of its anti-Confucian 
attitude, the book of Mo-tze was almost constantly listed in the official 
Index Librorum Prohibitorum of various dynasties. This probably caused the 
-loss of nineteen chapters, and may also have caused alterations in the text of 
the remaining chapters. 
Nevertheless, despite these many misfortunes, it is generally believed, 
and not without critical reasons furnished by most scrupulous research, that 
the extant text still contains faithfulll what is essential in Mo-tze's 
original doctrines. 
32 During the persecution of She Wang-Ti, all of the most famous books of 
ancient China, including the five canonical books, were destroyed. All 
people were forced to turn over their books or fragments of books to the 
government. The whole army was sent out in quest of books. A house to 
house search was ordered. Whoever dared to conceal a condemned book was 
subjected to the death penalty. The scholars were mass-murdered; most of 
them, according to trustworthy tradition, were buried alive. The restora-
tion of ancient books was accomplished, during the Han dynasty through the 
mutilated codes and fragments, (probably conSisting of pieces of bamboo 
or terra cotta, for these were the most common materials for books of that 
time; only wealthy people could afford a silk roll or mouton skin for 
writing papers) which were found in double walls or other kinds of secret 
places. Nevertheless, most of the works were restored chiefly by the 
tenacious memory of some very aged scholars who survived the persecution. 
Thus, for example, the "Book of Confucius" was dictated by a ninety-year 
old scholar named Ho Seng~ 'i., who was at that time almost completely 
blind, and also hard to understand because of his total lack of teeth. 
However, according to the tradition, his own daughter and a group of young 
scholars did succeed in obtaining a complete dictation from him, and thus 
with the help of recovered fragments, they restored the "Book of Confucius".' 
Similar difficulties can be expected in restoring the work of Mo-tze. 
But we have no positive tradition to construct a story for it. 
17 
In 1784 A.D., a public edition 33 was officially published with the 
explicit approval of imperial authority. This edition was carefully annotated 
under the direction of Dr. Pi-Yuan, a distinguished scholar and a member of 
the Imperia1 Academy, and it was immediately recognized among the intellectual 
milieu as the outstanding edition. Hence, it is naturally the basic reference 
source of our discussion. 
In 1894, Seng I-rang, an authority in ancient literature, wrote a very 
thorough and critical commentary of the ~ of Mo-tze, based on the text as 
contained in the above mentioned edition of Pi-Yuan. 34 To the present day, 
this commentary is considered the best ever written on the text of Mo-tze, and 
possesses incomparable authority in determining the original meaning of obscure 
passages in the text. 
Recently, in 1929, an English translation of the text of Mo-tze was made 
by Dr. Mei Yei-pao. 35 Since it is the only existing English translation, we 
33 Because of the imperial prohibition, the work of Mo-tze was not allowed 
to reach the public; however, private transcriptions or even printings were 
always-permitted to the scholars. For, the prohibition of imperial 
authority (after She Wang-Ti) never intended to exterminate any prohibited 
books, but merely prohibited their publie selling so that they would not 
be easily reached by the public as such. But, the scholars could always 
keep the copies they had and were permitted even to give them to their 
friends to be transcribed. In fact, in the imperial palace itself there 
was a library containing copies of those prohibited books just in order 
to preseM'e them. The reason for which the Book of Mo-tze W85 finally 
released from the Index was not given by 1mperial-authority. 
34 ~'f b- r~ ~t.. This connnentary is available only in Chinese. Therefore 
in many instances we could not use its great authority in proving points 
during our discussion. However, we are glad to learn that Mei Yei Pac, 
the English translator of Mo-tze's text, has explicitly acknowledged that 
in many instances he has consulted Seng's commentary. 
35 The Ethical and Political Works of Mo-tze by Mei Yei-pao; (A. Probatain, 
London & New York). Accomplishea-under the auspices of the school of 
philosophy of the University of Chicago. It is not a complete translation 
of the entire works of Mo-tze. Therefore, the translator has cautiously 
adopted a very well chosen title. For he did not translate the five chaptaB 
~l'n with logical principles and formulae, and also the last eleven 
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gladly used it for the quotations needed in our discussions. However, in a 
few instances (indeed, very few) we deemed it nece~sary to change some words 
of the given translation in order to bring out more clearly the exact intended 
meaning of the original text. We' shall give sufficient reasons for every 
change in such instances. Our technique in this matter will be: 1) consider 
the context of the same translation; 2) refer to the translation of the same 
passage of the original text that is translated and published by some Western 
authors either in English or in other European languages. Most Western 
authors, writing about Mo-tze, have translated a few more or less important 
passages from the original text whenever they wished to quote Mo-tze directly. 
Thus, we eliminated the necessity of referring directly to the original 
Chinese text. 
We also know of the existence of three different translations of the major 
part of Mo-tze' s work in French, Italian and German; however , unfortunately, 
they are not available in this country at the present time. 36 
36 We found these works through the bibliography of books we consulted in our 
dissertation. METI, des Sozialethikers und seiner Schuler Philosophiche 
Werke, by Alfred Forke, Berlin, 1922. Un Sicialista Cinese del yo Secolo 
(av. C) Mih-Teih, by Salvatore Cognettide Martiis, Roma, 181m:" \partial 
translation.) Mitsif L'Amour Universel. (French translation of the three 
chapters on Univers LOvw) by c. De Har1ez, to be found in Giornale della 
Societa Asiatica Italiana, Vol. II, pages 81 to 126. (We regret that we 
do not know the place and the date of the publication of the Giornale.) 
C) THE BACKGROUND OF HIS TEACHINGS 
As no doctrinal system is believed to be born over night, it is most 
useful to lmow the background which at least contributed to the birth of 
that doctrine. This is particularly true in discussing the teachings of 
Mo-tze, since his teachings were developed precisely in order to furnish 
remedies for the disorderly situations found in the social and economical 
fields of his time. 
The Chou Dynasty (from 1122 B.C. to 255 B.C.) was the longest and 
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probably the most splendid in China's forty-five centuries of history. But, 
at the time of its decline, the Emperor was only nominally the supreme ruler 
of the Country. In the so-called period of Spring and Autunm 37 there were 
many feudal states virtually independent. Here, we wish to quote the 
description of that time written by L. Adams Beck: 
China at that time was a collection of small 
kingdoms under one more or less nominal head, the 
sovereign. The vassal states under him were held on 
feudal tenure, as they had doubtless been from the 
earliest time which can be traced. Wu Wang, the great 
ruler, had thus divided the empire, like Napoleon 
plaCing his own relations on the minor thrones,--
a system well enough at the time, but as family ties 
weaken, unlikely to last. 
37 The Period of Spring and Autunm (from 722 B.C. to 481 B.C.), was a later 
period of the Chou dynasty. It is so-called because the Annals which 
recorded the history of that period were named the Books of Spring and 
Autunm. "~-Kfl. They were written, or rather composed, by ConfuciUS-
(for this, we have the explicit testimony of Mencius) and named by 
himself. Probably by this name Confucius meant The Books of Years, or 
The ~ of Ages, or, as some authors believed, The Book or Changing 
Facts; that is, The Books £! History. 
It ended, as such a system must, in disunion among 
the several states and disloyalty to the sovereign, who 
practically ruled only insofar as his own character and 
power enabled him to do; that was often to a very 
limited extent, and the state of China at the birth of 
Confucius was one of rapine and turbulence. Not only 
were the states orten at war among themselves, but power-
ful families in some of them disputed the rule with the 8 
princes, just as in the Wars of the Barons in England. 3 
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This passage describes the turning point between the "Period of Spring 
and Autumn" and the "Period of the Warring states." 39 Mo-tze lived at the 
beginning of the latter period. Hence he felt that he could not discuss 
problems of speculative philosophy in a peaceful, closed garden like the 
Academy of Plato. He was convinced that he must teach a practical doctrine 
to all the people, especially to the rulers of the people, in order to save 
the world in its great crisis. And he was so conscious of the need that he 
did not hesitate to criticise severely the doctrine dominant in his time, 
& 
i.e. Confucianism, because it was, in his judgment, unable to save the world. 40 
Probably, as we have already noted, Mo-tze had studied under a disciple 
of Confucius. He knew very well the literature and history of his time; 
38 Quoted from The History ~ Oriental Philosophy (page 226, see above note 2). 
The description referred originally to the time of Confucius. But it is 
just as good as for the time of Mo-tze. The"Wu Wang" mentioned in the 
quotation is the first Emperor of the Chou dynasty. He is also counted 
among the ancient sage kings. 
39 The "Period of Warring stat8IJ" (from 481 B.C. to 221 B.C.) was the last 
period of the Chou dynasty. The name of the period is realistic; i.e. 
corresponds to the facts. 
40 Mo-tze's criticism of Confucianism is undoubtedly the most violent of all 
ages. He pointed out four well-determined points by which, as he said: 
"Confucianism is going to ruin the whole world." (Conf. original text of 
Mo-tze, chapter 39, which is entitled "Anti-Confucianism·', and also 
chapter 49, Mei Translation.) 
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this is evident from the many quotations from the ancient books, and the 
citations of historical facts which are abundantly found in his eloquent 
teachings. What made him great, however, was his very correct understanding 
of the empirical value of a doctrine; he believed that a true doctrine cannot 
be impracticable. We shall discuss this point at length later on; here, 
however, we should like to point out that this practical tendency, which causes 
his doctrine to be looked upon as an utilitarian system, is not the essential 
characteristic of his doctrine, although many scholars, including some of the 
Christian authors, have considered Mo-tze as a utilitarian or socialist, 
and even as a communist. 41 
There is also a question, agitated by quite a few Chinese scholars, as to 
4I For instance, Wilbur H. Long, a Protestant writer, stated: fllf Mo-tze 
based his philosophy on the metaphysical doctrine of moral and humanitarian 
Providence, he nevertheless kept one eye on practical social welfare. In 
technical terms he was a eudaeministic utilitarian holding that the 
wellbabg of humanity is the end of moral, social and political life. A 
pragmatic practicalism is also characteristic of his thought." (Conf. 
his booklet Mo-tze, China's Ancient Philosopher of Universal Love, Peiping, 
1934, pages 33 and 34. Also Joseph A. Edkins, another Protestant writer, 
stated that Mo-tze based his doctrine of universal love flupon political 
utility while Our Saviour rests the obligation to love on religious and 
moral grounds •••• The Christian is to love in obedience to the will and in 
imitation of the example of God •••• Our Chinese Philosopher knew nothing of 
such an origin for his favorite principle." (Conf. his "Notice of the 
character and writings of Meh-tse ff , article in Journal of the North China 
Branch £!: the Royal Asiatic Society, London, May 11, l8>9.jWe shall cite 
more authors and discuss the matter later in our dissertation. Very 
recently, A. P. Sorokin, in his Crisis of Our Age, called Mo-tze a 
utilitarian. (see third edition, page ~2:r- As to the title "communist", 
Conf. Wilhelm Richard's A Short History of Chinese Civilization, page 151 
(see bibliogr!phy). Also quite a few Chinese authors, for example, 
Shang Nai-Hsi l~ 1 ... , have considered Mo-tze a communist. (Con!. his A 
Brief History of Chinese Thought, Shanghai, 1930.) -
- -------...:::...-
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the source of Mo-tze's doctrine. But, this is, in our opinion, a question of 
rather little importance, since Mo-tze knew all the doctrines and almost all 
the sciences and opinions of his time. Having such an ample knowledge, Mo-tze 
formed, by examining the root of the social and moral crises of his "time, a 
system of ethical principles which he thought to be absolutely true and there-
fore practically capable to restore order and prosperity to the confusing 
world if sincerely accepted by the people. 42 
* * * 
42 Fang Hseu-TseU1r~Jl~has written a book entitled The Source of Mo-tze's 
Doctrine .... (Shanghai, 1935). Many other authors have disCUssed this 
matter in their works or articles. Some of them even believed that Mo-tze 
must have had some knowledge of ancient Indian philosophy, and from it 
adopted his altruism. However, serious authorities such as Liang Chi-tstao, 
Hu-Shih (their authority is respected by Western writers, for instance 
by H. Williamson, who, in his Mo-Ti, a Chinese Heretic, TSi-Nan, China, 
1927, testified: "Professors Liang Chi Tstao, Hu-Shih and Chang Ping-
ling are amongst the better known moderns who are giving considerable 
thought to Mo-tze's Philosophy." cont. page 11.) all denied that Mo-tze 
or any Chinese at that time could have known anything about Indian philo-
sophy. (Conf. 2e. ~., above note 2.) As to Mo-tze's ample knowledge 
of all the sciences at his time, that is an obvious fact for whoever reads 
his works, since our philosopher has cited frequently almost all the ancient 
books, poetic verses as well as historical events. Moreover, his ample 
knowledge in architecture and mechanics is sufficiently demonstrated in 
the last ten chapters of his book. 
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D) THE CHARACTERISTICS OF HIS DOCTRINE 
Certainly the most characteristic point of Mo-tze's teachings is the 
doctrine of "Universal Love". This is, as we have already noted, the distinct 
characteristic of the school of Mo-tze. But, it is not less certain that the 
ultimate foundation of his entire doctrinal system, as proposed in the original 
text, was the doctrine of the "Will of Heaven" 43 which we shall discuss at 
length in the second chapter of this dissertation. 
Another characteristic of his teachings, as many authors have already 
pointed out, is the logical connections between his eloquent arguments which 
unite all his teachings into a single and well-organized body of ideas so 
intimately chained to each other that if one should be convinced of one point 
of his teachings, one would be forced by a series of logical inferences into 
acceptance of the entire system of Mo-tze's philosophy_ 44 
A strong and almost exaggerated tendency to emphasize the practical value 
of moral principles is also an obvious peculiarity of his teachings. He was 
43 There are three chapters of the original text of Mo-tze entitled "On the 
Will of Heaven" (chapters 26, 27, and 28.) According to the text, literally 
interpreted, it is clear that the WWi1l of Heavenft is for Mo-tze the 
ultimate basis of morality. Nevertheless we must. engage ourselves in a 
long and laborious discussion on this matter because quite a considerable 
number of authors. have believed that this is only a verbal formulation of 
Mo-tze's doctrine, whereas the real ultimate basis of his moral principles 
was "utility" or "social welfare fl • Hence, according to them, Mo-tze was 
really a utilitarian or a socialist. 
44 G. Vacca 'Wrote: "L'opera di Mo-Ti sussistono 53 capitoli raccolti dai 
discipoli, e la prima opera cinese in cui appaia un solido eoncatenamento 
logico delle idee. Ogni punto e esposto con chiarezza, ne sono definiti 
in termini e sono confutati Ie obbiezioni." Conf. Filosofia e Relif!0ne 
de11a Cina., in the Enciclopedia Italiana, Rome 1933, under tne tit e of 
CINA, Vol. X, page 300. H. Maspero has even 'Written a special essay on 
the logical ideas of Mo-tze entitled: Notes sur Ie logique de Mo-Tseu, 
article in the T'oung-Pao, PariS, 1927. 
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so anxious on this point that he solemnly declared: "How can there by any-
thing that is good but not useful?" 45 Hence, he is criticised by many modern 
scholars, both Chinese and Western, as a utilitarian. However, further 
studies will reveal that Mo-tze's basic idea was not the utilitarian principle; 
therefore, he is not to be considered as a utilitarian or pragmatist. 
Some modern authors, on the other hand, have accused Mo-tze of being a 
superstitious preacher because of the importance he has given to the -Will 
of Heaven" and also to the realistic power and influence of spirits and ghosts, 
which to our modern mind, are merely matters of a superstitious belief 
popular among primitive peoples. 47 We shall discuss the subject later. Here, 
we only wish to point out that Mo-tze was rather unique among all ancient 
Chinese philosophers in emphasizing the worship of spirits and ghosts. 
However, it seems that there is no mysticism in Mo-tze's teachin~. 
Despite the fact that spirits and ghosts received attention, he kept a very 
unusual silence on the future life of human souls. 48 We may say that Mo-tze 
45 Conf. original text, Chapter 16, Mai translation. The real meaning of 
these words of Mo-tze will be explained in the second chapter of our 
dissertation. 
46 Mo-tze dedicated one point of his teachings to the promotion of worship 
of spirits and ghosts. There are three chapters on this subject (chapters 
29, 30, and 31J However, only one of these three has survived to our day, 
chapter 31. 
47 Some authors have believed that Mo-tze was really a superstitious person and 
believed sincerely in those almost incredible stories about spirits and 
ghosts which are recorded in his teachings. But others tried to prove that 
Mo-tze did not believe in spirits and ghosts, but only used them in his 
teachings inasmuch as they are really useful in order to prevent people from 
doing evil things. We shall give our opinion on this point in the follow-
ing chapter. 
48 No ancient Chinese philosopher has explicitly spoken about the future life 
of human souls. But here we consider Mo-tze's silence unusual because he 
explicitly asserted the survival of the human soul and yet offered no 
details as to the conditions of future life after death. Moral sanctions, 
for Mo-tze" are limited entirely to this life. The only sanction 
after deatn is historical i.e. a ood . :In nl.sto • 
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e~en ignored ~sticism or spiritualism in the strict sense of the word. The. 
relation between God and men is according to him merelY a very natural one, 
intelligible to natural reason and thus reached by the same without super-
natural assistance from outside. His favorite comparison was that the relation-
ship between Creator and his creatures is similar to that between the Father 
and his own son. 49 Any further relation such as revelation, contemplation, 
ecstasy or some kinds of physical commixture of natures is absolutely alien 
to him. This kept him strictly in the rank of philosophers without his enter-
ing the field of ~ticism. 
Mo-tze was a moralist, although his knowledge actually extended to every 
field of science, his philosophy is almost exclusively moral phi10sop~. 50 
He had very little to do with metaphysics, strictly so-called. Socrates, as 
we are told by Xenophon and Aristotle, was interested only in human affairs, 
and other problems would interest him only inasmuch as they might be subservient 
to his interest in man. So with Mo-tze. Philosophy is for man, and not 
vice-versa. This is likely the attitude of Mo-tze towards all sciences. 
Mo-tzets entire teachings were summed up by himself in ten points, which 
constituted the main body of the original text of Mo-tze. The names of these 
ten points were given by Mo-tze himself, and were used by his disciples as 
the titles of chapters. As we have pointed out above, 51 the chapters are 
49 Conf. original text, Chapter 27 and 28, Mei translation. 
50 The chapters dealing with logical formulae, as we noted above (see page 
14, Class B text), are probablY of later date. These being counted out, 
we Will immediately realize that the philosophy of Mo-tze is entirely 
Within the realm of ethical doctrine. The last ten chapters of the 
original text are obviously not philosophical. 
51 See above, page 12. 
grouped in sects of three, and each set devoted to one point of Mo-tzefs 
teachings, with each chapter presenting the summary of that point, so our 
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readers will find that in the main boqy of the original text of Mo-tze a common 
name is given to every three chapters which explain that particular point of 
Mo-tze's teaching. We list these ten points of Mo-tze's doctrine with their 
corresponding chapters numerically marked according to the English translation 
Dr M • 52 of • ell 
Point I: 
Point II: 
"Exaltation of the Virtuous" explained in Chapters 8, 9, and 
10. 
"Identification with the Superior" explained in chapters 11, 
12, and 13. 
Point III: "Universal Love" explained in chapters 14, 15, and 16. 
Point IV: "Condemnation of Offensive War" explained in chapters 17, 
18, and 19. 
Point V: "Economy in Expenditures" explained in chapters 20, 21, and 
22. 53 
Point VI: "Simplicity in Funerals" explained in chapters 23, 24, and 
25. 54 
Point VII: "Will of Heaven" exPlained in chapters 26, 27, and 28. 
Point VIII: "Worship of Spirits and Ghosts" explained in chapters 29, 30, 
~d 31. 55 
52 See above page 17. In the original Chinese text, the chapters were not 
called by numbers. 
5) The text of Chapter 22 is lost to us. (See above page 14, note 29) 
54 Chapters 23 and 24 were lost. 
55 Chapters 29 and 30 were lost. 
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Point IX: "Condemnation of Music" explained in chapters 32, 33, and 
34. 56 
Point X: "Anti-fatalism" explained in chapters 35, 36, and 37. 
These ten points are to be explained by Mo-tze and consequently by his 
disciples to the common people and especially to the rulers of the states 
according to the actual situation of that given state where the teaching of 
Mo-tze's philosophy is to be done. In sending his disciples to teach all 
nations, Mo-tze told them: 
Upon entering a country, one should locate the need and 
work on that. If the country is upset in confusion 
teach them "Exaltation of the Virtuous" and "Identifica-
tion with the Superior". If the country is in poverty, 
teach them "Economy of . ExpendituresJl and "Simplicity 
in Funerals". If the country is iildulging in music and 
wine, teach. them "Condemnation of Music" and "Anti-
fatalism" • If the country is insolent and without 
propriety, teach them "Reverence of Heaven" and '"Worship 
of the Spirits". If the country is engaged in conquest 
and oppression, teach them "Universal Love" and "Condemna-
tion of Offensive War". Hence Mo-t~e said 'One should 
locate the need and work on that t. 7 
We must notice that these ten points were divided by Mo-tze (in his 
speech quoted above) into five parts or categories. The first part was planned 
to promote a good political order; the second, to promote a good economic 
order; the third, to promote a good moral order; the fourth, to serve as the 
basis of morality; and the fifth, to promote a peaceful inter-state relation-
ship, which might indeed be easily applied to our present international 
relations. 
56 Chapters 33 and 34 were lost. 
57 Conf. original text, chapter 49, Mei translation. 
nized by all authorities as one of most authentic. 
This chapter is recog-
(see above, page 14). 
Finally, also worthy of special note is a very strange and seemingly 
preter-natural 58 tendency in his teaching of "Universal Love". He was for 
this reason severely criticized by almost all wise men of ancient China. 
Most violent of all undoubtedly was Mencius, the Plato of Confucius. 59 
Mencius has openly condemned the doctrine of Universal Love of Mo-tze as a 
heretical teaching which is even against the nature of man. 60 Really, we 
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should admit that man has very little natural motive to love all his fellowmen 
as universally as Mo-tze wanted, that is, to love them without any discri-
mination. 61 Hence, as we shall see later, Mo-tze did not base this doctrine 
upon any uatural tendencies or any human authority, but positively and direct~ 
upon the "Will of Heaven", the Will of the Creator and common Father of all 
human beings. However, this still did not make his doctrine super-natural, 
since the "Will of Heaven", according to Mo-tze, is not given to us by 
revelation; he asserted that our natural reason is able to reach the following 
conclusion: "It is the Will of Heaven that we must love all our fellow men 
-62 
universally. " 
58 This term is used by modern theologians to indicate what is ~1ther strictI 
natural nor exactly super-natural. For example: the black magic operated 
by the power of evil spirits. Here, we adopted this term because Mo-tze 
evidently did not base his teachings on revelation and, on the other hand, 
we realize that the idea is somewhat a little above the natural tendency 
of human beings. This is why Mencius considered it against human nature. 
59 Considering Confucius as the Socrates of the Orient, many Western authors 
called Mencius the Plato of Confucius, because of his great effort in 
expanding and explaining the Confucian doctrine. 
60 Conf. Mencius, Book III,part 2, and Book VII, part 1, James Legge trans-
lation. (See bibliography) 
61 Conf. original text of Mo-tze, chapters 14, 15, 16, 26, 27, 28. 
62 Conf. original text of Mo-tze, chapters 26, 27, 28. We shall discuss this 
point at length in the following chapters of this dissertation. 
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Summarizing all that we have said in this section, we may regard the 
following points as the characteristics of Mo-tze's doctrine: 
1) Logical coherence of all parts. 
2) Strong practical tendency in moral principles. 
3) Frugal and altruistic tendencies in practice. 
4) Theistic basis as ultimate foundation. 
* * * 
Thus, closing oUI' first chapter, we believe that we have furnished quite 
sufficiently some indispensable preliminary notes which will serve our readers 
e.s a prospectus of the doctrine of our philosopher, Mo-tze, before entering 
into the philosophical discussion properly so-called. 
CHAPTER II 
mE BASIS OF HIS MORAL OOCTRINES 
A) THE PROBLEM 01'; IDRALITY IN ANCIENT CHINA PRIOR TO ID-TZE 
The most basic problem in moral philosophy is certainly the problem of 
morality. One who denies the real existence of a spiritual quality 'Which is 
called "moralit~ consequently denies the real existence of moral philosophy. 
- , 
For morality, according to the scholastics, is a special quality which is 
attributed to human acts, and by which the human act is called a moral act. 1 
Thus, the world of human thinking can be divided into two opposite groups: 
the moralists and the amoralists. The division would apply to Orientals 
as well as to Occidentals, to the ancients as well as to the moderns. 
Among the early Chinese thinkers there were no &moralists strictlY 
speaking, except perhaps Lao-tze, whose influence was of relatively little 
1 We may cite the definition of "morality" taken from one of the most 
commonly used scholastic text books: uMoralitas definiri potest: 
habitudo actuum humanorum ad re;eiam honestatis, vel: ilia proprietas, 
Vi eiiius aetus humanui honesti ve t~es dicuntur. n (quoted from 
~ a Philosophiae Seholastlcie'; by. S. Hickey, ,0. Cist. Dublini, 
1941, VoL III Editio septima, page 291.) Hickey also quotes Wayland's 
statemen t in Moral Science (page 24) "Moral philosophy proceeds upon 
the supposition that there exists in the action of men a moral quality; 
that is, that a human action may be either right or wrong." (see 
ibidem, page 293, note i.) 
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imPortance. 2 Generally speaking, the existence of a "morali ty" as a 
specificallY distinctive characteristic of human acts is universally admitte 
However, the problem of morality which deals with the flquidditas lf of the no 
of moraJity, i.e., the norm of good and evil in morals, was rather neglected 
2 We said: "perhaps except Lao-tze", because, as we shall see later, even 
literally,a.ccording to the Tao fe Ching (the work doubtfully attributed 
to Lao-tze)rt1;t~i, Lao-tze was not to be considered as simply an amoralis 
although many modem authors have considered him to be eo. Dr. Hu-Shih 
-AA J.. , former ambassador to the U. S. A., and a distinguished modem 
scholar, asserted that Lao-tze I s teaching is "absolutely destructive" 
in morals and anarchical in politics. (Conf • _ his: An Outline in Chinese 
Philosophical Histo!i' page 52.) Dr. Ts' ai Yuan-bai}:";t.Ji, former minister 
of !aucation of the epublic of China, has considered Lao-tze's doctrine 
an "equalization of good and evil", so that there would be no. distinction 
between them. (Conf. his: History of Chinese Moral Philosophy, page 33. 
(See bibliography for further iiiformation.) Our reason for not consider-
ing Lao-tze as an amoral ist strictly spealdng will be explained later on 
when we shall discuss Lao-tze' s teachings. As to the negligible influence 
of Lao-tze's teaching, it is a matter of fact admitted by almost all 
authors. lliis is because of the tmanimous silence about Lao-tze's 
teaching among all ancient Chinese books. Confucius, who is reported as 
once having been a disciple of Lao-tze, never mentioned a word of the 
teachings of Lao-tze. Mencius, who was an eager attacker of all heterodo 
doctrines (i.e., doctrines that are different from the teachings of 
Confucius) has failed completely to mention Lao-tze. And, Mo-tze, who 
criticized Confucianists as unbelievers, inasmuch as they practically do 
not believe that God is an intelligent being, would have had a furious 
argument against the naturalistic teachings of Lao-tze, if the teachings 
of the latter were known at Mo-tze's time. The complete silence of 
these three wise men positively proves that the influence of Lao-tze's 
naturalism was virtually non-existent among the people of ancient China. 
According to Mencius, there were only three different doctrines which 
had infiuence in the world of his time; he said: "Those who are not 
satisfied with the doctrine of Mo-tze and are ready to renounce it will 
certainly follow the doctrine of Yang-tze. And those who are not satisf 
with the doctrine of Yang-tze and are ready to desert it will certainly 
follow the doctrine of Confucius." (coni. Mencius, Book VII, part 2, 
J. Legge translation.) However, even though he had no influence on 
the common people, Lao-tze might have influenced Mo-tze, who mew almost 
all doctrines of his time. This is why we still wish to pre_ent Lao-tze's 
teachings. 
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(although not intentionally) by the ancient Chinese until the time of Mo-tze, 
~o was probably the first man to discuss the problem of morality in the Far 
Nevertheless, as we look into the history of philosophy, we shall realize 
aore and more fully that no great school of thought has ever been entirely 
independent of or isolated from preceding or contemporary systems. Hence 
it is helpful to extract the views of some of the leading thinkers of that 
time before we present the theory of our philosopher, Mo-tze. 
Thus, we pres ent : 
1) The Ancient Sage Kings 
2) Lao-tze 
3) Confucius 
4) Yang-tze 
1) THE ANCIENT SAGE KINGS 
This term, i.e. the ancient sage kings, which was already in use before 
the time of Confucius, was made very popular and autb::D:il'a.i ve by Confucius, 
Mo-tze, and Mencius, because they all anxiously asserted the conformity of 
their doctrines with the teachings of those venerable sage kings as a strong 
proof of the orthodoxy and nobility of their teachings. The term "ancient 
sage kings" indicates a series of famous rulers of ancient China, who were 
considered the ideal (i.e. exemplary) rulers and teachers of the people. This 
list includes: King Yao, King Seng, King Yu, King T' ang, King Wen, King Wu., 
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and the Great Duke of Chou or Chou Kung. 3 
According to the Canonical Books 4 of Ancient China, these ancient sage 
kings all believed in the existence of a personal God, Whom they called 
"Shang Ti", 5 which meant "The Emperor of Above". And since they also believed 
j Conf. above, page 6 and note 14 of first chapter. The first three-Yao, 
Seng, and Yu-were immediate successors on the throne of China; but they were 
not related to each other. They were chosen for the throne by their 
respective predecessors. King Yu founded the Dynasty of Hsia,)l, the first 
dynasty of China, which was ended by the revolution of Duke T'ang, who 
became the Emperor and founder of the dynasty Yen, 'k"-, which was ended, 
in its turn, by the revolution of WU-Wang and the great Duke of Chou, co-
founders of the great Chou Dynasty (1122 B.C. to 255 B.C.) ftll~ • 
4 Those so-called Canonical Books were alw~s considered by the Chinese of all 
time, even until very recently, as sacred and somewhat infallible. There 
were five of them, so they are called in Chinese It Yl. ,tJ. ". The surname 
"Canonical Books" is given to them by Western authors. They were collected, 
compiled and edited by Confucius, based upon ancient official historical 
records of the Imperial Court and other popular documents, both in poetry 
and prose. Confucius claimed he was not the author of these books but only 
the editor of them. He called himself "a transmitter and not a maker, 
believing and loving the ancient." (Quoted from J. Legge translation of the 
Analects of Confucius, Book VI, chapter 3.) 
5 In Chinese"..J:. .,.". Western authors are all agreed that by this term the 
ancient Chinese meant a personal God, although the attributes of such a 
God are not well defined as in Christian Philosophy. For instance, Rev. 
Father Paul Geny, S.J., professor of philosophy at the Pont. Gregorian 
University, Rome, stated: "Veteres Sinae in summitate re~~ ponebant 
Dea~ unicum, omniperfectum,personalem, a MUndo distinctum, quem Shang-Ti 
vocabant. Postea sermo fuit etiam de Tien (quod nomen coelum significat) 
qui initio videtur fuisse numen in coelo residens, probabilius ipse Shani-Ti 
novo nomine designatus." (Conf. Brevis Conspectus- Historiae Philosophiae, 
Romae, 1932.) Protestant writers also agree on this point. For instance, 
S. Holth, speaking particularly on the belief of the people at the time of 
Mo-tze, said: "One brief word must be added about the religious belief 
of that time. The original notion of a Supreme Being, sovereign on High, 
Shang-Ti or the Heaven, Tien, has apparently not degenerated, but the 
tendency towards animism.was increasingly manifested among the religionists 
of the period. It seems to have been a common assumption that only the 
Sovereign on High possesses power to govern the world, to reward the right 
and to punish the wicked. In him was no change. He will exalt and bless 
the good, but the guilty will not escape his judgment. Nothing can happen 
contrary to his will. (Conf. Micius, A Brief Outline of his Life and Ideas, 
Shanghai, 1935.) References on this particular pOint,-rhat is-tne:1aea----
of God among ancient Chinese, are quite abundant. Here we only name a few 
more specific works: 
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that His residence is in the heavens, they referred to Him as 1IHeaven". 
Eventually, because of the great respect due to the holy name of "Shang Ti", 
the term -Heaven" became much more frequently used to indicate God. They 
believed that this personal God ruled over all humanity and 'WOuld inevitably 
reward the righteous and punish evildoers. ConsequentlY they taught the 
people to worship Heaven and do good. This has been repeatedly established by 
Confucius, Mo-tze and Mencius, either by directly quoting the original text 
of the ancient documents or by representing it as a commonly known fact 
vividly depicted by their personal eloquence. To cite an example, Confucius 
has quoted the King T'ang as saying while he offers a propitiatory sacrifice 
a) Sur le pretendu monotheisme ~ anciens chino is , by Maurice Auguste 
Louis Marie Courant. An article appeared in Annales du !fusee, 
Paris (E. Leroux) 1900. -
b) The Development of Chinese Conception of Supreme Being, by B. 
Schindler. .An article in Asia Major, Hirth Anniversary Volume, 
London, 1923. 
c) L'idee de ~eu dans la Philosophie religieuse de la Chine, a booklet 
by Leon Louis Rosny, Paris, 1899. 
d) Vestiges des principaux dogmes Chretiens tirees des ancients livres 
Chinois, by Rev. Father Henri de Premare, S.J., Paris, 1878. . 
e) The Quest of God in China, by Frederik O'Neill, New York, 1925. 
The authorasserted firiiilY that the "Shang-Ti" of ancient China is 
a personal God. (Conf. page 75 and sqq.) 
f) Chinese Religious Ideas, a pamphlet by the Rev. Patrick Johnston 
Maclagan, London, 1926. The author asserted that the ancient Chinese 
did believe in a Christian-like personal God. 
Even atheistic modern scholars such as Dr. Hu-Shih and Ts I at Yuan-Bat (see 
above note 2) have asserted that the "Shang Ti" or "Heaven" of the ancient 
Chinese is a personal God having freewill and power to rule all humanity. 
(Cont. Hu-Shih: An Outline of Chinese Philosophical Histo~, Shanghai, 
1928, Chapter II, pages 35-42. Ts'ai Yuan-pei: History of Chinese Moral 
Philosophy, Shanghai, 1937, Chapter II, pages 7-8. 
on behalf of his people: 
I, the child Le, presume to use a dark-colored victim, 
and presume to announce to Thee, 0 Most Great and 
Sovereign God, that the sinner I dare not pardon; and 
~ minister, 0 God, I do not keep in obscurity. The 
examinat ion of them is by Thy Mind, 0 God. If in my 
person, I commit offences, they are not to be attributed 
to you the people of the myriad regions. If you in the 
myriad regions co~t offences, these offences must 
rest on my person. 
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Having such a belief, the ancient Chinese, like primitive people else-
where, did not bury their consciences which told them what was good and wha:t n01 
good. However, neither did they explicitly inquire about the existence or 
about the essence of an objective norm of morality prior to and consequently 
independent of the human conscience, which is, according to modern ethical 
science, the subjective norm of morality. The problem of morality is, of 
course, not concerned with the subjective norm but the objective norm of 
morality. In other words, the problem of morality is to find out what is the 
objective norm of morality. 
The ancient Chinese did observe that the simple and unreflective judgment 
of an individual person's conscience is not infallible in its dictum; hence, 
people must be taught to use (i.e., in our scientific language, to form) 
their conscience rightly, and this is precisely the task of the rulers and 
scholars. Thus, as a matter of fact (even though t~ere were no explicit 
statements), according to these Sages, the science of ethics ult:im9.tely is 
6 Quoted from the translation by James Legge, translator of the canonical 
books and all the books of Confucius and Mencius. (Vol. I, Book XX, chapter 
1, The Analects of Confucius.) However, in order to understand fully the 
meaning of this passage, one must possess an adequate knowledge of the 
customs and mentality of the ancient Chine~e. For the translation is very 
literal. We regret that there is not enough spacefor us to explain every 
detail. 
36 
based on the experiences and reasoning of wise men. In other words, the norm 
of morality (objectively speaking) is human reason, taken not individually, 
but rather as an elaborated common agreement of the wise, Dot without regard 
to historical experiences. 
This is very similar to that we call "common sense", Which is considered 
by many modern thinkers as the onll ultimate norm of morality, but which the 
ancient sage kings of China did not consider an exclusivell ultimate norm 
of moralit.Y. It is even probable that they did recognize the existence of a 
Divine Law which must be (if they had such scientific terms) the objective 
and absolute ~ of morality; that is to say, the norm of the subjective norm 
of morality which is our conscience. Here we are not merely gueSSing, since 
by the very fact that they did believe in reward and punishment by "Shang-Ti", 
they must have believed implicitly in the existence of a Divine Law according 
to which "Shang Ti" judged His human subjects. Moreover, there are a number 
of sentences in the text of the Canonical Books that either presuppose or even 
explicitly state the existence of a Divine Law. For instance, inthe 
She-Ch 'ing: 
Te sent down calamities on the Hea dynasty. The ruler 
of Rea increased his luxury. He would not speak kindly 
to the people and became utterly dissolute and lost to 
all intelligence. He was unable for a single day to 
rouse himself to follow ~ path marked out by!!. 7 
Here, the term "Tefl is a synonym of "Shang-Ti". In the She-Ch'ingvre 
often find "Te" instead of "Shang-Ti" for reasons required by poetry; for 
"She-Ch'ing" consists of a collection of ancient popular peems and songs which 
7 Quoted from J. Legge translation as used by himself in his The Notion of 
the Chinese Concerning God and the Spirits," Hong-Kong, 1892 (page lOry. 
Italics ours. - -
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were selected and re-edited finally by Ccnfucius with the purpose of educating 
the common people in morals. 8 
Incidentally, Mo-tze has also cited the Canonical Books in confirming 
hiS theory of the "Will of Heaven": 
Mo-tze not only established the "Will of Heaven" 
to be the standard; it is also the theme of an ode in 
the "Ta Ya" among the books of the ancient Kings: II God 
said to King Wen: 'I cherish your intelligent virtue. 
It was not proclaimed with much noise or gesture. It 
was not modified after the possession of the empire. 
Instinctively and naturally submissive to God's scheme.' 
This is to proclaim that King Wen used the "Will of 
Heavenlt as a standard and was submissive to God
' 
s scheme. II 9 
Although the original full meaning of this passage of the She-Ch'in~ is 
quite obscure and confusing, (for modern critics believe that there were 
missing words in the extant text) we may be sure that the author of this anci 
ode believed that all men, including the king, must be submissive to the 
scheme arranged by God. We believe that Mo-tze has given us a correct inter-
pretation of the originally intended signification. Thus, according to the 
Canonical books, man must follow the "path" marked out by God, or, in other 
words, he must be submissive to God's scheme. This should be a sufficient 
acknowledgment of the existence of Divine Law. 
Despite such expreasive statements, we cannot conclude definitely that 
the ancient Sage Kings of China asserted that the ultimate norm of morality 
is the law of "Shang-Ti If • The reason is that they did not have such a clear 
8 We said "re-edited finally" by Confucius because the book was edited and 
re-edited-with additional materials several times long before Confucius. 
Confucius was its last editor, giving us its present contents. As to the 
purpose of his work in editing She-Ch'ing, Confucius said himself that there 
Were 300 hymns in the She-Ch'ing, but that its purpose may be expressed by . 
one sentence, that is, do not think evil. 
(Conf. Analects, Book X:; - - -
9 Conf. original text of 
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and scientificallY'preci~e notion about thevalue of an objective, absolute 
norm of morality, and they were not conscious of a,.. necessity of a deeper 
discussion on the matter. Such a task was reserved for a later thinker, to 
be perfromed by our philosopher Mo-tze, the preacher of the "Will of Heaven. "10 
2) LAO-TZE 
Lao-tze, an early contemporary of Confucius, was perhaps the man nearest 
to amoralism in ancient China. We decline to make an absolute statement, since 
Lao-tze did not speak clearlY enough to let us decide positively, or rather 
he did not express his mind definitely; for it is quite possible that he had 
no definite theory of his own. Besides, it is not our purpose here to discuss 
at length the doctrine of Lao-tze, Whose influence was little noticeable among 
the ancient people of China, although probably it might have influenced Mo-tze 
in some way, since our philosopher's ample knowledge could hardly permit him 
to ignore it. 
In our opinion, Lao-tze might be called a naturalist, somewhat like 
10 As to Mo-tze's doctrine on the "Will of Heaven", it will be the subject of 
our discussion in the next section. Here, at the end of this section, we 
wish to recommend a few books in Western languages for further studies on 
the teachings of the Ancient Sage Kings. 
ItChina" (an article in the Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics) by W. 
Gilbert Walsche; La Chine Antique, by Henri Maspero; Sur Ie pretendu 
monotheisme des anciens Chinois, Qy Maurice A. Courant; Vestiges des 
~rincipaux dogmes chretiens tires des anciens livres chinois, by Pere 
J. Henri De Premare, S.J.; The Deve10pment 2£ Chinese Conception 2! Supreme 
Bein~; by.B. Schindler; Moral Tenets and Customs in China, by Leon Weiger; 
Filosofie e religione della Cina, by Giovanni Vacca tin Enciclopedia 
Italiana, under article CINA, Roma, 1930). (See bibliography for further 
information on these books). 
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Jean Jacques Rousseau, 11 because he stated that whenever man acts according to 
nature, his acti.on is perfect. A perfect action is neither good nor bad; for, 
tao-tze did not approve the use of these terms, i.e. good and evil. He 
considered the idea of distinguishing good from evil unnatural, because such 
an idea, he said, is not innate in our minds, but is invented by ancient 
pseudo-wise men. People are taught to conceive the difference between good 
and evil, and are taught to call certain things good and others, evil. ,If 
they were not taught to do so, they would not be able to conceive the meanings 
of the terms "good" and "evil". Without such a pseudo-knowledge, Lao-tze 
continued, man would be happier, for he would act according to nature only. 
Now, the pseudo-lmowledge and the pseudo-education given to the people by those 
so-called wise men has turned them from their natural innocence. When man 
turned away from nature, he was corrupted; therefore, Lao-tze accused the 
ancient wise men of corrupting the people and leading the world to disorder. 
Lao-tze also considered the conception of ftgood" and that of "evil" are 
strictly correlative, so that one can not have the notion of "good" without a 
full understanding of what is "evil". Thus, Lao-tze concluded that we must 
talk neither about "good II nor about "evil". If unfortunately we were taught 
to know what,is good and What is evil, then try to forget about it; and if the 
11 Ro~sseau wrote about man in what he called the natural, and consequently 
perfect state: "It is evident at once that men in this state, having 
between them no kind of moral relation nor any known duties, could not 
be either good or bad and had neither virtues ror vices." ("Discour sur 
l'origine de l'inegalite parmi les honnnes." See Oeuvres Completes de J. J. 
Rousseau Mises Dans un Nouvel Ordre; par V. D. Musset-Pathay. Vol.I,-
page 255, Paris;-IE2J: English translation by Ada Monaham, quoted from A 
History of ~ Problems of Philosophy. (See bibliography). -
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COllllIlon people did not mow about it yet, then let them ignore it as :far as 
possible. Wi th such an opinion in his mind, Lao-tze may well be called a 
nihilist in morals. 
There is no better way to confinn our presentation o:f Lao-tze1s teacnin 
than to quote some o:f his own words as they are recorded in the "Tao Te 
Ch'ing"J 12 
'When all in the world understand beauty to be beauti:ful, 
then ugliness exists. When all understand goodness to 
be good, then evil exists. 13 
Hence, according to Lao-tze, to have an ethical science is rather 
ha.:rmful, and the world is becoming worse and worse just because ethical. 
discussions are becoming more and more advanced. 14 Lao-tze declared his 
12 The authenticity of this book, ~ Te Ch1in,j[4.t.,H', is :ill doubt. It is 
now generally considered a later creation 0 some Taoists (the Taoists 
claim Lao-tze as the :founder of their religion), because there was an 
unbelievable silence about this unique work of Lao-tze :ill all ancient 
Chinese documents, written immediately after the time of Lao-tze. 
Confucius, who was once a disciple o:f Lao-tze, did not ,mention this 
work at all, and neither did Mo-tze and Mencius. But the greatest of 
reasons to doubt its authenticity is the fact that in the book of 
Chuang-tze it ~ , the greatest admirer of Lao-tze, no one could find a 
hint to indicate the existence of the 1!2 Te Ch I ing. Herbert A. Giles, 
professor of Chinese at Cambridge University, England, in the preface 
o:f his translation o:f Chu&~g-tze, asserted about the authenticity of 
~ Te Chling: "Chuang Tze himself never once alludes to such a book, 
although now, in this nineteenth century, there are some, happily few 
in number, lVho believe that we possess the work of Lao-tze I s pen. It 
is perhaps happier still that this small mnnber cannot be said to 
include within it the name of a single native scholar of eminence." 
(page XI, Chuang-Tzu, translation by H. A. Giles, London, 1926.) 
13 Con!. Tao Te Ch'ing, ch~ter 2. This quotation is :from the En,lish 
translation by Ch1u Ta Ko. (See bibliography). All the following 
quotations of the -Tao Te Ch' in, are also from this same translation. 
14 The falsity of thi~iWnent 0 Lao-tze is even obvious to the atheistic 
Mr. Ts I ai Yuan-Bai~ jL ~ see above note 2 of this ch.apter.) He cn ticized 
Lao-tze's condemnation o:f moral discussions as ridiculous as a man's 
condemnation of the advancement of medical sciences because he thinks 
that it is the cause o:f more illness. (Conf. opus citata of Ts' ai, 
page 32). 
------------------..... 
nihilism as follows: 
Do away with leaming, and grief will not be known. 
Do away with sageness and eject wisdom, and the people 
will be more benefited a hundred times. Do an:y with 
benevolence and eject righteousness, and the people will 
return to filial duty and parental love. Do away with 
artifice and rgject gains, and there will be no robbers 
and thieves. 15 
Then, if you were to ask Lao-tze: "What is your plan, Sir?" Lao-tze 
would answer you in a few words: 
Man follows the laws of earth; earth follows the laws 
of heaven; heaven follows the laws of Tao; and Tao follows 
the laws of its intrinsic nature. 16 
What he meant 'exactly by the term. "Tao" has always been a source of 
interminable discussions among the scholars. The trouble is that Lao-tze 
himself does not mow what exactly the "Tao" is. He said, 
There is a thing inherent and natural, Which existed 
before heaven and earth. Motionless and fathomless, it 
sta} ds alone and neVer changes; it pervades everywhere 
and never becomes exhausted. It may be regarded as the 
Mother of the Universe. I do not mow its name. If I 
am forced to give it a name, I call it "Tao", and I name 
it as supreme. 17 
15 From Tao ~ Ch'ing, ohapter 19. 
16 From Tao ~ Ch!ing, chapter 25. Here, the translation of Mr. Chtu is 
quiteeI'aborated. We think that our readers will appreciate having a 
more 11 teral translation in order to be able to guess the original 
meaning of Lao-tze I s words by their - 1. e. our readers -- own intuition. 
"Man imitates the earth (meaning the world), earth imitates the heaven 
( astronomical universe), heaven imitates the Tao, and Tao imitates the 
nature." We do not mow exactly what Lao-tze meant by the word " ;di. " 
which literally means "to imitate"; and exactly 'What by "Tao" it. ,'Wbiob 
may be translated literally by "the virtue" or lithe way" _ (for, even 
liter~, it is an equivocal term in ancient Chinese); and finally, 
we do not know exactly what he meant by "J~ }t!," of which the word 
"nature" seems to be the best literal translation. 
17 From Tao Te Ch I infl, chapter 25. The last word in the original text is 
" A ", that is, "big"; we think it is better to translate the last 
sentence of this ,quoted passage as: "and I name it as the Great." 
Tao is a thing both invisible and intangible. 
Intangible and invisible, yet there are forms in it. 
Invisible and intangible, there yet is substance in it; 
subtle and obscure, yet there is essence in it. This 
essence being invariably true, there is faith in it. 
From of old till now, it has never lost its (nameless) name, 
through which the origin of all things has passed. How 
do I mow what it is so with the origin of all things. 18 
The incomprehensibility or rather indemonstrability of the "Tao" is 
solemnly proclaimed by Lao-tze at the very beginning of his ~ Te Ch'ing. 
He said: "Tile Tao that can be expressed is not the Eternal Tao." 19 
Most probably, Tao is considered by Lao-tze as an ultimate principle, 
not transcendental but rather inmanent, of the Universe. It is something 
like the "One" of Plotinus and somewhat like the "N ature" of the modern 
atheists. -20 ' 
Lao-tze believed that man must have known this "Tao", or rather the 
laws of this "Tao", naturally and unconsciously, so whatever man does 
according to his natural instinct, is perfect, since it is according to the 
laws of Tao. "Good" and "evil" do not exist in nature or in the "Tao". 
18 From Tao !! Ch I ing• chapter 21. The last sentence of the original. text 
is very obscure. e may interpret it as this: "Lao-tze asked: How 
can I mow what is supposed to be the origin of all things?" That is 
to say, Lao-tze believed that it is impossible for any human being to 
know the Tao clearly and completely. Parenthesis is from translation. 
19 This is the opening sentence of t~e ~ !!! Ch'ing. 
20 Although Lao-tze spoke about " ~ /*!!, II which is translated as "nature", 
we can not be positive that it is therefore the "nature" according, to 
modern atheists. For Lao-tze spote about it With even 1lOl"e uncertainty 
than he did in explaining the Tao. BeSides, he spoke about it, i.e., 
nature, only a couple of times. It seeu that it is an even more 
original principle than the Tao; yet, it may be also considered as the 
same thing as Tao, only under a different aspect. We prefer the latter 
opinion because Lao-tze has maqy times QX.pligit\y stated that Tao is 
the ultimate principle of all things; hence, 1Ihatever " ~ I~\ II or nature 
represents, can not be really a more ultimate principle than Tao. We 
think "Tao" is similar to the "nature" of modern atheists, inasmuch as 
it is an immanent principle of.,the Universe. 
They are rather artifically invented by those pseudo-wise men. When man 
forgets about the laws of the "Tao", then the knowledge of "good" and "evil" 
comes out, and together with it the knowledge of moral doctrines and, 
consequently, then comes the moral evil. IIWhaTJ. the great Tao is lost, If 
said Lao-tze, "there springs forth benevolence and righteousness. When 
wisdom and sagacity arise, there are great hypocrites." 21 
He emphasized the correlation of "good" and "evil" so that he would 
" -
assert that the "evil" is formally caused by the existence of the "good". 
Had man not known what is good they would not have done evil things. Hence, 
he wished for a total. annihilation of what is lmann as good in order to 
annihilate what is evil. Thus, indeed, he had the courage to sCiiV: "Do 
away with benevolence and righteousness ••• etc." 221fhi.ch is a quite shocking 
statement to many people" Westerners and Chinese alike. Lao-tze even 
believed that the so-called wisdom of his time was but a pseudo-knowledge. 
He said: 
He who lmows does not speak; he who speaks does 
not know. He who is virtuous does not dispute; he 
who disputes is not virtuous. He who is learned is not 
wise; he 1Iho is wise is not learned~ 23 
This was his "coup de gracell for science and learning. Consequently his 
political theory is to make people simple and ignorant. 
People are difficult to govern because they have much 
knowledge. Therefore, to govern the country by increasing 
the people's knowledge is to be the destroyer of the 
country; to govern the country by decreasing their 
knowledge is to be the blesser of the country. To be 
21 From Tao Te Ch I ing" chapter 18. 
22 From Tao Te ah I ing" chapter 19. See above quoted on page hl and note 15 
23 From Tao Te Ch I ing, chapter 81. 
acquainted with those two ways is to know the standard; 
to keep the standard always in mind is to have sublime 
virtue. Sublime virtue is infinitely deep and wise. 
It does2~everse to all things; and so it attains perfect 
peace. . 
We wish immediately to call to the attention of our readers that here 
Lao-tze speaks about "perfect peace", "wisdom", "sublime virtue", which are 
. . 
not the terms preferred by one truly an amoralist; most of all, he even 
mentioned a "standard"; as the context shows, presumably a moral standard, 
i.e. a standard of political good and political evil. 
Lao-tzers utopia is described by himself as follows: 
Supposing there is a small State with few people. Though 
there are various vassals I will not have them put in use. 
I will make the people regard death as a grave matter and 
not go far avray. T'nough there are boats and carriages, 
they will not travel in them. Though they will have amour 
and weapons they will not show them. I will let them 
restore the use of knotted cords (intead of writing). They 
will be satisfied with their food; delighted in their dress; 
comfortable in their dwellings; happy with their customs. 
Though the neighboring states are within sight and their 
cock$' crowing and dogs I barking are wi thin hearing, 
yet the peop12#>f the small states) will not go there all their lives. 
The practical conclusion of his teaching is, in a word, ~ ~ simple. 
In order to be satisfied with simplicity, we must simplify our desires. 
In order to simplify our desires we must simplify our knowledge. Lao-tze 
24 From ~ 1!. Ch'ing, chapter 65. Italic is ours. 
25 From Tao Te Ch'ing, chapter 80. Parentheses originally from Ch'u 
translation, therefore not ours. 
We believe that the first sentence of this passage is to be translated 
as: tiThe states must be small" as Lao-tze spoke about states in general 
and not anyone in particular. The original Chinese is "/J'I~ 1. ~tI. 
Also, the last sentence should be "The people will not go and come to 
visit wach other during all their lives", smce the original Chinese is: 
~ .t ft. J6 ;f- ;:fa H. t.. 
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understood fully the scholastic axiom: "Nihil est voli tmn nisi praecogni tum 
Therefore he teaches "ignorance" as the foundation of' all virtues. This 
is almost diametrically opposed to the Socratic (and also Conf'ucian) 
doctrine of identi:f'ying virtue with !mowledge. 
Lao-tzets idea of human life is very similar to the "abstine et 
Bustine" of the Cynics. From a certain point of' view, his teaching is simi-
lar to the Evangelical doctrine of simplicity and poverty, although the 
reasons given for the counsels are of entirely dif'ferent character. Lao-tze 
despises material goods merely because of material reasons -- for the sake 
of obtaining an easier satisfaction of our desires rather than to sacrifice 
them (i.e. give up our desires); f'or the sake of appeasement rather than 
that of mortification. 
Nevertheless, we still do not think that Lao-tze was ~~ amoralist, 
strictly speaking, since he acknowledged the existence of what is good and 
what is evil, notwithstanding the fact that he did not like to discuss their 
"raison d' etrelt , and did not wish to adopt the conventional term for them, 
i.e., "good" and "evil". He explicitly and repeatedly speaks about Virtue, 
perfection, peace, order, and even sanctity, despite his rejection of' 
"righteousness and benevolence". He only wishes that people would be 
simple enough to ignore elaborate moral discussions; and by ignoring what 
is moral evil, Lao-tze says, people will not do what is morally evil, and 
hence, they are good. In our modern philosophical terms, we will say that 
Lao-tze would likely have said: "Let the people be ignorant about moral. 
doctrines, because in their ignorance, although they will be mabIe to be 
formally good, they will, at the same time, be unable to be f'onnally evil. 
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Yet, (according to Lao-tze) to be formally good is to know and to contemplat 
oneself as a "good manll , and this is to be a hypocrite. Hence, ignorance 
'Will assure people to be both not evil and not hypocritical. Therefore, 
ignorance and simplicity form the only way to human perfection." The 
falsity of such an opinion is obvious; therefore, we do not have to comment 
on it. 
* * * 
3) . CONFt:CIUS 
Confucius was neither a very devout Theist such as some of the 
Christian authors have presented him, nor strictly a sceptic or an agnostic 
concerning the existence of a personal God as many a modern skeptic has 
wished to prove. Some of his statements seem to be sceptic or agnostic; 
nevertheless, a great many of his teachings concerning "Shang-Ti" or Heaven 
rather conform to the traditional belief expressed by the ancient documents, 
as we have earlier explained, while presenting the teachings of the ancient 
Sage Kings. For instance, the prayer of King T' ang, which we quoted 
above, 26 is described b.r Confucius and recorded in his Analects. Moreover, 
as we have pointed out already, it was Confucius who compiled and edited 
the so-called Canonical Books. Had Confucius been a sceptic, probably the 
contents of these Canonical Books would be quite different from what is in 
the presently existing texts. Since Confucius was the editor of these 
ancient documents, and, since he always claimed that he teaches the same 
26 See above page 35 and note 6 of this chapter. 
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doctrine that was taught by these ancient documents, 27 we may rightf~ 
conclude that these ancient canonical Books really represent the teaching 
of Confucius, perhaps even more faithfully than they would represent the 
. original teachings of the Ancient Sage Kings. We believe that they 
represent the teachings of the Sage Kings only because we believe the 
authority of Confucius wno compiled these ancient documents. Hence, we feel 
safe in asserting that the teaching of Confucius concerning the norm of 
morality is essentially the same as that of the ancient Sage Kings which we 
presented earlier. 
However, direct disciples of Confucius were criticized by Mo-tze as 
being insincere in their belief in the power and intelligence of Heaven. 
Nevertheless, if such criticism were applied to the teachings of Mencius, it 
would be most likely untrue, for Mencius repeatedly asserted the authority 
and the directing hand of Heaven in human affairs. Mencius himself declined 
to dispute with the disciples of Mo-tze. In fact, he did not even answer 
the criticism of Mo-tze against Confucianism but simply attacked Mo-tze's 
teachings of lIUniversal Love" and "Simplicity of Fmerals". 
One thing is quite sure, that Confucius was very strictly conservative 
and also might be considered a fonnalist. He held to and encouraged the 
practice of all the ancient rites, ceremonies and formaJ.i ties strictly 
n ad li tteram", 1. e. word by word, and even to the litera]. meaning of every-
27 Confucius claimed that he was not the author of these Canonical Books 
but only the editor of them. He called himself "a transmitter and not 
a maker, believing and loving the ancient. 1f (Quoted from J. Legge 
translation of the Analects of Confucius, Book VI, chap. 3.) 
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_ri Yet he wished to establish many more new, small and almost insig-1f'O"..... . 
nificant regulations for all human activities; and in order to give good 
example he sorupulously observed all of them in detail. Thus, he would not 
eat a pieoe of meat whioh was not cut in a perfeotly oubio or at, least 
reotangular fonn. 28 This was critioized, not without reason, by Mo-tzeas 
insignificant and hypooritical. 29 
As far as the problem of morality is ooncerned, Confucius, and conse-
quently his faithful followers, (that is, the Confucianists) failed to 
furnish any discussion on the existenoe and nature of an objective norm 
of morality. In judging moral affairs, he more or less recommended the 
moral sense, that is to say, the dictum of our Olm conscience, 'Which is, 
acoording to him, naturally capable of distinguishing good from eVil, . and 
imperatively commanding us to do good, although practically speak:ing we are 
still free to do evil. 
His Plato, 30 Mencius, explained this point more clearly by asserting 
that human nature is naturally good; that is to say, naturally inclined to 
do good unless forced by circumstances. So Mencius used to speak of the 
human conscience as "good conscienoe" and of human nature as rtgood nature."l. 
-
Once, he discussed this mater with Kao-tze, who asserted that human nature 
is rather indifferent, by which Kao-tze meant that human nature is neither 
good nor bad, hence it is oapable of being good and evil with equal 
facility, like the nature of water which flows indifferently towards east 
28 Coni. Analects of Confucius, Book X, "Hiang Tang" ,it ~t, Ch. 8. The entire 
Book X is virtually filled with such formal regulations. 'l'j 1- Sf.. ~J~ 
29 Conf. text of Mo-tze, ohapter 39, "Anti-Confucianism". 
30 See above, page 28, and note 59 of.our first ohapter. 
31 "Good oonsoience" in original Chinese " ~ *,~ rr, and "Good nature" " t.~!6 If, 
often used by Menoius. 
Mencius replied: 
Water indeed will flow indifferently to t he East or to 
the West, but, will it flow indifferently upward or 
downward? The tendency of man's nature to good is like 
the tendency of water to now downwards. There are none 
(human beings) but have this tendency to good, just as 
all water flows downwards. Now by striking water and 
causing it to leap up you may make it go over your forehead, 
and by damming and leading it, you may force it up a hill; 
but, are such movements according to the nature of 
water? It is the force applied which causes them •. When 
men are made to do what is not good, their nature is 
dealt with in this w~, (i.e. by force). 32 
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Hence, according to Mencius, men are rather forced to do evil things, 
and when they actually do evil things, their nature is distorted by force 
trom outside. He attributed to evil political and social circumatances the 
crime of distorting human nature •. However, since Mencius is posterior to 
Mo-tze and consequently had no direct influence on Mo-tze's teachings, we 
have no· intention of discussing his doctrine other than inasmuch as it is 
needed to illustrate the thinking of ConfuciUS, his Socrates. 
In brief, Confucius did not have anything further to offer that is 
useful to 'the problem of morality properly speaking than what is already 
included in the teachings of the ancient Sage Kings. 
Among many books written 1:n many different languages dealing with the 
doctrine of Confucius, (either exclusively or incidentally) we prefer to 
cite this brief statement of Father Paul Geny, S.J., as the conclusion 
of our brief discussion on Confucius: 
32 Conf. Mencius, Book VI, part 1. Quoted from Legge translation. (See 
bibliography). 
Confucius (n. 551 A.C.) morum pristinam rectitudinem, 
suo tempore collabentem, restaurarj intendit; nullo autem 
fundamento metaphysico supposito. 3 
* * * 
4) YANG-TZE 
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The only famous· egotist in the :whole history of Chinese oivilization, 
yang Chu 34 was very probably a contemporary of Mo-tze. His teachings were, 
as it was testified by Mencius, not less influential than those of Mo-tze 
and Confucius. To quote Mencius himself: "The words of Hang-Chu and Mo-ti 
fill the country. If you listen to the discourses ofpeople throughout the 
land, you will find that they have adopted the views either of Yang or of 
Mo." 35 This is a frank ~knowledgment, by a lead:ing Confucianist of the 
time, of the overwhelmingly popular influence of Yang-tze's doctrine. 
Yang-tze's ethical theor.y is, in Western terms, individualistic 
hedonism mixed with pessimism. Human life, according to him, has no meaning 
and no purpose. It is . very short and filled with painful events so that the 
very little pleasure we can enjoy in our, life must be so dear to us that 
W'e would not miss any of it. To miss anyone of these pleasures is to be 
foolish. Hence there is absolutely no reason why we should sacrifice any 
of our pleasures, or anything we possess. Mencius has criticized him thus: 
"The principle of the philosopher Yang was 'each one for himself'. Though 
33 Conf. Brevis Conspectus Historiae Philosophiae (page 25) by Rev. Paul 
Geny, S.J., professor of philosophy at the Pontifical University of 
Gregoriano, Rome, 1929. It is, however, regrettable that Father Geny 
did not know about the teachings of Mo-tze. 
34 In Chinese, ":J::h' " is the surname; "*" Chu, is the given name proper 
to him. Yang-tze is of course equivalent to Dr. Yang. 
35 Conf. Menoius, Book VI, part 1. (Legge translation used.) 
he might have benefited the whole C01mtry by plucldng out a single hair, 
he would not have done it." 36 
However, when explicitly asked whether he would sacrifice a single 
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hair in order to benefit the world, Yang-tze cleverly replied: !lAs a matter 
of fact, the world cannot be benefited by a single hair." The inquirer, 
ChlIDg-tze (probably a disciple of Mo-tze), insisted again. "But suppose 
it would benefit the world, then would you do it?" Yang-tze declared 
(many centuries before our modern diplomatic science was born) that he 
declined to answer such a question. 37 
However, when the inquirer, Chung-tze, had left him, Yang-tze commented 
on this matter for his own disciples: 
In the ancient time, if you told the people that they 
might benefit the whole world by plucking out a single 
hair, they were not interested in it. And, if you 
should offer the wealth of the entire world to one 
person for his own benefit, he would not take it. 
If nobody bothers to pluck out a hair, and nobody 
bothers to benefit 5ge whole world, then, the world 
would be in order. 
36 Coni. Mencius, Book VII, part 1. Note here that James Legge has trans-
lated "Tze" SIr "Philosopher" (see our explanation on this matter on page 
4 and note '. 8 of. our first chapter). Also, he translated "f:... f. II into 
"whole country" while most Western authors have translateo. the same 
word as If the whole world". 
37 The conversation between.Chung-tze and Yang-tze is recorded in the Book 
of Yang-Tze. There is only one chapter left to us; This chapter is the 
unique direct source of Yang-tzers teaching. Except for this, we know 
about Yang-tze only from his adverSaries, chiefly from Mencius. Chung-tZE 
was probably the same person called Chung Wua.-lee'i~'5'~ior Ch1mg-tze who is 
a disciple of Mo-tze and is mentioned often in the last eleven chapters 
of the original text of Mo-tze, because later in the text (of Yang-tze) 
this Ch1mg-tze asserted to a disciple of Yang-tze that he (Chung-tze) 
had adopted the view of the Great King Yu and follO'1lid the doctrine of 
Mo-tze. 
38 Conf. original text of Yang-tze, unique chapter. Since there is no 
English translation available, we had to translate it. Here, we furnish 
the original Chinese text for reference. ~:t A.. ;f~ - ;t.j1 J..... 1', *'~ JJ0 /~A. ...,... it- -) ;{, fl~ >t. A..}"" .... t~ - IL A.. A. 1-. ~.j J.,."(, t... of- J't? }~ . 
52 
By these words, Yang-tze meant that the present trouble with the world 
is that everyone is too anxious to benef'i t the world and f'orgets about him-
self. If, instead, everyone would only mind his own bUSiness, and f'orget 
the big idea of' benefiting the whole world, then, the world would be really 
benefited. 
Yang-tze criticized the altruistic socialism of' his time as merely 
hYPocri tical; and he frankly stated that the connnon good of society is 
ultimately based upon the individual :interest of' each member. Hence the 
real and ultimate norm in judg:ing what is good and what is evil is our own 
indi vidual interest. 39 Man's f'irst and most natural. instinct is the 
instinct of self-preservation and self-prosperity_ These are, theref'ore, 
the first standards to be followed in guiding our own. acts. 40 
Based on such a strictly egoistic attitude, the norm of' morality for 
yang-tze is practically the same as that of the Epicureans; that is to sa::!, 
the identif'ication of' pleasure with good. 
* * * 
By saying "In the ancient time," Yang-tze meant: "In the better time" 
i.e. when morals were higher; for all wise men of' that time were more or 
less, to use Cicero's expression, "Laudator temporis praeteriti.". 
39 J. Bentham made a similar statement: "The comnUIlity is a fictious body, 
composed of the individual persons who,are considered as constituting, as 
it were, its members. The interest of' the community then is what? --
The sum of the interests of the several members who composed it." . Quoted 
f'rom: An Introduction ~ the Principle of' Morals and Legislations, 
Oxford,-r876, Chapter 1, section 4. 
40 Dr. Hu-Shih~fi'il(See our note 2 of this chapter) has given special praise 
to Yang-tze for his audacious invention of that "Seil-preservation" 
instinct, and his courage in admitting f'rankly man's natural tendency to 
egoism. (conf. An Outline of' Chinese Philosophical History, Shanghai., 
1928, 14th Edi:hion, pages 119-180. 
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B) THE NORM OF MORALITY ACCORDING TO 1I0-TZE 
Our philosopher, Mo-tze, While believing that the traditional doctrine 
of the Ancient Sage Kings contains rudimentary truth, nevertheless realized 
its imperfection inasmuch as it is too generic and lacks logical reasoning 
explicitly set in the form. of arguments. As the result of such an imper-
fection, Mo-tze believed that the traditional doctrine could not stand up 
against the sophistic, agnostic and individualistic views of his time. Henc 
our philosopher was eager to develop the traditional doctrine into a new and 
better system in order to restore its authority and thus help to solve the 
moral crisis of his time. 
He was apparently very much disgusted with the indifferentism in moral 
affairs of Lao-tze, and furious. against the almost agnostic attitude of the 
ConfUcianists about the existence of a God acting through intelligence and 
will. However, we must point out that Yo-tze did not make this accusation 
against Confucius himself, but only against the disciples of Confucius. As 
to Confucius himself, Mo-tze did criticize him as being a formalist and 
hypocrite. 41 
It seems that Mo-tze ignored the teachings of Yang-tze, although the 
latter fS doctrine had spread through the world so quickly that at the time 
of Mencius it had as many followers as 1l0-tzeism and Confucianism. Never-
theless, obviously, Yang-tze was not the first egotist in China, although he 
was the founder of an egotistic philosophy. As may be seen indirectly 
through the books of Confucius and 1l0-tze, the egotistic tendency had already 
become more and more the dominant sentiment of society at that time. 
41 Con!. text of llo-tze, Chapter 39. Also see above pages 46 and 47, notes 
28 and 29 of our dissertatio 
Mo-tze, indeed, was right in criticising the scholars of his time as 
understanding only trifles but not things of importance, because whereas 
they all engaged in heated discussions about moral affairs, none of them 
ever discussed the origin and the standard of morality. 
In fact, Ko-tze was really the first Chinese philosopher who ever 
properly discussed the essential character of the norm of morality. In 
ordinari~ intelligible language he discussed the problem as follows: 
Those gentlemen in the world who want to practice 
magnanimity and righteousness cannot but examine the 
origin of righteousness. Since we want to examine the 
origin of righteousness, then where does it originate? 
Righteousness does not originate with the stupid 
and humble, but with the honorable and wise. How do we 
know it does not originate with the dull and humble but 
with the honorable and wise? For righteousness is the 
standard. How do we know righteousness is the standard? 
For with righteousness the world will be orderly, and 
without it the world will be disorderly. Therefore, 
righteousness is lm01't'll to be the standard. As the dull 
and humble cannot make the standard, and only the wise 
and honorable can, therefore, I knew righteousness does 
not come from the stupid and humble but from the honorable 
and wise. 
Now, who is honorable and wise? Heaven is honorable42 and wise. So, righteousness must originate with Heaven. 
Then Mo-tze tried to prove that Heaven is more honorable and more wise 
than the Emperor who is the most honorable and supposed to be the most wise 
of all human beings. After this he continues: 
-
This shows that Heaven is more honorable and more 
wise than the »aperor. But is there anyone more honorable 
and more wise than Heaven? So Heaven is really the most 
honorable and the most wiS~1 Therefore, righteousness 
surely comes from Heaven. 4J 
42 Cont. text of Mo-tze, Chapter 27, Mei translation. 
43 Ibid. 
-
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And hence )(o-tze concluded: "If' the gentlemen of' the world really 
desire to tollow the way (i.e. the moral path) and benefit the people, they 
JlUSt not disobey the Will ot Heaven, which is the origin of magnanimity and 
righteousness." 44 
At the end ot the same chapter Mo-tze explicitly pointed out that the 
Will ot Heaven is the standard ot morality: 
Therefore, the Will ot Heaven to llo-tze is like the 
compasses to t he wheelwright and the square to the 
carpenter. The wheelwright tests the circularity ot 
every objeot in the world with his compuses, saying: 
fThat which satisties my compass is circular. That 
which does not is not circular.' Theretore whether an 
object is circular or not is all known, because the 
standard ot oircularity is all established •••• SiDiilarly, 
with the Will ot Heaven Mo-tze will measure the juris-
. diction and the government ot the lords in the empire 
on the one hand and the doctrines and teachings ot the 
multitudes in the empire on the other. It some conduct 
is observed to be in accordance with the Will of Heaven, 
it is called good conduct; if a teaching is observed 
to be in accordanoe nth the Will of Heaven it is called 
good teaching; if it is in opposition to the Will ot 
Heaven, it is called bad teaching; and if a government 
is observed to be in accordance nth the Will ot Heaven, 
it is called a good government; it it is in opposition 
to the Will ot Heaven it is called a bad government. 
With this as the model and with this as the standard, 
whether the lords and the ministers are magnanimous or 
not can be il~asured as easily as to distinguish black 
and white. 4;1 
The tinal sentence ot his third chapter on the Will ot Heaven is a 
solemn and decisive statement: "Theretore the Will ot Heaven is truly the 
standard ot righteousness." 
44 Ibid. 
45 IHa. Italics <nil" own. 
-
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We might well quote a fine diacussion on this matter in the fourth 
chapter of the Book of 1I0-tze, which is entitled "The Necessity of Standard". 
. 46 
However, since the authenticity of that chapter is rather doubtful, we 
do not think that it is necessary to cite it here, especially when we have 
already" cited sufficiently from one of the most indisputably authentic 
chapters of the Book. 
From what we have quoted above, it is obvious that Ilo-tze has positive~ 
and explicitly stated that the Will of Heaven is the standard of righteous-
ness. Now, this is equivalent to saying that the Will of God is the norm 
of morality. The matter does not need proof but may need further explanatio 
The Chinese term which is translated here as Heaven was commo~ 
regarded at that time as representing the King of Heaven or the "Shang-Tin, 
i.e. the :Emperor of Above, who is a personal God, Creator and Supreme Ruler 
of the Universe, Supreme Judge of all human activities. He sees and knows 
all the acts of every man so that no one can escape His observation. This 
is the traditional. belief, according to the teachings of the Ancient Sage 
Kings. 47 
However, after Lao-tze had used the term "Ttien" or "Heaven" in a 
rather material and impersonal sense, modern scholars doubted the intentions 
of all post-Lao-tze philosophers whenever th~ used this venerable term. 
As a matter of fact, Confucius used the same term sometimes in a merely 
material sense, in 1Ib.ich the term indicates simply the sky or skies above 
our head. 
46 See above, chapter I, page 14. 
47 EYen such an atheist as Dr. Hu-Shih ~fla has to admit this fact. Conf. 
his ~ Outline .2!. Chinese Philosophical History, Shanghai, 1928 
(p es 54-55). . 
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But it is only natural that Confucius should at some time have used 
tbe term "T'ienlt to indicate the material elements of the sky, since this 
is the original and literal sense of the term. It is only by a conventional 
concensus of the ancients that this term 1I8.S used also to indicate the "King 
of Heaven", the "Shang-Ti tf, that is, "God" in English terminology. 48 
w. H. Long has seen a very good reason why the later Chinese wisemen 
preferred to use the term "Heaven" instead of "Shang-Tin. 
. . . 
The use of 'T'ien', he noted, in place of Shang-Ti (the 
Lord) as the term designating Deity indicates a desire 
to avoid narrow anthropomorphic suggestions, while at 
the same time, affirming God to be selt-consciousness, 
creative, intelligence and holy will. 49 
S. Holth has made a praiseworthy obseryation on the religious belief 
of the common people at the time of Mo-tze, 
One brief word must be added about the religious beliefs 
of that time. The original notion of Supreme Being, the 
Sovereign on High (Shang-Ti) or Heaven (T'ien) has 
apparently not degenerated,. but the tendency towards animism 
was increasingly manifest among the religionists of the 
period. It seems to have been a common assumption that only 
the Sovereign on High possesses power to govern the world, to 
reward the righteous and to punish the wicked. In Him 
there was no change. He will exalt and bless the good, but 
the guilty will not escape Hi~l'\judgment. Nothing can 
happen contrar,r to His Will. 7V 
Whatever it might mean for Lao-tze and Confucius, the term "Heaven" 
as used by our philosopher, J(o-tze, was certainly a synonym for "Shang-Tiff, 
48 As 'We have noted before, this use of uHeaven" to indicate God is 
probably due to the respect to the term IfShang-Ti". See above page 34. 
49 Quoted from his booklet, Mo-tze, China's.Ancient Philosopher of Univers 
lDve, pages 15-16. (Peiping, 1934). . -
50 Quoted from his booklet Micius, A brief outline of his life and ideas, 
Shanghai, 1935. - - - - -
!& 
58 
tha.t is,a personal and intelligent ~, Creator ~ Supreme Ruler .2! ~ 
Universe. 
- We may prove our statement as foll0'W8: 
1) Heaven is, according to Mo-tze, a Eersonal ~, honorable, intelli-
~~ ~ capable' !!! willing, ~ loves ~ universally and dearly, ~ wishes 
~ ~ love each ~ universally. Mo-tze explicitly and repeatedly, 
without any kind of equivocation, has stated so: "Heaven is more honorable 
and wise than the »nperor. But, is there anyone more honorable and w.i.se 
than Heaven? Heaven is really the most honorable and wise." 51 And Heaven 
is so intelligent that it dis cerns eYerything everywhere: "For Heaven 
certainly discerns it, eYen if it be in the woods, valleys, or solitar;r 
caves Where are no men." 52 
Heaven has volition. The fact that three chapters of his book were 
entitled "The Will of Heaven" speaks for itself. Heaven's love towards 
men as described by Mo-tze is the best assertion of its kind in all Chinese 
literature. "Heaven loves all men univernlly." 53 "Heaven loves all the 
people of the -world." 54 And Mo-tze has tried to con~ince his listeners 
of the great !2!! ~: Heaven; he pointed out many sound reasons w~ we must 
acknowledge that Heaven loves men dearly: 
Heaven loves the whole world universally; everything 
,is prepared for the good of men •••• Moreover, I know 
Heaven loves men dearly not without reason. 'Heaven 
ordered the sun, the moon and the stars to enlighten and 
guide them •••• yet this does not exhaust my reUOM whereby 
I know Heaven loves men dearly. It is said the murder 
51 Con!. original text of Mo-tze, Chapter 27, Mei translation. 
52 Ibidem, chapter 26. 
53 fbidem, chapter 16. 
54 Ibidem, chapter 28. 
of an innocent individual will call down a calamity. 
Who is the innocent? Man is. From whom is the visitation? 
From Heaven. If Heaven does not love the people dearly, 
why should Heaven send dawn a visitation upon the man 
who murders the innocent? Thus I know Heaven loves man 
dearly. This is still not all ~ which I know Heaven 
loves men dearly. There are thos e l'Iho love the people and 
benefit the people ag~ obey the will of Heaven and obtain 
reward from Heaven. 
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Heaven wishes that men love each other universallY: "What is the will 
of Heaven that is to be obeyed? It is to love all the people in the lIOrld 
iversally." 56 
Heaven likes to have the world live, and dislikes to have 
it die, likes to have it rich and dislikes to have it 
poor; and likes to have it orderly and dislikes to have 
it disorderly •••• He who obeys the will of Heaven loving 
universallY and benefiting others, will obtain rewards. 
He mo opposes the wil1 of Heaven by being partial and5 unfriendl.y and harming others, will incur punisbment. 7 
2) Heaven, according to Mo-tze, is !!!! Creator ~ ~ Universe. 
Heaven loves the whole world universallJ'. EYeEY thinJ 
is prepared for the good of men. Even the top of a hair 
is the lJ'Ork of Heaven •••• Heaven ordered "the sun, the moon 
and the stars to .enlighten and guide them. Heaven ordained 
the four season, Spring, Autumn, Winter and Summer to 
regulate them. Heaven sent down snow, frost, rain and 
dew to grow the five grains and flax and silk so t hat the 
people could use and enjoy them. Heaven established the 
hills and rivers, ravines and vall~s, and arranged many 
things to minister to man's good. , 
Our readers may remark th~t in the above quoted passage the term "create" 
. 
is not used. Hence it is doubtful whether or not Mo-tze rea1l1 meant a 
creation of the universe in the sense of scholastic philosopny. As we 
ss Ibidem, chapter 27. 
S6 Coni. original text of Mo-tze, chapter 28. 
S7 Ibidem, chapter 26. 
S8 ibidem, chapter 27. Italics are our own. 
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consider this an interesting question, we wish to discuss it in some detail. 
First of all we must remark that here we are not discussing what term 
was used by Mo-tze, for, in ancient China, there was no word that will 
exactly express the idea of Creation according to scholastic philosop~. 
The word "maket• was used on all oceasions. SOmetimes the ancient Chinese 
used the word "generate" to indieate the ereation of men. Thus they often 
said: "Heaven generated the people". 59 It is but obvious that the word 
is not to be understood in a fleshly meaning. Since the technical word 
for creation was not to be found in Chinese literature until our modern 
age, we cannot accuse 1Io-tze of not believing in a scholastically defined 
creation just because he did not use the technical term. The lJOrd "make" is 
most commonly used b.y all primitive peoples to indicate the creation of God. 
The mind of the user is to be determined by what he expressed throughout 
his discussion on the matter. Besides, although Mr. Mei Yi-Pao has translat 
)lo-tze's original word into Rmake", we neTertheless may find others who have 
translated it as "create". Thus, for instance, Dr. Wu Kou-Cheng often used 
the term "create""' in his -translation of Mo-tze's original text. 60 Therefore 
59 "Heaven generated the people" - " A !!. J. f<.J" - is an expression often 
used in the canonieal books.". 7I'l the Analects of Confucius and the books 
of Meneius, we often see this expression " "- ~~ iff f/(; JJ0 ", i.e. "When 
Heaven generated the people ••• " _ "" 
60 Dr. 1'111 (Ph.D. from Princeton University) has translated "T'1Bn" into 
God and .the .description of creation byUo-tze as fo1101'1S:" . "There are 
reasons lIb:y I mow that God loves men dearly. He makes the.sun, the 
moon and the stars to guide and to shine upon them. He creates the four 
seasons, spring ••• " (Conf. his Ancient Chinese Political Theories tt , 
Shanghai, 1928). We may, however, notice that Dr • Wu misplaced the word 
"ereate", for the seasons cannot be properly said to be created. This 
shon that even modern Chinese scholars still consider "create" as a 
term interchangeable with the ancient word "make". HOl'fevei', Dr. 1i1 has 
translated this following sentence of Mo-tze (from ehapter 11) better 
than Dr • 1Iei: "In ancient times, when t he people had just been created, 
and when neither" government nor law was established ••• " (Conf. ibidem.) 
to determine Mo-tze' s original belief, we must inquire what would be his 
idea of creation, or the making of the universe by God. 
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In fact, the conception of creation has never been developed by any 
pagan wisdom as perfectly as according to Christian philosophers. One of 
the greatest philosophers of the pre-Ghristian ciTilization, Aristotle, lIho 
has conceived the Supreme cause of all beings as the "Actus purus", has not 
yet quite reached the idea of creation properly speaking. 61 The general 
belief of heathen religion and primitive peoples was that God created the 
universe by giving a determined form to the pre-existing matter which the" 
called the Chaos. However, in China, except for a very few ancient scholars 
who gained only secondary importance in our ancient culture, the generaJ. 
opinion of our ancient wisdom rather. seemed to be near to a Christian-like 
conception of creation; that is, the idea that God has created everything 
including the most elementary materiaJ..s. In the five canonical books, the 
Ancient Sage Kings have stated repeatedly that the Emperor of Above, "Shang-
Ti", has created everything. The tem "everything" is used Without quali-
fication; therefore, it is to be interpreted as including even the most 
elementary materials. 
Mo-tze went even further. He pointed out something more particular than 
the general term of "everything". He said, as it is quoted above, "Even 
. ~. 62 -
the top of a hair is the work of Heaven". Now, by" the top of a hair, 
61 The Most Rev. William Turner, who did not hesitate in calling Aristotle 
"the greatest of heathen philosophers", (Conf". his article: Aristotle in 
the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. I, p •.. 713) has this to say: flIt seems 
hazardous to say that he (Aristotle) taught the doctrine of Creation. 
This much, however, may safely be said: He lays down principles which, 
if carried to their logical. conclusionz.. would lead to the doctrine that 
the world was made out of nothing." {J.t>id., p. 716.) We believe that 
62 *iahIn~g \)e s ~ abour Mo-tze as"we • _ . 
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Vo-tze meant the smallest and most elementary material; therefore" Mo-tze" 
if he did not exactly reach" at least he very nearly approached" the Chris-
tian idea of creation as it is e:xpressed by this technical phrase: "Ex: 
nibilo sui et subjecti" •. We shall prove our statement thus: 
By saying "the top of a hair"" Mo-tze meant the smallest !!!!! !.2!! 
elementary material; because: 
a) In ancient China" the conception of hy"lemorphisin is unknown. A 
hair is" for the Chinese" a simple i.e. uncomposed" elementary material" 
because it was not yet recognized as an organic body. The ancient Chinese 
did recognize that the human body is composed from many different materials, 
but they did not have the help of the microscope to see that even the hair 
is an organic compound. Hence" a hair is simply an elementary matter for 
the ancient Chinese; any composition for a hair" chemical" organic or hyle-
morphic, is unknown to them. 
b) The expression of "a hair" was often used by ancient Chinese to 
designate the aost common and most worthless thing. For instance, Mencius 
has criticized Yang-tze" the arch-egotist" that he would not even pluck out 
a single hair although this might benefit the whole world. 63 Moreover" 
besides its original meaning" the word "hair" is used by the ancient Chinese 
to designate the smallest material unity known at that time. A ~ 64 
in weight is the thousandth of a "liang" which is approximately an "ounce". 
And again" a "hair" 6, is used in- the m~asurement of space; it is one 
~ conr. Mencius, Book VII" part I. See above" pages 50 and ,1. 
64 In Chinese measure: 10 hairs n ~ " make a Ch' ien " 4~ "; 10 ch' ien make 
a fen" I,,'"; 10 fen make a liang" -1 H. .•. . 
65 In Chinese.measure (of length): 10 hairs" It" make a lee" f "; 10 lee 
make a fen "/,,' "; 10 fen make. a tsun If .-,f !1, which is apprOximately an 
English inch. 
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thousandth of an "inch". In addition, there are many well-knOlm Chinese 
eXPressions in which 'We use the term "hair" to indicate ftabsolutely 
66 
nothing." Therefore, for the ancient Chinese a hair is the synonym of 
what is the smallest and most elementary in all existing things. 
c) Moreover, .Mo-tze clearly emphasized that he wanted to say something 
even smaller and more elementary than the commonly accepted term, "a hair". 
Thus he said: "~~ top 2,f abair". That is to say: (if by arty chance 
the hair should be still a composed matter, then I take the top of a hair) 
the extremity of that hair, not a part of its body, but just the point in 
its extremity. Hence, 'We are sure that Mo-tze meant to point out, as an 
example of the absolute inclusiveness of Heaven's creative power, "~ top 
of a hair," which is, as he believed, the smallest and most simple being that 
---
a human mind could possibly imagine at his time. 
Therefore, if Mo-tze had been an atomist, he 'Would have said that even 
an "atom" is made by God. (In case that he Jrlght be a modern atomist, we 
-
8hould mention here the electron, proton, and neutron). And, if he believed 
in hylemorphism, he 'Would have said that even the "materia prima" is made 
by God. Hence, 'We haye reason to believe that llo-tze .rather favored somethi 
like the scholastic idea of creation, which is qualified by "ex nihilo sui 
et subjecti". At any- rate, whether God created us from absolute nothingness, 
or, rather made us from some pre-existing materials, Mo-ize obviously still 
maintains that He is our father and our master, because, Without going to 
the rather subtle discussion of absolute or relatiVe nothingness, 'We may 
al:ways say in either case that He made us; and therefore He is our master. 
66 For instance: "tj, ~ 1 .. '11 means ~bsolutely careless; " t f" ,Lfj ;l n means 
absolutely no ~e; " It, J,!, %- " means abs 
It is also quite obvious that this subtle distinction of absolute or relative 
~othingness is rather a very important issue in metaphysics, but, since 
here in this treatise our purpose is to discuss the moral philosophy of 
vo-tle, the importance of such a distinction is rather secondary and almost 
aegligible, as long as we are sure that Mo-tze did believe that God is our 
.alcer and ruler. For this is all that is required in his moral teaching. 
3) Heaven, according to Mo-tze, is ~ Supreme Ruler of ~ Universe 
and especiallz 0Lmanldnd. From the quotations cited above 67, ... e may see 
-
that Mo-tze has described Heaven as the Ruler of nature, the sun, the moon 
and the stars, the four seasons, sno ... , frost, rain and dew, rivers and 
aountains, etc. However, Mo-tze insisted again and again on Heaven's rule 
oyer human beings. 
Each individual, no matter where he may be or what position he may have 
in the ... orld, is actually imder the rule of Heaven. 
IT a man commits a misdemeanor in the family, he still 
bas other families in ... hich to seek shelter •••• IT a man 
commits a misdemeanor in the state, he still has other 
states in ... hich to seek she1ter •••• No ... , all men live 
in the world and under Heaven. When a man sins against 
Heaven there is nowhere to seek shelter. For Heaven 
certainly discerns it, even if it be in the ... oods, valleys 
or solitary caves where there are no men. 68 
This is to say that our Supreme Ruler, Heaven, knows everything that is 
done everywhere. This is more than being intelligent. Shall ... e say that, 
according to Mo-tze, Heaven is infinitely intelligent? Heaven's rule is so 
absolute that it includes even the Emperor, who is, as Mo-tze said: "the 
most honorable in the ... orld". 69 Heaven makes the standard to be followed 
67 See above page 59. 
68 Conf. original text of Mo-tze, Chapter 28, Mei translation. Italics are 
our own. 
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bY the Emperors, and rewards them or punishes them according to their merits 
The Iililperor may not make the standard at will. There is 
Heaven to give him a standard. The gentlemen of the world 
all understand that the Emperor gives the standard to the 
world, but do not understand that Heaven gives the standard 
to the Iililperor. The Sages explaining this said: "When 
the Emperor has done good, Heaven rewards him. 'When the 
Emperor has committed wrong, Heaven punishes him." 70 
J(o-tze has even given to his statement an orthodox confirmation, that 
il to say, a confimation from the venerable authority of the Ancient Sage 
nngs • After quoting a poem from the She-king (one of the five canonical 
books), Mo-tze concludes: "This is to proclaim that the King Wen used the 
will of Heaven as standard q,nd was submtssive to God's scheme." 71 
Hence it is obvious that by the term "Heaven" Mo-tze really expresses 
and indicates what is most essential in the notion of "God" as th~s term is 
.understood by modern theistic philosophers. 
According to Andre Lalande, in his Vocabulaire Technique et Critique de 
1:: Philos~phie, the exact philosophical notion of God may be summed up in 
these four definitions: 
1) Considere comme un principe d' explication 
A} Au point de vue ontologique: Principe Supreme de l'exi.stence ~ 2! 
l'activite universelles. 
B) Au point de vue logique: Principe Supreme de l'ordre ~ !!~, 
de la raison dans l'homme et de las correspondance entre la pensee et 
les choses. 
- Ibidem, chapter 28. Italics are our own. 
Cont. original text of Mo-tze, chapter 28. Also see above, page 36. 
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2) Considere comme un Etre aotif: 
0) Au point de vue material: Etre personel superieur !. l'humanite, qui 
~ des ordres et ~ des :eromesses, auquel ~ addresse :erieres ~ 
gUi les exauce. 
D) Au point de vue moral: ~ :eersonel tel qutil ~, :ear !£!! intelligem 
et sa volonte, Ie principe Supreme et la gar~tie de la moralite. 72 
..... - - ----
Now we can easily see that Mo-tze stated all the contents of those four 
definitions except the second part of the second definition, which is a ver,y 
recent notion, since the problem of knowledge has risen into great prominence 
only with Descartes. 
Therefore "The. Will of Heaven" is, in other words, "The Will of God". 
Now it rem~ins to show that the Chinese term "I" 73' (pronounced like 
. 
the "I" of Latin), which is generaJJ..y translated as "righteousness", is 
practic~, it not theoretically, an equivalent of the philosophical term 
. "morality". We have said practically, that is, inasmuch as it is used here 
in this particular sentence, 1.e., when we say, following Mo-tze, that the 
Will of God is the norm of righteousness. 
However, philosophically speaking, these two terms are not exactly 
synonymous, because their comprehenSions are not equivalent. 
The Chinese term "I" at its ver,y origin signifies "what is due to"; 
it corresponds pretty well to the notion of justice, as a general virtue, 
72 Cont. o.pus cit. Since the text is a dictionary, one may easily find our 
quotation under the word ''Dteu''. Italics are our own. The purpose 
is to show that Mo-tze has expressed the ideas contained in these 
italicized words. 
13 The Chinese term" 1 "is also Widely Used to signify justice in the 
strict sense, and.then it is considered as one of the four or five car-
dinal virtues according to the ancient Chinese wisemen. But here in our 
case it is obvious that the term must be translated as "riKhteousness". 
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especially as the term is used in the Bible. JUstice meant, according to 
the writers of the Holy Scripture, whatever is due to the moral perfection 
of a man; hence, a just man is a morally perfect man. Many a Christian writ 
bas, therefore, translated the Chinese term ItI" by It justice" • However, 
other authors, in order to avoid the equivocation with the meaning of 
"justice" in the strict sense, have preferred the word "righteousness" which 
stands for whatever is morally right, and., as is obvious, excludes whatever 
is morally wrong. 
But, as a consequence of this obvious exclusion, the term "righteous-
ness" is not the synonym of the relatively modern term "moralitylf because 
morality has an even wider meaning than righteousness. Morality, according 
to its philosophical definition, is a supreme genus which includes two 
supreme species (or three species, for those, i. e. Suarezeans, who admit the 
existence of a species of indifference) which are: morally good or right and 
morally evil or wrong. 
Such a well-developed and well-defined conception would not have a 
term to express it in ancient China; that is to s83', the ancient Chinese had 
no such conception which would include righteousness and its opposite at 
the same time. Since morality includes what we may call "unrighteousness", 
it is obviously not a synonym of "righteousness". 
Nevertheless, though this is true philosophically speaking, the vulgar 
language 'Will (wronglT of course) make them synonyms. According to the 
popular way of speaking, only what is morally good is called "moral", and 
lIhat is morally eril is rather called "immoral". Hence, according to this 
way of speaking, "righteousness" would be exactly the synorqm of "morality"; 
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and "unrighteousness" 'WOuld be an equivalent of "immorality". 
But we must not put the foundation of our statement on the vulgar use 
(or rather abuse) of the term which must be philosophically understood as 
we are actually dealing with philosophical questions. Thus we must point 
out that the vulgar notion of morality is not correct, because the contrar,r 
of "moral" is "amoral", and hence an "immoral act" is scientifically a 
. - -
"moral act". St. Thomas calls a moral act a "human act" (actus humaD.us) 
~ich can be morally good or evil, 'Wrong or right; he calls all other 
activities of human beings which are not subject to the moral law simply 
an act of man (actus hominis). 74 Thus, the "actus hominis", which we may 
call "amoral actft (in opposition to Ifmoral act" which St. Thomas called 
"actus humanus lf ) is not a moral act; therefore it is neither morally good 
nor morally bad, simp17 because it is out of the realm of morality. 
74 St. Thomas: "Actionum, quae ab homine aguntur, illae solae proprie 
dicuntur humanae, quae sunt proprie hominis, in quatum est homo. Ditfe 
autem homo ab irrationalibus oreaturis in hoc, quod est suorum actUlllIl 
dominus. Unde liae solae actiones proprie humanae vocuntur, quarmn 
homo est domilnts. Est autem homo dominus suorum actuum per rationem 
et voluntatem; unde et liberum arbitrium esse dicitur facultas voluntati 
et rationis. Ille a ergo actiones proprie humanae dicuntur quae ex 
voluntate deleberata procedunt. Si quae autem aliae actiones homini 
convenient, possunt dici quide. actiones hominis, sed non proprie humana 
quam non sint hominis, in quantum est homo." (S. Th. I 2, quest. 1, 
art 1.) (Italics ours). "Sic ergo moralia .. philosophiae, circa quam 
versatur presens intentio,.proprium est considerare operationes humanas, 
secundum quod sunt ordinatae ad invicem et ad finem. -- Dico autem 
operationes humanas, quae procedunt a voluntate hominis secundum ordinem 
rationis. Nam si quae operationes in homine inveniuntur, quae non 
subjacent voluntati et rationi, non dicuntur proprie humanae, sed 
naturales, sicut patet de operationibus animae vegetativae. Quae nullo 
modo cadunt sub consideratione moralis philosophiae. Sicut autem sub-
jectum philosophiae naturalis est MotUS, vel res mobilis, ita subjectum 
moralis philosophiae est operatio humana ordinata in finem, vel etiam 
homo prout est voluntarie· agens propter tinem." (In Ethicorum.. Lib. I, 
Lectio I, No. 2-3). --
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Hence we may say that an amoral act is not a moral act, but an immoral act, 
as it is understood by the common people, definitely is a moral act. Of 
course, it is morally evil or wrong. 
'Therefore righteousness is only one species of morality. .An unright-
eoua act is just as much a moral act as a righteous act. Unrighteousness 
(or immorality according to the popular notion) is but another species of 
morality. 
Acknowledging fully the difference of the meaning of "r~ghteousness" 
and "morality", we can, nevertheless, show that the two terms are practicall 
equivalent in this particular case, that is, when we say "the norm of 
righteousness" or "the norm of morality". Because the norm of righteousness 
serves to distinguish what is morally right from what is morally wrong; 
and the "norm of moral! ty" is just exactly another !!!!!!!2,.r the ~ ~ 
We wish to be permitted to quote Mo-tze at length in order to convince 
oUr readers that what Ilo-tze meant by "standard of righteouaness" is exactly 
the same being which is conceived by modern scholastic philosophers as "the 
objective norm of morality": 
Therefore the will of Heaven to Mo-tze is like the 
compasses to the wheelright and the square to the 
carpenter. The wbeelright tests the circularity of 
every object in the world With his compasses, saying: 
"That which satisfies my compasses is circular. That 
which does not is not circular". Therefore whether an 
object is circular or not is all known, because the 
standard of circularity is all established. The carpenter 
also tests the squareness of every obj ect in the world with 
his square, saying: "That which satisfies my square 
is square; that which_does not is not sfluare. It Therefore 
whether any object is square or not is all known. Why 
so? Because the standard of squareness is established. 
Similarly, with the Will of Heaven Mo-tze will measure 
the jurisdiction and government of the lords in the empire 
on the one hand, the doctrines and teachings of the 
multitudes in the empire on the other. If some conduct 
is observed to be in ac~ordance with the will of Heaven, 
it is called good conduct; if it is in opposition to the 
will of Heaven it is called bad conduct. And if a govern-
ment is observed to be in accordance with the will of 
Heaven it is called a good government; if it is in opposi-
tion to the will of Heaven it is called bad government. 
With this as the model and with this as the standard, 
whether the lords and the ministers are magnanimous or 
not can be measured as easily as to distinguish black and 
white. Therefore Mo-tze said: "If the rulers and the 
gentlemen of the world really desire to follow the Tao 
and benefit the people they have only to obey the 'Will 
.of Heaven, the origin of magnanimous and righteousness. 
Obedience to the will of Heaven is the standard of 
righteousness:-- ---- --
From this we also see that the norm of morality must necessarily be 
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morally good itself, since evil does not exist as positive being, that is to 
say, a being which has its own "raison d' etre tf , its own "esse". 
Hence, we think, after this careful explanation, that we may state 
without temerity and without hesitation that according to Mo-tze's teachi~, 
~!!2!! 2!. morality .!! ~ !!!! of God. 
Thus the problem of morality is proposed, discussed and answered by 
Jlo-tze. However, the bare text does not always represent exactly the real 
mind of the author. It has always to be considered together with other 
critical reasons in order to decide the real mind of the author. Therefore 
many different opinions have often been expressed about one and the same 
original text. This has happened also to our philosopher, as we shall see 
in the following section of our essay. 
75 From the original text of Mo-tze, chapter 27. 
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C) THEISM VERSUS UTILITARIANISM 
For centuries, Chinese scholars have consistently believed that 
lrfo-tze was a sincere theist and that he believed really in the existence of 
a personal God, Whose 'Will is, as he stated again and again, the norm or 
the standard of morality. No criticism has ever been made against Mo-tze's 
sincerity on this point, although he was severely criticized by his adver-
series, especially the Confucianists of all ages headed by Mencius, on almos 
all other pOints, of his teachings. 
However, when the Chinese in modern times learned skepticism and all 
of its consequences, the curiosity and pride of finding something new and 
different in contrast to a long and common traditional belief tempted our 
modern scholars, of lIhom a great number have been converted to Positivism 
and Materialism under the influence of the neo-paganism of a modern EUrope, 
and especially of a modern America. Hence the,y found, as they claimed, an 
atheistic Lao-tze, an agnostic Confucius, and a utilitarian Mo-tze. "God 
had no place in ancient Chinese philosophy, although He ~ have had a hide-
. 76 
out in the hearts of the simple and ignorant common people." 
This, of course, is quite a revolutionar,y statement about the history 
of Chinese philosophy. It is not only revolutionary with regard to the 
traditional belief of Chinese scholars, but, most of all, it is in diametri-
cal contradiction to the opinion of the Western Christian Sinolog1sts, who, 
76 1'0 name a few of these modern authors: Chen Yuan-Teb r~!LJ';.t ; Chle 
Wen-Hu ~ k. if; Shang Nai-Hsi '* J5 ~; Ts I ai Shan-Ssu Ii:: ~ !~. Con!. their 
respective works listed in the bibliography (section II, Chinese works). 
Also, they Will be quoted later in our discussion. 
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from the time of Father Matteo Ricci, S. J., do1m. to the most recent 
~sioners, have always believed and even proved 'With sound arguments that 
tbe ancient Chinese people were undoubtedly theists and even clearly 
~notheists. 77 We shall cite a few statements of theirs, especially 
referring to'the teachings of Mo-tze. Henri Maspero, the noted French 
Sinologist, has written the follo'Wing words about Mo-tze in his well-known 
work, !! Chine antique: 
Pour lui, (Yo-tze) la morale repose sur quelque chose 
de plus profond: les hommes doivent: "prendre le Ciel 
pour modele, faire ce qui lui plait et,laisser de cote 
ee qui lui deplait." •••• Le Ciel, pour Mo-taeu, clest le 
Seigneur d I En-Haut, Dieu personnel et tout puissant qui 
sait tout,. en sorte que vis a vis du Ciel, il n l6 a 
pas de gorge ombreyte, de retraite, de desert, que sa 
lumiere ne voir." 7~ 
w. H. Long made a beautiful evaluation of Mo-tze's teachings: 
Motze is still a living thinker. The fundamental prin-
ciples which he taught, freed from the limitations of 
their times, are as sound and as powerful for human good 
today as they were in the ancient golden age of Chinese 
philosophy. A purpose-governed cosmos, a God-appointed 
moral law, spiritual personality as the essence of 
-Deity, moral freedom and personal responsibility, the 
supremacy of the Divine Will in social and political 
life, the law of universal love among men sanctioned by 
man-loving Divine Spirit; the inwardness and social fruitage 
of goodness, humanitarianism, the appeal to logic and 
intelligence, the progressive mind, the distinction 
between defensive and offensive war--these remain pro-
found doctrines challenging acceptance by the mind of 
man today •••• Motzets thought is essentially one with the 
"Veteres Sinae in summitate rerum ponebant Deum. unicum, omniperfectum, 
personalem, a mundo distinctum, quem Shang-ti vocabant." Cont. Rev. 
Paul Geny, S.J., professor of philosophy at the Gregorian University, 
Rome: Brevis Conspectus Historiae Philosophiae, Romae, 1932. Also 
eont. above text, page 33, and note ~ of this chapter. 
Cont. opus ~., pg. 487 (Paris, 1927). 
personalism and the theistic idealisms of the West which 
find in moral and creative SeUhood the clue to the most 
real as well as the most divine, the end of being, the 
goal of education, and the hope of society. 79 
Even the most skeptical Western author who is doubtful about the 
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sincerity of all Chinese ancient philosophers in their belief in the real 
exiStence of a personal God Will accept Mo-tze as an obvious exception. 
Thus S. Holth cited Wieger as saying: 
Mo-Ti is the only Chinese lIriter of whom it may be thought 
that he believed in God; the only apostle of s00ve and 
champion of right Which China has produced. 
Thus the Western Sinolog1sts have rather followed the traditional 
belief of Chinese scholars, which is but a natural and logical conclusion 
from the original text of the ~ of Mo-tze. 
Nevertheless, maQy scholars of modern China have created a question 
which deals with the personal conviction of Mo-tze because although Mo-tze, 
as a matter of fact, preached the Will of God as the norm of morality, it 
might well be that he himself was not convinced of the existence of a per-
sonal God. Kant, who encouraged the belief in the existence of God for a 
practical reason, is a good example for this ease. Or, more recently, 
Giovanni Gentile, not agnostic like Kant, but positive~ an atheistic ideal-
1st and the founder of the Italian Liberal School, has been credited With 
the re-introduction of religious classes in the Italian schools. He asserted 
that the religious belief of faith in the existence of a Christian God was 
the only practical philosophy of the common people, while for philosophers, 
79 Conf. Mo-tze, China's Ancient Philosopher of Universal Love, p. 38. 
(Peiping, China, 19034). W. H. LOng is considered an auUiOrity on 
Chinese ancient philosophy among the Protestant circle in China. 
80 Conf. Micius,..! Brief Outline of His Life and Ideas, Shanghai, 1935, 
• 
.uch as he, all religious teachings philosophicallT considered are but 
nonsense. 
Confucius seemed to be, somewhat like Kant, agnostic about the 
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existence of God, yet he was fanatically insistent upon conserving all the 
ancient sacrificial rites. 1'his might perhaps be the real mind of Mo-tze, 
who is, according to those atheistic writers, too enlightened to be a sin-
cere religious believer. Hence, they have formed this question: "Did 
llo-tze really and sincerely believe in the existence of a personal God?" 
This is an interesting and important question, because it deals not 
onlY with Mo-tze's personal belief, but also with a possibility of a change 
in the fundamental concept of Talues of the entire ancient Chinese 
philosophy-. 
Indeed, if Mo-tze, who criticized almost all the wise men of his time 
as insincere belieTers. in God, did not he himself really believe in the 
existence of God, then how can one imagine that a really theistic idea 
existed in Chinese philosophy? As a consequence the entirety of ancient 
Chinese philosophy might easily be considered as sophistic, superstitious 
or utilitarian, and hence atheistic. What a change will then have taken 
place in the history of philosophy? 
Such a thought may not lead one to doubt the Sincerity of Mo-tze's 
belief. But, since the doubt has already arisen, we cannot neglect further 
investigations of the matter in order to assure ourselves of the truth. 
Now it is a matter of fact that m~ objections have already been 
launched against the sincerity of Yo-tze's belief in the existence of a 
personal God. They are not without foundation, and some of them appear 
quite convincing and are supposed to be trustworthy, since their authors 
possess considerable authority on this matter. 
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Here, however, our intention is to examine and criticize these obj~ct-
iOns carefu.1.13"; however, not without respect to their authors. Above all, 
'P should find the truth, for the truth is better than any human authority. 
Henee, if we shall find that the objections of these authors are not 
sufficient to convince us, we shall simply be maintaining the traditional 
belief, which is, in this case, still in the conditio possidentis. It may 
be that we can also procure some positive reason to confirm this traditional 
opinion. 
Before we present and answer those objections, we would like to point 
out that almost no Western Sino1ogist is acquainted with the arguments of 
modern Chinese scholars and, as a consequence, none of them has as yet 
tried to answer them. We believe that our effort in examining and refuting 
those objections is the first of its kind in defending the theistic position 
of our philosopher, Mo-tze, and that if this effort is successful, we shall 
have contributed to the solution of an important problem in the history of 
Chinese philosophy. 
The following are the objections as found in the words of modern 
Chinese scholars: 
OBJECTION 1. Mo-tze did not prove the existence of God; therefore he 
did not sincerely believe in God; he only utilized the superstitious mind 
of the common people to propagate his political utilitarianism. 81 
-
81 This argument is quite CODmon among all Chinese modern authors. Cont. 
Ts' ai Shan-Sse k ~ J~ An Outline of the Development of Chinese Civi1iza-
~, Shanghai, 1932, Ch. II, p. 123. Also Chen Yuan-Teh rJ--Jv ~~ 
History of Ancient Chinese Phi1oso ,Shanghai 1937 • 191. 
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ANSWER: At first sight it seems very strange that Mo-tze, lIho was a 
philosopher, should speak about God without ever attempting to prove the 
existence of God. However, if one understands well the ancient belief of 
the Chinese people, one is not greatly surprised by this, because the 
ancient Chinese always believed in the existence of a personal God. We 
could cite almost every authoritative work on this subject, Western as 
well as Ch~ese -- even our modern materialistic authors -- to prove our 
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statement. The very fact which this objection admits, namely, that 
Mo-tze was utilizing the belief of the common people, sho~ definite~ that 
the common people did sincerely believe in the existence of a personal God. 
Therefore, Mo-tze did not need to prove the existence of God to his listeners. 
He could have merely described, as he did, God's knOWledge, power, goodn~ss, 
justice, etc., and insist, as a practical consequence, that man must act 
in conformity to the will of God. 
Besides, as we ean see in the text of the Book of Mo-tze,83 he 
strenuously endeavored to prove the existence of spirits and ghosts; this 
waS because people no longer believed in their real existence as certainly 
as in the existence of God. Yet, generally speaking, the Chinese people 
ot that time still believed in the existence of spirits and ghosts. Hence, 
we can be sure that Mo-tze did not teel it necessary to prove the existence 
of God, because if he had felt ·the necessity of doing so he would have done 
it as solicitously' as he proved the existence of spirits 8ll'ld ghosts. In 
addition, Mo-tze was very amtious to have a firm basis for his doctrine. 
82 Cont. above text page 12, note 11 and pages 33 and 34, note 5. 
83 Cont. original text of Mo-tze, chapter 31, "On the Existence of spirits 
and ghosts. tt 
Be 1(88 very careful in examining any doctrine; he established three ways 
,t examining the source, the value, and the effect of any doctrine or any 
84 
.tatement• 
In exposing his doctrine of "anti-fatalism", his principal argument 
.as hiS open challenge to fatalists that the,r must prove the existence of 
the thing they called "Fate". Yet, Mo-tze gave his arguments against the 
existence of "Fate" and thus concluded that "Fate" does not ex::tat. He 
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also wanted the fatalists to lOlow that instead of "Fate" it was Heaven who 
rules over all men and will eventually reward good ones and punish the evil 
ones. 85 Therefore, if Mo-tze was conscious that the existence of God 
needed to be proved, he surely would have done it most anxiously, lest his 
opponent challenge him to prove the existence of Heaven, Whose will he 
considered as the standard of morality. 
Moreover, Mo-tze is considered by all Western and Chinese authors, 
even the objectors themselves, as the most logical 86 and most radical in 
teachings among all ancient Chinese philosophers. Hence we may assert that 
he would certainly have proved the existence of God if he only had felt 
that this was in need of any proof. 
64 Cont. original text of Mo-tze, chapters 35, 36 and 37. 
85 conr. original text of Mo-tze, chapters 35, 36, and 37, "Anti-Fatalism.tI 
86 Conf. above text, page 23, note 44 of our first chapter. We may still 
add this statement of Wilhelm Richard, who wrote about the school of 
Mo-tze: "The whole spirit of this school is one of religious asceticism 
Everything in their doctrine is logical, rational." (Conf. A Short 
Histo~ of Chinese Civilization, New York, 1929, p. 150. H. Williamson 
eiaite Mo-tzets logic in these words: "Aristotle was born just about 
the time that Mo-tzu died, and he is usially considered to be the father 
of logic as a system. But possibly this honour may yet have to be 
accorded to Mo-tzu, or same other Chinese Sage not yet restored to us 
from the shade of antiquity." (Conr. his Mo-Ti, a Chinese Heretic, 
Tsl-Nan, China, 1927, page 16.) -
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Finally, our readers will understand our statement still better from 
the attitude of the opponents of Mo-tze. Almost every point of his teaohing 
especially ~hat of "universal love", whioh is intrinsioally oonneoted with 
the existenoe of God, was vigorously attacked by his opponents from Mencius 
down to our modern age; but his teaching on the will of God' Without proving 
the existence of God was never cri tioized until very recent M,mes. 
In fact, none of the ancient Chinese philosophers ever systematically 
proved the existence of 'God. One might wonder at the fact, but it is 
more wonderful that the existence of God was never explioitly and UeJl.:LUtlr.lT.e 
denied in ancient China, and hence, that it needs no proof.' 
One might point out Lao-tze as an emeption; but Lao-tze was rather a 
pantheist than an atheist, unless one would call Plotinus or Philo the Jew 
an atheist. On the other hand, some Protestant authors even have tried to 
shOW' that the "Tao" of Lao-tze is rather a personal God and can be regarded 
as simUar to the Logos of St. John the Evangelist. However, we would 
obviously not oonsent to this statement; we may acknowledge the resemblance 
of the "Tao" of Lao-tze to the Logos of Philo, but not to the Divine Word 
of St. john' the Evangelist. 87 
87 Con!. above text page 42. We have explained that the Tao of Lao-tze 
is somewhat like the "one" of Plotinus and somwbat like the "Nature" 
of the modern materialists. Therefore, it is impossible for.us to admit 
any real similarity between the Tao and the Divine Word of St. John the 
Evangelist. As to the Logos of Philo, the Jew, since it is similar 
to the "Onett of nitinus, it may be said also similar to the Tao. In 
one word, the Tao is an immanent principle of the universe while the 
Verbum of St. John is trasncendent and distinct from the world. 
------------------------------.... 
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At any rate, an explicit and definitive denial of the existence of God 
"as unkno'Wll at the time of Mo-tze. The Tao !! Ch'ing of Lao-tze, Whether 
authentic or not, was certainly unlalown at that time, as we have demonstrated 
Hence we may say with certainty that an atheistic or evena pan-
theistic doctrine was unknown to the people of ancient China at the time ot 
our philosopher, although it may have been embryonically growing in a small 
milieu of scholars. 
Another objection to our statement might be based on the fact that 
Mo-tze criticized the scholars of his time, namely the Confucianists, as 
insincere in their belief in God; therefore, the scholars, if not the 
gen~ral, of his time must have been agnostic, not to say atheistic. 
Hence, Mo-tze should have proved the existence of God. 
We shall defend our statement by distinguishing two kinds of agnosticism 
also two kinds of atheism. The first kind is' theoretical or philoso-
phical and the second kind is practical. Atheists of the former class deny 
the existence of a personal God by their theories, teachings and arguments, 
while those of the latter class have no arguments at all against the 
existence of a personal God, although they act as if a personal God does 
not exist. It is practical atheism or agnosticism that Mo~tze has severely 
condemned. In fact, the argument which Mo-tze uses against the scholars 
of his time is to show that they act contradictorily to their theory. They 
are accused by Mo-tze of being careful not to offend the head of family or 
sta.te in 'Which they were living, but not caring much whether they offend God 
or not, although theoretically th~ do agree with Mo-tze that ever.rone is 
living under the domination of God Who is present everywhere and is watching 
every one of our actions. 
If a man commits a misdemeanour in the family, he 
still has other families in which to seek shelter. 
Yet father reminds son, the elder brother reminds the 
younger brother, saying: 'Be obedient, be careful 
in conduct in the family. If one is not obedient and 
careful in conduct in the family how can he live in 
the family?1 If a man commits a misdemeanour in the 
state, he s.till has other state. in which to seek 
shelter. Yet the father reminds the son and the elder 
brother reminds the younger brother saying: 'Be 
obedient and be careful. One cannot live in a state 
and be disobedient and careless. I Now all men live 
in the world and under Heaven. 'When a man sins against 
Heaven there is nowhere to seek shelter. But people 
do not think of warning each other. Thus ,I know that 
they do not understand things of importance. And 
Mo-tze said: 'Be obedient. Be careful. Be sure to 
do What Heaven.desires and avoid what Heaven abominates. 88 
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Therefore, Mo-tze recognized the fact that there were many practical 
though few theoretical agnostics and atheists in ancient China. This is a 
fact in our day; we are quite certain . that there are only a very few 
theoretical atheists but the practical atheists or agnostics in our own time 
nmst be counted by millions. One of the most commonly used arguments agains 
them (practical atheists) is still the same kind of argument that was used 
by Mo-tze; namely to show that their practical lives contradict what they 
admit theoretically; Ul. the existence of a personal God. 
Acknowledging this distinction, one will not wonder why Mo-tze did not 
attempt to prove the existence of God ~le he criticized the insincerity 
of the scholars and people as well in their belief in God. 
Yet Mo-tze was certainly far from being the only theist who preached 
the will of God lVithout ever proving the existence of God. The typical 
88 Cont. original text of Mo-tze, chapter 28, also chapter 26. 
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eJ(8Ilple would be Our Lord Jesus Christ Himself and His Apostles, especially 
st. Paul whose mission was precisely to teach the gentiles to whom the 
atheistic ideas of the early Greek philosophers seemingly were not unfamili 
although as a matter of fact the people in general were rather polytheists 
at that time., We may remark two strange facts whieh are strange to us 
because they happened after ancient Greece had produced so many unquestion-
'ably atheistic philosophers. The first is that th~ Greek people in general, 
up to the time of St. Paul, are polytheistic and very superstitious. 
The second fact is that Socrates, who talked so much about God or rather 
gods, had very little tq offer in proving the existence of God or gods, 
except the statement that: "Whatsoever exists for a useful purpose lIlUSt 
., 89 
be the work of an intelligence. tI On this matter, our philosopher did 
even better than Socrates when he stated that the standard of morality must 
be given by the most intelligent being whom he called Heaven. Yet Mo-tze 
did not have to confront Thales the materialist, Pythagoras the numerolOgist, 
Deliocritus the atomist, Heraclitus the evolutionist, and so on. China has 
fortunately had no such philosophers. 
This shows us at least that the sole fact that Mo-tle did not prove 
the existence of God does not implT that therefore he was insincere in 
his believing in it, because proof is needed only when doubt exill!ts. Hence 
where there is no doubt there is no need of proof, such as in the case of 
immediate "evidence". Generally speaking, the existence of God is' not ! 
~iori and per!! evident to human knowledge. However, it can become 
evident, a posteriori of course, to the extent that it will not be a matter 
-89 Cont.~. I. 4, 2. 
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of doubt for a certain number of people under certain circumstances for a 
certain length of time. This s eerns to have been the case of the ancient 
Chinese people, as it was for many other peoples during a certain period 
of their history. It was because of this same reason that Our Lord did not 
have to prove the existence of a personal God. And, thus, St. Paul did 
not care to provide a really philosophical argument for the existence of 
a personal and unique God 90 but he was rather anxious to demonstrate that 
there is a moral law written in our hearts. 
Moreover, such a popular belief in the existence of God is not a 
merely superstitious idea unless we would completely deny the value of the 
so-called argument from the unanimous consent of all peoples (consensus 
omnium populorum) which is often used as a proof of the existence of God. 91 
90 The text of Rom. 1, 20, is believed by some minor authors as an attempt 
of St. Paul to prove the existence of God by natural reason. But major 
authorities see only that the text furnishes an assertion from theologi 
authority that by natural reason alone man may know the existence of a 
personal God. Thus the possibility of a natural theology is authorized 
by the revelation. But St. Paul personaJ.ly was not a natural theologian. 
Furthermore, St. Paul seemed to insist on the invisible qualities or 
proprieties of God: IfInvisibilia enim ipsius ••• 1t seems to us more likely 
to indicate the invisible qualities of God than the existence of God. 
The ilmnediately folloWing context will confirm our opinion, for St. Paul 
condemned those people as inexcusable because while by their reason they 
may know that God is invisible, yet they "mutaverunt gloriam incorrupti-
bilis Dei in similitudinem imaginis corruptibilis hominis, et volucrum, 
et quadrupedum, et serpentium." (Rom. 1, 2.3.) This is condemnation of 
idolatry not of atheism. In other words, it deals with the spirituality 
or invisibility of God rather than with His existence. 
91 Here, it is not our task to defend the value of this argument from the 
unanimous consent of peoples. However, personally we believe that this 
argument has a profound philosophical value, because such a persuasion 
common to so many people is obviously not a blind faith but rather the 
result of clear reasoning based on solid facts. For instance Rev. J. S. 
Hickey formed his argumentum ex Consensu Generis Humani as follows: 
"Inter omnes homines existit ineradicabilis persuasio de alicujus numinis 
8upremi existentia; atqui haec ~ersuasio non potest prodire nisi a natura 
rationa~. et proinde infaIIiDi ~ter vera est; ergo ••• 1f (Co~ 
8;3 
Especially is this true in China, for the ancient Chinese wise men certainly 
did not blindly believe in the existence of God. Theyconsidered God, their 
"Emperor of Above" (Shang-Ti), as Creator and Supreme Ruler of the Universe, 
.;mose existence was taken for granted by them, for otherwise there could be 
no explanation for the origin and the order (both physical and moral) in 
the Universe. These ideas contained at least virtually all the elements 
of the various standard arguments for the proof of the existence of God. 
Therefore, they have also a certain amount of philosophical value of their 
own. 
In one word, we state that inasmuch as one cannot show that Mo-tze had 
to prove the existence of God, this objection remains invalid. 
As to the second part of this objection, it is also of little value, 
since Mo-tze obviously could not be utilizing the superstitious belief of 
the common people while, at the same time, complaining that people lacked 
sincerity in their belief in the existence of God and spirits. Our philo-
sopher, as we stated above, was solicitously attacking the practical 
agnosticism of his time; hence, one could scarcely say that he has utilized 
the superstitious devotions of the common people because only a practical 
superstition of this kind can be utilized for the purpose mentioned in the 
objection. The people at the time of Mo-tze, generally speaking, had solely 
a theoretical belief in the existence of God and spirits; as to the practical 
Side of the matter, their belief did not bring up devotion nor zeal. Hence 
they acted as if there were no God to punish them. This is true not only 
Philosophiae Scholasticae, Vol. III, Dublini, 1941, page 63. In pages 
64-61, the author proves his minor: "atqui ••• " Italics are our own. 
in ancient China, but even in our present day there are a great many 
Christians who are actually enjGying their lives in sinful pleasures and 
profits as if God did not exist, although they do believe (not dutiously 
but rather certainly) that God does exist and will punish sinners. And 
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most of such Christians are even still quite proud of their Christian faith. 
Such a cold belief in the existence of God without any real devotion and 
zeal cannot be utilized to back up a social movement, as the objector would 
wish us to believe in the case of Mo-tze. Given a people who were devoted 
and zealous in acquiring pleasure and profits, our philosopher should have 
preached the ways and means to pleasure and profit if his purpose had been 
to "utilize" the popular devotion or tendency. But, 'Whoever should dare to 
speak of the ways and means of loving and obeying God to this kind of 
people, would only quickly lose his popularity (if he did have any) instead 
of gaining any support. They 'WOuld not confront his doctrine by denying 
the existence of God, but they s imply would not listen and would be annoyed 
by repeated attempts to speak to them. This was exactly what happened to 
our philosopher. Anyone of our readers may try this on a practical un-
believer and let his own experience confirm our statement. Therefore, 
in concluding, we may say that since the people of that time did not deny 
the existence of God, Mo-tze did not have to prove Godts existence, because. 
there was no sufficient motive for doing so. But, on the other hand, since 
th~ were mostly practical unbelievers, our philosopher could not utilize 
their devotion and zeal towards God and the spirits to back up his social 
reform simply because there was no such devotion. Mo-tze, conscious of 
Such a fact, complained of the lack of true believers. Therefore, we may say 
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that this objection failed completel7 in reaching its intended purpose, 
namely to convince us that Mo-tze was not a theist. 
OBJECTION II 
Mo-tze compared the "Will of Heaven". to the instruments of the carpent 
therefore, in his mind, the "Will of Heaven" is merely a tool to promote 
a good social. order. In fact, Mo-tze said: "The Will of Heaven to me is 
like the compasses to the wbeelright and the square to the carpenter." 92 
OUR ANSWER 
Frankly speaking, 'We must sa7 that this objection is rather sophistic. 
If one take it seriously, it shows only that his knowledge of formal logic 
is rather poor. A simple distinction will make it clear. We must mow 
that Mo-tze compared the "Will of Heaven" to the compass and square of the 
carpenter not because they are instruments, but, because the7 are standards 
-
for measurements. In more philosophical terms, we ma7 say- that the compari-
son is based on the similari t7 of both objects in on17 one of their 
characteristics, namely their ability to be a standard for a certain kind 
of measurement. Hence the comparison is not to be extended arbitrarily 
to other characteristics of any of those two objects. And if one does so, 
it is but obvious that he is making a sophistic (i.e. illogical) inference, 
which is of course inval.id. For example, when we say that while most of 
vertebrate animals are quadrupeds, birds, on the contrary, like men, have 
--
only two legs, of course we cannot conclude that therefore birds are intelli 
gent or that men can fly without an airplane. Now, in the comparison of 
92 This objection is advanced by Chen Yuan-Teh rt. fu.4~ once a lecturer at 
the University of Hu-Han ¥\.7J-A I~Hupei, China. This objection is quoted 
from his (Chen IS) History of Ancient Chinese PhilosophZ' Shanghai, 
China, 1937, page 212. 
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Mo-tze, the compass and square are considered as standards, not as instru-
ments; in faet, strictly speaking, they are not instruments, they are solely' 
standards. In quoting a few more lines of the original text, the sophistry 
of this objection becomes obvious. 
Mo-tze said: The will of Heaven to me is like the 
compass to the wheelright and the square to the carpenter. 
The wbeelright and the carpenter measure all the square 
and circular objects with their squar~ and compass and 
accept those that fit as correct and reject those that 
do not fit as incorrect. The writings of the gentlemen 
of the world of the present day cannot exhauStively be 
enumerated. They endeavor to convince the feudal lords 
on the one hand" the scholars on the other. But from 
magnanimity and righteousness they are far off. How do 
we know? Because I have the most ~mpetent standard 
in the world to measure them with. 
Throughout the entire book of 53 chapters, Mo-tze has repeat~ stated 
that the "Will of Heaven" is the standard (not instrument) of righteousness" 
especially in the three chapters on the "Will of Heaven" and in the fourth 
chapter which is entitled "On the Necessity of A Standard". Although this 
-
last mentioned chapter is not usually' considered as among the most 
undoubtedly authentic ones, it is certainly the work of a follower of Mo-tze t 
disciples; hence, it is not to be considered as strictly spurious. And it 
does represent, as we stated above, the traditional opinion of Mo-tze on the 
doctrine of a moral standard. ~ We refrain from citing the arpents and 
Cont. text of Mo-tze, chapter 26, Mei translation. Italics our own. 
See above, page 11 of our dissertation (first chapter). These chapters 
are not strictly spurious, because although they are later compOSitions, 
they do represent the original doctrine of Mo-tze, at least in substance. 
Hence, they are substantially faithful, ~d hence authentic, in the 
larger sense of the term. This is siJDi1ar to the case of the Pseudo-
Diony-sius Areopagitae which is spurious in a sense yet a valuable 
ancient document accepted by all critics. 
explanations of the original text, because they are too long, but we may 
. sUll them up as follows: 
In teaching his doctrine on the standard of morality, Mo-tze said: 
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To accomplish anything whatsoever one must have a standard. The artisans 
bave their compass, lines, or pendulum as standards in their words. But 
the gentlemen of the world do not realize the necessity of having a standard 
for their conduct; this shows that they are even less intelligent than the 
artisans. Now, what is the standard of human conduct? Or what could be 
its standard? Shall we say, let everyone imitate his ovm parents? Or his 
teacher? Or his king? But there are few good parents, good teachers and 
good kings. As a matter of fact, there are many bad ones. To take them 
as standards is to learn to be bad, and therefore they can not be the 
standard of morality. The only person surely and always good is Heaven. 
Therefore, Mo-tze wishes that everyone imitate Heaven, take Heaven as his 
standard of morality or righteousness. 
It should be obvious even to those imperfectly acquainted with philo-
sophical distinctions that the compass and square are not considered as 
mere instruments in making objects; rather they are standards in measuring 
the perfection of an object either already made or still in the making. 
Mo-tze exposed this comparison of his more explicitly in the second chapter 
on the Will of Heaven. 
Therefore the Will of Heaven to Mo-tze is like the compass 
to the wheelright and the square to the carpenter. The 
wheelright tests the circularity of every object in the 
world with his compass, saying: 'That which satisfies 
my compass is circular. That which does not is not 
circular.' Therefore whether an object is circular or 
not is all known, because ~ standard ~ circularity!! 
all established •••• The carpenter also tests the 
squareness of every object in the world with his 
square •••• Sim11ar~, with the Will of Heaven, Mo-tze 
will measure the juriSdIC'tiO'ii and government of the 
IOra's in the empire on the one hand, and the doctrines 
and teachings of the multitude in the empire on the 
other. If some conduct is observed to be in accordance 
with the Will of Heaven, it is called good conduct •••• 9S 
In concluding, therefore, we may say that 'Mo-tze did not intend to 
say that the Will of Heaven is an instrument to make a sooia1 order as 
the compass is an instrument intended to make a cirou1ar object; but the 
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original text oertainly and explicitly tells us that, for Mo-tze, the Will 
of Heaven is a standard or ~ for judging the righteousness of all 
human activities just as the compass is a standard for judging the circular-
ity of all objects. 
If Mo-tze did intend to bring out the instrumentality of the objects 
as the liaison-concept in this comparison, then we may askthe author 
of this objection: ffWby did our philosopher not choose any other tools 
used by the carpenter, such as the axe, ruimmer, saw, etc., lIhich are more 
commonly knOlm as instruments?" 
said: 
said: 
said: 
OBJECTIOW: III 
We must examine how Mo-tze presented the ''Will of Heaven" to us. He 
96 --
"I have the Will of Heaven ••• " Again, on another occasion he 
"Therefore, Mo-tze has the wii1 of Heaven ••• " 97 Finally, he even 
"Therefore, Mo-tze established the Will of H~aven as the standard •• ~ 
Those wOrds show us sufficiently that the Will of Heaven is something 
95 Cont. original text of lIo-tze, chapter 27. Italics ours. 
96 Cont. original Chinese text of llo-tze, chapter 26. 
97 Cont. ibidem, chapter 27. 
98 Cont. ibidem, chapter 28. 
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that Mo-tze possesses, or that is established by him. Theref~re it is 
his own creation, or in other words, it is his mental child, his imaginative 
inVention so that he can say that he has it or that he established it. 
This is to say that the Will of Heaven does not exist objectively, but it 
is surely a subjective idea of Mo-tzers. Otherwi~e, why did Mo-tze not 
say: "There is the Will of God to be followed as the standard of moralit,..," 
which sentence would indicate clearly that the Will of God is something 
objectively real and exists outside the mind of Mo-tze. 
If Mo-tze were a sincere believer, i.e. a true theist, he could not 
use such expressions as: "I have the Will of God" and "I establish the 
will of God to be this or that ••• It Would not these expressions be most 
insulting and humiliating to his Almight,.. God? Hence, we must say that the 
Will of God is reall,.. the will of Mo-tze, who wishes to promote social 
.\ 
well being as this is obviously the ultimate aim of his teachings. 99 
OUR ANSWER TO OBJECTION III 
In examining this objection, we wish, above all, to note that the words 
of Mo-tze quoted in the objection are not from the translation of Dr. Mei 
Ii-pao. For Dr. Mei has translated these same words of Mo-tze in a much 
less literal way. Instead of making Mo-tze say: "I have the Will of 
Heaven," Dr. Mei has translated the original Chinese text as follows: 
"Mo-tze said: 'The Will of Heaven to me is like ••• " 'Therefore, if we 
had used this latter translation, we would have been some1lhat unfair to 
99 Mr. Chen Yuan Teh rJ;t> ~t (see above note 92) is the author of this 
objection. (Cf. opus ~. above in note 92). The three quotations of 
Mo-tze are literally translated from the original Chinese text. Here, 
we ~an not use the Mei translation, as we shall explain immediately 
in answering this objection., 
the objector, since it would greatly diminish the vigor of this objection, 
because the force of this objection is precisely built upon the literal 
meaning of the original text. Word by' word, literally translated, Mo-tze 
did say: "I have the Will of Heaven. If And, on the other occasion, the 
original Chinese text did stLy literally: "Therefore, Mo-tze has the Will 
of Heaven". Dr. Mei did not translate these words literally because he 
believed that they are not to be interpreted as the author of this objection 
did. However, we wish our readers to know that the author of the objection 
did not alter the original text; in fact, he could not, since he quoted 
Mo-tze in the original Chinese text; for this objection, as well as most 
of the follOwing objections, is to be found in the works written in 
Chinese by modern authors ot China. They quote the original text directly 
without opportunity to change an "iotaH from it. On the other hand, Dr. 
)(ei is not to be accused with unfaithfulness in translating; for, as we 
shall demonstrate now, the real mind of Mo-tze is not to be reached by 
a literal translation or literal interpretation. 
Even according to this word by word literal translation, we may still 
remark that the words If I have" and ffMo-tze has" do not necessarily indicate 
a merely subjective meaning. For instance, the objector says: If I have an 
objection." He certainly does not intend to say that his objection does 
. 
not exist objectively outside of his mind. In tact, except ~. the case 
of those who are strictly subjectivists or idealists, whenever one says 
that he has something, he presupposes a real distinction between himself 
and the object he possesses. Hence, the object possessed by a certain 
SUbject is, according to our common use of language, almost ~ facto 
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objectively distinguished from its possessor. 
However, our objector went further. He pointed out that a sincere 
believer can not say that he has the Will of God, or that he establishes 
the Will of God to be this or that, as if he were superior eTen to God 
Himself. This would be absurd and most impious. Hence, in such a ease, 
it is more logical to say that he is rather an unbeliever at heart. Mo-tze 
was probably such a person. 
We would agree with our objector it Mo-tze did mean that he possessed 
or established the Will of Heaven in such a sense that it implies that he 
is superior to Heaven Himself. But, to the regret of our objector, this 
is most unlikely to be true. In order to show'Mo-tze's real intention, we 
only have to read the original text a little further than th~ passage quoted 
by our objector, because the objection precisely consists in cutting Mo-tze' 
words from a complete sentence, 'Which if read entirely will show that Mo-tze 
did not mean that he possesses the Will of Heaven as if it were one of 
his belongings. We may still use the literal translation, as would be 
preferred by our opponents, and thus we quote .Mo-tze: "r have the Will of 
-Heaven like the 'Wheelright has his compass or the carpenter has his square ... 
The sentence is still not concluded but it is already sufficient to show 
that our objector misunderstood Mo-tze. As we have already quoted this 
complete passage of Mo-tze twice before, our readers will remember that, 
after having said so much, Mo-tze went on to explain that he uses the will 
of Heaven to measure the righteousness of human conduct just as the carpente 
1I.Ses compass and square to measure the circularity and squareness of any 
object. 
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It is altogether different to say simply: til have the Will of Heaven" 
and to say: til have the Will of Heaven as the standard of morality, as 
the carpenter has compass and square as standards in measurements." If 
the former sentence were in.itself a completed one, and definitely so 
expressed by its author, we might then think that its author was not a 
sincere believer. However, the latter sentence can just as well be a 
sincere and even devout profession of a theist, for, the theists do bell.eve 
that the Divine Law is the norm of morality and if they do say that they 
have the Divine Law as the standard of morality, we understand well what 
-
they really mean. 
So far we have clearly explained the meaning of the word "have", we 
still have to examine the word "establish" used b3T Mo-tze in this occasion. 
Indeed, as it is reported in the objection, our philosopher stated: "There-
tore, Mo-tze established the Will of Heaven as the standard ••• " Hence, the 
objector concluded that the will of Heaven is merely a mental creation of 
Jlo-tze. 
We may first point out that the word flestablish" has not the same 
meaning as the word "create" or "invent". This is even more obvious in 
the original Chinese text. The Chinese never use this term, (which is 
translated here by Dr. Mei as "establish") to indicate creation, formation 
or any kind of production, nor even any kind of manufacturing process. 
It means solely "to set up", that is to say, "to put something in a certain 
. 
POSition in order that it may exercise a determined function." In a more 
. 
material sense, this term is often used to indicate, for instance, n!2, set 
~ a fence in order to divide land ownership". In a more abstract sense, 
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it is often used to indicate, for instance, "to set ~ a rule, or a standard 
to be f.ollowed". At any rate, the original notion of this term is very 
JIl11ch different from that of creating or producing by manufacturing processe 
Thus, especially in philosophical discussions, whenever one says that 
he establishes (or he sets up) some thing as the standard of morality, it 
is but obvious that he means that he asserts, declares, or he adopts, 
accepts this or that as the standard of morality. It is, therefore, a 
statement, a declaration of a faot which is already existing rather than a 
creation or invention of a new fact. Hence, a theist philosopher, while 
disoussing with his opponents, may rightly say that he sets up (or esta.li::iie~ 
the will of God as the standard of morality against those EO wish to accept 
or deolare that the norm of morality is human interest. Therefore, properly 
speaking, these words of Mo-tze, even as they are cited in the objection, 
do not necessarily imply a subjectivist Mo-tze. We wish, however, to go 
even further so as to exclude positively the unfaithful and false interpre-
tation pr.esented in the objection. In other words, we will show that it 
1s definitely false. 
It is always a fundamental rule of interpreting, that when the text is 
somewhat obscure and ambiguous, the context must first be consulted in 
order to determine the original mind of the author. Such is now our case. 
Now, the contexts, both preceding and follOwing, of these three state-
ments cited in the objection are favorable only to our interpretation, that 
is, that Mo-tze believed sinoerely in the objective existence of the will 
of Heaven in a personal God. 
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We must remember that in the passage of the original text from which 
Mo-tze was quoted by our objector, our philosopher was demonstrating to 
hiS listeners that a moral standard must be unquestioningly recognized by 
all as absolutely good or righteous. In other words, Mo-tze wanted a 
universal and absolute standard. Thus, as we have already mentioned above, 
our philosopher, in explaining his doctrine on the necessity of a standard, 
has explicitly excluded all human'beings and their respective authorities --
parents, teachers, kings, and even the Emperor. Some of them are good but, 
as Mo-tze stated explicitly, most of them are bad; moreover, even the good 
ones are not always good. Therefore, their authorities, their teachings 
or their laws are not to be considered as the standard of morality, since 
the real standard must be absolutely good. Hence, Mo-tze reached the 
conclusion that only the authority of God can be the real norm of morality. 
Moreover, in his three chapters, undoubtedly among the most authentic, 
on "Identification with the Superior", Mo-tze condemned the subjective and 
individualistic theory which permits that everyone take his individual 
opinion as the standard of morality, considering such a theory the cause of 
disorder in the world. Hence, the remedy for this evil is to unify the 
standard of morality in order to have a universal standard to be accepted 
by all human beings. Such a universal standard, our philosopher concluded, 
, 100 
can be only the will of God. Then, in explaining his teachings on the 
"Will of Heaven II , Mo-tze said: 
100 Conf. original text of Mo-tze, chapters 11, 12, and 13. All are 
entitled "Identification with the Superiortt • 
Now a standard is never given by" the subordinates 
to the superior} it is always to be given by the 
superior to the subordinates. Hence the common people 
may not make the standard at will, there are the scholars 
to give them the standard; the scholars may not make 
the standard at will, there are the ministers to 
give them the standard. The ministers may not make 
the standard at will, there are the feudal lords to 
give them the standard. The feudal lords may not 
make the standard at will, there is the emperor to 
give them the standard. The emperor may not make 
the standard at will. There is Heaven to give him 
the standard. The gentlemen of the world all-under-
stand that the emperor gives the standard to the 
world but do not understand that Heaven gives the 
standard to the emperor. The Sages explaining this 
said: "When the emperor has done good, Heaven 
rewards _ him. When the 8!peror has eommi tted wrong, 
Heaven punishes him. 1; 
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Thus by enumerating all human beings in different grades of authorities 
trom the common people to the Venerable Emperor, Mo-tze certainlY intended 
to say that absolutely no human being can make this standard at will; and 
ultimately he stated that Heaven alone can give and it does give this 
absolute and universal standard of morality. 
Not only can no individual human being give the standard of morality, 
but not even can the agreement of a great many people or the tradition 
of a whole nation do such a thing as make a moral standard. Mo-tze stated 
clearly that a custom of a nation can not be considered as a standard, for 
it evidently can be wrong. In explaining his doctrine on the "S1mplicJJty 
of Funerals II , he debated with those who maintained that an elaborated and 
sumptuous funeral is from the ancient -tradition of China, and that, there-
fore, it must be a right thing to do. Mo-tze said that this is only because 
tradition and custom do create babi ts and prejudice or a certain fixed way 
rot Cont. original text of Mo-tze, chapter 28, Mei translation. We must 
notice that only the last standard, this one given by Heaven, is, 
acoording to Mo-tze, the real standard, smce it alone is ultimate and 
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of considering things; but this does not imply" that it is therefore good. 
In fact, our philosopher told his opponents that custom and tradition may 
even be obviously" wrong. 
South of Ch'u there was a cannibal tribe. Upon 
the death of the parents the flesh was scraped off 
and thrown away" while the bones were buried. And 
by following this custom one became a filial son. 
West of the state of Ch'in there was the tribe of 
Yi-Gh'u. Upon their death the parents were buried 
on a bonfire and amidst the smoke, and this was said 
to be ascension to the golden clouds. In this way 
one became a filial son. The officials embodied it 
in the government regulations and the people regarded 
it as a commonplace. They" practiced it continually 
and followed without discrimination. Is it then the 
good and right way? No, this is really because ha8~t 
affords convenience and custom carries approval. 1 
On another occasion, Mo-tze discussed the question of custom and 
tradition with Lord Wen of I'll Yang, and expressed similar opinions. 
Lord Wen of Lu Yang said to Mo-tze: "There is a 
cannibal tribe on the south of Ch'u. "When the first 
son is born they dissect and devour him. This is 
said to be propitious to his y"ounger brothers. If 
he tastes delicious, he will be offered to the chief, 
and if the chief 1s pleased, the father will be 
rewarded. Is not this a wicked custom?" Mo-tze said: 
nso is the custom in China. How is killing the father 
and rewarding the son different from devouring the 
son and rewarding the father? If magnanimity and 
righteousness are not observed, wherefore shall we 
condemn the barbarians for eating their son?" 103 
Thus, from the bad custom of the southern people, Mo-tze showed that 
even in the center of civilized China there were plentY" of bad and immoral 
customs. 104 Therefore, most likely", Mo-tze would not accept the conven-
absolute. Other standards mentioned in this passage, such as the 
standards given to the common people by" the scholars, are intermediate 
ones. 
102 Cont. original text of Mo-tze, chapter 25, "Simplicity in Funerals", 
Mei translation. " 
103 Conf. original text of Mo-tze, Mei translation, chapter 49. 
104 conr. ibidem immediately" following the quoted passage. 
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tional theory conceming the origin of moral laws. Those who adhere to 
thiS theory believe that, at the very beginning of human existence, there 
.. ere no moral laws at all; men had merely learned by experience that it was 
better for their own good to establish some moral principles according to 
which one might judge 1Vbat is wrong and what is right. Thus moral ideas 
originated. This opinion is generally called the conventional theory. 
Our philosopher would appear most unwilling to accept such an idea, for he 
has clearly expressed himself that he does not believe in any human origin 
of the moral standard, either individually or collectively. Human will is 
explicitly excluded by Mo-tze as a possible source for moral principles; 
no man can make this moral standard at will; not even the whole hierarchy 
of human authority put together can produce this standard. 
Finally, even the comparison itself reveals to us something not less 
significant. Because the compass and the square are absolute (mathematic 
absolute) standards for circularity and squareness and they are universally 
accepted by all men as such standards, but, of course, the carpenter did 
not create or make these standar,ds at will, i.e. arbitrarily; nor could 
any one else do so; not even the highest human authority or the unanimous 
consent of all men in the world would be able to make an arbitrarily 
determined mathematical standard. We ore told that in the early days of 
the existence of a modern state, the original state legislators were then so 
. practical-minded that they passed a peculiar law which declared that in the 
State of Kansas the mathematical value of ff7l" would be exactly 3 instead 
of the traditional 3.1416. This was said' to be a practical move to facil 
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.athematical oalculations. 105 Needless to say, such a law could not live 
long. People do find out that the human will is not almighty atter all 
and that democracy can not be carried too far as to determine everything 
by the consent of majority. 
Returning to our subject, 'We must admit that compass and square have 
their value in the nature of mathematical laws, which is entirely independen 
of the mind of the carpenter or of any other human being. Therefore,we 
may say that by this comparison, Mo-tz.e intended to state: "Just as the 
compass and the square are objectively absolute standards of geometrical 
figures, so the will of Heaven is an objectively absolute standard of 
morality for all mankind. II In other words, if Mo-tze had known our modern 
philosophical terms, he would have said that the will of God is, the standard 
of morality, and it is as absolute, as objective, and as universal as is 
the compass considered as the standard of circularity. 
Just one more argument to confirm our opinion. We quote Mo-tze again: 
Therefore Mo-tze established the will of Heaven to 
be the standard. Not only did Mo-tze establish the 
will of Heaven to be the standard, but it was also 
the theme of an ode in the Ta Ya, among the books of 
the ancient sage Kings: nGOcI said to King Wen: I 
cherish your intelligent virtue. It was not proclaimed 
with much noise or gesture. It was not modified after 
the possessions of the empire. Instinctively and 
naturally submissive to God's scheme. II This is to 
proclaim that King Wen US ed .. the will of Heave~ gs a 
standard and was submissive to God's scheme. 0 
105 We read this in the Chinese newspaper (The Sam-ming Morning paper 
:5- ~ /1 t1L April 29, 1942, page 8) published in Chicago. It is men-
tioned among strange facts. We are unable to verify it with more 
authentic documents. But, it is of little importance whether it is true 
or not. Here, it serves as an example that conventional origin can not 
explain everything. 
106 Conf. original text of Mo-tze, chapter 28. (Mei translation) The 
original text of Ta Ya is obscure. 
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This is a brilliant testimony to prove that Mo-tze was not trying to 
create or invent something new; neither was he establishing something never 
established before. He was just declaring a principle that much be recog-
nized by all wise men, and it was in fact known to King Wen even hundreds 
of years ago. 107 Hence, although Mo-tze did not state it e:xplieitly, we 
may logically deduce that Mo-tze intended to point out that this standard of 
morality is unchangeable as time passes by centuries; in other words, it is 
permanent or even eternal; that is to say, universal not only in extension, 
but also in time. Therefore, for Mo-tze, the will of God is a moral stand 
common to all men of all time. 
Summarizing our arguments, we may state, as a conclusion in answering 
this objection, that according to Mo-tze, the will of Heaven is objective~ 
existing in a personal God, who is the Supreme Ruler of all men of all times 
that is to say, an Almighty and Eternal God. According to what Mo-tze 
himself stated in the original texts, the will of Heaven as the standard of 
morality is universal, (in the sense we just explained above), objective, 
(i.e. independent of human will), absolute, (i.e. enforced among human being 
even if it should be against their will) and unchangeable (i.e. not modifica 
ble by human will). All these characteristics evidently exclude and reject 
the subjectivistic interpretation of the objector. 
OBJECTION IV 
Mo-tze was extremely anti-fatalistic. Now, if he really believed in 
the existence of a personal God who has power to determine our happiness or 
107 King Wen was the father of King l\U, who was the first emperor and found 
er of the Chou dynasty (1l22 B.C. to 255 B.C.) The exact dates of his 
birth and of his death are unkno1lll. 
;; 144 
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unhappiness, the consequence would be just the same as that of fatalism. 
Therefore, Mo-tze could not sincerely believe in the objective existence ot 
108 
a personal God. 
OUR ANSWER TO OBJECTION IV 
We have only to note that this is a very singular opinion. We wish to 
reproduce it here because we wish our discussion to be most complete. We 
said that this is a singular opinion, for we found no supporter except its 
author. All other authors, Westerners and Chinese alike, have rather con-
sidered that the anti-fatalistic attitude of Mo-tze was a logical consequenc 
of his doctrine of the will of Heaven. For instance, Dr. Hu Shih, who is 
an atheist and is well lmown in this country as an outstanding Chinese 
modern scholar with ample lmowledge of American philosophy (for he is a 
graduate of Columbia University), has written the following statement: 
The reason why Mo-tze refused to believe in fatalism 
is just because he firmly believed in the Will of 
Heaven, that is to say he firmly believed that God 
and the spirits can and will reward and punish the 
deeds of men according to their merits and demerits. 
Therefon?, he can not tolerate the teachings of 
fatalism. 109 
Indeed, fatalism destroys the real idea of reward and punishment. 
This is the same as to deny the dignity and authority of God as the Supreme 
Ruler of the Universe, and consequently His existence as God. Mo-tze 
vigorously condemned fatalism as destroying the moral order which is 
objectively based on the essential difference between good and evil, and 
subjectively based on the individual responsibility for one's own acts. 
The doctrine of fate automatically destroys these two basic ideas: 
108 Cont'. History of Chinese Thought by Seng Gee Ming %J: t .i.t., Shanghai, 
109 U: An Outline of Chinese Phi1oso hical Histo (.170 Shan ai 1928 
.1i;;t! 
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Now the fatalists say: "'Whoever is rewarded by 
the superior is destined,to be rewarded; it is not 
because of his virtue that he is rewarded •••• Whoever 
is punished by the superior is destined to be punished; 
it is not because of his vice that he is to be 
punished." •••• The unnatural adherence to this doctrine 
is responsible for pernicious ideas and is the way 
of the wicked. 110 
Furthermore, Mo-tze shows that fatalism offends God and hence those 
who believed in fatalism will be punished by God,as historical documents 
from the ancient canonical books demonstrated it to us. 
The Gt-eat Declaration says: "Shieu became insolent 
and would not worship God and,. pushed away the ancestors 
and spirits without offering them sacrifices. And 
he said: Fortune is with my people. And he neglected 
and betrayed his duty. Heaven thereupon deserted him 
and withdrew Its protection. It This tells how ~g 
Wu shoed Shieu's belief in fate to be wrong. 1 
In concluding his treatise against fatalism, our philosopher stated th 
idea of an intelligent governor as the true doctrine, in contradicting the 
wrong idea of the fatalists. 
Hence, peace and danger, order and disorder, all 
depend on the govermnent of the superior. Holf' can 
it be said that everything is according to fate? l12 
This statement of our philosopher is to be applied to the physical 
order of the universe, to the social order of the states and also to 
individual moral conduct; man's own intelligence and will is like a superio 
'Who governs the activities of the entire body. Mo-tze apparently noticed 
that where there is an order there must be an intelligent governor, for 
110 Conf. original text of Mo-tze, chapter 35. ("Anti-fatalism") 
111 Conf. ibidem. Shieu was one of the most wicked kings .H.t.. The 
Great neclaration is the title of a chapter in one of the canonical 
books. _ 
112 Conf. original text of Mo-tze, chapter 35. 
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order is produced only by intelligence. 
Fatalism is the direct denial of intelligence, it is therefore con-
demned by all philosophers, since philosophy too is intrinsically a product 
. 
of intelligence. What the author of this objection needs to know a little 
better is the diametrical opposition that exists between fate and intelli-
gence. This diametrical opposition is even more obvious in moral philosophy 
than in metaphysics because if fatalism were to be accepted as true, then 
there could not be any subj ects for moral philosophy, and thus moral 
philosophy would simply lose its "raison dtetre" and therefore not exist. 
In fact, if all movements in the universe were caused and directed by 
~, which is by definition an unintelligent principle, then there should 
be no difference between actions of human beings and those of mineral 
elements; hence, obviously; human actions should merely be subjects of 
cosmology or physics. St. Thomas has noticed: IfMoralitas necessaria 
praesupponit libertatem, quia actus, qui non procedit a ratione deliberativ 
non est proprie loquendo moralis. f' 113 Moreover, because of the fact that 
~ is anextrinsic principle which moves human beings without any purpose, 
it would inevitably deny the value of both "finis operis" and "finis 
operantis", which are vital elements in moral philosophy. We all know that 
fatalism is diametrically opposed to finism. "Fate" is the special term 
that is invented by the fatalists with the sole purpose to deny the princiPle 
of finality; namely: "omne agens agit propter fmem". Moral philosophy 
is based on the value of finism. "Moralis philosophiae proprium est 
considerare operationes humanas, secundum quod sunt ordinatae ad invicem 
et ad finem •••• Ita subjectum moralis philosophiae est operatio humana 
m sum. Theo. I, 2, Qu. 18, art. 9. 
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ordinata in finem, vel etiam homo prout est voluntarie agens propter 
llh 
finem." The shortest descriptive definition of fatalism may be 
expressed in two words, i.e. NO PURPOSE; that is to say that there is no 
purpose whatsoever in any actions or movements in the universe. But the 
fatalists still have to answer the important question which asks why this 
action or that movement is so and so and not otherwise? They were forced 
to say that it is because fate has determined or directed it so and so 
and not otherwise. But, if we should persist in our inquiry and ask the 
fatalists why ~ has determined or directed this particular action to 
beso and so and not otherwise, they would reply that ~ has no reason 
for its decision, for it is not reasonable; it is not intelligent. 
The inventors of fatalism as well as its followers of all ages indeed 
understood that finism is based on the existence and the value of intelli-
genee in intelligent beings. Finism requires intelligence not only in 
moral philosophy but in cosmology as well. 
Unde patet, quod non a casu, sed ex intentione 
pervenit ad finem. Ea autem quae non habent cogni-
tionem, non tendunt in finem nisi directa ab aliquo 
cognoscente et intelligente, sicut sagitta a sagittante. 
Ergo est aliquid intelligens, a quo omnes re~ naturales 
ordinantur ad finem, et hoe dicimusDeum. 11;7 
Acknowledging the diametrical opposition between finism and fatalism, 
one Will easily see a similar opposition between the basic principles or 
elements of the two iSms, namely ~ and intelligence. 
OBJECTION V 
Mo-tze was a utilitarian. He stated that the standard for distinguish-
~ I Ethic., lectio 1, n. 3. 
115 Sum. Theo., i, Qu. 2, art. 3. 
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j,Dg IIgood fl and "evil" is utility. In fact, he said "If it [his doctrine 
of universal love J were not useful, then even I would disapprove of it. 
n6 But, how can there be anything that is good but not useful?" This was 
an explicit confession of his real mind which was evidently utilitarian, 
since he identified the "good" with the "useful". Therefore, the "will 
of Heaven" was only a kind of smoke screen that served to aiapt his utili-
. lU 
tarian doctrine to the superstitiously-minded common people. 
OUR ANSWER TO OBJECTION V 
The last part of this objection was already refuted when we examined 
the first objection. In addition, as we will demonstrate later, our 
philosopher was precisely considering the utilitarians of his time when 
he stated the sentence that is now quoted in this objection. Therefore, 
he certainly did not need any kind of smoke screen to persuade them of 
utilitarian principles, since they were already utilitarians and moreover 
they were trying to convince Mo-tze of their utilitarian ideas. 
As to the first part of this objection, which is considered by those 
authors as their most powerful argument in making Mo-tze a utilitarian, 
we shall examine more carefully the original text in order to find out the 
most exact interpretation of it. As is clear from the immediately preceding 
context, Mo-tze was not positively teaching the basic ideas or principles 
116 Conf. original text of Mo-tze, chapter 16, "Universal Love". 
117 This objection is to be found in The Anoient Chinese Ideas_oonoerning 
Politios ~ Sociology by Ch'i Ven-Hu ~ ~ ~. ,Shanghai, 1930. ' 
Similar opinion is expressed by Liang Ch' i-Tsao, ?J.)J:.... #L Fun Yuan-Lan 
('.1; jj...,i • Similarly, S. Holth and W. Long oalled Mo-tze utilitarian 
for this reason, although they oalled him a sincere theist too. We 
will cite them later. 
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of his doctrine; but he was answering an objection, and it was an objection 
addressed to him by the utilitarians of his time. Therefore it is not 
surprising if he should speak on utility and almost adopt the views of 
these utilitarians just in order to prove to them that his doctrine of 
universal love is at the same time "good" and "usefu1f1 • 
In fact, the passage cited in this objection is quoted from the six-
teenth chapter of the original text, which is the third chapter dealing 
with the doctrine of "universal love". In this particular chapter, our 
philosopher cited as many as six main objections against his doctrine of 
universal love and refuted them eloquently one after another. If we only 
wish to read just a few more lines which precede the cited text, we shall 
see clearly that Mo-tze was answering one of those objections given to him 
by the scholars of his time. Mo-tze reported to us: 
Yet their objections to it are not exhausted. It 
is asked: 'It may be a good thing, but can it be 
of any use?~ Mo-tze replied: 'If it were not useful, 
then even I would disapprove of it. But how can 
there be anything that is good but not use.fu.l?t 118 
We may immediately notice that the objection is strongly utilitarian. 
The objectors appear willingly to have agreed with Mo-tze that his doctrine 
of universal love is a good one; but, they asked: "Can it be of any use?", 
since according to them the practical criterion of all things is their 
usefullness. 
Upon hearing such an objection, Mo-tze felt almost insulted. We may 
even imagine him jumping up on his feet and possibly banging his. fist on 
the discussion table as he says, to quote: "If it were not usefulll , he 
said with indignation, "then, even I would disapprove of it.1I We have 
U8 Conf. ori inal text' of Alo'::;; ~ha ter 16. 
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underlined the words "even I" not without reason. As a matter of fact, 
obviously Mo-tze has emphasized the word "even I"; that is to say: "even 
!, Mo-tze, who am not a utilitarian like you gentlemen, even I would 
disapprove of it, if it were not useful." This is to assert in a most 
absolute way that he is entirely convinced that his doctrine of universal 
love is not only, as the utilitarians have agreed with him, theoretically 
good, but also, undoubtedly, practically useful; i.e. possible of adoption 
by the people and therefore able to promote the common good for society. 
It is literally obvious that the "even I" used by Mo-tze is intended to 
distinguish himself from the ideology of his questioners. Now, it is also 
quite obvious that the questioners here are utilitarians; therefore, Mo-tze 
indicates that he does not want to be considered as a utilitarian. 
Moreover, Mo-tze went even further to refute their prejudice, because, 
contrary to their false idea, Mo-tze is convinced that whenever a mo~al 
doctrine is theoretically right, it must necessarily b.useful, i.e., 
practically p0ssib1e to put into use and thus promote the common good for 
men. Therefore, he counter-questioned them! "But, how can there be any 
'- 119 good doctrine that is not practical? or not useful?" Although the 
original text does not say "good doctrine", but merely says "anything 
that is good", the contexts demonstrate sufficiently that it was the goodn 
of his doctrine that was in question. S. Holth, referring to this passage, 
translated the same discussion as follows: 
119 Con!. original text of Mo-tze, chapter 16. The original Chinese words 
are: ,,~~.-$... "i1 ~ ~ >fl ~ 1" We also have quoted the Mei trans1at 
above in the objection and als,o used it in our answering explanation 
until now. Here we merely want t~ express it more explicitly than 
the Mei translation which is rather too .1iteral in this case. 
nSir, your theory is excellent, but it cannot be 
practical." His reply was; "If it is good, it must 
also be practicable." 120 
Mme. Alexander David has translated this same passage in French as 
.follows : 
TIs disent: "II est possible que Ie principe soit 
bon, mais comment Ie mettre en practique?" Notre 
Maitre dit: "En supposant qu'il ne puiss,e pas etre 
practique, il.parait difficile, meanmoins, de continuer 
a Ie condamner. Mais comment peut-il etre bon !! 
impossible ! etre !!! ~ practique?1I In--
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These two lately quoted translations are obviously less literal, or 
more liberal, than that of Dr. Mei which we used in our discussions. 
However, they do help us here to understand the real and original meaning 
o.f the text concerned. 
Therefore, with this counter question, Mo-tze wished to show that the 
objection against his doctrine of universal love is not based on reality 
but solely on a false prejudice of his questioners, namely that they 
believed that a moral doctrine could be theoretically good, honest and 
desirable, yet it might be at the same time practically inapplicable, 
useless or even harmful. So that it should be called practically wrong, 
i.e. no good. 
Understanding the whole situation in Which Mo-tze uttered this stateme 
we may even say that, instead of its being a proof for the opinion of our 
opponents, it is really rather a quite solemn denial of their belief, namely 
that our philosopher was a utilitarian. 
i20 Conf. S. HoI th in his Micius, a Brief Outline of His Life and Ideas. 
Also H. Williamson has a similar translation. - - - -
121 Conf. her work: ~ Philosophe Meh-fi et l'Idee de Solidarite, Lon~on, 
1907. Italics our own. The reason for doing so is because we think 
the sentence is ldsll translated. 
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Furthermore, even without the help of contexts, we may still demon-
strate thatthe conclusion of our opponents, namely that Mo-tze has identif 
the "good" with the '!useful", is not logically sound, although at first 
sight one may easily think that our opponents have the situation well in 
hand. 
Indeed, Mo-tze's counter-questioning implies that whatever is goo~ 
be "ipso facto" also useful. This however does not necessarily mean to 
assert the basic principle of utilitarianism, namely the identification of 
flgood1with fluseful". 
To s~, as our philosopher said: "How can there be anything that is 
good but not useful?" (here we use the literal translation of Dr. Mei 
again, just so that our opponents will be the more convinced with our 
arguments), is to say:. "Eyerything that is good is therefore useful". 
But, it is quite obvious according to the most fundamental rules of logic 
that this does not necessarily mean the identification of "good" with "use-
rul" because it does not imply that whatsoever is useful is therefore also 
good. In a universal and affirmative sentence the subject is simply 
included in the predicate but is not necessarily equipollent with it. To 
make those two concepts equipollents; one must state that all S are P and 
~ versa. Now, in the original text it is obvious that Mo-tze did not 
say "and vice ~." Nor did he say: "How can there be anything that is 
useful but not good?", which would be by all means the speaking manner of 
a utilitarian. Therefore, even literally speaking, one can not accuse 140-
tze of identifying "goodtt and "useful". 
To penetrate even deeper into the matter dealing with "good" and 
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"useful", we would like to inquire concerning the metaphysical conception 
of both of them. In fact, any concept may be abstracted from all particul 
qualifications, i.e. notes, and thus considered merely in its own 
"constitutivum metaphysicum", that is, the first and most essential notion. 
If we do consider the concept of "good" and that of "useful" in this manner, 
we will find that th~ do approach each other so much that they may be 
spoken of as practically indicating the same thing in reality. In other 
122 
words, metaphysically speaking, they are equipollent concepts. 
In fact, metaphysically speaking, what is "good"? It is nothing but 
being inasmuch as it is conceived to be desirable by some appetitive 
faculty. "Bonum est appetibile. 1f 123 Neither the human will nor any other 
kinds of appetitive faculties will desire anything unless the cognitive 
faculty of the subject sees or feels the usefulness of the desired object. 
It is obvious that no appetitive faculty will be attracted by anything that 
is completely useless to itself or to the subject in general. In ordinary 
language, we may say that no one wants a useless thing. Therefore, "good" 
means "desirable" and "desirable" means, frankly speaking, "useful" to 
the subject desiring. A thing is desirable because it is good. Why then 
is it good and therefore desirable? Because it suits the natural needs, 
122 N .B. We do not say that they are identical, but that they are 
~uiPollent concepts. 
123 cording to St. Thomas A.quinas "goodfl and "beingl1 indicate the same 
thing, only the notion o;f flgoodfl,points out that the same is desirable. 
Thus he stated: "bonum dicit rationem appetibilis, quam non dicit ens. 
(Sum. Theo. I, Qu. 5, art. 1) Again he said: "Idem apparet ex hoc 
quod ipsum esse maxi me habet rationem appetibilis; unde videmus quod 
unumquodque naturaliter appetit conservare suum esse, et refug1t 
destructiva sui esse, et eis pro posse resistit. Sic ~ipsum ~, 
inquantum ~ appetibile est bonum." (De Malo, Qu. I, art. I. In 
respondeo ••• circa finem. Italics ours.Y-
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and is adapted to the natures of the being that desires it or tends towards 
it; because it helps this being, agrees with it, by contributing towards 
the realization of its ends; Bonum est id quod convenit naturae appetentis: 
The good is that Which suits the.nature of the being that desires it. 124 
Nevertheless, to assert this, one must conceive, as we noted above, 
the notion of "usefulness" in a most abstract way. It would be merely a 
notion of conformity or desirabilit.y of the perfections of the object to 
the subject of the appetitive faculty. We point this out carefully, 
because in the current use of the term, "useful" means solely and exclusive-
ly such a conformity or desirability in the physical order, so that the 
appetitive faculty is attracted only by the physical perfections of the 
object which is considered by the cognitive faculty to be physically 
helpful to reach a certain physical perfection (or pleasure) of the subject. 
It is now solely in this qualified sense that the utilitarians use the 
term "useful", or "utility." 
Originally, however, it seems that the term "utility" was not neces-
sarily restricted to physical goods. First of all, its essential notion 
does not imply this restriction; then even in the practical use of ancient 
times this term is not exclusively limitated in the physical order. Thus, 
the ancient Church, in Her early dated Roman Missal prayers, asked the 
pious and devoted congregation to pr~ for the "utility II of themselves 
and for the whole household of Church members. flAd utilitatem quoque 
124 Coffey, Ontology, page 169. (Quoted from J. S. Hickey's Summnla 
Philosophiae Scholasticae, Vol. I, page 338, note 1, Dublini, 1942, 
Editio nona.) Father Hickey did.not give any further.reference to 
Coffey's work. . There is no bibliography given in any of the three 
volumes. 
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nOS tram totiusque Ecc1esiae Suae Sanetae." 125 Evidently, this utility 
that we are praying for in our daily Masses is by no means restricted 
solely to physical goods; it must also and even primarily include our 
spiritual welfare. otherwise the Church, whose emphasis on spiritual 
welfare over that of the physical order is well-known to all, would likely 
have used some other terms which would properly represent our spiritual 
welfare before She would allow us to mention the term "utility". The fact 
that the term "utilityff is allowed to be mentioned immediately after "Ad 
laudem et Gloriam Nominis Ttli II, has revealed significantly that in the 
early days it was not solely ~ntended for physical goods. Moreover, 
Christian moralists, even to this day, are accustomed to write a little 
paragraph "On the Utility of Moral Philosophy" at the beginning of their 
126 . 
text books on this science. Hence, utility or usefulness was original 
used indifferently to express "goods" either physical or moral, spiritual 
or material. 
Pope Pius IX, therefore, in denouncing the principle of utilitarianism 
did not use simply the term IIutilitytt, but rather he preferred to qualify 
that the utilitarian.s or pragmatists teach: ffOmnis morum disciplina 
honestasque collocari debet in cumulandis et augendis quovis modo divitiis 
127 
ac in voluptatibus explendis." 
Therefore, utilitarianism is wrong because it confuses the two orders, 
namely moral and physical, which are "de jurel! and "de facto" distinguished. 
125 
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127 
Quoted from the "Suseipiat. 1f Originated about third century and still 
in daily use today. 
Many text books of scholastic moral philosophy have such a paragraph. 
One instance is that of J. S. Hickey, O. Cist., in his ~a 
Philosophiae Scholasticae, Vol. III, page 244. (ed. 194~ 
~~~~e ~~. No. ote rom Summula Philosophiae Scholas-
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And what is even worse, utilitarianism literally dropped the moral order, 
which is "per sen superior, into the physical order of pleasure (divitiae 
et V'oluptates). Admitting that "useful" can be referred to the moral order, 
... 8 shall nevertheless very carefully distinguish the morally tluseful ll from 
the physical, since they are two essentially different notions. Now, very 
cautiously in order to be most clear and exact, we wish to advance the 
following statements concerning when and how the notion of "useful" can be 
considered an equivalent to "good". 
1) Whatever is useful in the moral order, is therefore good in the 
same order, and vice versa. 
2) Whatever is useful in the physical order, is also therefore good 
in the same order, and vice versa. 
3) Whatever is useful in the moral order, is also therefore good in 
the physical order, but not !!£! versa. 
4) Whatever is useful in the physical order, is also therefore good 
in the moral order. 
Of these four statements, the first two are obviously correct. The 
third one is correct too, because of the fact (we regret that it is outside 
the scope of our thesis to prove this) that both orders, moral and physical, 
originate from the sqme Supreme Being, the Prime Cause of al1 beings. By 
• 
His decree, the physical order is so constituted that it is subordinated 
to the moral order perfectly and "per sen harmoniously. Thus, the moral 
order is a superior order which perfects, improves and beautifies the 
inferior order, name~ the physical one. The superior order is by no means 
made to damage or to destroy the inferior one, as is believed by a few 
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.odern thinkers. On the other hand, of course, the physical order, being 
jJlferior , has absolutely no right to overcome the moral order and, as the 
utilitarian principle makes it, to absorb completely whatever is moral. 
However, we can not help but notice that de facto there is a kind of 
conflict between the two orders. This conflict is, nevertheless, merely 
apparent. It is due to the irregularity of human passions and the partial 
blindness of man's knowledge in perceiving the real good for himself, not 
as a solely material being but as a special and unique being composed of 
spiritual soul and material body, so that he alone is the subject of both 
moral and physical orders. 
No one should be surprised at seeing this conflict. As a matter of 
fact, even in the p~sical order itself there are many conflicts which would 
have a character more serious than a merely apparent disagreement. Yet it 
is not to be found only among different numbers of subjects, such as lrilen 
the interest of one man conflicts with that of the other, but even in the 
same individual. Mo-tze has noticed this long before us: 
To cut a finger in order to save the hand is to 
take a minor damage in order to have a major profit. 
Thus, to take a minor damage M not to take a damage 
but it is to take a profit. 1 
To out a fin8er, 'Which is "per .!!"a physical damage, becomes a truly 
physical good and hence useful if it should be done in order to save the 
hand. A greater good caused by a certain act will justify the relatively 
small damage caused by the same act on the same subject, provided that the 
128 Cont. original text of Mo-tze, chapter 44. Dr. Mei did not translate 
this chapter, and no other translations are available. We have, 
fore, translated it. The original Chinese text is copied here for 
immediate reference: tt~)~ I'), ia- ~ jlJ ~ t jj~ K ~ ~ t ~)J, J.t. ~ ~ f ~A 
~ ft~ fI~ '! ~ Ji'R. -*1 ~ 
a necessary and hence inevitable effect of the very same 
That this is obvious in the physical order, even the materialists 
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Now, based on the same reason, if we believe that the 
moral order is superior to the physical one, we must see no more conflicts 
between the moral order and the physical than there are in the physical 
order itself. Thus, simply speaking, moral goods, which are by nature 
superior to phySical goods, must be preferred in any instances where a 
conflict between the two seems to be inevitable. 
Returning now to the original subject of our discussion, we will see 
to whioh of those four sentences concerning the notion of "useful" our 
philosopher would adhere when he asked: "How oan there be anything that is 
good but not useful?" 
Now, if we wish to say that Mo-tze was talking about the very abstract 
metaphysical notion of the two terms "good" and "useful", we have no right 
to accuse him as a utilitarian, for the reason we have clearly explained 
above. Or, if we suppose that he was talking about "good" and "useful" 
in the same order, he was merely asserting the true statements expressed 
by our examples one and two. Neither of them is utilitarian in the sense 
of the term understood both by ourselves and by our opponents. The sole 
way to make Mo-tze a utilitarian is to prove that he stated the fourth 
form of our examples, namely: tlWhatever is useful in the physical order 
is also therefore good in the moral order." The point is, however, to 
prove it positively and not merely to guess or suppose. We may prediot 
their failure unless they can change the original text. The third state-
ment, which is not utilitarian, is precisely our interpretation of Mo-tze's 
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real mind when he asked: "How can there be anything that is good but not 
useful?" As we have demons~rated before, the contexts show us definitely 
that our' philosopher meant that a doctrine morally good must therefore 
!E,s2 facto be practically good. 
Finally, just to illustrate that a statement like this of Mo-tze 
doeS' not imply utilitarianism, we may quote Cicero: "Est nihil utile quod 
I 
idem non hones tum" , which is, under all aspects, much more utilitarian 
than what is said by Mo-tze; Cicero, however, :immediately gave the reason 
for his statement: "Nec quia utile hones tum est, sed quia honestum, 
utile. tf 129' Cuttinghis first sentence from the rest of this text, one 
would be able to make Cicero a perfect utilitarian. Yet, as a matter of 
tact, Cicero was one of the strongest opponents of the utilitarianism of 
his time. He clearly pointed out that utility is certainly not the 
norm of morality in these words: "Nemo est qui hanc affectionem animi 
non probet atque laudet, qua non modo utilitas nulla quaeritur, sed contra 
utilitatem etiam servatur fides." 130 
We are fortunate enough to be able to cite a similar statement of 
Mo-tze to prove that he is no more utilitarian than Cicero would be: 
Mo-tze said: Among all things there is nothing 
more worthy than righteousness. Suppose now I say 
to a man: 'I now give you a new hat and a pair of 
shoes; will.you let me cut off your hands and feet?' 
He certainly will not accept this offer. Why? 
Because hat and shoes are not as worthy as hands and 
feet. Now suppose again I say: 'Give you the 
entire wealth of the world and let me kill you.' 
He will certainly refuse. Why? Because the entire 
world is not as worthy as his own, life. Now there 
129 Conf. Cicero: De Offic., I, 3, c. 30. 
130 Conf. Cicero De-rinibus Bon. ~ Mal., I, 5, c. 22. 
are people who gave their life because of one word. 
This is to state that righteousness is more worthy 
than their own lives. Hence, I say: "Among all 
things nothing is more worthy than righteousness." 131 
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This is a simple and clear statement which does not need further comment 
It shOWSaJ.so that not only Mo-tze but even many people of that time did 
believe that there is something (which Cicero calls hones tum and Mo-tze calls 
~ghteousnesB) which is superior and is therefore more precious than the 
entire grand total of all physical goods. Such belief is frank and genuine 
recognition of'the real existence of a moral order superior to the physical 
one. 
In closing our explanation, we wish to bring forward one more analogical 
,reason in convincing our opponents. Leibnitz has said something very similar 
to what is the focus of our discussion. "True or real ideas are those whose 
. U2 
execution we are assured is possible; the others are doubtful. tt This, 
however, does not make Leibnitz-a pragmatist. So why Mo-tze should be 
considered as a utilitarian for a similar statement? 
OBJECTION VI 
Mo-tze did not sincerely believe in the existence of spirits and ghosts 
even after a laborious attempt to make sure that others should believe in 
it. Therefore, !fortiori, he could not sincerely believe in God, Whose 
eXistence he never attempted to prove. 
In fact, after he has done all he possibly could in order to convince 
the people of the real existence of spirits and ghosts, and thus urged them 
to keep the traditional ceremonies of sacrifices, Mo-tze has shown his 
i31 Conf. original text of Mo-tze, chapter 48, "On the value of Righteous-
ness", Mei translation. 
Conf. New Essa Concerning Human Understanding, English translation by 
Lan 1 
4X. 
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skeptic attitude on this matter by saying: "Even if there were no ghosts 
and spirits, a sacrifice would yet gather together a party and the parti-
133 
cipants could enjoy themselves and befriend the neighbors." This 
his insincerity in believing in the real existence of spirits and ghosts. 
Yet, it also reveals that his real mind was utilitarian. He wished that the 
traditional ceremonies of sacrifices be conserved because they were gV'~ •• ~~~ 
useful; th~ gathered relatives and befriended neighbours that all parti-
cipants might have a good time. It did not matter whether the spirits and 
ghOs8 really existed.· 
In addition to this, Mo-tze really did not believe in the ruling power 
of the spirits over human beings, although he has anxiously preached the 
same to the people. He st.ated frankly, when asked by one of his disciples, 
that the influence of ghosts and spirits on human welfare is only as little 
as one per cent of the total influence which man may receive from other 
elements of nature. This is to say that the influence of spirits and ghosts 
is practically nothing. 
Mo-tze was sick; Teih-Pi carne and inquired: "Sir, 
you have taught that the ghosts and spirits are 
intelligent and are in control of calamity and 
blessing. They will reward the good and punish the 
evil. Now you are a sage. How can you become sick? 
Can it be that your teaching was not entirely correct? 
That the ghosts and spirits are after all unintelli-
gent?" Mo-tze replied: "Though I am sick how 
(does.it follow that the ghosts and spirits) should 
be unintelligent? There are many ways by which man 
can contact diseases. Some are affected by climate; 
some by fatigue. If there were a hundred gates and 
only one of them is closed, howl!g it that the burglar 
eould not be able to get in?" 
.. 
original text of Mo-tze, ch. 31, "On the Existence of spirits 
ts II Mei translation. 
of " ~j( l probably is 
118 
Therefore, if that influence or control of ghosts and spirits which 
_o-tze has emphasized so strongly in his public speeches, is, as he con-
fessed privately, so little as merely "one per cent" of the total causes of 
caJ,amity and bleSSing, we may say that practically, Mo-tze did not believe 
in the control of spirits and ghosts. Hence, they are practically non-
eXistent. For an analogical reason, we may say that the mind of Mo-tze 
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towards the existence of God is similar. 
OUR ANSWER TO OBJEXJTION VI 
To examine this objection we must, above all, distinguish and even 
separate the belief in the existence of God from that in the existence of 
spirits and ghosts. Because these two kinds of belief are not "per sen 
necessarily connected with each other. Therefore a doubt or even an 
explicit denial of the existence of spirits does not necessarily imply a 
similar mental position towards the existence of God. Hence, the a fortiori 
of the objection does not seem to be lOgical. Especially it is not ada-
quately placEd here, sinc e, as we have demonstrated above, Mo-tze was not 
obliged to prove the existence of God. 
In fact, there are people who do believe in God, yet deny the existence 
of purely spiritual beings, such as the Anabaptists and most of the liberal 
Protestants. 136 St. Thomas Aquinas has reported many different reasons 
expressing the disbelief in the existence of created spiritual beings 
This again is an objection authored by Chen Yuan Teh rtfi.;A'J;.who is the 
author of objection II and III. (22. cit., p. 194.) See above text 
page 75 and note 81. Also page 85, note 92. Also Fang Hsen Tsou -1" f~~ 
who insisted on the "one per cen11'ratio. (Conf. his The Source of 
Motiism, Shanghai, 193.5, p. 106. _ --
Conf. J. M. Herve, sr.D., Manuale Theologiae Dogmaticae, Paris, 1931, 
Vol. II, page 264. 
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~thout body; apparently the authors of those opinions are all theists. 137 
rurthermore, many modern scholastic authorities maintain that the existence 
of angels is not positively proved by reason alone. Reason can only show 
the possibility or the great probability of their existence. After the 
facts of revelation have positively testified to the existence of such 
created purely spiritual beings, then reason might give a persuasive 
argument to show such beings most probably must exist in order to complete 
·the metaphysical hierarchy of beings. 138 St. Thomas himself demonstrated 
solely the great probability or great suitability of the existence of angels 
but he did not produce ~ reason for the absolute necessity of their 
existence 139 such as he did in proving the existence of God. In other 
words, the existence of God is an absolute necessity philosophically proved, 
the existence of created spiritual beings is only a great proba-
so that we see their existence suits our reason; but on the other 
hand, if and in case that they do not exist at all, we do not see any 
This is, in our opinion, because God is absolutely free 
in creating all his creatures, that is to say, He may create the angels, 
but also, theoretically speaking, He could also not create themat all. 
Hence, for us theists, there is not an essential connection (philosophically 
speaking, for it would be different under theological aspects) between the 
belief in the existence of God and that of the spiritual beings, as it is 
~ressed in the objection. A theist philosopher may doubt or even explici 
ly deny the existence of purely spiritual creatures. 
l37 
138 
Conf. De StiritualibUS Creaturis, art. V. As many as eleven objections 
were repor ed by st. Thomas. 
Coni. P. Parente, S. T. D., De Deo Creante et Elevante, Roma, 1938. 
Als 0 J. M. Herve, £E. ~., iii above note 130. 
See above note 137; also Contra Gentiles 1 2 c. 
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The simple fact that Mo-tze did attempt to prove the existence of 
spirits and ghosts, shows us that at least some people of his time did not 
believe in their existenoe. Yet, as we have demonstrated above, people at 
hiS time did believe in the existence of God so that Mo-tze does not see 
arI1 necessity of proving His existence. Puttj.ng these two facts together, 
the logical consequence is that there were many people 1Iho~ although -
believing in God, did not believe in the existence of spirits. Therefore, 
de facto it is possible to doubt the existence of spirits while at the same 
--
time sincerely beliving in God. Hence, even though it might be positively 
proved that Mo-tze does not believe in the existence of spirits, it does 
not imply that he is not a theist philosopher. For this reason we said 
-
the inference in the objection is not logically valid. 
Mo-tze himself has always carefully distinguished God from spirits 
and ghosts. First, in the text of Mo-tze, the doctrine of the will of 
Heaven and that of the existence of spirits and ghosts are not only recu~,~c,~ 
in different chapters but even in different books, 140 entirely separated 
from each other so that on the one hand the doctrine of the "will of 
Heaven" does not depend on the "existence of spirits and ghosts"; and on 
the other hand the existence of Heaven as a personal God does not imply 
the existence of spiri ta and ghosts. It is also to be remarked that, for 
Mo-tze, the will of Heaven alone is to be obeyed and to be considered as 
the standard of morality; not so the will of spirits and ghosts, although 
they are to be worshipped. Indeed, they can punish and reward men's con-
duct; but they must reward those who have obeyed the will of Heaven and 
iii For the distinction of "books" and "chapters" in the text of Mo-tze, 
confer above page 11. The extant text of Mo~tze is divided into 
pUJrl-Sh those who have disobeyed It. They are ministers whom Heavenhas 
established to "minister to man t s good and bring them evil ft. 1l.,1 
Although the spirits and ghosts, being spiritual like God, are much 
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superior to human beings, they are nevertheless much inferior to God and, 
~cording to Mo-tze, there is an essential difference between them and God; 
our philosopher used a characteristic description of his own to designate 
three different degrees of intelligent beings, namely God, spirits and man. 
For example, in praising the virtue of the ancient sage kings, Mo-tze said 
about them: "In the highest sphere they revered Heaven, in the middle 
aphere they worshipped the spirits and in the lower sphere, they loved the 
142 people. tI 
c 
We have a statement of Mo-tze himself to confirm our opinion that the 
differences between these three kinds of intelligent beings are essential 
rather than merely of degree. Mo-tze stated that the perfections of spirits 
and ghosts are incomparablY and even transcendentally superior to those of 
human beings. He said: "The ghosts and spirits are wiser than the sages by 
88 much as the sharp-eared and keen-sighted surpass the deaf and the 
blind. II 14.3 I Now, it is obvious that the keen-sighted man surpasses ordinar,y 
sighted man or near-sighted man only by degrees of perfection, but surpasses 
the blind by an essential difference. Thus, we may believe that Mo-tze 
intended to state an essential and even transcendental difference between 
the nature of the spirits and that of man. By an analogical reason, althoug 
our philosopher did not state so explicitly, he m~ well have recognized a 
Conf. original text of Mo-tze, chapter 27. 
Conf. ibidem, chapters 26, 27, and 28. To be found in all three 
chapters. 
Conf. original text of Mo-tze, chapter 48, Mei translation. 
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similar distinction between God and the spirits, that is to say, there is an 
essential difference between the nature of God and that of the spirits. 
Moreover, Mo-tze has conceived God as creator and supreme ruler of the 
universe, and upon His will he built the entire doctrine of his philosophy; 
since the existence of the spirits and ghosts plays no important part in his 
doctrine as an organized system, it could be taken away Without affecting or 
changing any point of Mo-tze' s teachings. Many a Chinese author in fact has 
alreacr,r pointed out the superfluousness of this chapter on the existence of 
spirits and ghosts. Hence, the existence of God, or rather the belief in 
the existence of God, is not to be considered as insincere or doubtful in 
the mind of Mo-tzeeren though one might positively prove that he denied the 
existence of spirits. 
But, we do not think that Mo-tze was even doubtful as to the real 
existence of spirits and ghosts, because he brought outIrBny arguments based 
on the facts cited from authentic historical books (some of thea were writt 
or edited by Confucius) which, at that time, were considered by all scholars 
as well as common people as most trustworthy documents. The reason given by 
the objector is not sufficiently convincing so that one might discredit 
Mo-tze sincerely. It remains unconvincing unless the objector can prove tha 
Mo-tze did not believe in the authenticity of those ancient documents from 
which he cited many facts concerning the existence of spirits. 
Leon Wieger writing about Mo-tze's belief in the existence of spirits 
and ghosts has put these words into the mouth of our philosopher: 
Comment peut-on douter de leur existence, de leur 
puissance, alors qu'ils se sont manifestes tant de 
fOis, en plein jOur, davant de nombreux spectateurs? 144 
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In the passage cited in the objection, Mo-tze was again answering a 
utilitarian objection to his doctrine of the existence of spirits and ghosts 
'We must not neglect the preceding context. Our philosopher was given an 
obviously" utilitarian objection which said: arr ghosts and spirits did not 
exist, it would seem to be a waste of m.aterials, of cakes and wine, that 
'Were used in the sacrifices. 1f To this, Mo-tze immediately replied: "But 
such use is not just to throw them into the ditch or gully. For, the 
relatives from the clan and friends from the villages and districts can yet 
eat and drink them. So even if there were no ghosts and spirits, a sacri-
fice will yet gather together a party." 145 What we see here is that Mo-tze 
-
once again wished to prove that whenever a thing is good (i.e. righteous) 
it must be also useful even in a material sense. The worship of spirits 
and ghosts is first of all a duty of human beings, because, although they 
are not our Creators, they are nevertheless, by the constitution of the 
Creator, our superiors and have power to bless or punish us. Hence, the 
sacrifices in their honor are only a natural duty of ours to pay reverence 
to our superiors and on the other hand it is also for our own geod (or 
utility) because such sacrifices will bring us bleSSings and protection from 
the spirits and ghosts. 
144 Coni. his Histoire des Cryances Religieuse ~ des Opinions Philo-
sophiques !£ Chine,-paris, 19~2, page 211. 
145 Conf. original text of Mo-tze, chapter 31, Mei translation. 
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However, as we pointed out above, Mo-tze eas ily became over-anxious in 
heated discussions. This time is no exception. And, we may even say that 
this instance is the worst of all. For he even went so far as to suppose 
that he might adopt the principal belief of his opponents in order, as he 
believed, to show that even according to their principle the question dis-
cussed between them would still remain in favor of Mo-tze. In ordinary 
plain language we may describe Mo-tze's attitude as follows: "All right, 
gentlemen", our philosopher would have said, "if after so many arguments 
'Which I brought to you, you still refuse to believe in the real existence of 
spirits and ghosts and therefore do not believe in our duty of offering 
sacrifices to them and do not believe that they may bring us blessings and 
protection, then, you ar~ fanatically materialists. But, I still may show 
you that even from a solely materialistic and utilitarian-point of view, 
you still have no reason to reject these traditional ceremonies of sacrifice • 
Because, it is at least for you, utilitarians, a good and useful party among 
relatives and friends, a valuable and practical way to befriend the neighbo 
It is not a waste of cakes and wines as you said, for they are not thrown 
into the ditches, but are to be eaten and enjoyed by yourself and your 
friends. Therefore, no matter what is your belief, your objection based on 
the fact that the sacrifice is a waste of food is not valid." 
Although this is our own interpretation, it is strictly based on the 
original text of Mo-tze. Whoever will read the entire original text of the 
chapter entitled "On the Existence of Spirits and Ghosts" will agree with 
us. Here, unfortunately, Mo-tze was overanxious to conclude this discussion 
in a hurry, so that he brought out the most destructive weapon against his 
12, 
opponents by proving that even according to their own principle the point 
in question was still in favor of Mo-tze himself. Such an argument is in 
tact regarded by the common people, even in our present day, as a most power 
tul and decisive (comparable to the atomic bomb) counter-attack to silence 
one's opponents definitely and absolutely. Very probably Mo-tze had won a 
great applause from those who listened to this discussion. And evidently 
he also 'WOn the last word. 
We have said that this statement of Mo-tze was unfortunate because even 
though it won him a decisive victory at that time, it nevertheless caused a 
serious criticism against him, namely against his Sincerity in believing in 
the existence of spirits and ghosts. From a strictly philosophical point of 
view (that is, without considering the circumstances in which the statement 
is made), such a statem.ent is rather a weakening of one's own opinion than a 
"coup de grace" for his opponents, as the common people believed. 
From an historical point of view (that is, according to the critical 
rules adopted by writers of philosophical history), such a seemingly compro-
mising statement as that of our philosopher's should not affect his previous 
positive arguments. An example in this matter is Socrates. No serious 
philosophical critics will doubt of his belief in the immortality of souls. 
Yet, one might well quote him as doubting in this matter from very authentic 
sources in Plato hims elf. 146 In addition to our own judgment on this 
matter, we may cite a well-known American author in the field of the history 
of philosophy, His Excellency the most Reverend William Turner: 
146 Con!. Apol., 40. 
Although Plato represents Socrates as considering 
dilemmatic ally "either death ends all things, or it 
does not", there can be no doubt as to Socrates' 
belief in the immortali tYof'"tiie human soul. It may 
be that he thought the dialectical proof of the doctrine 
to be beyond the power of human mind, but the depth 
2! ~ personal conviction cannot for !moment be 
questioned.I47 
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Let us also remember that Mo-tze has strong~ criticized those who wis 
to offer sacrifice but did not sincerelY believe in the existence of spirits: 
Kung Jlen-tze said that there were no ghosts and. 
spirits. Again, he said that the superior men must 
learn sacrifice and worship. Mo-tae said: "To hold 
there are no spirits and learn sacrificial ceremonials 
is comparable to making fishing nets while there are 
no fish." 148 . 
Thus, Mo-tze mocked Kung Men-tze, a Confucianist, as being "just like a. 
man who does not believe that there are such things called fishes, and yet 
he is seriously making his fishing net". That is to say that according to 
Mo-tze the opinion of Kung Men-tze is obviouslY absurd, because it is self-
contradictory. Thus, we may be sure that Mo-tze's own mind must have been 
contrary to that of lUng Men-tze. Now, it is clear that Kung Men-tze was 
the typical example of the kind of person, whom the objector wanted to make 
Mo-tze look like~ In other words, the author of this objection 'Which we are 
examining wanted to prove that Mo-tze adopted the opinion of Kung Men-tze; 
ie.e. to keep the traditional sacrifice solely because of a utilitarian re 
not because the spirits really exist. This passage, which we just quoted 
above, is certainly no help to the opinion expressed in the objection. 
As to the second passage cited in the objection, we must again note 
147 Conf. History of Philosophy, page 82. Italics ours. 
148 Cont. original text of Mo-tze, chapter 48, Mei translation. 
127 
that Mo-tze was answering an objection to his teaching. This objection 
offered to Mo-tze is quite familiar in every kind of theistic moral teaching; 
for a typical example, one might read in the Gospel of St. John: 
And as he was passing by, he saw a man blind from 
birth. And his disciples asked him: "Rabbi, who 
hath sinned, this man or his parents, that he should 
be born blind?" Jesus answered: "Neither hath this 
man sinned, nor his parents; but t,pat the work of God 
should be made manifest in him." 149 
Concerning the fact of sickness and miseries, theist philosophers are 
perpetually bothered by two kinds of queries. On one hand, the unbelievers 
always point out the fact that the miseries are inflicted upon good men as 
a proof that God does not exist. And on the other hand there are always 
a great many persons who believe as did the disciples of Our Lord that all 
sicknesses are punishments of God. 
The inquisitive questioning of Teih-Pi, as cited in the objection, 
presents a dilemma to Mo-tze, so it seems that Mo-tze either must acknow-
ledge that he himself is punished by the spirits or that the spirits are 
not intelligent. Of course, we must remember that Mo-tze was only a heath 
philosopher, so that we cannot expect him to give such a sublime answer to 
the question as did Our Lord. Nevertheless, he did give a philosophically 
correct answer although he might have exaggerated while attempting to 
explain that the punishment visited by spirits is only one of the many 
causes of sickness. The objector has pointed that out that Mo-tze minimize 
the influence of the spirits to as low as only one per cent of the total 
influences man may receive. But, this is, in our opinion, not a logically 
respectable inference because we do not see in the original text that 
149 Conf. John, Ch4Pter 9, v. 1, and sqq. 
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Mo-tze either directly or indirectly expressed such a mathematical propor-
tion. 
Indeed, Mo-tze did use an example in minimizing the influence or rather 
the punitive power of spirits as the cause of sickness. He said that if 
there were one hundred doors in our house and we closed only one of them, 
then we should not wonder why and where the burglar did get in. However, 
if one be accustomed to the style of ancient Chinese scholars, one must see 
that lIone hundred" meant merely "a great many", "a good number", and did 
not necessarily indicate a precise mathematical value. Generally speaking, 
a tendency to n~erical exaggeration is very common among ancient Chinese 
thinkers. And the term "one hundred ff is the most commonly used, or rather 
abused, expression meaning ttmany" or "many more!t. It is obvious that some 
times when we say !tmany more", we mean merely "a few more". This is very 
probably what Mo-tze meant. For, as we may read in the original text, 
all Mo-tze meant to say was that there are many more causes for one's being 
sick than the punishment of spirits. Mo-tze even named a few of them, 
such as climate and fatigue. 150 The comparison of the house with one 
hundred gates or doors is brought out solely to help in convincing his 
questioner. Therefore it is to be taken in its substantial sense and not 
in its literal meaning, because, in itself, it is not a statement explain-
ing Mo-tze' s doctrine. Therefore, what Mo-t ze wished to say is: "There 
are ma~ other causes of sickness besides the punishment of spirits, as in 
the case of a house with many doors, where if only one of them be closed 
we would not wonder how a burglar could get in." 
150 Since the original text is already cited in the objection, we do not 
cite it again. 
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Furthermore, even if we are forced to take the mathematical number of 
one hundred, Mo-tze was not exactly wrong either, for modern medical scienc 
tells us that there are surely more than one hundred causes by which man 
suffers sickness from the forces of the elements of nature. Therefore 
there are more than one hundred different sicknesses which of course 
require different causes; yet even the same sicmess may be produced by 
different causes in different persons under different conditions. 
Moreover, this does not imply that Mo-tze considered the influence of 
the spirits therefore to be only "one per cent" of the total influences men 
may receive. Although punishment by spirits were only ~ of ! hundred 
causes of sickness, it still would not mean that out of a hundred sick 
persons only one of them is punished by spirits, or that the chance of 
being punished is only one out of a hundred. We cannot see any logically 
legitimate inference in it. Punishment, even if one of a hundred causes 
of Sickness, would have to be a principal or a most common cause, so that 
a great percentage of ~ickness were caused by it, in a manner similar to 
that in which sudden change of weather is the most common cause of the 
most common sickness, the common cold. Therefore, from the fact that Mo-tz 
said that the punishment of spirits is only one of the many reasons man is 
Sick, one has no right to conclude that Mo-tze has reduced the power of 
spirits to practically nothing as the objector has attempted. Hence, the 
objection is invalid. It does not succeed in diminishing the sincerity of 
Mo~ze's belief in the existence of spirits and ghosts, and much less could 
it be of any use in questioning our philosopher's Sincerity in believing 
in the existence of God. 
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OBJECTION VII 
:r.b-tze was a pragmatist, or altrustic utilitarian. He proved the value 
of all his teachings by their social consequences. The welf~e of society 
is the real goal of his philosophy-. The "will of Heaven If is merely another 
name for this goal. The conclusion of his teachings is invariably pragmatic 
He repeated innumerable times: "Therefore, whoever wishes 10 see the world 
in order, peace and prosperity, or whoever wishes really to benefit the 
151 . 
people, must necessarily accept his doctrine." Even in teaching his 
supposedly fundamental doctrine of the "will of Heaven", Mo-tze used a 
clearly pragmatic starting point. He said: "What is thereason for dis-
order in the world? It is because the gentlemen of the world all understand. 
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trifles but not things of importance. If Then he went on to show that the 
important thing is to obey the "will of Heaven". If we should ask him why 
this is important, he would surely reply that, when we obey the "will of 
Heaven", then the world will be iri order and in peace. This would show 
clearly that the "will of Heaven" is not the ultimate basis of his tel\.Chings; 
it is rather a means to his real goal *hich is "social welfare" not for one 
particular state only, but, in the mind of Mo-tze, for 'all nations and all 
peoples in the world. This attitude we call in modern terms "altruistic 
utilitarianism". Perhaps it is best to let Mo-tze say this for himself; 
after having stated that we must obey the Ifwill of Heaven", Mo-tze continued: 
Now what does Heaven desire and what does It 
abominate? Heaven desires righteousness and 
abominates unrighteousness •••• But how do we know 
151 Although this is not a direct quotation of Mo-tze, we do agree that 
Mo-tze has said so on many occasions. 
152 Cont. original text of Mo-tze, chapter 28. 
that Heaven desires righteousness and abominates 
unrighteousness? For with righteousness the world 
lives and without it the world dies. With it the 
world becomes rich and without it the world becomes 
poor; with it the world becomes orderly and without it 
the world becomes chaotic. And Heaven likes to have 
the world live and dislikes to have it die; likes to 
have it rich and dislikes to have it poor; and likes 
to have it orderly and dislikes to have it disorderly. 
Therefore, we know that Heaven desires righteousness 
and abominates unrighteousness. 153 
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Very similar discourses are to be found in the other two chapters on 
the "will of Heaven". In one word, it is obvious, according to Mo-tze, that 
the social wellbeing of the world is the "will of Heaven"., Whatever we do 
to promote such welfare is to obey the "will of Heaven", and therefore is a 
virtuous act, which deserves reward and praise; and whatever we do to pro-
duce distress in society is to disobey the "will of Heaven", and, therefore, 
a vicious act which deserves punishment. This is the real mind of Mo-tze. 
And this shows that the "will of Heaven" is nothing but another name for the 
social wellbeing of the world. Hence, Mo-tze was a socialistic pragmatist, 
or an altruistic utilitarian. 
The leading author of this objection was the late Liang Chli Tsao, 154 
whose opinion is adopted by many modern scholars in China and is also 
followed and expressed in the English language by Dr. Mei, the translator 
of the original text of Mo-tze. Although Mei stated that the ethical prin-
ciple of our philosopher rests ultimately upon the doctrine of Universal 
Love, he nevertheless pointed out explicitly, adopting the opinion of Liang 
Chli Tsao that Vo-tze was a utilitarian. Thus, Mei first criticized Mo-tze 
in these words: ftFor, in his opinion, anything that could enrich the poor 
m QUoted trom original text of Mo-tze, Mei translation, chapter 2~. 
154 Liang Ch'i Tsao. jJ(;it. 4 China's leading scholar in the beginning of 
this century. Cf. his! Critical. Study 2!!. )i)-tze, Shanghai, 1921. 
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iIlCrease the few, remove danger and regulate disorder would be m.agnanimous 
155 
and righteous. tf Later, Mei went on to s err: lIMo-tze' s aIlS"Irer to this 
argument we have already quoted was an evidence of his utilitarian principle 
156 
of the greatest good for the greatest number." And, Dr. Mei briefly 
summed up this answer of Mo-tze's: 
In short, he points out that the four or five success-
ful states might be benefited thereby, but we have yet 
to take into consideration the destruction of the many 
unfortunate ones before we can give a just estimate of 
the merit of the institution of offensive war. His 
crude example was.the merit of the physician that 
cured a few but killed a great many by giving every 
siek person the same drug. Moreover it is to be doubted 
whether victory in these wars is really a blessing and 
benefit. Mo-tze thinks that it is not. For cities 
and states are not taken without effort. Many people 
would be killed on both sides. The result is but an 
empty name and a tract of desolate land •••• Therefore, 
Mo-tze declares: "But, when "Ire consider the y;1ctory 
as such, there is nothing useful about it. ff 1>7 
With Dr. Mei, many Chinese authors have cited Mo-tze's criticism ot 
offensive war as a revealing statement of his adherence to the principle ot 
"the greatest utility for the greatest number". Therefore, Mo-tze was an 
~ru.istiC utilitarian. 158 
155 All three quotations of Dr. Mei are from his Ko-tze, ! Neglected Rival 
of ConfuciUS, London, 1934, (page 95.) 
156 Ibidem, page 96. 
157 Ibidem, page 96. 
158 I great many modern Chinese and Japanese authors and quite a few modern 
Western writers adhered more or less to the opinion expressed in this 
last objection. Besides those who are directly quoted we may name the 
following:D. T. SuZuki, ! ~ History ~ Ear;ty Chinese Philosophy, 
London, 1914, page 95. Watanabe,! Brief Introduction to the Histo!"l 
of Chinese Philosophz, Shanghai, 1928, pages 135=136. Fang Hseu-Tsou, 
!'he Source of Monism, Shanghai, 1935, pages 103-104. T' ang Ching-Kao, 
;se!'ected Teit' or 'Matze with Notes and Introduction, Shanghai, 1926, 
Introduction, page 14. T'sai Shan-Sse: The Philosop~ of Life Accord-
ing !£ Lao-tze ~ Mo-tze, Shanghai, 1935;Page 61. ong Western 
Christian writers, for instance, W. H. Long stated: If Mo-tze based 
his philosophy on the metaphysical doctrine of a moral. and humanitarian 
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OUR ANSWER TO OBJECTION VII 
This objection, which is based not only on one particular statement of 
)lo-tze but on the fundamentals of his teaching, is perhaps the most convincin 
of all the arguments of our opponents. It is really a cumulation of all the 
other arguments. To answer this objection adequately we shall first explain 
the essential difference between a theistic moral philosophy and a utilitari 
one. 
This essential difference may be expressed briefly. The theistic moral 
philosoPhy is Theocentric, and the utilitarian doctrine is Anthropocentric. 
The former claims that God is the Supreme Being and therefore the center of 
moral philosophy; that is to say, that all moral principles come from this 
center as from their ultimate source and origin, and all moral arguments 
converge to this Center as to their ultimate aim and end. But, utilitarians 
give this honorable place to human beings by denying the existence of God 
either practically or even theoretically. Thus, they make human beinp the 
center of the physical universe, and consequently also the center of the 
moral universe, since, according to them, the moral order is not reallT 
distinguished from the physical one. 
However, while the utilitarian denies simply the fundamental thesis of 
Theism, the theist does not deny the fundamental prinCiple of utilitarianism 
Providence, he nevertheless kept one eye on practical social welfare. 
In technical terms he was a eudaemonistic utilitarian, holding that the 
'Wellbeing of humanity is the end of moral, social and political life. 
A pragmatic practicalism is also characteristic of his thought." 
(Conf. his Motze, China's Ancient Philosopher of Universal Love, 
Peiping, 1934, page 33.) lime. I. David has a SI'milar statement in her 
La Philosophe Meh-ti !! l'idee ~ Solidarite, London, 1907, page 154. 
Also Rev • J. Edkins said that Mo-tze "based his doctrine of Universal 
e u~on 0a 'lH..~ :.rt-... Ullo!o!;~~ ~li~· _t~~~nf . h~e articli:L tt:~tiC: §~J~e China 
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simPly, but only denies its absolute value. We theists do assert that man 
is, according to a very well qualified sense, the center of the material 
11Jliverse, becaus e he is the only material yet intelligent being. It is by 
bis intelligence that man surpasses all other material beings, and becomes 
the highest among all animals. Hence, in the material universe, that is in 
the physical order only, human interest or human utility is really the 
ultimate and supreme aim to be reached by all the actions in this order. 
Nevertheless, because we recognize the existence of a moral order which is 
based on the spirituality of human souls, we could not acknowledge that the 
phpical order is the supreme order in itself. The existence of a moral 
order is immediately deduced from and guaranteed by the very existence ot 
the human intellect 'Which is spiritual, and the existence of htlllan will.hic 
is free, and hence assumes moral responsibility. It is by the same obvious 
reasoning that the moral order is proved to be superior to the physical 
order just as the human being is proved to be superior to all other material 
beings. To deny successfully the superiority or the existence of a moral 
order is possible only by denying the existence of human intellect and 
free will, and, consequently, also denying the superiority of the human 
being over brute animals. If the human being has no spiritual faculties 
suoh as intellect and will, then he is by no means superior to brute animals 
and he will have no reason for regarding himself as the center of the 
universe. All he may take for granted is that perhaps ~ facto he is, or 
rather it seeu to him that he is, the center of the universe, but there wil 
be nothing 2! jure. In other 1IOrds,he has no reason for so regarding him-
self. However, this situation de facto provides very lit'tl:e value for man 
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practically speaking, even the humblest of brute animals 2! facto might 
consider (not by intellect but by its instinctive feeling) itself, or its 
own species, as the center of the universe 80 that everything else would 
exist for its species, which would therefore be the supreme being. 
Utilitarianism, therefore, cannot produce a reasonably convincing 
reason for its fundamental thesis unless it also acknowledges the spiritual 
yalue of human souls which will give him the right of being essentially 
superior to brute animals. However, as soon as one acknowledges the 
spirituality of the human soul, one must also necessarily acknowledge the 
existence of a spiritual order, which is, of course, superior to the physic 
order. Then, one is no longer utilitarian in the strict sense of the term. 
Perhaps the utilitarians will reply that they do not care about the 
existence of spiritual beings, or about the essential superiority of human 
beings over all other animals; for them, the fact that man is the most per-
fect animal is sufficient to prove his superiority. It does not matter 
whether man has a spiritual soul; it is enough that he is in ~ the most 
perfect and consequently the mightiest being in the universe. 
We will say that this principle based solely on physical perfection 
and might is quite dangerous to human society. If man has the right to 
be the center of the universe because of his physical perfection and might, 
then why should we not also apply the same principle in dealing with the 
different races and nations of human beings? Hence, racism, nazism, 
imperialism, which all are based on the principle that might is right. 
History has demonstrated to us that this principle me ans the ruin of 
, 
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civilization and the destruction of human race. 159 
strictly speaking, 'We 'Would say that there are only two kinds of 
theory about morality, namely theistic moralism and atheistic utilitarianism 
To this latter belong both materialism and idealism. 
We believe firmly that besides a sincerely theistic morality, there is 
no other moral system which is not fundamentally utilitarian. As we said 
above, moral philosophy is either Theocentric or Anthropocentric and, the 
160 
. latter, is necessarily utilitarian. 
This can be clearly demonstrated by the following argument: The moral 
laws or moral principles must be made either by man or by some being superio 
to man, because it is absurd to think that some being inferior to man should 
make moral standards for us. Then, if it is a superior being who made this 
standard, he tmSt be the Supreme being which is inferior to no other being; 
tor otlierwise he 'Would be subjected to same other being superior to him and 
therefore must accept standards from the latter. Thus, follOwing the process 
similar to that of St. Thomas by which he reached the prime and ultimate 
Mover (or Kovens), we may conclude that there must necessarily be a Supreme 
superior who must give the ultimate standard of morality. This Supreme 
Superior is God, considered in the speculations of moral philosophy. 
Mo-tze had this same idea in seeking for an ultimate and absolute 
standard of morality. First of all, he asserted that: It A standard is not 
159 We are glad that we are writing this essay in a time when the evil of 
racism, nazism and imperialism is obviously accepted by all the people 
in the world, so that 'We do not have to prove it. 
160 Even the theory of duty of Kant is ultimately utilitarian, because (1) 
it is agnostic in the existence of God; therefore, it is Anthropocentri 
(2) Kant repudiated the value of speculative reason and admitted. 
solely the value of practical reason, which, if considered as the sole 
guidance on moral affairs, will lead us to pragmatism. 
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to be given by the subordinates to the superior, but by the superior to the 
subordinates." 161 . Since this superiority is not based on mere political 
rank nor on physical power, our philosopher went further: ",As the dull and 
the humble cannot make the standard, and only the wise and honorable can, 
therefore, I know righteousness does not come from the stupid and humble 
but from the honorable and wise.'f 162 Then he continued: "Now, who is 
honorable and who is wise? Heaven is honorable and Heaven is wise. So 
then righteousness mu@t ha~e originated with Heaven." 163 After this 
statement, MO-tze brought out his arguments to demonstrate that Heaven is 
most honorable and most wise; and in concluding, he challenged his audience 
to point out some being more intelligent than and superior to Heaven; he 
asked: "But, is there yet anyone more honorable and wise than Heaven? 
Heaven is really the most honorable and wise. Therefore righteousness sure 
comes from Heaven." 164 By using the terms "wisetl and uhonorable" 165 our 
philosopher brought out the notion of intelligence together with that of 
superiority, so that the Moral standard must be given by the most intelligen 
Supreme Being. This,according to all theistic moralists, is no one else but 
God. 
Now, if one exclude the eXistenoe of God from moral philosophy, one 
must necessarily take the second hypothesis, namely that moral principles 
are merely man-made. But, if man did make moral prinCiples for himself, he 
must necessarily have taken no other standard than that of his own utility 
161 Quoted from Mei translation of the text of Mo-tze, chapter 26. 
162 Mei translation of the text of Mo-tze, chapter 27. 
163 Ibidem. 
164 Ibidem. 
165 The original Chinese word n ~t fI (for wise) and fI -t " (for honorable.) 
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and understands it. It is impossible to oonoeive otherwise. 
'l'berefore, an atheistio moral philos ophy must necessarily be Anthropocentric, 
that is to say, fundamentally utilitarian. Other systems such as Naturalism, 
H.donism, Sentimentalism, Sympatism, Pragmatism, Kantianism and even 
Rationalism are, in our opinion, merely different denominations of either 
egoistic or altruistic utilitarian. We must find the ultimate standard of 
morality either in God or in man. Therefore, fundamentally speaking, in 
moral philosophy, we are either Theist or Utilitarian. 
The only third position possible is that of fatalism, 'Which is, as we 
pointed out before, anti-philosophical; it is therefore not to be considered 
as an opinion in moral philosophy. It is not only the denial of theism 
but also of utilitarianism; for fate, which is by definition blind (i.e. 
lIIlintelligent) will act oempletely in disregard of human interest if it does 
exist. ~eism does give a proper consideration to human interests; God, 
who is, as Mo-tze pointed out, 166 a benevolent Father, necessarily aimed 
at the real interest of human beings when He brought them into existence and 
promulgated moral laws to them through their own nature. Hence, we may say 
with Mo-tze: "Ho1l' can there be anything that is good but not useful?" since, 
according to our philosopher, "everything is prepared for the good of man; 
even the top of a hair is the ~rk of Heaven." 167 That is to say that God 
created everything, and, what is even more important to us, He created 
ever.ything for the good of man. Therefore, theistic moral philosophy does 
not deny the "utility!' of man, but 801el., and firmly denies that it can be 
conSidered as the ultimate norm of morality. And, if the term "utility" 
-
166 conr. original text of Mo-tze, chapter 27. 
167 Mei translation of text of Mo-tze, chapter 27. 
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should be understood in its original meaning which includes both the moral 
and the physical welfare of human beings (as we demonstrated above in 
answering Objection V), it may eventually become a proximate (not ultimate) 
and practical (not theoretical) standard in judging social, economical and 
political doctrines, for it is precisely the causa finalis of these sciences. 
After such a complete and radical explanation, one should not be so 
bold as to call whoever urgently discussed human interest (or utility), 
especially collectively taken, ipso facto a utilitarian. The essential 
characteristic of utilitarianism is to deny both theoretically and practic 
the existence of a moral order which is really distinct from and superior to 
the physical order. Therefore, as long as one does not deny the real. 
existence of moral goods for man he is not a utilitarian in the real sense 
of the term. 168 
Mo-tze not only did not deny the existence of moral goods but explicitly 
and repeatedly defended its real existence and its superiority over the 
material interests of human beings. 
First of all, we must know that there was, in the time of Mo-tze, a 
general persuasion among the scholars as well as among the common people that 
above all material interests there is a moral principle which is to be 
followed at ~ cost of physical utility. The Confucianists even want so 
far as to have too little consideration of the physical utilities; this was 
justly criticized by Vo-tze as impractical, inasmuch as it leads to a great 
decrease in the production of material goods on the one hand and to increas-
ing waste of the same goods on the other. 
168 See above, page 111 definition given by Pope Pius IX. 
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Now, we do not yet intend to discuss this point, but we do wish to 
elllPhasize that the ancient Chinese did have a very sui table notion of 
"righteousness tl which is essentially different from the notion of interest or 
~tility. Mo-tze did not, and could not alter the notions or identify them. 
!!! did not, because, as a matter of fact, no one could quote him saying 
so, although several attempts have been made by modern utilitarians in 
interpreting him to show-that he identified righteousness with utility. No 
one could quote him directly asserting this, and, as we have seen above, such 
attempted interpretations are not logically sound. On the contrary, we can 
quote our philosopher as s~g that righteousness is more valuable than the 
entire wealth of the world and even more valuable than one's 01m life. l6~ 
Therefore, Mo-tze positively asserted that the principle of righteousness is 
superior to all physical utility. 
He could not. Even though Mo-tze wished to alter the traditional mean-
ing of the term ffrighteousness tf , he would have been unable to do so. Because 
no one could change the notion of such an important term and yet diseuss with 
his many opponents on moral doctrines without their misunderstanding each 
other on this term and especially without being accused by his opponents of 
misconceiving or purposely altering the meaning of this term. Righteousness 
was one of most sacred terms for the ancient Chinese wise men. Its meaning 
is well known to all as representing moral good, virtues and other praise 
worthy non~aterial things. Although different wise men have given different 
definitions of this term, they all agree on one point, that is, that in the 
notion of righteousness there is nothing of material or physical goods. 
169 See above, page 116 and note 131. 
Among the opponents of Mo-tze, the Confucianists especially were most 
,crupulous in definitions of terms, and they most of all 'Would not permit or 
tolerate anyone who would try to materialize the sacred terms of magnanimity 
and righteousness. Confucianists considered ·utility" as the opposite of 
righteousness, as something irreconciliable with the notion of virtue, so 
that JBany of them were actually ashamed to mention the term 1futility" in 
their teachings. Mencius, lIhose criticism against Mo-tze was absolutely 
merciless, was also a great opponent of utilitarianism; he 'Was so consistent 
and so determined in this point that-his immediate disciples decided to 
170 -begin the book of Mencius with a solemn condemnation of utilitarianism 
by their Master. 
Mencius went to see King Hway of Leang. The king 
said: "Venerable Sir, since you have not counted it 
far to come here, a distance of a thousand 1e, may 
I presume that you are likewise provided with counsels 
to profit my kingdom?" llencius replied: ItWhy does 
your Majesty use that . word 'profit'? 'What _ I am 
likewise provided. with are counsels ·to benevolence 
and righteousness and these are my only topics. If 
your Majesty say: lfhat is to be done to profit my 
kingdom? The great officers will say: What is to 
be done -to profit our families? And the interior 
officers will say: What is to be done to profit our 
person? Superiors and inferiors will try to snatch 
this pr.ofi t the one from the other, and the kingdom 
will be endangered. In the kingdom of ten thousand 
chariots, the murderer of his sovereign shall be the 
chief of a family of a thousand chariots. In a 
kingdom of a thousand chariots, the murderer of his 
prince shall be the chief of a family of a hundred 
chariots. To have a tho~and in ten thousand and a 
hundred in a thousand, cannot to be .-aid not to be a 
large allotment, but if righteousness is put last, 
170 The book of Mencius is also written by his disciples, probably after his 
death. The ease is quite similar to that of Mo-tze. See above, pages 
11 and 12 of our first chapter. 
and proftt be put first, they- will not be satisfied 
without snatching all. There never has been a man 
trained in righteousness, who made his sovereign 
an after consideration. Let your Majesty also say 
"benevolence and righteousness", and these shall be 171 
the only terms. Why mu.st you use that word 'profit'? 
Indeed this is a very emphatic cimouncement of utilitarianism; but when 
JeDciUS attacked the doctrine of Mo-tze, he could say nothing like this • 
• erves as a valuable criterion in confirming our opinion, namely that Mo-tze 
was after all not a utilitarian. 
On the other hand, Mo-tze also had many utilitarians as his opponents 
and they discussed matters with him quite orten. We may read their discus-
lions in the original text of Mo-tze, especially in the sixteenth chapter. 
Ko-tze personally answered their objections, some of which were veryclevaiy 
proposed. Th~ understood Mo-tze fairly well, and the.r also understood well 
the difference of opinion between themselves and Mo-tze. They were trying to 
convince Mo-tze of their principles just as eagerly as our philosopher was 
trying to convince them of his doctrine. 
We just wonder how the utilitarians of those old days who discussed 
things personally with Mo-tze for a long period of time with frequent 
and insistent arguments could not find Mo-tze a utilitarian at heart, while 
the utilitarians of Ollr day claim that they find ¥o-tze to be utilitarian. 
It we are permitted to use the famous statement of St. Augustine, "Credo ergo 
Evangelistae", 172 we would say that we rather believe the contemp~raries of 
our philosopher who had a constant personal exchange of ideas (and terms) 
172 Tract. I, in Joann. After examining the Arian heresy about the "Verb'Wll", 
the Bishop of Hippo concluded with this famous proclamation. It. is 
often mentioned and copied by theologians. 
1dth him. Thus, from the attitude of the opponents of Mo-tze (both 
1sts and utilitarians), we oould furnish a good reason to prove that our 
pbilosopher was after all not a utilitarian. 
It is indeed a Tery oommon defect of modern utilitarians that they w ....... uv 
see the fundamental differenoe between their prinoiple and that of a theistio 
.oral dootrine. They generally misunderstand the theists. They 'believe that 
the theists too are fundamentally utilitarians, but instead of proolaiming 
frankly the prinoiple of utility, the theists -- aocording to these utili-
tarians -- preferred an indirect method USing the religious superstition of 
the oommon people. Mo-tze certainly was not the only theist considered by 
them as a utilitarian like themselves. A typical example of this attitude 
can be quoted from the work of a leading utilitarian, John Stuart Mill, who 
wrote in his famous Essay ~ Utilitarianism: 
I must again repeat that the assailants of utilitarianism 
seldom have the justioe to aolmowledge that the happiness 
which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right 
in conduot is not the agent's own happiness, but that 
of all oonoerned. .As between his own happiness and that 
of all others, utilitarianism requires him to be as 
strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent 
speotator. In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazarethll~ 
read the oomplete spirit of the ethics of utility. 
Mill, who is so proud of his atheistio belief that he said of himself 
"I am thus one of the very few examples, in this country, of one who has not 
thrOTm off religious belief, but hever had it If, 174 is evidently trying to 
make Our Lord a utilitarian. Some utilitarians are so blinded that they can 
not understand the fundamental difference between their principle of ethios 
173 Conf. ~ cit., page 24. 
174 Conr. AU!ObIOgrap~, 1873 Ed., Chapter II, page 43. 
'!'hey are so fanatically sunken in materialism 
imagine that some one else may believe in the existence 
God. 
There is another group of utilitarians 'Who have misunderstood the theist 
a different way or a different direction. They believe that the theists 
e fanatically anti-utility or anti-pleasure inasmuch as theism is taken to 
e a condemnation of all kinds of happiness and material goods as flipso factoH 
sinful and vicious, and exalt all kinds of abnegations or painful sacrifices 
This is, of course, not correct at all. 
Mo-tze also has been often criticized as such a fanatic ascetic. Many 
modern scholar, such as Dr. Hu-Shih, has noticed this point; but the 
earliest criticism came from Chuang;..Tze only a few years after the death of 
In his book, Chuang-tze wrote: 
lfih-Tzu and Ch t in Hua-li became enthusiastic followers 
of Tao, but they pushed the system too far, carrying 
their practice to excess. '!'he former wrote an essay 
"Against Music" and another which he entitled "Economy". 
'!'here was to be no Singing in life, no mourning after 
death •••• He would have men toil through life and hold 
death in contempt. But this teaching is altogether 
too unattractive. It would lead mankind in sorrow 
and lamentation. It would be next to impossible as 
a practical system and can not, I fear, be regarded 
as the Tao of the true Sage. It would be diametrically 
opposed to human passions, and as such would not b~ 
tolerated by the world. Mih-Tzu himself would be 
able to carry it out; but not the rest of the 
world, his chances of developing an ideal State become 
small indeed •••• And because he thus sacrificed him-
self to the commonwealth, ages of Mihists to come would 
also wear short serge jackets and straw sandals, and 
toil day and night without stopping, making self-mortification 
their end and aim, and say to themselves: "If we 
can not do this, we do not follow the Tao ~f Yu., 
and are unworthy to be called Mihists. n 17;1 
We do not feel it necessary to quote any other author in order to show 
Mo-tze could be and in fact was criticized as an extremist in aacetieiRm. 
should be an inspiration, if not a persuasion, to those -.po lIished to 
Mo-tze a utilitarian Whereas Mo-tze himself did not bother much about 
pursuit of physical happiness, which is, according to the utilitarians, the 
thing desirable as an end, all other things being desirable only as means 
to that end. 176 
If Mo-tze was a utilitarian, he could not have been accused of excessive 
" ... " ........ ; and if he was really an excessive ascetic, then he could hardly 
The fact that he has been· accused of both 
is a pretty good argument to demonstrate that in reality he is nei 
one nor the other. "V:itus stat in medio"; so Mo-tze, as we think, is just 
about in the middle between these two extremities. 
Furthermor~, utilitarianism inevitably ends in egoism in spite of all 
its altruistic appearances. To prove this statement, we may call many a 
famous utilitarian as our advocate. 
Bentham, Who was the pracher of the principle of "the greatest happiness 
of the greatest number" has thus analysed his own altruism: 
175 Quoted from Chuang-tzu {J.. .J- , translated from the Chinese original text 
by H. Giles, Professor of Chinese at Cambridge UniverSity, England, 
chapter 33, page 440. Giles has spelled the name of our philosopher as 
Mih-Tzu. Chfin Hua-1i ~~~llis a disciple of Mo-tze. Yu is King Yu, 
one of the ancient sage kings. 
176 J. S. Mill wrote: "The utilitarian doctrine is, that happiness is 
deSirable, and .the only thing desirable as an end; all other things 
being only desirable as means to that end." Quoted from. Essay ~ 
Utilitarianism, chapter IV. 
The community is a ficti Ulus body, composed of the 
individual persons who are considered as constituting, 
as it were, its members. The interest of the community 
then is what? - The sum of the interest of the several 
members who composed it. 177 
This is enough to see that the "raison d'etre" of his aJ.truism is 
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!1lndamentally individualistic and even eloistic, while Christian aJ.tru1sm haa 
. 
an altogether different "raison d I etre". 
i811: 
Mill had an even franker statement in his famous Essay on Utili tarian-
No reason can be given why the general happiness is 
desirable, except that each person, so far as he b~lieves 
it to be attainable, desires his own happiness. l7tl 
Hence, fundamentally speaking, the happiness of oneself is truly (for 
the utilitarians) the ultimate standard in judging the moral or ethical value 
of human conduct. Hobbes has declared more audaciously: 
Whatsoever is the object of an.y man's appetite or deSire, 
that is it which he for his part calleth good, and the 
object of his hate and eversion evil; and of his contempt, 
vile and inconsiderable. For these words of good, evil 
and contemptible are ever used With relation to the person 
that useth them; there being nothing simply and absolutely 
so; nor any common rule of good and evil to be taken from. 
the nature of objects themselves. 179 
This is going too far in indicating views alien to our philosopher Mo-tz • 
Whoever reads the text of Mo-tze 1I:ill spontaneously agree With us. It is mor 
reasonable to accuse Yang-tze, the egoist, With utilitarianism; but Yang-tze' 
teaChing is, as we mentioned above, of course diametrically opposed to that 
of Mo-tze. 
117 
178 
179 
Quoted from An Introduction in the Principles of Morals and Legislation, 
by J. Bentham; Oxford, l876,Chapter I, sec. 4~page 3. -
Opus cit., chapter IV. 
Coiif. l!:rementa Philosophica, I, vi, page 41. Quoted from .An Historical 
Introduction ~ Ethics by Thomas V. Moore. (See bibliography). 
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Summarizing what we have explained so far in answering this last objec-
tion, we may state that the fact that Mo-tze has always started and ended 
hiS discussion 'With an eager interest in securing a peaceful socio-political 
order does not imply that he was a utilitarian; even the fact that llo-t ze 
seemingly 'Wished to prove the value of his doctrine by citing the social 
consequences it would produce does not imply that he was a utilitarian, un-
less one can prove that his principles of moral teaching corresponds with 
those of utilitarians, such as Mill, Bentham, or Hobbes. 
It is obvious that a social doctrine is to be held good when its practi 
'WOuld bring social wellbeing. This is precisely the aim of all kinds of 
social theories. Hence, Mo-tze was completely right in using this as an 
argument to prove that his social theory does work and, therefore, is good, 
not only theoretically but also practieally, since his opponents were solely 
interested in practical consequences. Any other theistic moralist would 
likely have done the same in a similar situation. Therefore, this does not 
imply that Mo-tze has taken social -wellbeing as the ultimate standard of 
morality. 
According to Mo-tze the will of God is the absolute standard of 
morality_ In the realm of social and political orders the will of God is 
precisely that all men should cooperate in a friendly and even fraternal 
manner in promoting the greatest common good pOSSible, provided that common 
good is to be understood as including both moral and physical interests. 
This is not the persuasion of Mo-tze alone but is that of all sincere 
theists, and this has caused the illusion of the utilitarians who believe 
that all theists are fundamentally utilitarian. We have already given our 
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eJC,Planation for it, because our God, as Mo-tze said, is a benevolent Father 
,mo can not but wish us good and thus looks after our own interest, of course, 
both spiritual and physical. If they still can not believe us, then they 
must have been blinded by their fanatic atheism that they can not even under-
stand that someone m~ believe in the existence of God. 
As we believe in the existence of a personal God, Creator and Supreme 
Ruler of the universe, infinitely good and infinitely perfect, we can not 
imagine anything else but that He loves us. He has created us because he 
loves us. He loves us, therefore, He wishes us good. We are in complete 
agreement with Mo-tze when our philosopher says that Heaven loves all men 
in the world universally; therefore, it must be His will that we should love 
each other mutually and universally in order to attain the greatest common 
good possible. We are philosophical theists and not superstitious devotees; 
therefore, we do not believe in any God who is a terrible slave master, 
perhaps with three eyes and six arms, etc. Our God is a God of love, 
"Deus Charitas est", and to love is, for God, to wish good for His belc.ved 
ones. 180 God loves all men as a whole being, namely humanity, and also He 
loves every one of us as an individual; therefore, He wishes the common 
good for the mankind in general and also the indiVidual good for each one 
180 st. Thomas wrote: "Deus alia vult in ordine ad bonitatem suam, non 
autem hoc modo, ut per ea aliquid bonitatis acqu1rat, sicut nos facimus 
circa alios bene operando, sed ita quod eis sua bonitate aliquid 
largiatur, et ideo liberalitas est quasi proprium ipsius, quia ex 
operatione sua non intendit aliquid sibi commodum provenire, sed vult 
bonitatem suam in alios diffundere, et ideo Augustinus dicit, quod ipse 
uti tur nobis ad boni tatem suam et utili tatem nostram. II (10 Sent., dist. 
h5, quo 1, art. 2) 
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of us. This is the real reason why Mo-tze has stated that the Will of God 
is to promote the good for men. To reach this conclusion one must read 
the original text of our philosopher entirely as a whole and inseparable 
thesis, and not just cut one particular passage out of it, as our opponents 
have done, in order to show that Mo-tze was solely interested in social 
'lfellbeing. By doing so, they are greatly unfair to our philosopher, who 
has explicitly found the "raison d' etre" of social wellbeing in the paternal 
, love of God: "Heaven loves the whole world universally, everything is 
prepared for the good of men." 181 As some scholastic philosophers have 
pointed out, the natural law (i.e. norm of moralit.y) is to be found or 
discovered through the natural nonn, which is, according to them, the human 
nature itself. In analyzing and observing this natural norm, we may find 
out the natural tendenqy to its own perfections, both physical and moral; 
so that we may say whatsoeVer is helpful to the fulfilment of such perfections 
is therefore in accordance with the natural law. This is by no mecn s to 
be utilitarian. 
Therefore, Mo-tze, as well as ever.y philosophical theist, has a good 
reason to believe that the Will of God is that all men 1i ving in society 
should cooperate fraternally in order to promote the common good as well as 
the individual good of each person. These two kinds of goods which are seem-
ingly of different character and sometimes even apparently contradictory to 
each other, are really reconciliab1e and are even hannoniously united under 
DiVine Providence, since the Divine Will has intended both of them. This is 
Why theists believe that the true individual good is to be found in the common 
good of society, and the true common good will provide, as a necessar.y 
-181 Original text, chapter 27, Mei translation. 
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consequence, the individual interest of each member of society. 
The utilitarians, having rejected the real existence of God, will 
necessarily have no other reason to promote the common good except that each 
person desireshis own individual happiness. Hobbes, Mill and Bentham, as 
V{e quoted them above, have frankly explained this fundamental pOint. 
As long as one can not show that Mo-tze was fundamentally indiVidual-
istic or egoistic, one can not state that he is fundamentally a utilitarian. 
A utilitarian who does not consider his own happiness as essential, would be 
a contradiction in terms, if the term "utility" is to be taken in its real 
sense. We are firmly convinced that the difference between an individualisti 
utilitarian and an altruistic utilitarian lies in the fact that the latter 
understands that individual happiness is only possible when the connnon good 
is first secured, while the former does not. 
An ethical-maching that does not consider one's ovm happiness at all 
is absurd. st. Thomas has started his moral doctrine with the notion of 
beatitude, because it is, as Aquinas told us, the end of human actions. 182 
Frankly speaking, what we are all looking for is precisely "happiness" of 
our mm. 183 The purpose of ethics is precisely to teach us how to reach our 
real happiness but its first duty is to show us which and what kind of 
182 
183 
st. Thomas stated that the aim of human will is "good": ItManifestum 
est, autem, quod omnes actiones, quae procedunt ab aliqua potentia. 
causantur ad ea secundum rationem sui objecti; objectum autem voluntatis 
est finis et bonum: unde oportet, omnes actiones humanae propter finem 
sint. n (.urn. Theol. I, II, quo 1, art. 1.) A little later, the Angelic 
Doctor asserted emphatically: "Sed contra est, quod ultimus finis 
hominum est beatitudo, quam omnes appetunt, ut Augustinus dicit (lib. 19 
De Civ. Dei, cap. i, et 13, De Trint., cap 4.); (Sum. Theol., 1, IIae, 
qu.T, art. 8.) -
"Man, prompted by an irresistible tendency inherent in his nature, des' 
happiness, and rests only when he has achieved it, full, supreme, and 
endless." (John J. Ming, S.J., Data of Modern Ethics Examined, p. 43, 
3rd Edition, Chicago, 1904. ---- --
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is the real happiness for us. In the answer to this last question 
lieS the essential difference between a theist and a utilitarian. Basically 
,peaking we are all individualists, inasmuch as we all seek our own happiness 
but not in the sense that we look solely for our own individual interest. 
The theists have a good reason to be not exclusively individualist; but the 
utilitarians do not have any such reason; therefore, their altruism is only 
a medium to reach their individualistic end. 
Now, regarding the doctrine of Mo-tze, it is certain that no one can 
reduce his teachings to those of the exclusively individUalistic utilitarian; 
not even modern utilitarian Chinese scholars have attempted to do so, for 
they all acknowledge that Mo-tzefs altruism is sincerely unselfish. It is 
so strongly unselfish that many ancient Chinese wise men have criticized it 
to be put into practice 184 or as something that is against 
human nature. 185 However, we do not think so for Mo-tze has given a good 
reason why one must be altruistic, although we do think that he may have 
exaggerated a little in practising his altruism. This may be eJq)lained by 
pointing out that our philosopher was teaching and practising in reaction to 
the evergrowing egoistic tendency of that time. 
The reasons why Mo-tze f s altruism can not be reduced to the individual 
interest may be briefly listed as follows: 
1) In fact, no one has ever asserted that Mo-tze was fundamentally an 
individualistic utilitarian. On the contrary, as we have just stated above, 
maqy of his opponents, both ancient and modern, have pointed out that Mo-tze 
184 
185 
Con!. original text of Mo-tze, chapter 16. Conf. also above text, pages 
105-106, translation of S. Ho1th and A. David. 
Mencius criticized Mo-tze1s altruism as against human nature. Conf. 
above text, page 28, note 60 of our first chapter. 
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~s fanatically altruistiC, to such a point that they think he was no longer 
reasonable, since he required that one must completely become a slave or a 
victim in working for the happiness of his fellow men. 
2) We would like to recall to our readers' mind the fact that Mo-tze, 
together with his disciples, did in fact demonstrate his s:i.ncere spirit of 
abnegation and sacrifice for the benefit of his fellow men. We have briefly 
described this in our first chapter. 
3) To quote only one more of many significant statements of Mo-tze 
himself: 
To kill a man in order to preserve the world is not to 
kill a man in order to benefit the world. But, to 
sacrifice one's own life in order topreserve the world, 
is to saQrifice one's own life in order to benefit the 
world. ltl6 
This shows clearly that self interest is not for Mo-tze the. ultimate 
eason for working for the common good. Furthermore, the statement is obvious 
ly anti-utilitarian, because it shows clearly that the righteousness of an 
act does not depend upon its practical consequences. In the given example, 
the practical consequence which follows both acts of killing is exactly the 
same, that is to preserve the world, so that supposedly without it the world 
would be destroyed. But, Mo-tze has denounced the first act and approved the 
second. Although both acts would, practically, save the 'World, Mo-tze would 
not consider the first as a real benefit to the world for it violates a moral 
186 Conf. original text of Mo-tze, chapter 44. Dr. Mei did not translate 
this chapter. No other translation is available; therefore, we are 
forced to translate it ourselves. We rep~oduce the Chinese text here 
for immediate reference. J~ - A. )'), fJ- J... -r, ~f 1-!l--)-- y), t1 A. -r- .JL j~ ~ Y'J,/K f:... 
1- ,t ~t ~ .,'" t'l " -r:. ~ 
However, the authenticity of this chapter is rated class B. (See above, 
page 10.) 
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principle, namely to'kill an innocent person. Mo-tze approved the second 
beCause he thinks of it as a voluntary heroic sacrifice; it does not violate 
BIlY moral principle, and therefore, one might say that it really benefited 
the world. In addition, this also proves that Mo-tze would not agree to the 
axiom "finis sanctificat mediumll taken in an unqualified sense, nor would 
our philosopher likely agree to the principle of the greatest happiness for 
the greatest number. Mo-tze maintained that even a IIgreatest goodlf such as t 
save the whole world can not justify the killing of a single person, supposed 
1y innocent. This argument alone is sufficient to contradict our opponents 
who wish to make Mo-tze a supporter of the principle of utili~. 
Positively speaking, Mo-tze did not say that we must obey the will of 
Heaven because we may therefore reach our own happiness, although he might 
have said so to those utilitarians of his dl3i7 just to pers'lade them to obey 
the will of Heaven. But, even though he had said so, it does not follow 
that he was therefore a utilitarian; almost all theistic moralists did state 
that men I s true happiness may be reached only by obeying the laws of God. 
~is is because man's nature is made by God in such a way that it must reach 
its perfection by following the Divine Law established for him and according 
to his nature. We call this law the· "natural law't. 
But, for Mo-tze, this is not the prima~ reason we must obey the will 
of Heaven. Our philosopher has given three objective and ! priori reasons 
as the basis of his doctrine on the will of Heaven, without any regard 
either for its social consequences, or for the indiVidual happiness of the 
SUbject. 
1) Above all, Mo-tze has taken a juridical concept as the starting 
point of his teachings on the "will of Heaven". This juridical concept 
establishes men's absolute duty and obligation to obey the will of God, 
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regardless of its consequences. He demonstrated this through the comparison 
with the family and the state. Just as all me.rnbers of the family must "de 
jure" obey the head of . the family, and all citizens of a state must It de jure" 
obey the head of the state, so all men liVing under Heaven must "de jure" 
obey the will of Heaven, since Heaven is the Supreme Ruler of the entire 
world. Our philosopher begins his teaching on the "will of Heaven" as follows 
Mo-tze said: The gentlemen of the world all understand 
only trifles but not things of importance. How do we 
know? We know this from one's conduct in the family. 
If one should offend the patriarch of the family, there 
are still the homes of the neighbours in which to seek 
shelter. Yet parents, brothers and friends all keep on 
reminding one to be obedient and careful. For, how can 
one offend the patriarch and stay in the family? Not 
only is this true about conduct in the family, but also 
in the state. If one should offend the lord of the state 
there are still the neighbouring states whither he may 
flee. Yet parents, brot~ers and friends all keep on 
reminding one to be obedient and careful. For how can 
one offend the lord of the state and stay in it? From 
these there are yet shelters to flee to, yet there are 
such constant counsels. Should there not be more counsels 
in a case from which there is nowhere to flee? As the 
saying goes: "Sinning in broad daylight, whither can 
one flee?" Really there is nowhere to flee. For Heaven 
clearly discerns it, even if it be in the woods, valleys 
or solitary caves where there is no man. But, contrary 
to our expectation, regarding Heaven, the gentlemen of 
the world do. not understand mutually to give counsels. 
This is how we know the gentlemen of the world undSr-
stand only trifles and not things of importance. 1 7 
Therefore, according to Mo-tze, our obedience due to the will of Heaven 
is a "de jurelf matter and is consequently a question to be settled Ita priori It ; 
187 Mei translation, the first passage of chapter 26 which is the first 
chapter on the "will of Heaven". A similar passage is to be found in 
the chapter 28. 
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that is to say: The method of settling the question is one which prescinds 
from the effect or advantage of the subject concerned. As it is here, the 
revnp:'ds and punishments of Heaven which .follow on the obedience or disobediere 
of human beings do not constitute the real and "de jure" reason o.f Mo-tze t s 
teaching on the will of Heaven. 
As to the brie.f introductory "WOrds in the beginning of the twenty-
eighth chapter of the text of Mo-tze, "Which is cited by our opponents in 
their attempts to prove Mo-tze a utilitarian, we must remark that they are 
found in only one of the three chapters on this same point of his 
ctrine. The passage just quoted represents the opening words of our philo-
his teaching on the "will of Heaven" • The third chapter on the 
subject (that is the twenty-eighth chapter) is quite similar to the first 
e. Mo-tze also started his arguments with the same process in comparing 
he jurisdiction of a father and that of a king with that of God. The intro-
ctorywords cited by our oppone~ts consisted merely of three short sentences. 
obviously not to be considered as an argument. But, they are, as 
merely a short introduction to the proper subject. We do acknowledge 
that these introductory words did bring up the importance of social well-
being, but that is only because the listeners of our philosopher were very 
uch interested in social wellbeing. Our opponents have yet to prove that 
o-tze did nonsider social wellbeing as the norm of morality. The fact 
social wellbeing was mentioned first is no sound proof. 
2) In the second chapter on the llwill of Heaven", IvIo-tze started his 
eaching with a metaphysical concept o.f the origin and the standard o.f 
Such a standard, as we have sufficiently explained while 
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answering other objections, must be absolute, objective, universal and 
perpetual. Therefore we must adopt this standard or follow it regardless of 
our own interest. This is again a "de jurel! matter, and the argument is 
therefore again an "a priori" one. The following is the opening of the 
twenty-sixth chapter. 
Mo-tze said: Those gentlemen in the world who want 
to practice magnanimity and righteousness cannot but 
examine the origin of righteousness. Since we want 
to examine the origin of righteousness, then where 
does it originate? 
Mo-tze said: Righteousness does not originate with 
the stupid and humble, but with the honorable and wise. 
How do we lmow it does not originate with the stupid 
and humble but with the honorable and wise? For 
righteousness is the standardSS.As the dull and humble 
cannot make the standard... 1 
Now, the notion of a standard presupposes intelligence, for nothing 
can be a standard unless it is considered to be so by an intelligent being~9 
Therefore, Mo-tze said: ItI know that righeousness does not come from the 
" 190 
stupid and humble but from the honorable and wise. fI This is similar 
to the notion of a moral standard in general (not necessarily the ultimate 
188 
189 
190 
Conf. Mei translation of Mo-tze, chapter 27. We must make a quite 
important remark on the word "standard" which is used here by Dr. !liei 
in translating the original Chinese word "-! 'Zit. Lest our opponents 
accuse us of profiting from Dr. Mei t s free translation, we must say 
that we acknowledge that the .. original we rds must be literally translated 
as "good government". However, even based on this literal translation, 
our argument still stands and its value is not affected at all, for, 
to govern is to make order, and as St. Thomas said, Itsapientis est 
ordinare lt (Cont. Gen., L I c. 1) and "Ordinatio non est absque 
ordinatore" trbidem;-1. III, c. 38), therefore, the idea of honorable 
(ordinator) and wise (sapiens). 
We remark again, that even if the original text should be taken literalq 
our inference stands. For a good government or a good order also pre-
supposes intelligence, as we already said in the preceding note (188). 
Conf. text of Mo-tze, chapter 27 (just quoted above). 
Quoted from Sum. Theol., I, IIae, quo 90, art. 4. 
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norm) as it is analyzed and described by St. Thomas Aquinas. The definition 
of law (including the natural law) by the Angelic Doctor is: "rationis 
ordinatio ad bonum commune, ab eo, qui curam communitatis habet, promul-
t il 191 ga. a. 
Here, we see that St. Thomas pointed out especially two ve~ important 
notions about law, namely, intelligence (rationis ordinatio) and authority 
(qui cur:a,'n connnunitatis habet). For a like reason, Mo-tze has stated that 
the moral standard (or moral law) must originate from the wise (intelligence) 
and the honorable (i.e., authority). After that, our philosopher continued: 
"Who is honorable and who is wise? Heaven is honorable alld Heaven is 
rlse.11 192 Then he tried to demonstrate tha.t Heaven is really the most 
intelligent being and also has the most supreme authority. Althoug..ll his 
argument for this matter was rather un-philosophical and even vulgar 193 
we nevertheless can excuse him by noticing that.his argument was fundamentall 
based on the commonly accepted fact that Heaven is the Creator and Supreme 
Ruler of the entire world. Moreover, after having demonstrated that Heaven 
is "de facto" more intelligent and more honorable than all men in the world 
including the venerable Emperor, Mo-tz.e even challenged his audience to 
prove or to point out anyone more intelligent and more honorable (having 
higher authority) than Heaven. Since no one could do so, our philosopher 
... 
191 Quoted from Sum. Theol., I, IIae, quo 90, art. 4. 
192 Quoted from Mei translation of Mo-tze, chapter 27. 
193 Conf. text of Mo-tze, chapter 27. It is too long to be quoted. Even 
though the argument is not philosophically sound, it does not diminish 
the value of Mo-tze's teaching on the doctrine of the "will of Heaven" 
because, at his time, people did believe (as we demonstrated above) 
that Heaven is the Supra':1e Ruler of t..1-J.e world. Considering this as 
accepted fact, Mo-tze I s whole argument is sound, since t"t1.e 'ilajorll is 
a prinCiple taken from the metaphysical notion of "standard" or "order" 
and the "minor" is based on a commonly aceepted faet. 
concluded: "Heaven is really the most honorable and wise. Therefore, 
194 
righteousness surely comes from Heaven". 
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One may easily see that this argument of Mo-tze in demonstrating the 
origin of righteo'.lsness is an Ita priori" one; its value is metaphysical and 
not moral in t..1.e sense of being, based on the moral or social consequences 
of the theory. As we may see in the original text, Mo-tze used the· argument 
right in the very beginning of the chapter before mentioning any social 
or political consequences of his doctrine. We said that the value of this 
argument of Mo-tze is metaphysical, because, according to him, it is proved 
directly from the essential notion of a moral standard, or moral order, that 
the norm of morality must come from intelligence and authority. Thus, the 
ultiIDate ~ of morality (or the origin of morality) must necessarily come 
from the ultimately most intelligent and ultimately highest authority. 
Now, continued our philosopher, since we all agree that God is the most 
intelligent and that He also has the highest authority, therefore, we_must 
conclude that the u1t~ate norm (or the origin) of righteousness comes from 
Him. The force of this argument is obviously independent of the social con-
sequences, which is not even mentioned here. We believe til at it is 3bD1ute1y 
impossible to consider this argument as representative of utilitarian or 
pragmatic reasoning. 
3) A third "a priori" argument used by our philosopher to persuade 
his hearers of the "must" (i.e. an ~ priori necessity or obligation) of our 
obedience to the "Will of Heaven" was the argument of love. It is not 
strictly a metaphysical but rather a moral arglli~ent. However, it is not to 
be considered an ~ posteriori argument, because it is not based on the moral 
-194 Mei translation, text of Mo-tze, chapter 27. 
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consequences of the premises. Mo-tze based this argument on a basic moral 
principle, a principle that is accepted by all human beings, and is con-
sidered an .! priori moral. principle. The argument reads as follows: 
Now Heaven loves the whole world universally. Every 
thing is prepared for the good of men. Even the top 
of a hair is the work of Heaven. Substantial may be 
said of the benefits that are enjoyed by men. Yet 
there is no service in return. And they do not even 
know this to be unmagnanimous and unfortunate. This 
is why I say that the gentlemen understand only trifles 
and not things of importance. 
MOreOVer, I know Heayen loves men dearly not without 
reason. Heaven ordered the sun, the moon and the 
stars to en1ight and guide them. Heaven ordained the 
four seasons •••• This has taken place from the antiquity 
to the present. Suppose there is a man lrl10 is deeply 
fond of his son and has used his energy to the limit 
to work for his benefit. But lIhen the son grows up 
he returns no love to the father. The gentlemen of the 
world will all call him unmagnanimous and miserable. 
Every thing is prepared for the good of men. The work 
of Heaven extends to even the smallest things that 
are enjoyed by men. Such benefit may indeed be said 
to be substantial, yet, there is no service in return. 
And they do not know this is to be unmagnanimoua. 
This is why I say that the gentle."l1en of the world 5 
understand only trifles but not things of importance. 19 
'Ilhus, Mo-tze insisted on the moral obligation of our obedience to the 
"will of Heaven", because of Heaven t s great love and great beneficence. 
~ 
Obedience to Heaven is considered by our philosopher as a "thing of impor-
tance", and in comparison with t..us very important obedience, obedience to 
a loVing father becomes unimportant as a "trine". This statement of 
Yo-tze does not imply that he belittled the importance of filial obedience, 
but only shows his emphasis on the great importance of a greater duty, 
"will of God." 
Mei translation of Mo-tze, chapter 27. The first and the last parts of 
this quotation are almost identical. It is so in the original text. 
This passage was cited such as it is in order to show Mo-tze t s insistence 
The duty of a son to obey and to please his loving father is an "a 
priori tl obligation; that is to say that the enforcement of this duty is by 
no means based on the pr~tical utility which may follow it as a result; 
but it is one of our most essential moral obligations 'Which we must carry 
out not because of our own phYSical interest. This is precisely the essen-
tial difference between filial obedience and servile submission. The former 
is natural, moral Ita priori", whereas the latter is decided upon considera.-
tions as to the practical consequences; it is therefore based on physical 
interest, or utility. It is obvious that Mo-tze did not preach a servile 
obedience to God, but he explicitly insisted on a filial one based on love, 
not on interest. Therefore, the basic reason for Mo-tze's doctrine on the 
"will of Heaven" is not the utilitarian principle. 
By these three main arguments of an evidently Jla prior" character, 
our philosopher has explained to us 'Why we ~ obey the will of God. It 
is a "must" regardless of our personal interests. It is a IIDlst from a 
juridical point of view; it is a must from a metaphysical point of view; it 
is finally a ~ from a moral point of view: An obligation mder a triple 
"a priori tl reason. 
Having thus established the "a priori" value of his doctrine of the 
,"will of Heaven", our philosopher surely could and even had to consider the 
practical side of the matter. Especially did this become necessar,y when his 
listeners were, as we noted, ve~f practical-minded. Therefore, Mo-tzewas 
rather anxious to show them that his doctrine was al.so practical: First, 
it can be taught to the common people; secondly, anyone wo has a good 
Will, after having understood it, will be able to put it into practice 
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even though it requires a little sacrifice of his personal interest; thirdly, 
the little sacrifices involved will be considered. but as trifles when one 
contemplates the great benefit that follows the practice of his doctrine, 
so that they are not to be considered as sacrifices. For a man EO has made 
a little investment in order to collect a great profit, it is not to give 
away his money but to make profit. Finally, Mo-tze reasons, if his moral 
doctrine be not accepted, and practised, the world will be in disorder and 
consequently even our personal interests will perish. Therefore, even 
under this practical consideration alone, the doctrine of our philosopher is 
to be followed and practised. 
As to the historioal facts that Mo-tze cited in order to demonstrate 
that fide facto" Heaven rewards those 'Who obey Its will and punishes those EO 
do not, they are not cited or used as an argument to prove our duty of obey-
ing Heaven. The contexts show clearly that Mo-tze t s arguments were by no 
means based on these facts. In our opinion, Mo-t~e rather cited these 
historical facts in order to confirm (not to prove) that the will of Heaven 
is precisely the principle of Universal Love which is another point of his 
teachings, although it is intimately connected wi ttl or rather derived from 
the doctrine of the will of HeavEn. 
Metaphysically speaking, there is an essential difference between those 
two points of Mo-tze t s teachings, namely, the doctrine of the Will of Heaven 
and that of Universal Love. The former is the answer to the question "Whence 
comes the norm of morality"? And the latter is the answer to the question: 
'"Rhat is this norm of morality as we may know it and express its content in 
a sort of axiom?" The fonner solves the problem concerning the origin of 
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, 196 JIlOrality or righteousness. The latter solves the problem concerning the 
IIconstitutivum metaphysicum" or the most essential s]llopsis of this norm of 
~ora1ity. Mo-tze approached the first problem b.1 establishing the necessar,y 
character of such an ultimate norm of morality. He stated that it must be 
absolutely good, universal, unchangeable, so that it must necessarily come 
from the Supreme Intelligence and Supreme authority, namely, from God. His 
solutiO~ of the second problem will be the topic of the next chapter of our 
dissertation. 
Moreover, even in this second point of his teaching, namely, the doctrine 
of universal love, our philosopher did not use historical. facts as a principal 
argumen t. The actual principal argument is, as we will see later, still an 
Ita priori" one, based on the reason that Heaven must wish us to love each 
. 
other, since It loves all of us. After having established the principal 
" argument, Mo-tze could, of course, use some secondary ones or rather confirma-
,tions of an "a posterioritl character in order to persuade his listeners even 
more finnly since most of them were practical-minded. Thus, he cited those 
historical facts from the ancient canonical books (Which are considered most 
trus~ by all scholars of that time) just in order to demonstrate that 
the will of Heaven consists precisely in the principle of tmi versal love, 
because, according to these ancient documents, Heaven did reward those Who 
practiced universal love and did punish those who rejected this principle. 
~erefore, these historical facts cited by Mo-tze were confirmative factors 
~ather than argumentative principles. 
196 As we quoted him before (see page 156), Mo-tze e~licitly used the 
term or~ and started his teaching on the will of Heaven by, as he 
said, ";;;mining the origin of righteousness. tI 
Now we shall examine, in concluding this section, the opinion originated 
IJ.ang ChI i Tsao, and adopted and expressed in English by Mei Yi-pao - an 
cited in the last objection. ACCOrding to them, Mo-tze adopted the 
1 .. r:LlJv .... l"'-.- of "the greatest happiness for the greatest number"; and they cited 
saying: "For, any thing that could enrich the poor, increase the 
remove danger and regulate disorder would be magnanimous and right-
eous.n197 Thus, they concluded that Mo-tze must have been a utilitarian. 
Our readers may well remember how we explained why Mo-tze has said: 
'HOW can there be any thing that is good but not useful 1" By the same reasons 
may be convinced that in the passage cited by Mr. Mei Yi-pao, our philo-
did not state the principle of utilitarians. He asserted that any 
that could enrich the poor, remove danger and establish order is there-
magnanimous and righteous, because he firmly believed that whatsoever is 
good, is also i.E-SO facto usef'ul for men. As we explained quite exten-
Mo-tze, as a theist, was convinced that only by some principles or 
theories morally good might men reach their physical interests. Therefore, if 
a theory or a principle is morally ~~, it just can not produce such 
good effect as to enrich the people, remove danger and establish social order. 
is not because he adopted the utilitarian criterion, but it is because 
already, by an .! priori reason, had established a principle: that only a 
IK)rally good doctrine can produce such an effect. Therefore, whenever one 
lees such effect is de facto produced, one may conclude that a morally' good 
doctrine must have been adopted before. This is the sole reason why Mo-tze 
Con!. Liang Chli Tsy's A Critical study on Mo-tze, and Mei Yi-paots 
Mo-tze, 2 Neglected Rival of Confucius.-The quotation is from the 
latter work. 
-------------------. 
said that "whatsoever may enrich the peopletf etc. is therefore good. Be-
sides, as we have eJCplained, these social common goods are to be considered as 
the ~ (causa finalis) of any social and political doctrines. Even in the 
general notion of law, st. Thomas pointed out the common good as its aim" 
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'ad bonum conmune." Therefore, it may rightlJr serve as a positive or 
practical criterion for social and political theories. It is obvious that 
-natsoever reaches its proper aim is to be called good. For instance" a good 
watch is the one that keeps time most accurately" and not necessarily the one 
consider the quality of fruit as the ultimate criterion" but we do take it as 
a practical criterion only because we firmly believe in this principle 'Which 
19 adopted as the real rea.son 'Why we may judge a tree from its fruit; namely 
~t a good tree cannot bear bad fruit nor a bad tree bear good fruit. Hence, 
a man who adopts this principle or a principle similar to this one, is not to 
be considered as necessarily utilita.rian. 
Dr. Mei Yi-pao has also tried to prove that Mo-tze adopted the principle 
of the greatest utility for the greatest number. However, the passage of the 
Original text which Dr. Mei has translated and quoted in criticizing our 
Cont. above, page 156 and note 189. 
This is obvious for Christians. 
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¢dlosopherfS real mind, is rea~ not a positive expose of Mo-tzers 
b1JIi solely an argument of our philosopher given to the utilitarians of his 
ume in order to show that even according to the view point of its utility, 
the aggressive war is not to be preferred because it is obviously working 
the utility even of the victor. Hence, even according to the prin-
ciple of the utilitarians, it can not be considered some thing useful. 
fore, n Mo-tze declared, Itwhen we consider the victory as such, there is 
useful in it. n2OO 
This, according to us, does not imply that our philosopher was therefore 
I utilitarian. It is the eormnon practice of theists to show the utilitarians 
the real good of mankind can not be reached through the principle of 
tarianism. In many instances, we may demonstrate to them that it is of-
a matter of fact that by directing one's activities solely according to 
the principle of utility one lands on the opposite side of "What he originally 
intended, namely his own interest. This is especially clear in the case of 
aggressive war. Theists would gladly adopt such arguments as the one used by" 
ze in order to show that aggressive war, or war in general, should be 
In fact, we are always glad to bring out statistics to show that 
allll"I"A:!lIl'nVe war has never brought real profit to the aggressor even though he 
may completely conquer his victim, occupy a great and rich new land, etc. 
Obviously there is no reason to accuse any theist of adopting utilitarian 
......... ..L1J.J..~., 1I1henever he prefers to use such an argwnent against aggressive war. 
Moreover, Mo-tze did not use this argument as his principal reason in 
condemning offensive war. He started his doctrine of condemnation 'With a 
Quoted in objection VII, see page 130 and note 1510 Mei Yi-pao quoted 
No-tze as so. Conf. Mei l s Rival of Confucius. 
£ 
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~riet notion of commutative justice, so that we may say positive~ that his 
first argument against the aggressive war is because it is unjust. In fact, 
Ile compared aggressive war with the injustice committed in robbery and theft, 
~ held that the former is even a much greater one.201 This is the essential 
Since the original text is interesting and somewhat important in proving 
our opinion, but at the same time is unfortunately too long, we decided 
to put it in this note: 
Suppose a man enter the orchard of another and steal the other I s 
peaches and plums. Hearing of it, the public will condemn it; getting 
hold of him, the aulihori ties will punish him. Why? Because he injures 
others to profit himself. As to seizing dogs, pigs, chickens, and young 
pigs from others, it is even more tmrighteous than to steal peaches and 
plums from his orchard. Why? Because it causes others to suffer more, 
and it is more mhuman and criminal. When it comes to entering another's 
stable and appropriating the other's horses and oxen, it is more unhuman 
than to seize the dogs, pigs, chickens and young pigs of others. Why? 
Because others are caused to suffer more. When others are caused to 
suffer lOOre, then the act is more llIlbuman and criminal. Finally, as to 
murdering the innocent, stripping him of his clothes, dispossessing him 
of his spear and sword, it is even more mrighteous than to enter the 
other's stable and appropriate his horses and oxen. Why? Because it 
causes others to suffer more; 'When others are caused to suffer more then 
the act is more unhuman and criminal. 
These, all the gentlemen :in the world know that they should condemn, 
calling them lmrighteous. Buli When it comes to the great attack of 
states, they do not know that they should condemn it. On the contrary, 
they applaUd it, calling it righteous. Can this be said to be knowing 
the difference between righteousness and unrighteousness? 
The murder of one person is called unrighteous and incurs one death 
penalty. Following this argument, the murder of ten persons will be ten 
times as mtrighteous and there should be ten death penalties; and the 
murder' of a hundred persons will be a hundred times as unrighteous and 
there should be a hundred death penalties. All these gentlemen in the 
world mow that they should condemn calling them unrighteous. Buli, When 
it comes to the great unrighteousness of attacking states, they do not 
lmow that they should condemn it. On the contrary they applaud it, call-
ing it righteous. And they are really ignorant of its being unrighteous. 
Hence they have recorded their judgment to bequeath to their posterity. 
If they did know it to be unrighteous, then why wbuld they record their 
false judgment to bequeath to posteri. ty? 
Now, if there were a man Who, upon seeing a little l:ia.ckness should 
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LoIUio'''~.- our philosopher was against aggressive -war. 
Thus, although many times :Mo-tze seemed to adopt the principle and view 
of utilitarianism, he was by no means a true utilitarian, since his adoption 
1I8s merely apparent, and could be distinguished by a more careful analysis 
of the meanings of his words through the study of the contexts. 
Now, we may conclude this part of our essay by asserting fi.rml;r that it 
baS been proved that Mo-tze was a theistic moralist, that is to say that the 
basiS of his ethical doctrine is the real existence of a personal God, who 
is the guarantor of an absolute and objective norm of morality. 
say it is black, but, upon seeing much, should say it is white; then we 
should think he could not tell the difference between black and white. 
rf, upon tasting a little bitterness, one should say it is bitter, but 
upon tasting much, should say it is sweet; then, we should think he could 
not tell the difference between bitter and sweet. Now, when a little 
wrong is conmd.tted people mow that they should condemn it, but 'When such 
a great wrong as attacking a state is committed people do not mow that 
they should condem it. On the contrary it is applauded, called right-
eous. Can this be said to be Imavring the difference between the right-
eous and the unrighteous? Hence; we Imow the gentlemen in the world are 
confused about the difference between righteousness and unrighteousness. 
(Quoted from original text of Mo-tze, :Mei translation, chapter 17.) 
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D) Philosophy or Religion? 
Whereas our philosopher is accused of being an 'Unbeliever by a great many 
,.oderIl authors, it is strange but true that he is also accused by a few aU.ULLV ...... 
of being a religious preacher or even a founder of a religion; hence, accord-
iJlg to the latter, he was not strictly a philosopher, for his doctrine was 
•• 'IT"" ..... y built upon the superstition of the common people of that time. 
Dr. Hu-Shih was the pioneer of this opinion. He stated in his not yet 
completed An outline 2! Chinese Philosophical History: 
Mo-tze was an earnest religious world-saviour, a founder 
of religion •••• If Mohism had been placed in circumstances 
sjmilar to those of medieval Europe, it certainly would 
have been able to develop a religious government, of m ~c~ 
its fOhu-Tzu'Sf would have taken the place of the Pope. 0 
As we mentioned above, Dr. Hu-Shih is a defender of Me-tze r s sincerity 
in believing in the real existence of God and the Spirits. He stated that 
llo-tze, 1m.like the Confucianists of that time, really believed in the 
of God and spirits.203 This is quite a notable fact, since at that time, 
he wrote this statement, he was definitely an atheist.204 
Conf •. Hu-Shih 's !!!' outline of Chinese Philosophical History, Vol. I. 
We said "not yet completed, If because the second volume of the work is 
not yet published. The English translation is of S. Holth quoted from 
Micius, A Brief Outline of His Life and Ideas. 
Conf. Hu".:shih, ~ cit.;-14th edition, Shanghai, p. 170, 1928. S. Holth 
also mentioned this belief of Hu-Shih. 
Dr. Hu-5hih obtained his Ph.D • .from Columbia University, New York. He 
openly professed atheism in China and tried to prove that all proofs of 
the existence of God are invalid. A typical example can be found in his 
~ OUtline of ~ History 2f Chinese Philosophy, Vol. I, 14th edition, 
page 263, where he stated: "The religious preachers of the West usually 
use the principle of causality to prove the existence of God. They sup-
pose that ~ere there is a cause there must be an effect and vice versa. 
From effect A we may prove the e:xistence of cause B; and considering B 
However" Dr. Hu-8hih did not esteem very highly the philosophy of Mo-tze. 
gis evaluation of the latter was: 
The above-mentioned nine articles are precepts of yo-tzets 
religion; they are not very important in Philosophy •••• 
Mo-tze was a very deeply religious person; he wished" 
therefore" that "the w.i.ll of God" be the ffuniversal moral 
standard,," so that all men of the world w:ill "identify their 
nil to the Will of God." And" thus" from a philo§opher 
Mo-tze became the f01m.der of the religion of Mo.205 
Dr. Hu-shih, being definitively an atheist at that time" ignored the 
eJCistence of natural theology (or as the modern scholastics like to call it" 
theod1cy) as a part of philosophy. Hence" whenever people speak about God as 
creator and Sup rente Ruler of the Universe" Dr. Hu-Shih believed that the 
matter was outside the realm of philosophy. According to him" philosophy must 
necessarily be atheistic. 
It does not need a scholastic philosopher to point out the mistake of 
Dr. Hu-Shih and his fellow atheist sCholars. We may cite one of the 
as effect" 1Ie may prove the existence of cause C, etc. Thus" we must 
necessarily reach an ultimate cause; this ultimate cause is God" the 
creator of the Universe. But" we 'Who do not believe in God" we may reply 
to them by the same principle of causality. The essential notion of the 
principle of causality ist ".A. cause must necessarily have an effect, and 
an effect must necessarily have a cause ." Now" if you say that God is 
a cause, then" may I ask you what is the cause of God? If you!!2: that 
God is the ultimate cause" this is equal to saying that God is !!! e1f'eCt 
w.i.thout any cause, m.ich is contradicting the principle of causality. 
How can one still use the same principle to prove the existence of God? 
If you say that God also has his cause, then, may I ask what is the cause 
of the cause of God? •• Therefore" it cannot be said that there is a 
Creator and Supreme Ruler of the Universe." 
It muld be go:Ing out of the realm of our dissertation to refute the 
argument of Dr. Hu-Shih. We only wish to say that" as it is obvious, his 
lmowledge on the principle of causality" especially as it is understood 
by scholastic philosophy" is altogether wrong and even ridiculous. 
Translated from An Outline of Chinese Philosophical History, Vol. I, 14th 
edition, pages 114-175_ 
criticisms already made by S. Holth: 
Dr. Hu.-5hih has said that Micius was the only early 
Chinese writer who sought to form a genuine religious 
system. He even calls him a founder of religion. This 
is undoubtedly an exaggeration •••• It seems strange Micius 
any more than Confucius and Lao-Tze should be a founder 
of religion •••• Ml.cius, it must be admitted, was decidedly 
religious, but he can ~dJ.y claim to be considered as 
a founder of religion. 
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Among Western authors, none of the author.ities has ever depreciated the 
pbi1osophical value of Mo-tze' s doctrine. Nevertheless, there could be one 
two writers who might foll.ow Dr. Hu-Shiht s mistake. To cite an example: 
.' B. Pettus wrote, in the preface of a booklet concerning Mo-tze: 
In his life and in his teachings Mo-tze resembled Jesus 
more than did any other teacher or religious leader of 
AsiBr. He is the only Chinese who founded a religion or 
established a church. In his use of symbols, he resembled 
the teacher of Freemasonr,r and he uses the square, the 
level, the compass and the plumb to teach morality.207 
The statement is of negligible value; its opening assertion of the simi-
larity of Mo-tze's teaching to that of our Lord, is merely a repetition of a 
wide~ expressed view. The second part is but a shadow of Dr. Hu-Shihfs 
opinion. The last sentence very probably sets forth an original idea of the 
ter, but, unfortunately, it is not likely true. Our readers should have 
little difficulty in recognizing its falsity, since -we already have given a 
good EDCplanation of Mo-tzef s mentioning those instruments, or rather standards 
cannot realize how this could have any resemblance to the m,ysticism of 
To decide whether the teachings of Mo-tze had any philosophical value, 
or whether he was merely a religious preacher among primitive people, who are, 
and 48. 
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some think, more superstitious than civilized modern people, is a question 
iJl~lving a clear and precise definition of terms. Our opponents did not ex-
clearly- what they meant by the term "religious preacherlf and what they 
meant by the term "philosopher". However, it does not take a scholastic to 
,ee that God, and things concerning God, are an essential part of philosophy. 
the def:inition of philosophy by Cicero wast IfPhilosophia est rermn 
divinarum et hllmanarum causarumque quibus hae res continentur, scientia.u208 
do not think that Mo-tze should be excluded from the realm of philosophy 
arq more than the famous author of !!! Natura De~ 
As a matter of fact, we may state w.i. thout hesitation, that the intellect-
11&1 milieu as a whole, even in our modem age, bas never excluded God from the 
realm of philosophy. The reason is obvious to us; it is because God is by 
UI:I.I..,l.U..l.tion the ultimate universal cause of the universe, while philosophy is 
the science of knowing beings by their universal causes. Only those who deny 
the value of the principle of causality, such as William James, will """"i5<a .... v 
31 create an entire~ new kind of definition for the term philosophy. 
ttphilosophy is an unusua.~ persistent effort to think clear~ 
But, even according to this def:inition of philosophy, folloWers of James, such 
as Dr. Hu-Bhih, cannot banish the teaching of Yo-tze from the realm of philo-
sophy, unless they prove that whenever people speak about God, they do not 
think clearly. But, this lDuld imply that menever people deny the enstence 
of God, they do not think clearly either, because to deny the existence of God 
Con!. Cicero De OffiCiis, Book II, chap. 2. 
Quoted from Chen Yuan-Teb ( I:i. j(..l At ), who in the preface of his Histo~ 
of .Ancient Chinese PhilOSOPh! (written in Chinese), has purposely cite 
William James in the origina English to emphasize its importance. (See 
) 
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is to speak about God. It is obvious that the atheists must first 1.mderstand 
clearly the reasons by which the theists affirm the existence of God; other-
fise they si~1y have no reason for dez¢ng it. 
Therefore, the mere fact that Mo-tze spoke about God and His will does 
not make his teachings lose their philosophical value. For us, it is clear 
that the essential difference between a philosophical doctrine and a religious 
one is that the former is based on natural reason as such, while the latter is 
produced by a co-operation of reason and Revelation. 
Mo-tze was strict~ a philosopher. This can be proved by the fact that 
he bas never associated any supernatural elements with the basic principles of 
teaching. Indeed, Mo-tze spole often about the relations between man and 
his Creator, God; and this seemed to be a good reason to call him a religious 
.p.l.,;oa. ............. , since, by definition, religion is the relation between men and God. 
nr ... ",...,. ...... , we must know that there are two kinds of religiOll, namely the super-
and the natural; the latter is s~~ a part of philosophy" because it 
deduced from natural reason. The natural reason of human beings, purely as 
such, is able to know and to prove the existence of God, and hence to deduce 
the due relations between man and his creator. 
The religion of the ancient Chinese was purely natural 1.mtil the intro-
duction of Buddhism from India.210 There were of course plenty of mythologi-
cal. legends and supernatural fairy tales, but none of them has ever so influ-
tIlced ancient Chinese thought that the Chinese took it as the foundation of 
their religion. Mo-tze also has cited many of those supernatural tales, most 
The fact is clear because prior to the introduction of Buddhism no 
Chinese has ever claimed having seen God or rec~i ved revelat;iQn~ from the Same. In other words there was no supernaturalism in the relig:LOus 
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frOlIl the books em ted by Confucius, in order to prove the existence of spiri t/i 
and specifically the existence of the human soul after the destruction of the 
bOdy. This, however, does not affect the philosophical value of Mo-tze's 
teaching, because, as we demonstrated above, the doctrine of the existence of 
sPirits thus confirmed is not an essential part of his teaebing. It could be 
completely ignored without causing any change in the entire system of Mo-tze t s 
It is obviously beside our purpose to discuss whether Mo-tze personally 
believed these reports on the re-a.ppearance of deceased persons. Nevertheles~ 
we may remark that even if he believed in them, he biould not be considered 
merely superstitious, because the reports he cited do not involve absurdity, 
that is to say, those alleged facts are at least possible if' one believes in 
the innnortality of souls; we may say that it is possible that they come into 
contact with us 'With the permission of God. Besides, Mo-tze did not invent 
them, for they are recorded in the ancient historical documents, the canonical 
books. The Chinese are glad, and even a little proud, to point out that, un-
like the ancient Greek mythologies, their ancient spiritual legends did not 
~ly ~ idea of polytheism nor have any exaltation of immoral acts. The 
most common form of these legends was that the irmnoral and unjust acts com-
mitted by human beings were punished by the spirits or duly revenged by the 
very same spin t (that is the separated soul) of the victim. Mo-tze could 
have used those legends in promoting the moral consciousness of the common 
people; while doing so, he obviously 'WOuld not have been teaching his philo-
SOPhical doctrine, but merely citing the ancient books. Afier all, a philo-
SOpher is not expected to speak philosophically all the time. He might speak 
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e. theologian or an historian even for a great part of his life. Thus, st • 
..... n~ .. was a true theologian and a true philosopher. As long as the philo-
,..tm;1J.'-•• _1 teachings of Mo-tze can stand as a solid system without any help of 
knowledge, his doctrine must have a philosophical value. 
EVidently, Mo-tze professed the existence of God without any supernatural 
• Then he proved by merely natural reason that the norm of morality must 
.... (,l8i6CI-J.·..I.ly have its origin from God, the most honorable and most intelligent 
• Hence, the will of God is the ultimate norm of moralityo Now, his 
r merit is that he succeeded in presenting what is the will of God in 
concrete formula, with sound reasons, yet 'Without introducing any super-
factors throughout his entire argument. He did not say that if the 
of morality is the will of God, then let Him tell us what He wishes; but 
rather said that if the norm of morality is the will of God, then, let us 
find out in what the will of God consists. We must find it out by natural 
reason, and not sit down and wait for a revelation. Mo-tze definitively aelirJ.OIl~ 
strated himself as a true philosopher by inqu:i:r:i.ng What is the will of God 
that could be expressed under the form of a general principle, and especially 
by inquiring into it through exclusively natural reasoning. 
God, Who is the Creator of all human beings, must love men all univer-
211 
sally. He created every thing for the good of man. Thus, God is the 
Common Father of all human beings. Now, a father who loves his sons and 
daughters must necessarily wish that his sons and daughters love each other 
and work to their mutual benefit. This is the only reasonable way of under-
standing the matter. Halce, we may know that God, the Common Pather, also 
2JJ. Conf. original text, Chapter 27. 
--------------------------. 
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that all of his sons and daughters love each other and 'WOrk for their 
._"" ....... '_ benefit. Furthermore, as the Supreme Ruler of mankind, God must also 
the principle of universal love. 
The rule of Heaven, said Mo-tze, over the world is not 
mlike the rule of the feudal Lords over the state. In 
ruling the state does the feudal lord desir2~S ministers 
and people to work for mutual disadvantage? 
Mo-tze left the answer to his listeners. The matter is obvious. There-
tore, according to Mo-tze, the fact that God is the Creator and Common Father 
and the fact that He is also the Supreme Ruler of all men must 
inply that He wishes that all men love each other mutually and 
Our philosopher discoursed quite extensively in order to demonstrate that 
God is a Loving Father for all humanity. As we cited above, he had many 
reasons to prove his statement. 
Heaven loves the 'Whole world universally. Every thing 
is prepared for the good of man. Even the tip of a hair 
is the work of Heaven .... Moreover, I 1maw Heaven loves 
men dearly not without reason. Heaven ordered the sun, 
the moon .... yet this does not exhaust lI\Y reason whereby 
I know Heaven loves men dearly .... This i~ ati1I not all 
by which I knaw Heaven loves men dearly. 13 
When this fact, namely, that God loves men universally, is accepted, the 
implication is obvious. Thus, Mo-tze has demonstrated that the will of God 
consists in the principle of universal love. 
We must note that all these reasons are of a purely natural character. 
There was not even a slight suspicion of the use of supernatm-al authoritieso 
Conf. original text, Chapter 27, Mei translation. 
Coni. original text, Ibidem. 
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tt is only a question of reading the original text; it does not need any 
The greatness of Mo-tze consists precisely in this, that he proved by 
.,tapb:y'Sical a priori reasons (i.e. from the very nature of the being con-
cerned) that the absolutely ultimate norm of morality must necessarily be the 
till of God. And then, by a kind of a posteriori reasoning based on the facts 
of 'our immediate eJq)erience, he demonstrated that the 'Will of God consists iIi 
the pr:inciple of universal love, 'Which he declared by answering a self-posed 
What is the will of Heaven that is to be obeyed?_It is 
to love all the people in the world universally.214 
This answer is definitely positive. It is the firm conclusion of a pro-
leSS of clear reasoning, which is merely natural and strictly within the realm 
of philosophy. Philosophy or Religion? We may leave the answer to our 
readers. But, before we conclude this chapter of our dissertation, we must 
mrlook one point that many of our readers are probably expecting us to bring 
is, Mo-tze, with his doctrine of the will of Heaven, seems to be a 
or a positivist.2l 5 According to the so-called voluntarists, the 
lill of God is absolutely free to decide what is good and what is evil, so 
that prior to the decree of God's will there is nothing that may be called 
good and nothing that may be called evil. In other words, nothing is 
Conf. original text, Chapter 27, Mei translation. 
Quite a few scholastic authors do not use the name voluntarism in this 
case. They rather insist on the intrinsic and essential distinction of 
moral species and thus malce all those 1Vho maintain an extrinsic and 
positive distinction of the same their opponents. And this later opinion 
is called positivism in morals or Ifpositivismus moralis. fI (Conf. J. S. 
Hickey, O. Gist., Summula Philosophiae Scholasticae, Vol. III, page 294, 
7th Ed., New York, 1941.) . 
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iJrIirinsically good or evil, but becomes good or evil only after the decree of 
(JOdI s will, which is an extrinsic principle or an efficient cause of species 
of morality. This was the opinion of Ocham, Gerson and other nOminalists. 216 
:Ill modern philosophy, Descartes was the greatest among the voluntarists.217 
The following statement of Descarliesis very similar to the doctrine of 
'Will of Heaven of our philosopher: 
Thus it is that man, uniting his will to that of God, 
loves Him in so perfect a manner as to desire nothinfu 
more in this world but that the will of God be done. 
The first thesis of voluntarism is: uTo make our will and our under-
standing one w.i. th the 'Will and understanding of God. - In this lies the 
..mole of morality.n219 Indeed, the above cited statement of Descartes and the 
1'.I.rst thesis of voluntarism applies very well to the teaching of our philo-
soPher concerning morality. But, we may note that these also may be applied 
to the fundamental principle of Christian ascetism which can be summed up in 
"Thy Will be done." Therefore, obviously, voluntarism proper-
11 speaking does not consist in these two statements quoted above. 
Suarez gave testimony to this statement: nQuidam dixerunt nullum esse 
actum voluntatis ita malum, quin possit esse non malus, quamvis libere 
at humano modo fiat, quia putant omnem malitiam pendere ex voluntate Dei, 
quae libera est in omnibus effectibus ad extra, quorum unus est prohi-
bitio sen praeceptum. Ita Nominales fere setiunt, Ochamus, Gerson." 
(Cont. Suarez, De Bon. et Mal., dist. 7, s. 1, n. 2.) 
Descartes was nOt only voluntarist in morals, but also in metaphysics as 
well: "Truth, according to Descartes, rests ultimately on the divine 
free-will: and had God so chosen, our necessary truths might have been 
the reverse of 'What they are. (Cont. J. S. Hickey, O. Gist., S1mnnla 
Philosophiae Scholasticae, Vol. I, page 349, 9th Ed., New York, B4!.) 
Cont. "Letter to M. Chanut, U English translation quoted from! Histo17 
~ Problems of Philosopgy, page 58. 
Quoted from ! Historz of Problems .2f Philosopgy, page 58. 
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The voluntarism of Ocham and Descartes consisted in their belief that 
.per se I and 'a priori' there is nothing that is intrinsically wrong or right. 
It is entirely a matter of free choice made by the Divine 'Wi 11. Since we 
..,st admit that the Divine will is absolutely free, and therefore is not 
bOund to choose a certain action as morally right or morally wrong, we must 
conclude that there is nothing that could be considered morally right or 
.,rally wrong prior to this determination of the Divine will. Therefore, if 
GOd bad so wished, what is now considered moral wrong could become moral right 
and vice versa. In other words, morality depends entirely and absolutely on 
OUr preoccupation here is not to refute this Ocham-Cartesian v01mtarism, 
since the procedure of such refutation is already well known to scholastic 
philosophers. We merely 'Wish to state that voluntarism considered as such, 
our philosopher Mo-tze was not one of its defenders simply because Mo-tze 
never discussed this point and probably never thought about it. In fact, 
TOluntarism, as it is described in the above paragraph, was simply unlmown 
among the ancient Chinese wisem.en. Therefore we find no one in ancient China 
(or even in medieval China) who has brought the point into discussion. 
The teaching of Mo-tze concluded in the precept that we must obey the 
will of God and consider it as the standard of morality. This, however, can 
not be said of Cartesian voluntarism. The insistence on the absolute 
of God's free will made by Ocham and Descartes was simply beyond the thoughts 
of our philosopher and if' necessary admit that such a subtle and intricate 
question would not have occurred to him. 
However, suppose Mo-tze was ~ced with this Cartesian doctrine. Would 
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accept or reject it? The follow:iJlg is only our opinion~ since there can 
be no certitude in answering this query. Considering that Mo-tze has said 
"no human being can make the standard at will (i.e. freely); even the 
may not make the standard at will. There is Heaven to give him the 
220 
standard," and that, on the other hand, Mo-tze never said that Heaven may 
not make the standard at will, it seems that one can suppose that our philo-
sopher has conceded the right of making a standard at will to Heaven. That 
to say, according to Mo-tze, God is free to make the norm of morality as 
is pleased. 
Furthermore, accordiltl to Mo-tze, God makes the standard of morality; 
gives it to the emperor and to all other human beings, but He did not re-
ceive it from anywhere or anyone. Even more precise:Q'", Mo-tae ~licitly 
221 
stated that Godt s will itself is the standard of morality. This seems to 
be a good reason why we may believe that Mo-tze would have been a supporter 
of voluntarism if he had had the chance of learning something along this line 
~om either Ocham or Descartes. 
Nevertheless, if, on the other hand, we consider the eagerness of our 
philosopher to find out or to establish an ~bsolute norm of morality, the 
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of intelligence with regard to the norm of morality and the 
genuine interest (or rather love) or God in men which he described So well, 
Conf. original text, Mei translation, ch. 28. Also page930f our disser-
tation. 
conr. original text, Mei translation. ''Mo-tze established the will of 
Heaven to be the standard." (ch. 28) "The will of Heaven is truly the 
standard of righteousness." (Ibideml last sentence of ch. 28.) 
"Righteousness does not originate with the stupid and humble, but with 
the honorable and wiseo lt (Original text, Mei translation, ch. 27. Also 
cont. page 150 and sqq.) 
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t}leIl we greatly doubt that Mo-tze could have believed that such an ultimate 
norm of morality would have no other reason than the arbitrary free will of 
Particularly interesting to us is the fact that Mo-tze' s main proposi 
:is to find out the origin of righteousness. He begins his teaching on the 
Jlo-tze said: "Those gentlemen in the world Who want 
to practice magnanimity and righteousness cannot but 
examine the origin of righteousness. Since we want to 
examine the origiri of righteousness, then where does 
it originate? 
Mo-tze said: Righteousness does not originate with the 
stupid and humble, but with the honorable and wise •••• 
Now Who is honorable and who is wise? Heaven is honorable 
and wise. 2~~ then righteousness must originate with 
Heaven •••• 
Then, after he proved that Heaven is most honorable and most wise, he 
"But is there yet any one more honorable and more wise than 
Heaven? Heaven is really the most honorable and wise. Therefore, righteous-
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ness surely comes from Heaven." This may convince us that Mo-tze 'WOuld not 
00 a voluntarist after all, because: 
1) The reason for Heaven's being the origin or originator of righteous-
ness is that Heaven is most honorable and most wise. Thus the ultimate 
authority is rather intelligence and consequently not free-will. 
2) The origin, i.e. the ultimate source, of morality is rather Heaven's 
person Itself. The ultinate metaphysical reason for this is the absolute 
Cont. original text, Mei translation, ch. 27. 
Cont. ibidem. 
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nobility of Heaven's person and the absolute wisdom (or intelligence) of 
geaven; and the free-will of Heaven is not even mentioned in Mo-tze l s main 
Cartesian voluntarism, which states that originally and absolute~ 
BPeakinB there is no difference between good and evil, would find no supp 
in ancient China except perhaps Lao-tze, nose teaching 'Was not popular at 
U 225 a • 
Therefore, in concluding, we think that we have full reason to believe 
that Mo-tze would not have approved the doctrine of voluntarism. 
225 Conf. pages 38-46 of our dissertation. 
CHAPl'ER III 
THE FIRST Jm'HICAL AXIOM: "UNIVERSAL LOVE" 
A) THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE AXIOM 
In the preceding chapter we have demonstrated that, according to Mo-tze 
the absolute norm of morality is the will of God, and that the will of God 
lAY be expressed in a brief form, namely "That we must love all the people of 
the world universally.tr 
Now, 'What is that Heaven desires and what is it that It 
abominates? Certainly Heaven desires to have men benefit 
and love one another and abominates to have them hate and 
harm one another. How do we know that Heaven desires to 
have men benefit and love one another and abominates to 
have them hate and harm o~e another? Because It loves and 
benefits men universally. 
Mo-tze even went so far as to quote (from imagination of course) Heaven 
as speaking about the ancient sage kings: 
Thereupon, the will of Heaven proclaimed: "All those 
'Whom I love these love also, and all those whom I benefit 
these benefit also. Their love to men is all~mbracing 
and their benefit to men is most substantial." 
He repeatedly :insisted on the term "universal": 
What is the will of Heaven that is to be obeyed? It is 
to love all the people in the world universally.3 
To obey the will of Heaven is to be universal, and t04 oppose the will of Heaven is to be partial (in love.) 
Quoted from Mei translation, text of Mo-tze, ch. IV. 
,!pidem, ch. XXVI. 
!bidem, ch. XXVIII • 
.!bidem, ch. XXVIII. Parenthesis original. 
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It is, as we believe, a firm conviction of Mo-tze that the will of HO!l'U'o'nl 
:i.S the principle of tmiversal love; hence, "universal love" is the first CIo.A..L.Vllll 
of morality, which in its turn is the standard. dictating or measuring all 
human action and thinking. Thus, practically speaking, Mo-tze considered the 
following three terms as equipollent: 1) Norm of morality. 2) Will of 
Universal love. 
However, as we have seen in his ~ose of the doctrine of the "will of 
Heaven, If our philosopher liked to start his expositions 'With a seemingly 
matic argument, although later in the explanation he would eventually show 
the significance of his a priori arguments, 'Which are for him the real 
tion of his doctrine. We have explained above that the reason for his doing 
so was to facilitate a proper approach in the mind of his audience 'V'ho were 
tor the most part exclusively interested in restoring social order and in 
stinmlating peace and harmony. Thus we trust that our readers will not be 
surprised to find Mo-tze introducing his doctrine of universal love with a 
pragmatic argument. We prefer to quote him directly: 
Suppose we try to locate the cause of disorder, we shall 
find it lies in the want of mutual love. What is called 
disorder is just the lack of filial piety on the part of 
the ministers and the sons towards the emperor and the 
father. IDving himself and not his father the son benefits 
himself to the disadvantage of his father. Loving himself 
and not his elder brother, the ymmg brother benefits 
hiinself to the disadvantage of his elder brother •. Loving 
himself and not his emperor the minister benefits himself 
to the disadvantage of his emperor. And these are what is 
called disorder. When the father shows no affection to 
his son, 'When the elder brother shows no affection to his 
younger brother, and 'When the emperor shows no affection 
to his ministers, on the other hand, it is also called 
disorder. When the father loves only himself and not the 
son, he benefits himself to the disadvantage of his son •••• 
And the reason of all these is want of mutual love. 
This is true even among thieves and robbers. Loving 
only his own family and not other families, the thief 
steals from other families to profit his own family. 
Loving only his own person and not others, the robber 
does violence to profit itself. And the reason for all 
these is want of mutual love. This again is true among the 
mutual disturbances among the houses of the m:inisters. 
and the mutual invasions among the states of feudal lords. 
L::rving only his own house and not the others the minister •••• 
These instances exhaust the confusion in the world. And, 
when we look into the causes we find they all arise from 
mL""lt of mutual love. 
Suppose everybody :in the 'WOrld loves universally, 
loving others as one t s self. Will there be any unfilial 
:individual? When every one regards his father, elder 
brother and emperor as himself, 'Whereto can be directed 
any unfilial feeling? Will there still be an unaffectionate 
individual? When one regards his younger brother, son 
and minister as himself, 'Whereto can he direct any feeling 
of disaffection? Therefore, there will be notany unfilial 
feeling or disaffection. Will there then be any thieves 
and robbers? When everyone regards other families as his 
own family, who 'Will' steal? 'When every one regards other 
persons as his own person, 'Who w.i.ll rob? Therefore, there 
will not be any thieves or robbers. 
Will there be mutual disturbance among the houses 
and invasion among the states of feudal lords? ••• Therefore 
there will not be any mu.tual disturbance among houses 
nor any invasion among the states of feudal lords. 
If every one :in the world will love universally, 
states not attacking one'another, houses not disturb:ing 
one another, thieves and robbers become extinct, emperor 
and ministers, fathers and sons all being affectionate and 
filial •••• If all this comes to pass the world will be 
orderly •••• SO when there is mutual love in the world it 
will be orderly, and when there is mu.tual hate in the world, 
it will be disorderly. This i~ why Mo-tze insisted on per-
suading people to love others. 
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From this introductory argument of our philosopher, we may already grasp 
the general idea of his moral doctr:ine. He has already demonstrated that, 
t a priori, t the doctrine of universal love is the only reasonable 
from Mei translation of Mo-tze f s works, ch. 14. 
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1Xlterpretation of the will of Heaven; and now he has demonstrated by its 
lOgical consequences that the same doctrine is also the nucleus of moral 
order, which regulates the relations between individuals, families, societies 
for him, universal love is the first and most basic 
All writers, Chinese and Western, ancient and modern, have In'lanimous1;r 
agreed on this point. Yu Yuch, in his preface to Sun Yi-Jung's connnentary 
OIl yo-tze' s 'WOrks says: 
According to my judgment, it seems Mo-tze was interested 
in the art of defence and fortification because he con-
demned offensive war; he condemned offensive war because 
he taught identification with the superior; and he taught 
identification ~th the superior because he championed 
universal love. 
The above quoted lIOrds were written prior to 1895 A. D. when Mo-tze's 
teachings were for the first time kind1;r and favorably studied by the Chinese 
scholars in public. There has never been a notable conflicting voice as to 
what is the basic principle of M:l-tze's teachings. Ever since Mencius, Mo-tze 
has been distinguished by the title of "Philosopher of Universal Love." Hence 
119 do not have to prove our viewpoint, for it is already accepted by all as 
a fact. We wish now to compare this moral axiom of :M:>-tze's with the axiom 
of the western moralists. 
Western moralists have agreed generally that the first moral axiom is 
is usua11;r expressed by this standard Latin sen'bence: "Bonum est facien-
dum, malum vero vitandum." However, this first dictate of our conscience (or, 
~ the scholastics called it more specifically, synderesis) has never been put 
6 Quoted in English from Mo4;ze, ~ Neglected Rival of Confucius, by Mai 
186 
~~;u',.,,..u a formal axiom by any of China's ancient philosophers, although it is 
doubt that they were all conscious of the existence of such an inner 
dictation .from deep in our souls. As a matter of fact, Confucius, generally 
JaloWll as the greatest of all Chinese moralists, did not bequeath to us any 
a:xiom at all, except once "When he was explicitly asked to condense all 
teachings into one sentence; then he replied: "lfuatever you do not wish 
be done to you, then do not do this same to the others." 7 
This incidentally is one of the S}Ddereses commonly recognized by the 
SCholastic philosophers. "Quod tibi non vis fieri, alteri ne feceris.,,8 
7 Conf. Analects of Confucius; Book 25, chapter 23. James Legge's transla-
tion reads as fOllows: "Tze Ktmg asked, saying: t Is there one word 'Which 
may serve as a rule of practice for all one 1 s life?' The Master said: 
'Is not reciprocity sooh a word? What you do not want done to yourself 
do not do to others.'" (page 301). Recently some Chinese scholars w.ished 
to demonstrate that the teachings of Confucius may be s'lllllID!:ld up in one 
precept: "To imitate Heaven" (~t.- 1(). This opinion is not yet generally 
accepted and probably will never be: first, because it is still to be T\""'YU'""rtI 
that Confucius really believed in a personal God who is the perfection of 
all virtues so that He must be considered as the perfect standard for us 
to follow in leading our moral life (this is incidenta~ the opinion of 
Mo-tze as it is recorded unequivocally in the fourth chapter of his works.) 
secondly, as a matter of fact, Confucius did not explicitly express it in 
the form of an axiom. 
8 Speaking of the difference between synderesis, moral science and conscience 
Cornelius Daman, professor of Morals at the Pont. University of Propaganda 
Fide, wrote: "l;Ynderesis est habitus naturaliter inditus, quo prima agen-
dorum principia legis naturalis cognoscimus, e.g. bonum est faciendum, 
malum fugiendum; Deus est colendus; quod tibi non vis fieri, alteri ne 
feceris. Scientia moralis est habitus acquisitus, quo homo ope ratiocina-
tionis conclusiones generales seu principia secundaria deducit a primis 
principiis, e.g. Deus est colendus; atqui blasphemia Deum inhonorat: ergo 
blasphemia est f'ugienda. Conscientia vero est actus, quo homo principia 
sunderesis et conclusiones generales scientiae applicat ad casus parti-
culares. (Cont. Introduction in TheololP:a Moralis, Romae, 1939, 13th 
Edition, page ~,.) 
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However, we lIOuld decline to agree that such an axiom could be recognized 
,6 a really basic principle of moral doctrine, because it is obviously nega-
in form; and, as we lmow, moral perfection is not attained or approached 
but it must be pursued by positively doing good. But let 
us return to our remarks on Confucius. 
Indeed, on several occasions, Confucius has given a few kinds of moral 
principles both in negative as well as in positive forms. Nevertheless he did 
not establish, and did not even attempt to establish, a moral systenl .L.V~.L.I"c:l.I...J..~ 
~duced from some sound principle of ethics.9 He was much too practical to 
care for the establishment of theoretical principles. His doctrine, as it 
is recorded in the so-called analects of Confucius, is rather a mere 
eel series of "do'sn and "do not· s", most of them without even a properly given 
Furthermore, a great number of them were merely 
~ernal formalities deriving their social rather than moral value from tra-
dition and from the ceremonial or ritual books.10 
Mo-tze, on the other hand, was quite anxious to build a systematic moral 
doctrine. First of all, he wished to find an ultimate, absolute and universal 
standard of morality, 'Which effort has been the pride of our modem philo-
sophers 'Who considered it an indispensible basis of a scientific ethical doc-
Thus, for eX3Jl'ple, Herbert Spencer wrote in the preface of his ~ 
As we have noticed earlier in our dissertation, Father Paul Geny, S.J., 
fessor of Philosophy at Gregorian UIli versity, Rome, has written about Con-
fucius: "Confucius, morum pristinam rectitudinem, suo tempore collabentem, 
restaurare intendid; nullo autem f'undamento metaphysico supposito." (Conf. 
his Brevis Conspectus Historiae Phi10sophiae, Rome, 1929, page 28. 
Rene Grousset wrote: "La philosophie de Confucius est me moral pratique, 
de caract ere ,essentiallement positif et social. Elle se contente de for-
muler la theorie de la societe chinoise telle que celle-ci ensta! t sous 
les Tchou." (Histoire.9! lfextreme Orient, Paris, 1929, Tome I, page 193.) 
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O!}~iCS: 
.".. 
Written as far back as 1842, my first essay consisting 
of letters on the proper sphere of Government vaguely 
indicated what I conceived to be general principles of 
right and wrong in political conduct; and from that 
time onwards my ultimate purpose, lying behind all 
proximate purposes, has been that of :Binding of the 
prinCiple of righfJ. and wrong in conduct at large, a 
scientific basis. 
This ultimate basis :Mo-tze fomd in the will of God, Creater and Supreme 
Ruler of the lmiverse; because, first, on the part of God himself, being the 
most :intelligent and most honorable Being, He, and He alone, has the right of 
establishing the norm of right and wrong;12 secondly, on our part, as we are 
His creatures and subjects, our first duty is to obey His 'Will regardless of 
our own interests; and, thirdly, Mo-tze even tried to prove that our own true 
Con!. ~ .£! Ethics by H. Spencer, published in 1879(in the preface). 
This is because to judge right or 'Wrong (morally) is essentially an act 
of intellect; therefore, intellect must in some manner possess the norm 
or the standard of right and wrong. But, as a matter of fact, no human 
intellect is infallible in such judgments; therefore, no hur.oan intellect 
possesses the absolute norm of morality. However, we may note that human 
intellects are not equal, some being more capable and hence more accurate 
in judgments; thus, we may say, that the more perfect intellect is the one 
that judges more correctly, since judgment, especially moral judgment, is 
the essential act of the intellect. Therefore, we may say that the most 
perfect judgment is in the most perfect intelligence. Then, Mo-tze shows 
that beyond any doubt Heaven is the most intelligent Being and hence Heav-
en must possess the most perfect judgment; therefore, we may take this 
most perfect judgment as the most perfect standard of right and 'Wrong. 
Thus, our philosopher stated that the norm of morality is given to us by 
Heaven through His will. 
Of course, Mo-tze did not develop his argument to such an extent, but 
he did point out that the nom. of morality must come from the most 
gent being because such a norm is a Standard, and it requires intelligence 
to make a standard. This argument is not similar to the argument of "the 
greatest Being" of st. Anselm, for Mo-tze did not intend to prove the 
existence of God, but solely to prove that the ultimate and absolute norm 
of morality must be in the person of God. This is similar to the argument 
of st. Augustine in proving the existence of a Divine Law. 
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iXlterests can be secured only by honestly obeying the will of God, since God, 
as a loving father, wishes us good and knows better than we do vmat is truly 
good for us. Therefore, Mo-tze stated that the will of God is the ultimate 
nol"Ill of morality. Supposing that the existence of such a personal God has 
been philosophically proved or commonly accepted by the people (such as here, 
in our case among the people of ancient China), then, our philosopher 1i:>-tze 
bas furnished the most reasonable, and, hence, the most scientific basis of a 
general principle of right and wrong, that is, the norm of morality. 
Having thus established the norm of .morality, Mo-tze proceeded to his 
fundamental moral axiom. His main argument was deductive i"h i1e the Western 
philosophers in searching for a first moral axiom used the inductive method 
or rather reductive method, i.e. by reducing all moral imperatives to the most 
common and most primitive one, vmich is, as they foundt "Bonum est faciendum, 
malum vero vitandum.tf But Mo-tze used a different procedure. He developed 
bis argument from the already established, objectively absolute norm of 
JIIOrality, which is for him the will of God, instead of proceeding from the 
subjective norm which is our own conscience. The latter way, which is used 
by the. Western moralists, is to find the most simple and most original dictum 
of our awn conscience. Mo-tze started from the objective side; he had proved 
that the will of God must be the objective norm of morality; therefore, he 
ilmnediately asked vhat does God wiBh us to do. The proper answer to this 
question 'WOuld be the practical e:xpression of the objective norm of morality; 
and, in the opinion of Mo-tze, if and when this practical expression were 
Properly mderstood and accepted by our intellect, then it would become the 
BU.bjective norm of morality, that is, the norm that we possess within our-
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When this essential difference of aspects is well understood, we may 
again follow the argument of our philosopher. He noticed that the aat "par 
~ellencelf of the will is to love. He saw that the first act of God tawards 
~ is the act of loving. God loves us and therefore He created us and creat-
ed all other creatures for our benefit. 
Now Heaven loves the whole world universal1:jr. Every-
thing is prepared for the good of man. Even the tip 
of a hair is the work of Heaven. Substantial may be 
said of the benefits that are enjoyed by man •••• Yoreover, 
I know Heaven loves men dearly not without reason. 
Heaven ordered the SlID, the moon and the stars to en-
lighten and guide them. Heaven ordered the four seasons, 
Spring, Autumn, Winter and Summer to regulate them •••• 
Suppose there is a man who is deep]:y fond of his 'Iron 
and has Used his energy to the limit to work for his 
benefit. But when the son grows up he returns no love 
to the father. The gentlemen of the world will all call 
him unmagnanimous and miserable. Now Heaven loves the 
world 1.miversal]:y; everything is prepared for the good 
of man. The worl<: of Heaven extends to even the smallest 
things that are enjoyed by men. Such benefits may be 
said to be substantial, yet there is no service in 
return.13 
Hence, according to Mo-tze, our first duty is to love C..od, render love 
for love, so that the love between God and ourselves may be mutual. But to 
love God tru]:y one must obey His will. A spontaneous loving obedience is the 
of loving a superior. At this point, the argument of our philo-
qui te c lose to the scholastic moral synderesis of "Deus est colen-
innnediate implication is "Deus est obediendus." However, accord-
ancient Chinese philosophers such a synderesis would be rather a 
religious precept than a true moral axiom. Morality, for the ancient Chinese, 
is the body of regulations among human beings. Thus the first moral a.:xiom 
13 Quoted from Mei translation of Mo-tze' s text, ch. 27. 
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,ust be a dictum as to the relations among men. Hence, Mo-tze went farther 
to ask what God wants us to do to each other. If we admit that God loves all 
,.n universally, then it is but obvious that He 'Wishes us to love each other. 
~erefore the principle of universal love is almost automatically deduced 
£tOT! the accepted premises. We find that a geometrical figure will help us to 
~onstrate the convincing force of this argument of Mo-tze. 
GOD 
MAN---------------------- MAN (i.e. fellow man) 
Once establish the side lines of this triangular figure, the basic line 
is but a moral neceSSity. 
st. Jolm, the Evangelist, has assured us that whoever says that he loves 
but does not love his brothers, is a liar.14 Mo-tze also conceived such 
and has given the natural reason for it; God loves all men uni c ... ,~Qo"''''''''. 
Itnlerel"OlI"l.'l, He vdshes that men love each other nmtually and universally. Hence 
the first axiom of morality is the principle of universal love. 
The first axiom of ethics, being found via-objectiva, is necessari~ of 
a character different from the moral axioms of western philosophers. It is 
not instinctive, nor subjectively self-evident, but it seems rather like an 
ext.ernal precept to which we will wllingly submit only after a clear and quite 
"If any man say, I love God, and hateth his brother, he is a liar. For 
he that loveth not his brother, whom he seeth, how can he love God, whom 
he seeth not?" (First Epistle of st. John, Chap. v, v. 20.) Cardinal 
Hayes edition. . 
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elabOrate reasoning. Thus, this first axiom of Mo-tze is not a real axiom 
:l.Il the strict sense of the word. We call it an axiom only inasnmch as it is 
an ultimate general principle of morality. We may compare it 'With the t.f"'"' .. 
ian commandment from Holy revelation: The second commandment is similar to 
the first one: "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. n15 It is indeed 
second for the Christian doctrine, but it would be a first precept for the 
Chinese moralists, since, as we have noticed above, they considered the realms 
of moral philosophy as merely embracing hl.llllaI1 relations. Our duty towards 
God is, for them, strictly religious, and religion is not considered as a part 
of ethical philosophy. Apparently Confucius has even considered religion as 
something less important than ethics. Once, when he was asked by a disciple 
how to worship God and the spirits, he answered almost indignantly: "Since 
you do not know yet how to serve your fellow men, then how could you 'Wi. sh to 
16 
know how to serve God and the spirits." This attitude of Confucius was 
severely criticized by Mo-tze, who believed that the ultimate reason for the 
nThis is the greatest and -the first connnandment, And the second is like 
to this: "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. tt (Matt. Chap. 22, 
v. 38-39.) Cardinal Hayes edition. 
Conf. ~ Confucian Analects, Book XI, ch. 11. Some authors tried to 
interpret this answer of Confucius as demonstrating his great respect for 
religion and for our religious duties. They believed that the real mean-
ing of this reply was: "If you did not learn yet the less important of 
your duties, then how can you learn the more important ones?11 However, 
most authors see here an evidence of Confucius' skeptical attitude t~ds 
the real existence of God and the spirits, or at least his purposely ex-
pressed negligence of our religious duties. We believe that Confucius I 
first interest was human affairs, human relations, and, as a consequence, 
the relation between ourselves and our Creator (if he did believe :in God) 
only came to the attention of Confucius in the second place. Rene 
Grousset, referring to this point, wrote: "De fait, Confucius, tout en 
honorant 1e Tlien concu comme principe de 1 t ordre universel, refusa tou-
jours dtappofondir cette notion. 'Comment savoir quelque chose du Cie1 
<l\l9.!lQ. it est ~1 difficille de _qui B.~ 'Oa~se sur 130 terre?' rep on-(ti.:t-~l a ses mterlocuf.eUrs.1t fi"Om Hl.S'toJ.re ~ 11 extreme Onen.t, 
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~ existence of ethical science is that we must love God and submit to His 
fill. 17 Our philosopher has always emphasized the importance of our duties 
tOfl8I"ds Heaven and the spirits.18 Nevertheless, nowhere may we find that 
"..tze has objected to the then traditional idea of ancient Chinese scholars, 
_ely that the realm of ethics is limited to the relations between men. 
Jo .. tze considered his doctrine of universal love not only as the distinctive 
character of his moral teachings but also the foundat ion or the first axiom of 
Once Mo-tze was told by Kung Men-tze (!~ i.J-) that Confucius, being eminent 
by virtue of his knowledge of literature, history, rituals, music and 
sciences .. would make a very good and very sage emperor to rule the world. 
To this Mo-tze replied: "! sage man must pay reverence to Heaven .. respect 
to the spirits, and love his fellow men." From this it seems that Mo-tze 
believed that Confucius did not worship Heaven sufficiently. Again.. in 
condeming the disciples of ConfuCius, Mo-tze declared: "There are four 
points from the Confucian doctrine 'Which are sufficient to ruin the WI1r1d. 
First .. Confucianism teaches that Heaven is not 1ntelligent •••• 1f (Coni. 
text of Mo-tze, ch. 48 .. Kung Yeng ( I~ fo.). 
According to l.b-tze our relations to Heaven and the spirits are always 
prior to that to our fellow men. Mo-tze said: "Any word, any action that 
is beneficial to Heaven, the spirits and the people is to be carried out. 
Any word, any action that is harm.ful to Heaven, the spirits and the people 
is to be abandoned." (Conf. original texl:i,ch. 47, Mei translation.) 
Describing the regime of the ancient sage kings as the ideal government, 
Mo-tze said in conclusion: "Such a regime was agreeable to heaven above, 
to the spirits in the middle sphere, and to the people below." (Ibidem, 
ch. 27, Mei translation.) Heaven was always mentioned as first and most 
important, followed by the spirits and then our fellow men. 
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B) TRADITIONAL CRITICISM AND MODERN OPINICll 
There was only one traditional criticism of Mo-tze's doctrine of 
universal love, the criticism of the Confucianists. It is, to our mind, an 
etceedingly severe condemnation rather than a philosophical criticism. Such 
an unkind condemnation, as 'We will show later, is probably based on a mis-
understanding of the meaning of the term "miversal." The principal exponent 
of such a severe criticism was no other than the Plato of Confucius, Mencius. 
Mencius, as we have explained in the first chapter, did not meet Confucius 
in person, neither did he ever meet Mo-tze in person; but he was living amid. 
the great dispute of the two philosophical schools, namely Confucianism and 
J(otiism. And Mencius surely could take the whole credit for the definite 
Y.i.ctory of Confucianism over Motiism and later over the Egoism of Yang-tze. 
However, the dispute was not a simple matter for Mencius, for the doctrine of 
1()-':[iZe and that of Yang-tze were quite popular at the time. To quote Mencius 
The words of Yang Chu and that of Mo-ti fill the empire. 
If you listen to people's discourses throughout it, you 
will find i~t theymve adopted the views of one or 
the other. 
I am alarmed by these things and address :myself to the 
defence of the doctrine of the former sages and to oppose 
Yang and Mo. I drive away their licentious e:xpressions 
so that suc~cfe:rverse speakers my not be able to show 
themselves. 
Quoted J. Legge translation of the Book of Mencius, Book III, pari:; 2, 
chapter 9. (J. Legge, Vol. II, pages 282-283.) 
. Ibidem, page 284. This also shows the eagerness of Mencius in attacking 
Mo-tze's doctrine for the defence of Confucian teachings. 
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However, as we noted in the previous chapter, Mo-tze also pictured him-
Beli as the faithful defender of the traditional doctrine of the ancient sage 
JdJlgs, and he also accused the Confucianists of misleading the people and dis-
torting the traditional orthodox doctr:ine. Apparently Mencius did not know 
JIIlch about Mo-tze's teaching. His criticism or rather condemnation of our 
philosopher is limited to only two points of the teachings of Mo-tze; namely, 
the doctrine of universal love and that of simplicity in funerals. In both 
cases Mencius seemed to have misunderstood our philosopher. Mencius pictured 
yang-tze as teaching extreme egoism and Mo-tze a s teaching extreme altruism. 
And, of course, as a faithful follower of the ancient sage kings and particu-
larly a faithful follower of the great Confucius, Mencius considered himself 
to be the champion of the true doctrine 'Which lies in the middle between the 
two extremes. The Confucianists had a good understanding of the principle 
'virtus stat in medio." Thus Mencius condemned the two extremes as follows: 
Now, Yang's principle is: "Each for himself Ill! which does 
not acknowledge the claims of the sovereign. Mo's principle 
is: "To love all equally," which does not acknowledge 
the particular affection due to a father. To acknowledge 
neither the king nor the father is to be in the state of 
the beast. If their prinCiples are not stopped and the 
principles of Confucius set forth, their perverse doctrines 
will delude the people and stot1 up (sic1 the path of 
benevolence and rj.ghteousness.2l 
This is the solemn condemnation of Mencius directed against the doctrine 
of universal love of Mo-tze. We suggest that the reaSoning of Mencius went on 
probably like this: "If we should loVe all the people in the world equally, 
then we must love our own father just as much as we love a stranger on the 
Quoted from J. Legge translation of the Book of Mencius, Book III, part 2, 
chapter 9. 
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• Now, to love our father just as much as 'M3 love a stranger is to 
ct our father completely; that is, :il other words, to deny the existence 
the special relationship between ourselves and our own fathers; which re-
is one of the five basic moral relations established by the ancient 
kingS22 and so much emphasized by our Master Confucius. Now, the essen-
difference between human beings and the beasts is that the human beings 
moral beings; they are moral beings because they alone truly have these 
va moral relationships and understand the rules involved in these moral 
• Hence, to annul or to destroy such relationships is to annul 
essential difference between human beings and the beast. Therefore, Yang-
, 'Who annuls the relation between the king and the subjects, and Mo-tze, 
annuls the relation between the father and the son, reduce the noble state 
human beings to the state of beasts. Consequently their doctrines are to 
Such a prejudiced judgment has dominated the Chinese-thinking mrld for 
s. To be brief, we 'Will just quote this statement of Wang Yang Ming,2 
These five moral relationships are: 1) The reJ.a.tion between king and 
subjects; 2) the relation between father and son; 3) the relation between 
elder brother and younger brother; 4) the relation between husband and 
wife; 5) the relation between friends. It seems that Confucius was the 
real author of these moral relationships although, as always, he prefers 
to say that the ancient sage kings were the originators of them. The 
original Chinese name for the five relationships is .A A~ • They are 
1) ~ Ii 2) J.... J.. 3) Ju 1 4) J.... 4t 5) )ft 1J.... • 
Wang Yang 'Ming ~ ~ 11-)3 (1472-1528 A.D.) is a remarkable Chinese philosopher 
noted for his analysis of human conscience and for his explanation of the 
two basic element s of the uni vers~, the Ying and the Yang rlt. r~ • 
one of the greatest medieval philosophers of China: 
Mots principle of indiscriminating love without recognizing 
any difference and class makes one look upon one 1 s oWn 
home, father and brother as one looks upon strang~rs. 
Thus one is left without a proper starting point. 4 
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The weakness of this strong condemnation of Mencius and his followers 
is that it cannot be properly applied to the teachings of Mo-tze. Throughout 
his entire teachings, we can find no evidence that our philosopher would 
us to neglect our own fathers and to regard them as strangers on the street; 
but, quite the contrary, we find Mo-tze emphasizing so much his doctrine of 
universal love that he would lead us to believe that we must love any 
on the street almost as much as we should love our own fathers and brothers. 
This, of course, does not man that we must therefore neglect our fathers and 
To say: "we must love strangers as we love our own fathers and 
is obviously not the same as to say "we must neglect our father and 
brothers and treat them as if they were strangers. 11 The first sentence em-
phasizes~, but the second one emphasizes negligence. One is to build up 
and the other is to destroy. Menci us and his followers such as Wang Yang 
simply made a logically illegitimate jump from the f:irst sentence to the 
second one, and thus they believed that they had good reason to accuse our 
philosopher of destroying the basic moral relationship between human beings. 
We shall discuss the real meaning of the term universal according to 
Mo-tze in the follovd.ng section of our dissertationo Here our sole intention 
is to show that the condemnation of Mencius is logically feeble and 
This English translation is quoted from S. Holth's booklet: Mencius,-.! 
~ Outline of ~ Life and Ideas, page 26. 
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. Unfortunately, with the complete victoI"J of Confucianism, 
tldS criticism or rather condemnation of Mencius remained for more than two 
tbOUsand years the golden rule in rejecting the doctrine of "universal love" 
of our philosopher. And consequently the entire contents of Mo-tze's teach-
ings has always been considered as heretical and dangerous to society. As 
we have noted in the first chapter, the woIks of Mo-tze were condemned many 
tjJnes by different Imperial authorities and the sale of his books was several 
tiJlles strictly prohibited. 
For more than two complete millenia, the Confucian doctrine enjoyed 
supreme command over the m:i.tl.ds of Chinese people. :Millions and millions of 
Chinese who had no chance of knowing anything directly from the vrorks of Mo-
tze, but liho had to study the books of Confucius and that of Mencius as an 
absolute necessity in accomplishing their education, have believed in good 
faith that Mo-tze was obviously a heretic who preached a queer doctrine which 
is not only false but also dangerous to such a point that its realization 
would mean to reduce the h~ being to the state of beasts. That was a part 
of my personal experience. When I was studyingthe book of Mencius lIDder the 
guidance of my grade school teacher, who was then not yet a Catholic (he died 
a Catholic later, two years after his conversion) but surely a very strict 
I then sincerely believed that no one should be permitted to 
of Mo-tze, since it contained such a perverse and dangerous 
Then, just about the time when I was seriously studying the books of 
COnfucius and of Mencius to the point that I was able to recite by heart 
their entire contents without missing a single word, there was a great 
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ution in Chinese literature follo'Wing the political revolution which 
eJlded the near4r five thousand years of history of the Chinese Empire and gave 
to a new republic. In like manner, the revolution marked the end of 
tbe Confucian dynasty in thinking and in literature, and opened a vast and 
tree field of studies and discussions. Since then, every one has been free to 
~oose a proper literary form to express his thought without the necessity o£ 
iJldtating the styles of the traditional classic literature. The only judge 
one's style is the general attitude of the public, 'Which may accept the style 
as pleasant or may reject it as impractical. This is called the new Chinese 
literary movement. 25 Such a movement has occurred in Italy, France, England, 
and in almost every nation in the world;26 therefore, it was not unlikely 
it should also happen in China. The political revolution has given it the 
chance it needed. However, we regret to note that the Chinese literary 
~lutian has proved itself to be much more successful than the political 
.1s the result of this literary revolution, the study of Me-tze's t ...... , ...... U51 
is now widely open to the public. And it proved to be a new and very 
ing field for those who were quited tired of the Confucian classics which 
they were only permitted to praise but not to criticize. The works and the 
doctrine o:f our philosopher has become one of the most common subjects of 
SCholastic discussions. For quite a While, in school halls, in periodicals, 
almost everyone wanted to say something about the doctrine of Mo-tze. The 
first statement connnonly agreed upon was, of course, that the condemnation 
In historical terms the Chinese call this movement th"t 1~ 1-J~ 1.. ~ The 
outstanding leaders of this movement were L'iang ChI i-Tslao 4: P..t)~ and 
Hu-Sheh ;i;A rl . 
Just a few hundred years ago,! in Europe~ it was considered unorthodox and 
daring to publish a book in ..Languages other than Latin. Some famous 
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of MeIlcius was obviously too severe and somewhat unjust. It was evidently a 
~srepresentation grossly exaggerated for whoever has had a chance to read the 
original works of Mo-tze himself. Hence, no modern Chinese scholar would take 
thiS traditional criticism of Mencius seriously. On the contrary, many modern 
~ese scholars have tried to raise Mo-tze into a position almost equal to 
that of Confucius, at least inasmuch as the original teachings of the two are 
concerned.27 'lhe doctrine of lIuni versal lovell our philosopher taught is then 
imIIlediately considered as praiseworthy under the principle of democracy. The 
first of the five moral relationships of Confucius, that is the relation be-
tween the king and his subjects, is now considered as a reactionary principle; 
since the principle of democracy abolishes the dignity and rights of the king. 
democratic government is by the people and for the people, and thus, the 
head of such a government is merely the public servant of the people. There-
fore the Confucian attitude towards the king and the emperor is necessarily 
considered as an anti-republican idea, and hence reactionary. The relat ..... v, ... "'~'-'H 
between father and son is no more so sacrosanct as Confucius wished it to be. 
Fathers are also human beings, so they are not infallible in domestic discus-
sions and most of all they cannot claim, as Confucius permitted them to claim, 
the complete possession of their sons and daughters so that the latter would 
have no rights of their arm and would have to follow the will of the parents 
and serve them at any cost. As to the elder brothers, they have lost com-
Plete~ their Confucian privileges under the new republican laws. Thus, the 
Of course their past influence in the minds of Chinese people can never be 
equal, since Confucius has enjoyed the undisputed throne of Chinese 
literacy for more than two thousand years. All the literary works of T.n.".,... 
two thousand years possessed an obvious Confucian influence either in 
thinking or in literary style. 
201 
tbfElB top relationships of Confucian morals have been greatly diminished if 
tlleY have not yet completely vanished. Only the last two relationships were 
].Bit more or less mchanged, namely the relation between husband and wife, 
and that between friends. However, Confucius did not say much about these two 
Almost simultaneously both Western and Chinese scholars noticed the 
si!llilarity existing between Mo-tze's doctrine of "universal love" and the 
Christian principle of "love thy neighbor. ft However, neither any of the 
'estern scholars nor any of the Chinese writers has ever attempted to deter-
mine and to demonstrate exactly to what extent the similarity between the two 
doctrines would go. They merely stated that there is an evident similarity 
28 between the two. !his we shall investigate in the next section of our dis-
sertation. 
In one word, modern critics have found the doctrine of universal love is 
tar from being such a menace to civilization as it was described by Mencius; 
it is, on the contrary, now considered the fomdation of democracy and the 
basis of world peace and'tmity. The following statement is, as we think, a 
typical e:x:a.rnple of 'What the Western Christian writers think about the doc 
of universal love of Mo-tze: 
The golden rule according to Micius (i.e. Mo-tzeJ is 
to regardct.bers as we regard ourselves; and to regard. 
Writers who considered Mo-tze as a utilitarian have consequently noticed 
the difference between the two doctrines. However, as we have demon-
strated above, their criterion is not objectively true, hence the differ-
ence pointed out is not true. others who agreed with our opinion, namely 
that Mo-tze was a theist, did not mention any essential difference be-
tween the two doctrines. 
the things of others as we regard our Ollll. It is a 
maxim'29as we see, very much like the Golden rule of the 
Bible. 
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Thus far modern opirP-on is manimous, among Westerners as well as among 
.odem Chinese authors. However, a further step in discussion will necessi-
tate a division of opinions among them, for thqse who believe in the s:inceri-
ty of Mo-tze l s faith (not as a supernatural virtue but only as a firm con-
viction by natural reason) in the real existence of a person God will connect 
out philosopher more closely with the principle of Christian morality; on the 
other hand, those who classify Mo-tze as merely a utilitarian will defini 
dissociate him from the Christians. 
We have already seen who is on which side during our long discussion in 
the preceding chapter. As a general rule, the Western Christian writers 
113turally tend to accept M'o-tze as being as close as possible to the 
L! , 
doctrine, Whereas materialistic-minded modern Chinese authors will prefer to 
make of uo-tze a mere social pragmatist or altruistic utilitarian. Never-
theless, we did notice immediately that there are quite a few exceptions. 
There are some prominent Chinese modern scholars Who are openly atheists, 
who aclalowledge Mo-tzets s:incerity in believing in God, and so they place 
philosopher side by side with the Christian moralist in establishing the 
of their respective doctrines of universal love because it is the only .J.AJ'''''''''-
conclusion for the theists that God, being the Creator of all of us, must 
wish us to love each other. Thus, for instance, the late Professor Tstai 
Yuan-Pai, former Minister of Education of the republic of China, and Dr. Hu 
29 Quoted from S. Holth in his Micius, .! Brief Outlineof His ~ ~ Ideas, 
page 32. 
I 
I' I: 
I 
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mais un mode avantageux de rapports reciproques et que, 
si nous nous aimions les uns les i~tres, nous Y trouverions, 
mutuellement, un benefice direct.'::s.::s 
Mei Yi Pao, the English translator of Mo-tze I s works and so far the 
o~ Chinese Who wrote a sizable treatise on Mo-tze in English (or ~ 
'estern language), expressed a rather ambiguous opinion. He may be quoted 
to support both of the two quite different (not to say contradictory) judg-
ments. In discussing Mo-tze1s doctrine of universal love, he first stated: 
Motse arrived at this all important conv.i.ction largely 
from reaction against the greed of the time and impatience 
at the4inaffectiveness of the Confucian solution of graded love. 3 
BeSides, Mei Yi Pao has, as we have quoted him in the preceding chapter, 
definitely stated that Mo-tze was a utilitarian because he was concerned 'With 
the greatest happiness for the greatest number of persons. Nevertheless, in 
. 
the same treatise, Mei asserted l~o-tzelssincerity in believing in God and 
. 
consequently the similarity of his teaching to the Christian principle of 
universal love. 
His [Me-tze's] religion is a revival of the old orthodox 
cult of a personal God not only as the head of numerous 
other spiritual beings but also crownin~ ... the ethico-
political hierarchy in the human world. J / 
lei continued: 
Borrowing the Christian terminology, we might describe the 
effort as one realizing the brotherhood of men through 
the fatherhood or at least the masterhood of God. Thereby 
Ibidem, p. 154. 
Quoted from Motse, 'Ihe Neglected Rival of Confucius, page 88. 
Ibidem, page 148. 
Motse expected more wholehearted ob§ervance and a deeper 
sense of loyalty of his followers .36 
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concerning this point, we heartily agree with this last statement of Mei 
1i pao and we shall undertake to prove that the statements of Madame A. David 
and others 'Who wished to make Uo-tze merely a utilitarian are based only upon 
false pretence. 
Indeed, Mo-tze has emphasized and even over-emphasized the mutual benefi 
that will result from the practice of his doctrine of universal love, but 
this does not imply that therefore he preached universal love for a utili-
tarian purpose. This is for two principal reasons: 
1) Mo-tze has solemnly stated the t a priori' reason for his doctrine of 
universal love, namely because it is the will of God that we must love each 
other, help each other and thus benefit each other. We have already proved 
in the preceding part of our dissertation how Mo-tze discovered this will of 
God without the help of revelation. Our triangular figure represented p.,..,.W\"'.,.., ... 
11 the logical implication of Mo-tze's argument. We have quoted abundantly 
from the original text of our philosopher in the preceding chapter to show 
his insistence upon our absolute duty to obey the will of God just as it is 
a duty for a citizen to obey the head of the state 'Where he is 1i'ring. And 
just because it is only natural that the father of a family wishes his sons 
and daughters to love each other, help each other a..."'ld benefit each other, and 
also just as it is only natural that the head of a state wishes that all his 
sUbjects love each other, help each other and benefit each other, so God, who 
is, according to Mo-tze, our father and ruler of the universe, wishes all the 
36 Ibidem, page 158. 
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men in the world to love each other, help each other and benefit each other. 
The rule of Heaven over the world is not unlike the rule 
of the feudal lord over the state. In ruling the states 
does the feudal lord desire hi§ ministers and people to 
work for mutual disadvantage?3"( 
Thus, the ultimate and imperati va reason 'Why we must love each other is 
that we must obey the will of God. We are quite surprised to find Madal'!le A. 
DaVid saying that Mo-tze 1 s argument "tendait a nous demontrer que 1a loi de 
L1AmOur Universal ntetait pas un devoir imperatif, mis un mode ad vanta-
geux ••• "38 We wonder whether the author of this statement can have read the 
entire text of Mo-tze thoroughly. 
Furthermore, the entire fourth chapter of the original text: -.:ill handily 
serve us as a supplementary argument. In this chapter which is entitled nOn 
the Necessity of a standard," Mo-tze demonstrated to us that, as human beings 
(i.e. moral beings), we are obliged to follow an absolute moral standard in 
directing our moral acts just as the artisans are obliged to follow their 
standards in their respective works. No actions can be accomplished without a 
standard. Mo-tze said explicitly that: "To accomplish anything whatsoever 
one must have standards. No one has yet accomplished anything without them. 
From this, Mo-tze went on to demonstrate that the absolute standard of our 
moral conduct is God himself. 
Henri Maspero, the noted French Sinologist, agrees with us when he writes 
Pour lui, Mo-tze la moral repose sur quelques chose 
plus profonde: Les hormrres doi vent 'prendre le Ciel pour 
Quoted from Mei translation, ch. 27. 
Cont. above, page 203 and note 31. 
Quoted from Mei translation, ch. 4. 
modele, fa~e ce qui lui plait et laisser ce qui lui 
deplait •••• 0 
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In quoting Masperots statement, ve shall cite our philosopher directly: 
Now, what is it that Heaven desires, and what is it that 
It abominates? Certainly Heaven desires to have men 
benefit and love one another and abominates to have them 
hate and harm one another. How do 'We know that Heaven de-
sires to have men benefit and love one another and abominates 
to have them hate and harm one an"iher? Because It loves 
and benefits all men universally.4 
Therefore, in spite of the strong emphasis on the social result of his 
doctrine of universal love, we have solid reason to believe that Mo-tze sin-
cerely based his doctrine of universal love upon the fact that Heaven loves 
all of us and wishes us to love each other. Like our Heavenly Father who 
makes rain to fallon the farms of both good ones and evil ones, we must love 
all our fellow men. 
However, we wish to emphasize that the similarity of Christian universal 
love and that of Mo-tze's teaching merely goes as far as pure natural philo-
sopny goes. The common brotherhood of humanity is reached by natural reason 
because the common Fatherhood of the One and Unique Divine Creator is defini 
ly within the realm of natural reason. That is to say, following scholastic 
philosophy, we do believe that our natural reason can reach a philosophical 
certitude in proving the real existence of God and consequently reach the 
principle of universal love or universal brotherhood. But, as all Christian 
doctrine is essentially supernatural, so Christian universal love is really 
Christian only in its theological or supernatural value, which is to be found 
in the magnificent dogma of The M'ystical Body of Christ, that is, of course, 
40 Quoted from La Chine Antique, Paris, 1927, page 478. 
41 Quoted from Mei translation, ch. 26. 
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transcendentally beyond the realm of philosophy. Therefore, we state that 
the similarity is merely and necessarily limited to the realm of natural 
philosophy. 
We have found that No Christian w.r:tters ever noticed this most essential 
and most important distinction. This is somewhat surprising to us, since 
there are at least two Protestant clergymen listed as authors in our biblio-
graphy. No Catholic clergymen have ever written a treatise on Mo-tze's 
teaching. Father J. Henry De Premare, S.J., published his Vestiges des 
pcipaux dogmes chretiens tires ~ ancient livres chinois in 1878, a date 
prior to the revival of the study of Mo-tze; hence we understand 'Why not even 
the name of Mo-tze was mentioned in this otherwise adequate research. 
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C) THE REAL MEANING OF UNIVERSAL LOVE ACCORDING TO MO-TZE 
The keynote for a decisive judgment on the doctrine of universal love 
of Mo-tze is to find the exact meaning of the term "universal. If We have seen 
that Mencius t condemnation is incorrect because he did not make enough effort 
to understand what Mo-tze meant by the term universal, and as a consequence 
Mencius condemned something which Mo-tze never preached. 
It is obvious to anyone who has read the original text of Mo-tze that 
be never undermined the special affection due to one's own father. On the 
contrary, as 'We have noticed, he took up this all-important filial devotion 
as the basis upon 'Which he established our duty to obey the will of Heaven, 
which duty in its turn becomes the basis of Mo-tzets entire moral system. 
'!'be argument went as follows: Heaven is to us like a lOving Father. Now it 
is but obvious that a son must love his father and obey him. Therefore, we 
must love and obey the 'Will of Heaven.42 Nowhere among the fifty-three chapt-
ers of the work of Mo-tze which ~ now possess may one find a single instance 
in 'Which uo-tze has taught us to consider our father as a stranger in the 
street.43 Unless Mencius got his information about the teaching of Mo-tze 
from a disciple of Mo-tze who pushed his master's universalism to an extreme, 
quite possible, we might say that Mencius has maliciously and 
Conf. original text, ch. 27. See also above, pages 188 and 20.5-206. 
This is unanimously agreed upon by modern authors both Chinese and West 
To cite one example, even Madame A1eJmIlder David noticed: "Nul1e part 
nous 1e voyons, du reste, renier ou attaquer 1es sentiments dlaffection 
familia1e. Tout au contraire, a maintes reprises, nous 1 t entendons 
qualifier de "desordre" 1es cas ou 18 piete filia1e, 1t amour paterne1 
et fraterne1 sont offenses." Coni'er her work ~ Phi1osophe Meh-ti et 
l'Idee de Solidarlte, London, 1907. 
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purPosely misinterpreted the teachings of Mo-tze. 
Neglecting criticisms both ancient and modern, for a moment, we will 
to analyze the significance of the term "miversal" from the Original text 
of Mo-tze alone. After careful stu<\v, we state that: 
1) Universal means all-including. Theobject of our universal love is 
the whole of humanity past, present and future because the whole human race, 
that is, every human being, was, is and will be as brothers and sisters of 
the sante family having God as the common father. Hundreds of years ago, the 
ancient sage kings had worshipped this same God and obeyed His will by loving 
universally. In other words, this universality of our love is based on the 
universality of God1 s fatherhood, vtlich is, according to Mo-tze, miversal 
to such an extent that it includes every single human being w.i..thout limits 
of time and space. Thus universality meant flaIl including." 
2) Universal means constant, since the real motive of universal love is 
the fatherhood of God, which is an mchangeable fact and does not accept aqy 
increase or decrease in intensity. Hence we must love our fellow-men con-
stantly during our whole life-time. 
3) Universal also means equal, but this is to be mderstood correctly. 
Mo-tze himself has said more than once that we must love all men equally. 
It seems certain that the Confucianists have based their severe condemnation 
of the doctrine of miversal love of Mo-tze entirely on their interpretation 
of this equality. Indeed, Mo-tze has stated on several occasions that we 
must love all men equally; however, the exact meaning of the word ttequallylf 
is to be established by the teachings of Mo-tze taken as a 'Whole system of 
doctrine. The text most often used to condemn Mo-tze read as follows: 
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Wu Ma-tze said to Mo-tze: 'I differ from you, I cannot 
love universally •••• I love the people of Tsou better than 
the people of Ch'u, the people of Lu better than the 
people of Tsou, the people of my district better than the 
people of Lu, the members o:f nw family better than the people 
of ~ district, ~ parents better than the other members 
of nw family, and mysell better than II\V parents. This 
because of their nearness to me. When I am beaten I 
feel pain. When they are beaten the pain does not extend 
to me. Why should I resist what does not give me pain 
f¥ld not resist what does give me pain? Therefore I 
would rather have them killed to benefit me than to have 
me killed to benefit them.' Mo-tze said: 'Is this view 
of yours to be kept secret or to be told to others?' 
Wu Ma-tze replied: 1Why should I keep II\V opinion to nw-
self? Of course I should tell it to others.' Mo-tze said: 
'Then if one person is pleased vvith your doctrine, there 
will be one person who will desire to kill you in order 
to benefit himself. If ten persons are pleased with you 
(your doctrine), there wi.ll be ten persons who will 
desire to kill you in order to benefit themselves. I:f 
(the people of) the whole world are pleased with you, 
the whole "WOrld will desire to kill you to benefit them-
selves. (on the other hand), if one person is not pleased 
with you, there will be one person who 'Will desire to 
kill you as the propagator of a 'Wicked doctrine. If ten 
persons are not pleased with you, there will be ten persons 
who will desire to kill you as the propagator of an evil 
doctrine. If (the people of) the whole world are not 
pleased with you, the whole world will desire to kill 
you a s a propagator o:f the evil doctrine. (So then) 
those who are pleased with you desire to kill you and 
those who are not pleased with you also desire to kill 
you. This is to say 'What passes out from your mouth is 
'What kills your body 1 Mo-tze continued: 'Then, lIl1J:lre, 
after all, does the bene£it of your doctrine lie1,44 
We can see that the objector, namely Wu Ma-tze, here is not arguing 
against the universal love according to its extenSion, that is, that love 
extend to all men in the world, since Wu Ma-tze himself stated that he does 
love other people, but only less than those who are closer to him b.Y a 
Conf. original text, ch. 46. yeti..' s translation, pp. 219-220. ParentuCi:)Cq 
original. Wu Ma-tze in Chinese: 2f. ,try J- • 
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certain natural relation. This attitude of Wu Ma-tze is but natural and 
quite correct. However, he went too far in stating that he would rather 
other people to benefit himself; this made him quite strictly an egotist. 
gence, Mo-tze took this opportunity to demonstrate to him that the doctrine 
of egoism does not even work for one's personal advantage and, that it is 
ultimately a doctrine of self-destruction. Of course Wu Ma-tze was unable 
to answer Mo-tze further, and thus Mo-tze 'WOn the discussion. Nevertheless, 
it is still obvious that Mo-tze did not answer precisely the main propositi 
of the objection to his reported doctrine of universal love. And for this 
reason, Mo-tze was condemed by Mencius as teaching an absolutely equal love 
towards :onefs parents and towards strangers in the street. No one can ap-
prove such an absolute equality in love. We are quite sure that Mo-tze did 
not intend to teach such a doctrine. His failure to answer Wu Ma-tze's ob-
jection precisely and positively was due either to the fact that he really 
did not want to answer it, or he might have considered it much easier to 
pose of this annoying objector with a reduction to the absurd of his own 
egoistic doctrine. 
We may excuse Mo-tze for the second reason, because we have seen that 
this objector, namely Wu Ma-tze, has already asked many other questions, mo 
of which did not show his sincerity in discussing philosophy but rather show 
his anxious desire to trap Mo-tze in a kind of dilemma which Wu Ma-tze hoped 
would silence Mo-tze and hence win him the great honor of triumphing over 
Mo-tze in a dialectical discussion. It seemed also that Mo-tze f:inally 
silenced Wu Ma-tze with this quoted method of reducing him to the absurd. 
However, we could not excuse Mo-tze for not answering such a query 
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abOut his doctrine of universal love anywhere in his entire wo:rlc. At least 
:lJl the whole text of the now-existing fifty-three chapters we could not find 
an1 positive and precise statemmt of Mo-tze concerning such an inportant 
~tter, namely to determine specifically onets due attitude toward his own 
parent and that toward a simple fellow-man. In other 'Words, must we real13' 
lOve all men absolutely equally or must we rather love our own parents and 
relatives more than outsiders? Nowhere did Mo-tze give any sort of positive 
or direct answer to such a quer,r. But, as we have noticed in our first 
chapter, it is a matter of fact that 'We do not possess the entire original 
work of Mo-tze; therefore it might be possible that Mo-tze had given such an 
answer in some missing chapters of his original text. 
The best we can do now is to find whether Mo-tze was in favor of such 
absolutely equal love from the rest of the text which we are fortunate to 
possess now. 
First, we must not neglect the important fact that at the time of our 
philosopher the Confucian doctrine was the dominant factor in the ethical 
ideas of the people. This Confucian doctrine emphasized or even over-
emphasized the duties of a son towards his father and that of a subject 
towards his ldng. The will of both the father and the king was to be obeyed 
at any cost and almost blincUy. One had to give ever-fthing he had and do 
everything he could to please his father and his king. The following sen-
tence was one of the famous e:xpressions of Con.tu.cianism: '"Nhen a king " .... >Ugq 
his minister to die, the minister must die and cannot do otherwise. When a 
father wishes his son to die, the son must die and cannot do otherwise." 
4, 
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lbe duties and affections between relatives are so much emphasized that 
nepotism :in politics was then but a connnonplace.46 Mo-tze wished to combat 
. suoh harmful nepotism which is the result of the over-emphasized fami~ 
:relationship; therefore Mo-tze natural.l:y kept silent on love among relatives 
At a:n.y rate" there is no reason to emphasize what is already over-emphasized. 
1lO-'tze wished to subordinate that over-emphasized love of onets om relati 
and on the other hand to emphasize that complete~ neglected duty of 10ving 
our fellow:-men just as such; so that by balancing more reasonably these two 
ldnds of love one might obtain the key to peace and prosperity for the whole 
world. The miseries in society, nepotism and consequent inefficiency in the 
government" and war among the nations were all the results of exaggerated 
familialism and nationalism, which are nothing else but the effects of an 
balanced love. Mo-tze called this ill-balanced love the particular love or 
the discriminated 1ove. 
But, 'What is the way of universal love and mutual aid? 
Mo-tze said: it is to regard the state of others as one's 
awn, the houses of others as onels own" the persons of 
others as one's self. When feudal lords 10ve one another 
there will be no more war; when heads of houses love 
one another there will be no mutual usurpation; when 
individuals love one another there will be no more mutual 
injuries. When rulers and ruled love each other they will 
be gracious and loyal; when father and son love each other 
they will be affectionate and filial; when elder and 
younger brothers love each other" they will be harmonious; 
when all the people in the world love each other" then the 
strong will not overpower the weak" the many will not 
oppress the few" the wealthy will not mock the poor" the 
honored will not disdain the humble" and the cunning will 
There are three chapters of Mo-tze's work entitled "The exaltation of the 
virt.uousff which are w.ritten against the nepotism :in politics of that 
time. 
not deceive the simple. And it is all due to DIIltua1 love 
that calamities, strifes, complaints and hatred are pre- 47 
vented from arising. Therefore, the benevolent exalt it. 
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We can see throughout his entire work that what Mo-tze meant by univer-
,allove is a more reasonabJ:y balanced natural love. The balance consisted 
ill eJd:;ending our love to our fellow-men. We must extend our personal love to 
other persons and consider them as "alter egos." We must extend the love of 
our family to love in a similar manner other people I s families; we must ex-
tend our love of country to love other people's countries. This is mat Mo-
tze called tmiversa1 or mutua110V9; and it is in this sense that Mo-tze ad-
tocsted the equalization of love 'When he said that we must love all men 
Mo-tze certainlY did not neglect the special relation between father 
and son, and that between king and subjects or between brothers and sisters. 
He specificalJ.;r lamented the lack of the virtues Iiue to such relatiOns be-
cause of the uprising of the modern (i.e. at his time) tendency of egoism. 
A.gain, the lack of grace on the part of the ruler, the 
lack of loyalty on the part of the ruled, the lack of 
affection on the part of the father, the lack of filial 
piety on the part of the son •••• These are further calamities 
in the empire: ~ 
Loyalty and filial piety are often openly recognized by Mo-tze as 
specific virtues, and the lack of them is called by him a calamity of the 
world. Hence, it is unfair to accuse Mo-tze of neglecting the special af-
fections between father and son and other relatives. 
Another fact to confirm our conviction is that Mo-tze has criticized 
Conf. original text, ch. 15, Mei's translation, PP. 82-83. 
COni'. original text, ch. 16, Mei l s translation, p. 87. 
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ultra-expensive funerals and the e:xaggerated three years' mourning for de-
ceased parents 'Which were practiced and preached by the Confucianists of his 
tiJllEl. For our specific purpose here we will only consider the facts about 
Mo-tze described the Confucian rules for mourning as follows: 
What are the rules to be observed by the mourners? He 
must weep without restraint and sound as if he is choking. 
Sack-cloth is worn an the breast and hat of flax on the 
head. His tears and snivel are not to be wiped away. 
The mourner is to 11 ve in a mourning hut, sleep on a coarse 
mat of straw, and lay his head on a lump of earth. Then 
he is obliged to abstain from food in order to laok 
hmgr,r, and to wear lit tIe in order to look cold. The 
face and eyes are to look sm:k as if in fear, and the 
complexion is to appear dark. Ears and eyes are to become 
dull, and hand and feet as to become weak and unusable. 
And, also, if the mourner is an official, he has to be 
supported to rise, and lean on a cane to walk. And all 
this is to last three years. 
Adopting such a doctrine and practicing such a principle, 
rulers cannot come to court early ••• the farmers cannot 
start out early and come in late to cultivate the land and 
plant trees; the artisans cannot build boats and vehicles 
and make vessels and utensils; and the 'WOmen cannot rise 
early and retire late to weave and to spin •••• Upon the 
death of the emperor, there will be three years' mourning; 
upon the death of a pa rent there will be three years of 
mourning; upon the death of the wife or the eldest son, 
there will be three years of mouming •••• Besides, there 
will be one year for uncles, brothers and the other sons 
and five months for near relatives; and also several months for 
a:mts, strers, nephews and uncles on the mother's 
sJ.de •••• 
So Mo-tze wished to shorten the time of mourning. He favored a three 
day period of morning50 for parents and a one day period for other relatives. 
Here we are not discussing the ancient mourning rules; we merely wish to show 
Conf. original text, ch. 26, Mei 1 s translation, pp. l25-126. 
Conf. original text, ch. 48. According to some commentators this 'WOrd 
"day" is to be read as "month" in the original text. This is probably 
because the Chinese 'liay" (a) is quite similar to the character for 
"Month" (!! ). A confusion in transcription or in printing is very likely 
possible. 
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tb3t Mo-tze was combating the exaggerated particular love of that time, and 
ttYiIlg to equalize man's love by diminishing what is exaggerated and -LLlI:;~!a~ ... 
lng what has been neglected, namely the love for one's fellow-men as such. 
On the other hand, it proves also that Mo-tze did not neglect the 
~ecial affections due to onets blood relations. otherwise, he would either 
abOllsh all mourning completely - that is, have one moum for one's own 
father no more than for any stranger in the street - or he would advocate 
a three days' mouming for any stranger! s death, 'Which fact vrould prove that 
he taught one to love any stranger in the street just as much as his own 
father. The solid fact that Mo-tze advocated a three day period of mourning 
for one's parent and, of course, none for the stranger, is enough to prove 
that Mo-tze dld not neglect the special affection between father and son. 
And thus we may state safe~ that M'D-tze did not preach an absolutely equal 
love for all human beings. 
The 'by-?IOrd of modern democracy inaugurated by the French Revolution is 
"liberty, fraternity and equality," which equality does not mean that all 
men are absolutely equal under a democratic doctrine. It rather means that 
the principles of democracy equalize social differences inasmuch as it is 
reasonably possible. This would be very much like the equality of love ad-
vocated by our philosopher. Or even better, we might say that modern dem0-
cracy considers all men equal as such; that is, inasmuch as they are co-
of the same country, they are equal in the dignity and rights of a 
citizen. Similarly, Mo-tze urged us to love all men equally inasmuch as 
are members of the human race. But it is a matter of fact that in a demo-
cratic society some citizens must possess a few special rights and even 
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dignities whioh are intimate~ oonnected with the publio offioe they hold. 
So, likewise" one Who praotioes the dootrine of universal love may 
].o'Ve and serve his relatives ;n a special way because by natural law they do 
d,eserV'e such a special affection. This" of oourse" does not destroy the 
value of the general principle of universal love. God loves all men equally: 
yet He will reward the just and punish the lmjust. This is clearly emphas 
by Mo-tze on many occasions. Thus" although we love all men equally" we 
not treat all men equally, beoause we have the duty whioh is dictated by the 
natura11aw to serve our parents and relatives and to show our affection 
towards them in a distinguished manner. Or We may put it this way" as ex-
pressed by one of the disciples of It>-tze: "To me, it seems that we are to 
lo'Ve all without difference of degree; but the manifestation of love must 
gin 'With our parents and relatives.,,51 
Once the meaning of the term "universal" is well qualified, we will 
proceed to determine the meaning of the term fl10vell acoording to Mo-tze. 
"Love" is surely one of the most widely used terms and yet its meaning is 
most confusing among the common people. People love to love and love to use 
the term "love," and most of them love to know what "love" is. Indeed, the 
definition of "love" has been most disputed from the first epoch of human 
culture until this very date. For us, the most satisfactory move oonoerning 
this matter was the distinction of n~ benevo1entiae" and "!:!!!2!: passionis" 
51 Con!. Mencius, Book III" part I, chapter,. Note that this disciple of 
Mo-tze is aotua1ly disoussing the matter with a disciple of Menoius 
at the home of Mencius (because Mencius refused to see him); therefore 
he used a less firm affirmation and begins with "To me, it seems ••• " 
Original Chinese: It * > -t Jfv Vi J/tJ -/l.~ 
219 
(or tfconcupiscientiae") which is accomplished by scholastic phi1osophy, al-
though it was initiated and even fairly well deve10ped by a few earlier 
philosophers. 
Now, having this clear distinction in our mind, we 'Will have little 
difficulty in finding out the formal cause, i.e. the essential factor, of 
ya-tze'g universal love. 
After a careful reacting of the entire text of the now-existing works 
of Mo-tze, we may firmly believe that Mo-tze has completely ignored the 
lIamor passionis" or rather purposely disdained to discuss it or even to 
-
mention it. Hence, the love advocated by Mo-tze is obviously benevolent 
love, or, as we said, the "~ benevolentiae." Mo-tze would agree w.i.l..l..JU, ... I5,..LJI 
with the saying "amare est velIe bene" to an unlimited extent. Cicero I::IJJt~ ... 
ing of love has said: 
Quid autem est amare, e quo nomen ductum amicitiae est, 
nisi velle bonis aliquem atfici quam maximis, etiam si 
ad se ex iis nihil redeat .52 
In a slightly different tone and under a somewhat different aspect, the 
great Leibnitz stated: "Amare sive diligere ~ felicitate alterius 
Cont. Cicero's ~ Finibus, Lib. II, cap. 24, no. 78. 
Conf'. De Notione Juris et Justitiae from Leibnitz's OpiSa Philosophica, 
editedby Erdmann, Beriiii, 1839, page 118. Leibnitz a 0 developed a 
reason for universal love similar to the reason given by Mo-tze. About 
this William Turner wrote: 
"The multitude of monads which make up the miverse are organized into 
the kingdom of spirits, of which God is the Supreme Ruler, a city of 
God, governed by divine Providence, or, more correctly still, a family 
of 'Which God is the father •••• l'rom this realization springs the impulse 
to love others, that is, to seek the happiness of others as well as one' 
own. The road to happiness is therefore through an increase of thlp.Ol'et,:t-l 
cal insight into the universe, and through an increase in love which 
naturally follows an increase of knowledge. The moral man, while he 
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ThrOughout the entire original text, we may find Mo-tze using «love" 
and flbenefitlf correlatively. Although there is no etymological cozmection 
between the two Chinese terms used by Mo-tze, the English and Latin terms in 
their connection show the same connection of ideas as is found in Chinese 
thouglrti. The English verb If to benefit" which came from the Latin word 
facere" is intimate~ connected with the "~benevolentiae.1f It is obvi 
that uto benefit" is but the practical realization of a benevolent love. 
attitude of Mo-tze concerning this mtter may be clear~ seen through this 
The Confucianists say that the wise-men do insist on loving 
people but they do not care to benefit them. This (accord-
ing to Mo-tze) is an erroneous statement. What Mo-~e 
would say is that there is no love 'Without benefit. 
Therefore, for Mo-tze, to love implies to benefit, at least in 
fo exclude the idea of benefiting from the definition of love is to destroy 
the very conception of love. Hence, his doctrine of universal love should 
be called, in its complete description, the doctrine of universal love and 
--
lIl\IIiual benefit. In fact, benevolent love is essentially to wish good which 
is not objectively real unless it is realized at least by intentiona.l~ u.v.1.~ 
so. Thus, "benevolent love" or ~elle benelf at least implies Ifintentionali 
, -
benefacere," "to benefit intentiona~." Therefore, the concept of "benefit 
promotes his own happiness by seeking the happiness of others, fulfils 
at the same time the Will of God." 
(Con!. W. Turner's article "Leibnitz ll in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. 
9, p. 138.) 
54 Conf. original text, ch. 44. Mei did not translate this chapter; the 
above translation is our om. Original Chinese: jlJ. I ..... ~ ~. ~ 1'" -tl) ~-% ~ 
~ -:t ~ J5 ;t.. ~ 1: ><t- i'-- 1- '"' t. ~ 11 ;} ;'{~ ~ ~ -i ~ ( -r-. JlA) 
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~.e., doing good and not merely wishing good, is at least an integral part 
of the definition of love. 
Turning to the even more practical side of this mtter, we may ask Yo-
tze hOW'this universal love is to be carried out in our daily life. We wish 
first to quote an unjust remark against Mo-tze by Frank Rawlinson, who is 
rePuted to be quite familiar with Chinese literature. Rawlinson lITote: 
What 'WOuld have happened, for instance, if Micius or the 
Micians had applied their justly famed logical principles 
to the question of finding out how an imparti§l love should 
operate? This they do not seem to have done.55 
This remark, as we said, ill liDjust, because very probably:Mr. Rawlinson 
haS misunderstood Mo-tze's doctrine of universal love as a teaching of 
absolute equ.a.1i ty in love 'Which is maintained by the modem communists to 
such an extent as to destroy the most natural human institution, namely the 
family, by proclaiming that the children belong to the state and that their 
father and mother are to them no more than any stranger on the street. Thus, 
the condemnation of Yencius falls justly to those Communists: "To love all 
equally Which does not acknowledge the peculiar affection due to a father ••• 
56 is to be in the state of beasts •••• " If Mr. Rawlinson is e:xpecting Mo-tze 
to tell us how to practice such equal love, then Mo-tze surely did not do it. 
But, if the doctrine of universal love of Yo-tze is to be interpreted, as it 
has been correctly done, as a prototype of Christian mi versal love, then 
llo-tze certainly has said enough as to how to do it. 
Con!. Micius, a Brief Outline of His Life and Ideas, by S. Holth (in the 
Introduction by Frank RawlinBOIl).- -
Conf. Mencius, Book III, part II, chapter 9, Legge's translation, vol. 
II, p. 283. 
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Mo-tze was not merely satisfied to tell us: "Love thy neighbour as thy-
.. .p If but he went further and more specifically to state that we must love S8.J,..J., 
other people's fathers as we wish to love our own father; 'We must love other 
people's nations as we love our own nation; we must love other people's 
property as we love our own properly.57 This is more specifiC than to say 
'Mo-tze said: Partiality fas to be replaced by universality. But how is 
it that partiality can be replaced by universality? Now, when every one 
regards states of others as he regards his own, who 1B>1lld attack the 
other's state? others are regarded like self ••• • When f!V'ery one regards 
the houses of others as he regards his O'WIl, who will disturb the others' 
houses? others are regarded as self. u ." Conf. original text, ell. 16. 
Again: "Now that there is disapproval, how can we have the condition 
altered? Mo-tze said: It is to be altered by the way of universal love 
and mutual aid. But 'What is the my of universal love and mutual aid? 
Mo-tze said: It is to regard the state of others as one's own, the LJ.VI~""<II 
of others as onets own, the persons of others as one's self •••• " Conf. 
ibidem, ch. 15. 
Ig83ii: "This is true even among t he thieves and robbers. As he loves 
only his own family and not other families, the thief steals from other 
families to profit his 0'W!l family. As he loves only his own person and 
not others, the robber does violence to others to profit himself •••• " 
Ibid~ ch. 14. 
Again in answering objections, Mo-tze replied: "Now let us inquire about 
the plans of the filial sons for their parents. I may ask, when they 
for their parents, whether they desire to have others love or hate them? 
Judging from the whole doctrine (of filial piety) it is cerlain that they 
desire to have others love their parents. Now mat should I do first in 
order to attend this? Should I first love others' parents in order that 
they would love my- parents in return, or should I first hate other's 
parents in order that they would love my- parents in return? Of course I 
should first love others' parents :in order that they would love my-
in retum. Hence those who desire to be filial to their parents, if they 
have to choose (between whether they should love or hate other's parents) 
they had best first love and benefit others' parents. Would anyone 
suspect that all the filial sons are stupid and incorrigible (:in loving 
their own parents)? We may again inquire about it. It is said in the 
"Ta-ya" among the books of the ancient kings: 'No idea is not given its 
due value; no virtue is not rewarded. When a peach is thrown to us, we 
would return with a prune.' This is to say that whoever loves others 
'Will be loved and whoever bates others nll be hated. It is then quite 
incomprehensible why people would object to universal love when they 
hear it.' Ibi~ ch. 16. Parentheses are original :in Mei translation. 
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lllOve thy neighbour as thyself''' because Mo-tze pointed out spec'ific 
to be considered in directing our practice of love. In pointing out some 
person as father, the special character of fatherhood (not physically but 
mora1:Q" considered) is brought out for consideration. This reminds us that 
1I'S surely wish to respect our father and also wish other people to respect 
our father; therefore nmst we give to this person the respect due to a 
father,.and so on and so forth. This is a very practical yet easy to under-
stand rule in answering the question how to realize universal love. 
so clearly shows that Mo-tze was not preaching a blindly equal love, or 
equal disregard, of all human beings. And modem materialistic Communism 
even goes so far as to equalize human beings with beasts by denying the 
spirt tua1 value of human souls, so that one t s own father does not mean more 
to him than a horse or a dog. This is truly a total destruction of mor~lity; 
with its moral value destroyed, love is merely a passion to provide self'-in-
terest Which we possess in conmon with the brute. 
To practice universal love is to exercise a virtue, but, since a virtue 
permits degrees of perfection, so the virtue of universal 10ve is not eql18J. 
in each individual. And it is our duty to reach the perfection of this vir-
tue as nearly as possible. 'Mo-tze stated clearly that the standard of such 
a perfection is the universal love of Heaven itseJi'. Heaven is the standard 
of all virtues; this is demonstrated by Mo-tze in the fourth chapter which is 
entitled "On the Necessity of a Standard." Specifically about universal 
said: 
The love of Heaven to'WaI'ds human beings is more universal 
than the 10ve of a wise man towards his fellow-men. But 
.the wise men love the co:rmnon people more universally than 
the common people would love the wise men. And also the 
wise men will benefit the common people more m'ODlPtly than 
the common people would benefit the wise men.~O -
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By the term 1f.wise man" fI the ancient Chinese meant not merely a learned 
person, but rather a virtuous person. Thus, the exemplary cause of this 
imPortant and. JOOst fundamental virtue is Heaven" the standard of all perfec-
tions. Man's first moral duty is to imitate such a perfection as closely as 
possible. And the way to reach this purpose is also clearly indicated by 
vo-tze ; it is that one must use his most sincere and undisturbed reason to 
direct his act of loving. rne more one is sincere and the more he is able 
keep his reason undisturbed by the passions" then so much the more is he 
to reach a higher degree of perfection in morality. The source of the so-
called partial and discrim:inated love is human passion" namely the passion 
of selfishness, which always threatens to disturb the reason and even to 
dominate it completely. Hence" a clear thinking with careful consideration 
to apply the golden rule of universal love, namely "to love other persons as 
is the method of achieving this first and most imporlant moral 
Mo-tze cited the examples of the ancient sage kings and showed how they 
practiced universal love and that, therefore, it is humanly possible to 
practice it. After citing many examples of the ancient sage kings" UO-tze 
Therefore" universal love is really the ~ of the ancient 
sage kings. It is what gives peace to the rulers and 
sustenance to the people. The gentleman would do well to 
understand and to practice universal love; then he would 
be gracious as a ruler, loyal as a minister, affectionate 
original text, ch. 44. 
as a father, filial as a son, courteous as an elder 
brother, and respectful as a younger brother. So if 
the gentleman desires to be a gracious ruler, a loyal 
minister, an affectionate father, a filial son, a 
courteous elder brother, and a respectful younger brother, 
universal love must be practised. It is the waY,~f the 
sage kings and the great blessing of the people. 
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Mo-tze t s emphasis on the importance of this fundamental principle of 
universal love is obvious in a great part of his works. He repeated and re-
peated the same statement or a similar one so that one may become tired at 
times while reading his works. However, this repetition which makes the 
heavier than it should be probably was caused by the unskilfulness of his 
disciples who actually wrote these text.s. 
In spite of the difficulties in practising universal love (beoause it 
requires a great effort to OVeroome onets own passiOns and thus sacrifioe a 
few personal advantages), 'Mo-tze still believed that it is not onl:y possible 
for a few learned men to practioe it, but it is also possible for the common 
people to practioe it in a wholesome way. A whole nation, even the whole 
world, could be led to universal love, if the leaders would properly 
their people and convince them of the value of this principle and assist 
to practice it in their daily lives. If this be done, Mo-tze says: "I feel 
people 'Will tend tmvard universal love and mutual aid like fire tending up-
wards and water downwards.,,60 
Because it is not aga:inst human nature and yet is attractive to human 
reason, the doctrine of universal love is easily aocepted by all men of good 
doctrine to procure peace and prosperity :in the world. This 
59 Conf. original text, oh. 16, the conclusion, Meils translation, p. 97. 
60 Conf. original text, ch. 16, l{ei' s translation, p. 97. 
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conviction of Mo-tze was cleverly illustrated by himself in answering ancltlllelt 
one of these sophistic objections of WUMa-tze: 
Wu Ma-tze said to Mo-tze: tThough you love lmiversally 
the world cannot be said to be benefited; though I do not 
love lmiversally the world cannot be said to be injured. 
Since neither of us has accomplished anything, 'What makes 
you then praise yourself and blame me? 'Mo-tze answered: 
ISuppose a conflagration is on. One person is fetching 
water to extinguish it, and another is holding some fuel 
to reinforce it. Neither of them has yet accomplished 
anything, but which one do you value? I Wu Ma-tze answered 
that he approved the intention of the person who fetched 
water and disapproved the intention of the person who 
holds fuel. Mo-tze said: tIn the same ~ner do I approve 
of my intention and disapprove of yours.' 
Therefore, the doctrine of lmiversal love is by its very nature, that 
to say prior to any realization of its practical advantage, obviously ap-
proved by human reason so that the human reason is more or less obliged to 
accept it as good. This is so obvious that even a malicious objector such 
In Ma-tze could not deny it. Thus, those who wish to make Mo-tze utilita 
have an additional difficulty in attempting to convince us of their opinion. 
Strange as it may seem, it is yet true that the Confucianists, such as 
)(encius, who condemned so severely the doctrine of universal love of Mo-tze, 
were teaching an almost identical doctrine. Confucius certainly never liaugltl1i1 
us to hate anyone. Although he did not teach positively "LoVe thy neighbor 
as thyself," he stated something very similar to it 'When he said: "What you 
do not wish to be done to you, then do n~ do itiD others.,,62 Yet this was 
given as a moral axiom 1Ihen Confucius was asked by one of his disciples to 
give such a rule for life. 
Cont. original text, ch. 46, Meils translation, p. 214. 
Cont. Confucian Analects, Book 25, ch. 23. Also see above pages l86and 
187 and note 7 of this chapter. 
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The teaching of Confucius was always very practical and almost 
inasmuch as it seemed that he did not care much about principles which con-
cern our inner conviction, and consequently our inner action (actus humanus) 
which is the essential part of the moral act or human act. It seems in the 
instance cited above that Confucius did not care much whether we must love 
others or not, but for a practical reason he wanted us not to hurt anyone. 
similarly, when he qs asked about his opinion regarding the attitude trnm.'I"d.c:d 
our eneIItr, he said he was not for the opinion which urges us to render good 
for evil received because if we do. render good for the evil, then with what 
'fJ1IJ3 we justly render the good we received? Therefore, we must render good 
for good, but let us also not do evil to our enemy. In other words, Con-
fucius disapproved the doing either of positive benefit or positive harm to 
our enentrJ we must stay in a purely negative attitude of disinterest in this 
63 
matter; that is, to forget rather than to forgive our enemy. This again 
shows that Confucius was not much concerned with our inner action. He did 
not care 'Whether we should forgive our eneIItr and even go farther to love him, 
or 'Whether 'We should still hate him while for a practical reason we do not 
want to do harm. to him. The acts of mind and heart as often neglected by 
Confucius, but the external acts are most carefully regulated - such acts as 
how to walk, sit, eat and drink - and to such an exaggerated degree of 
formality that he was reported by his disciples as refusing to eat any piece 
of meat mless it was cut in cubes. It is little wonder that Mo-tze has 
criticized the Confucianists of his time for carefully learning all ce:rmD.O!1d.al 
63 Conf. Confucian Analects, Book 24, ch. 36. 
228 
aots of sacrifice ~le not believing in the existence of spirits. 
Nevertheless, Confucius 1'iSS reported by Chuang-tze, the naturalist 
64 philosopher, as teaching universal love. We may also notice that Chuang-
tze seems to have believed that universal love is but natural to human nat 
He stated: "He who be-friends some (and therefore not others) has departed 
from human naturee,,65 At any rate, it is beyond doubt that Confucius has 
anxiously urged all men under heaven (i.e. all men in the world) to live to-
gether peacefulJ..y in order and in hannony. 
When Mencius took the floor among the disciples of Confucius, he decid-
edly insisted upon the importance of man's inner acts. He emphasized man's 
good will, the will to do good to others; he came so close to the doctrine 
of universal love that we often wondered how Mencius could condemn this 
doctrine of Mo-tze as heretical and dangerous. He was almost quoting yo-tze 
when he said: 
The man of magnanimity loves all men. The man of propriety 
shows respect to 6gthers ••• .,.qe who loves others is constantly 
loved by others. 
Again he said on another occasion: 
Treat 'With the reverence due to age the elders in your 
own fami13", so that the elders in the families of others 
shall be similarly treated; treat nth kindness due to 
youth the yotmg ones in your own family, so that the YOm1~ 
ones in the families of others will be similarly treated. 
This, under every aspect, is a facsimile of the doctrine of universal 
love. 'Mencius has sunmarized his teaching regarding this matter as follows: 
- Conf. Book of Chuang ... tze, ch. 13. 
Conf. ,2£- cIt., ch. 6. H. Giles translation. 
Cont. Mencius, Book 4, part 2, ch. 28. 
Cont. 'Mencius, Book I, part I, ch. 1, Legge's translation, p. 143. 
.. 
-
In regard to the inferior creatures, the superior man 
is kind to them, but not loving. In regard to people in 
general he is friendly but not affectionate. He is af-
fectionate to his relatives, and friendly to the people 
in general. He is _friEndly to the people in general and 
kind to creatures.68 
The following schema represents this opinion of his: 
-
subject Act Objects 
lDvef frienclly -- people in love general superior 1 affectionate -- creatures relatives 
love 
inferior 
Kindness --------- ----- creatures 
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As was demonstrated above by our analytic discussion, Mo-tze had taught 
precisely the same thing and called his teaching the doctrine of un1 versal 
Conf'. Mencius, Book VII, part I, ch. 14, Legge's translation, vol. In, 
p. 476. 
FtlNDAHEl~TAL PRn~CIPLES (E I:IDIVIDUAL 3TlUCS 
A) THE nmrVIDUAL IS nor nEGLECTED BY UO-TZE 
Since individual ethics is also (and even more common~) called basic 
ethiCS, we wish first of all to demonstrate against the opinion of a few 
authors, that Mo-tze did recognize the individual as a completely tper set 
existing moral entity, or moral subject, not just mere~ as a part of society 
In fact, quite a few writers, who misjudged Mo-tze as an altruistic 
utilitarian, have asserted that Mo-tze ignored individual ethics. Thus, 
for instance, Mei Yi Pao stated that for Mo-tze: "Evident~ outside of 
society there can be no ethics. u1 The reason given here by Mei _s that Mo-
tze followed the principle of "the greatest happiness for the greatest n~ 
ber." We have demonstrated that Mo-tze did not follow such a utilitarian 
principle, because although he is most willing to provide by all means the 
greatest happiness for the greatest number, he nevertheless does not admit 
that such a principle is to be aclmow1edged as the ultimate norm of morality. 
Mo-tze certain~ did not neglect the rights of individuals and those of 
lII:I.norities. In his description of an ideal peace and prosperity he clearly 
pointed out the rightis of individuals and those of minoMties. 
1 Conf. Motse, ~ Neglected Rival of Confucius, p. 109. 
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When all the people of the world love each other, then 
the strong will not overpower the weak, the liY ~ not 
~press the few, the wealthy will not mocl{t e poor, he honored will not di~dain the humble, the cunning will 
not deceive the simple. 
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EVeIl against the benefit of the whole world, the right of an individual 
stands solid and unchallenged. Mo-tze is more than willing to sacrifice his 
own life for the bEl1efit of the world, but he does not approve of someone 
else being forced to sacrifice his life for the benefit of the world. He 
said: 
To kill one person in order to save the whole world 
is not to benefit the wole world at the eJq)ense of 
one person. But, to sacrifice one's own life in order 
to save the world, is to benefit the world at onets own 
expense.3 
Therefore, according to :Mo-tze, every individual has a right to life which 
is not to be taken away by force even should the whole world be saved by 
an act. For such an aet, that is to ldll a person (supposedly innocent) is 
essentially unjust; therefore Mo-tze stated that even though the world DS 
saved by such an act, it is still mljust, and hence it is not to be said 
the act has benefited the 'Whole world. On the other hand, a supreme sacri-
fice offered by one's own free will is justified by the great benefit which 
follows; hencet "To sacrifice one 1 s own life in order to save the world, .!! 
to benefit the world by onets supreme sacrifice." That is how much Mo-tze 
----
maintained the rights of individuals. Therefore 'We do not think that Mo-tze 
has blindJ;r followed the principle of "the greatest happiness for the great-
est number" as it is understood by the modern materialistic utilitarians. 
Cont. original text, ch. XV, Mei translation, p. 83. 
Conf. original 'text, ch. 45. Since Mei did not translate this chapter, 
the above translation is our own. (Conf. above page l520f our disserla-
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Another argument to prove that Mo-tze cared for an individual ethics is 
the fact that Mo-tze did insist upon the unlimited knowledge of Heaven who 
is the supreme judge of all human acts and who eventually will reward or 
punish us accordingly: 
Heaven clearly discerns it (human conduct) even if it be 
:in the lfOods, valleys or solitary caves where there is 
no man.4 
In such a case, since definitely there were no other men present 'With the 
subject in question whose conduct Heaven clearly discerned, it is to be 
11Ilderstood that Mo-tze 1'/&S not speaking about our social conduct. Therefore 
evidently Mo-tze must have recognized the moral value of individual acts. 
However, what we call individual ethics includes all actions dealing with 
our fellow men as one individual to another individual. Mo-tze certainly 
could not neglect such an individual ethics, since it is but obvious that he 
tried to prove the existence of international and social justice by a com-
parison of their nature 'With the nature of the undisputed individual just 
or as the scholastic~ often called it, commutative justice. 
Suppose a man EIlters the orchard of another and steals the 
other' 5 peaches and plums. Hearing of it the public nl1 
condem it: laying hold of him the authorities 'Will punish 
him. Why? because he injures others to profit himself. 
As to seizing dogs, pigs, chickens, and young pigs from 
the others, it is even more unrighteous than to steal 
plums and peaches from his orchard. Why? Because it causes 
others to suffer more, and it is more unhuman and criminal 
••• .All the gentlemen of the world know that they should 
condemn these things, calling them unrighteous. But when 
:it comes to the great attack of states, they do not know 
that they should condem it. On the contrary, they applaud 
k Conf'. original text, ch. 26, Mei translation. 
it, calling it righteous. Can this be said to be know-
ing the difference between righteousness and unrighteous-
ness?5 
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Individual ethics thus serves as the basis of social and international 
ethics. We may even go so far as to state that "Politics with Mo-tze 'Were 
thUS merely Ethics on a larger scale, tt which sentence is usually accepted by 
critics as a proper judgment of Plato t s political philosophy. 
Moreover, Mo-tze has left us quite a few practical instructions concern-
ing how to control our own passions in order to achieve perfection of inner 
actions. For instance: 
'Mo-tze said: the six peculiarities must be removed. When 
Silent, one should be deliberating; when talking, one should 
instruct; when acting, one should achieve something. When 
one employs these three alternatively, he 'Will be a sage. 
Pleasure, anger, joy, sorrow, love and hate are to be 
removed; and magnanimity and righteousness are to replace 
them. When hands, feet, mouth, nose, ears and eyes are 
employed for righteousness, then one will sureq be a sage.6 
We must also notice that the second chapter of the works of Me-tze is enti 
IlSelf-cultivation," in which 'Me-tze has left us a series of practical 
concerning the regulation of our individual virtues. We shall discuss this 
IOOre specifically later. 
We do acknowledge that 'Me-tze's first concern was world peace through 
internationalq and nationally well-organized governments. Nevertheless, we 
insist that he was also very anxiously interested in individual morals. In 
concluding, we cite the follOwing from the third chapter of the original text 
watching a ctrer of silk at work, 'Mo-tze sighed, saying: 
"What is dyed in blue becomes blue; 'What is dyed in yellow 
original text, ch. XVII, Mei translation, pages 98-99. 
original text, ch. XVII, Mei translation, page 224. 
becomes yellow •••• '!'his is true not only nth silk dyemg; 
even a country changes its colour in response to its 
influences •••• Not only states but also mdi viduals are 
subjected to influences. 
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!hus, as a matter of fact, Mo-tze did not neglect the individual and 
his specific inportance in ethics. 
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B) THE EXISTENCE OF FREE WILL 
The first and most imporliant "ccndition sine qua non" of ethical science 
is undoubtedly the reality of free will. At the same time, it is also one of 
the most tedious tasks of moralists to prove the objectivity of our free will 
Mo-tze was full.y conscious of this point, and did his utmost to prove the 
value of our free will, although philosophically speaking his contribution 
to this particular point was of very little importance. HO'Wever, we do have 
to aclalawledge that Mo-tze was the only ancient Chinese philosopher who has 
ever realized the utmost importance of this matter and thus tried hard to 
prove the objectivity of our free will. 
In the five canonical books, which are the most ancient records ot our 
Chinese civilization, we do not find any vital material for discussion so far 
as the question of "free will ~u is concerned. For the freedom of the will 
to act as it pleases is to be understood as a fact taken for granted by the 
ancient Chinese. We notice that ~ Te Ching, i.e. the book of Lao-tze, is 
the oldest document where a skeptical attitude towards the reality of free 
will has been reported. However, as we pointed out above, the authenticity 
of this document is very much in question. 
At the time of Mo-tze, the undisputed "conditio possidentistf of the doc-
trine of free will was greatly challenged. And if 'We are to believe Mo-tze' s 
description of the situation "ad litteram," then we must say that the entire 
value of morality itself' was then in danger of being annihilated. But, as 'W8 
know, Mo-tze was a great orator, and it is most connnon that an orator will 
eDggerate the situation in 'Which the subject of his speech is placed. 
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fest ern classics students are undoubtedly familiar with the superlatives of 
O:!.ceI'O. Hence we believe they will understand why a tendency to push things 
to an extreme is often encomtered in Mo-tze, Mencius and even the conserva-
tively' tempered Oonfucius. We have seen that Mencius has severely condemned 
}{O-tze because the latter (according to the former) reduced the dignity of 
bunan beings to the state of beasts by abolishing 1Iha.t is most important in 
JIIOrality. NoW, Mo-tze has his turn in pushing his opponent into an extreme 
corner :in order to condemn him. He has done so by accusing the Oonfucianists 
of having preached fatalism which destroys the value of free will. 
Finally, they (the Confucianists) st!ppPse there is a 
fate, and that poverty or wealth, old age or untimely 
death, order or chaos, security or danger, all are pre-
determi.ned and cannot be altered. Applying this belief, 
those in authority of course will not attend to government 
and those below will not attend to 'WOrk. This is sufficient 
to ruin the world. 7 
Contmuing his fight aga:1nst fatalism in a special chapter dedicated to 
this purpose, Mo-tze said: 
To adopt the fatalists' doctrine is to overthrow righteous-
ness in the world. To overthrow righteousness in the world 
is to establish fate, which is a temptation to the peop~. 
And to offer people temptation is to destroy the people. 
This is because fatalism destroys the moral value of our action, which value 
made our action praiseworthy or punishable. 
Noy the fatalists say: Whoever is rewarded by a superior 
is destined to be rewarded. It is not because of his 
virlue that he is rewarded. Whoever is punished by a 
superior is destined to be punished. It is not because 
of his evil actions that he is punished.9 
7 Oonf. original text, ch. 48, Kung Meng. Mei translation. 
8 Conf. original text., ch. 35, "Anti Fatalism," Mei translation, p. 184. 
9 Ibid!Dll p. 186. (ch. 35, Mei translation). 
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And we may be morally certa1n that the necessar.r consequences of such a 
dOctrine will be disorder and all ldnds of moral evils: 
Under these conditions, the people 'WOuld not be filial 
to their parents at home and respectful to the elders 
1n the village and in the district. They would not ob-
serve propriety in conduct, moderation in going out and 
coming in, or decency between men and women. And if they 
were made to look after the court they would steal, 
if they 'Were made to defend a city they would raise an 
insurrection •••• The unnatural adherence to this doctrine 
(fatalism) is responsi~be for perniCious ideas and is 
the way of the w.tcked. 
Thus Mo-tze devoted a great deal ot his energy to combating fatalism. 
By demonstrat1ng the absurdity of fatalism, Mo-tze consequently defended the 
traditional belief of human free will. Man is gifted 'With a reason by which 
he may know mat is right and what is wrong, and he is also gifted with a 
free will which enables him to choose freely between doing good and evil; 
hence he is responsible for his action and merits reward. if he does good, 
deserves punishment if he does evil. This is the traditional doctrine of the 
Chinese people, as well as the original belief of all peoples no matter how 
primitive or how progressive their material civilization may be in our day. 
It is a historical fact that fatalism or any other form of amoralism came 
atter a certain period of time. The case here is similar to that of belief 
in the existence of God. The history of comparative religion has given evi-
dence that all primi ti va people believed in the real existence of a God 
creator and worshipped Him, whereas atheism came much later, during the so-
called progress of material oi vilization. 
Ibidem, p. 186. The translation is rather too literal; however, we do 
not think that a translation of our own is necessary in this case, since 
the purpose of 'Mo-tze I s speech is easily understood even in so strictly 
literal a translation. 
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And we may be morally certain that the necessary consequences of such a 
dOctrine will be disorder and all kinds of moral evils: 
Under these conditions, the people 'WOuld not be filial 
to their parents at home and respectful to the elders 
in the village and in the district. They would not ob-
serve propriety in conduct, moderation in going out and 
coming in, or decency between men and women. And if they 
were made to look after the court they would steal, 
if they were made to defend a city they would raise an 
insurrection •••• The unnatural adherence to this doctrine 
(fatalism) is responsi~be for pernicious ideas and is 
the way of the w.i.cked. 
Thus Mo-tze devoted a great deal of his energy to combating f'atalism. 
BY' demonstrating the absurdity of f'atalism, Mo-tze consequently defended the 
traditional belief of human f'ree will. Man is gifted 1'd.th a reason by which 
he may know mat is right and what is wrong, and he is also gifted with a 
free will which enables him to choose freely between doing good and evil; 
hence he is responsible for his action and merits reward if he does good, 
deserves punishment if he does evil. This is the traditional doctrine of the 
mdnese people, as well as the original belief of all peoples no matter how 
primitive or how progressive their material civilization may be :in our day. 
It is a historical fact that .fatalism or any other form of amoralism came 
after a certain period of time. The case here is similar to that of belief' 
in the existence of God. The history of comparative religion has given evi-
dence that all primi ti va people believed in the real existence of a God 
creator and worshipped Him, whereas atheism came much later, during the so-
called progress of material civilization. 
Ibidem, p. 186. The translation is rather too literal; however, we do 
not think that a translation of our om is necessary in this case, since 
the purpose of 'Mo-tze I s speech is easily understood even in so strictly' 
literal a translation. 
In combat:ing fatalism, Mo-tze was very anxious to show that the doctrine 
of fatalism is not scientifically proved, has no sufficient foundation, and 
is dangerous for the common good of the people; therefore it is to be reject-
ed. But Mo-tze did not furnish any positive argument to prove the real 
eXistence of human free 'Will. We can only try to construct what would be his 
positive argument after studying his refutation of fatalism. A.lso let us not 
forget that a positive argument to prove the real existence of human free 
1Ibich will please and satist.v all philosophers, is still wanting in our age. 
Mo-tze1 s refutation of fatalism is quite an elaborate effort in dialec-
tical technique. First he describes it as follows: 
The fatalists say: When fate decrees that a man shall be 
wealthy he will be wealthy; when it decrees poverty, he 
will be poor; when it decrees a large population, this 
will be large; and when it decrees a small population, 
this will be small; if order is decreed, there will be 
order; if chaos, there will be chaos. If fate decrees 
old age, there will be old age; if untimately death, there 
will be untimately death. Even if e man sets himself 
against his fate, what .is the use?ll 
Then, Mo-tze tells us that such a doctr:ine has influenced both the 
and the common people of his time, and that he therefore feels a careful dis-
cussion is urgently wanted to dete:rmine the trustworthiness of such a aOl~T.'''1.rUL 
Then he presEnts his three ways to test the value of any doctr:ine. 
Mo-tze said: Some standard of judgment must be established. 
To expound a doctrine 'Without regard to the standard is 
similar to determining the directions of sunrise and sunset 
on a revolving potter's 'Wheel. By ·this means the distinction 
of right and wrong, benefit, and harm, cannot be lmown. 
Therefore there must be three tests. What are the three 
texts? Mo-tze said: its baSiS, its applicability and its 
verifiability. On _at is:it. to be based? It is to be based 
on the deeds of the ancient sage kings. How is it to be 
11 Conto original text, ch. 35, Mei translation, p. 182. 
verified? It is to be verified by the senses of hearing 
and sight to the common people. How is it to be applied? 
It is to be applied by adopting it in government and 
observing its benefits to the country and to the people. 
This is w~t is meant by the three tests of every 
doctrine. 
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Here we must note that there are some slight differences among the three 
tests enumerated in three different chapters similarly entitled "Anti-Fatal-
ism," namely chapters thirty-five, thirty-six, and thirty-seven. For instance 
in chapter thirty-six, Mo-tze presents as his first test accordance with the 
will of Heaven and the spirits. And the senses of the common people are not 
named. Moreover, the texts following the enumeration of the three tests are 
somewhat confused. For instance, the senses of the common people is named as 
a test in chapter thirty-five, but its value only is discussed in chapter 
thirty-six where Mo-tze failed to name it as one of his tests. 
We must therefore read these three chapters as if they were one, and try 
to make them supply each other's lack, and thus reconstruct the more likely 
original argument of Yo-tse. 
A..:f'ter such an analytio and simultaneously (but not under the same respect 
synthetic research, we find that Mo-tze wished to condemn fatalism. with these 
arguments: 
1) Fatalism is not in accordance with the will of Heaven. This is prove ~ 
by ma.ny quotations from the ancient canonical books in which are recorded the 
teachings of the ancient sage kings, who declare explicitly or, more often, 
implicitly that the fatalistic doctrine is not in accordance with the will of 
Heaven. The same books also furnish us with historical facts 19hich prove that 
-
12 Cf. !bidem, p. 183. 
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geaven punishes severely those who believed in fatalism and rewards those 'Who 
do not believe in fatalism. Therefore, since our first duty is to obey the 
1dll of Heaven, we then must reject the doctrine of the fatalists. 
2) Fatalism is against the teachings and practice of the ancient sage 
ld,.ngs. This is again proved by quoting the ancient documents. It is rather 
a convincing argument since the people of M>-tze r s time generally believed 
that the ancient sage kings were vi:J."tualJ.y infallible. 
3) The real existence of Fate cannot be proved by any means. It carmot 
be proved physically by the senses of hear:ing and sight, for no one, from the 
beginning of time to our date, may testify that he ever saw or heard directly 
from such a thing as fate. It cannot be proved morally, because all moral 
arguments require the non-existence of fate, Since it is most '\lllW'anted moral-
lye It is even a moral necessity that fate must not exist. Therefore we may 
oonclude that fatalism has no foundat.ion :in reality. 
4) Fatalism is morally absurd, since its realization implies the total· 
destruction of morality which is based on the fact that human 'Will is free to 
operate as it wishes. Therefore, it must be a false doctrine. 
5) Fatalism is the imaginary creation of tyrants, 'Who wanted to enslave 
the people by making them believe in fate, blaming it for the miseries of 
their life. It is enjoyed by bandits and other evil doers in committing thei:r 
unjust actions, for they may transfer the responsibility of their acts to fate Ie 
It is welcomed by lazy people, who will abandon their works and duties as the) 
wish to trust themselves completely to the hands of fate. 
Therefore, Mo-tze said: Fate is invented by wicked kings 
and utilized by desperados. It is the doctrine of the 
wicked ones .13 
..L-I n'M a"fn:t1 t.Arl ~h ":l7. 
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Thus, yo-tze rejected and condemned fatalism or any other kind of deter-
minism. He solidly maintained that human nll is free, and that therefore 
man is responsible for his own actions. We may say that he proved the exis-
tence of free will by excluding the contradictory. 
But, mat it man cannot know what is right and what is wrong? In such 
case, free will alone nll not implJr moral responsibility. Therefore we must 
see 'What the attitude of Mo-tze is towards the moral value of the jud@lleIlt 
of human intellect. This will be the subject of our next section. 
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c) THE VALUE OF INTELLECT 
The topic of our present discussion, the value of intellect, is not the 
crucial problem of knowledge, although obviously there is a rather intimate 
oonnect.ion between them. We are hereby merely asking whether the human in-
tellect as such is capable of knowing what is morally' right and what is moral 
lY wrong. Of course, to ask such a qnestion we must pre-suppose that the ob-
jective value of human intellect has been accepted as a lIBtter of fact. We 
do not want to go beyond the realm of moral philosophy and to invade the 
field of criteriology, which is a branch of metaphysics. 
Quite a few modern sOholars speak of a "moral sense" with which we dis-
tinguish what is morally right from what is morally w:rong. We do not approve 
the use of the term "sense," because this may easily lead to a philoscphica 
deplorable confusion. We maintain that the faculty in charge of moral judg-
ment is intellect, which is not to be confused with any ldnd of sensitive 
faculties. 
The ancient Chinese would not have approved the use of the term "sense" 
to designate the faculty of our moral judgment, because they fi.rmly maintaine 
that the essential difference between human beings and brutes lies in the fa 
that the former is capable of distinguishing 'What is morally right and what 
is morally wrong. 
Just as in the case of tr£ree will, n the ability of our intellect to know 
morals is accepted as a matter of fact since the beginning of human civiliza-
tion. It is historioally certain that all peoples in their earliest and most 
Primitive state have believed that human. intellect, in its normal state, is 
capable of knowing what is morally right and what is morally 1I1'OIlg. The most 
)1 
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ancient written documents of any people nIl support either explicitly or at 
least implicitly this statement. One may find implicit support in the praise 
of heroes, the condemnation of villains, in all law codes, in religious re-
cordlJ speaking about rewards and punishments by God. All of this necessarily 
imPlies that the people of that time have believed in the moral value of h'1l1'OB.t 
intellect. The ancient Chinese people in particular 'Were conscious of this 
faot, and insisted upon the importance of it, beoause they believed that pre-
cisely on this point stands the essential differenoe between humans and brute~ • 
They did not take note of the abstraoti ve power of human intellect by 'Which 
the universal ooncept is formed. They did not see this as the essential 
superiOrity of the human being, only insisting upon the moral knowledge. 
As a matter of fact, we must admit that moral skepticism came later dur-
:lng the progress of histozy. And l'Ihenever it came, it came as a SlU'prisingl:,y 
unusual doctrine. It is reoorded in history rather because of its strange 
singularity than because of its value. We insist upon this faot beoause, 
first, the faot itself is a sort of positive argument for this important ba-
sis of morality; secondly, it may serve as a good reason to explain wl'\v the 
early philosophers did not oare to prove the moral value of lmman intellect, 
for at their time moral skeptioism was simply unknown. 
Certainly at the tillle of Mo-tze, a moral skeptiCism, 'Whioh ohallenges 
the capability of the human intellect in judging morals, was definitely un-
known. The fatalists had challenged free will but obviously left the in-
telleot unmolested. 
Accepting as a matter of fact that our intellect ~ and does know what 
is right and what is wrong, there is still an important question: "How does 
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principles of morality which are evidently "musts" just as it understands thai 
two and two ~ make four. Such principles are called moral axioms, or 
aynderesis; they are morally 'per se' evident and hence do not need any dia-
lectical proof or demonstration. 
However, the moral problems facing us in our daily life are not all so 
simPle as to be considered directly in the light of those moral axioms and 
thus to be judged by us almost instinctively. The practical facts are always 
much more complicated than the formula-like principles; this is because of 
the circumstances which are almost always present in any moral problem that 
faces us. In judging or rather solving a moral problem under many different 
circumstances, human intellect is infallible because it faces a quite compli-
cated logical process. Therefore we must learn, we must study in order to 
improve our ability to solve moral problems. 
This is probably the opinion of Mo-tze, because he believed that hmnan 
intellect is capable of distinguishing clearly, innnediately and without hesi-
tation 'What is essentially wrong from what is essentially right. He compared 
this spontaneous and decisive judgment to the judgment of the eyes in dis-
tinguishing mite and black, which was, for the Chinese of that time, a typi-
cal example of the most persuasive criterion of physical certitude. 
In his argument against offensive war,14 he pointed out that theft, 
robbery and murder are unjust because by these actions one injures other per-
sons in order to benefit himself. Now offensive 1'l8I' is nothing but theft, 
robbery and murder in large scale, yet some politicians are so perverse that 
14 We have quoted him directly on this lIBtter. See above note 5. 
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theY tried not on~ to justify it, but even to glorify it. So Mo-tze con-
cluded: 
Now, if there were a man mo, upon seeing a little black-
ness, should say it is black, but upon seeing much, should 
say it is 'White; then ~ should think that he could not 
tell the difference between black and white. If upon 
tasting a little bitterness one should say it is bitter, 
but upon tasting much, should say it is sweet; then we 
should think he could not tell the difference between 
bitter and sweet. Now, when a little wrong is connnitted 
people know that they should condemn it, but when such a 
great wrong as attacking a state is committed people do 
not know that they should condemn it; on the contrary, 
it is applauded and called righteous. Can this be said to 15 
be lmowing the difference between righteous and unr1ghteousi 
In this dialectical discussion, the innnorality of theft, robbery and 
murder is direct~ deduced from the common principle that condemns any action 
by 'Which one shall injure other persons in order to benefit himself. This 
principle, a.ccording to Mo-tze, is self-evident. All human beings are con-
vinced that such an action is not right just as much as they are convinced 
that black is not white. st. Augustine has also noticed that theft is ob-
viously wrong and so undoubteclly convinced by all that even the thief himself 
cannot tolerate anyone to steal his own possessions. Hence, here is one of 
the moral a:xioms which are obvious to all of us so that no argument is needed 
to convince us of its value. To injure others in order to benefit oneself is 
'WrOng. This is evident because our intellect sees it clearly and directly, 
excluding all possibility of doubts. 
However, in a more complicated matter, human intellect may easily be 
lured from strictly logical reasoning and thus misplace its moral judgments, 
as in offense, i.e. aggressive, war, in which the war lord tries to persuade 
his people that the mr they are going to start is a just one because of many 
~ r.nnf' or1g1nal text. ch. 17, Mei translation, pp. 99-100. 
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particular circumstances. We shall discuss later the arguments of Mo-tze 
against all those pseudo-justifications of aggressive war. Here we merely 
wish to demonstrate that Mo-tze was well aware of the fact that our natural 
or innate ability of distinguishing moral values is not alone sufficient be-
cause of the conplications of circumstances. In other words, although this 
natural capacity to understand clearly ftmdamental principles of morality is 
"Per self sufficient to us in order to make up our moral judgments, it is nevel' I-
theless in many cases insufficient flper accidens." Therefore we must learn 
hem to overcome the tfper accidens." This is, according to Mo-tze, to be done 
by following his triple tests, which we have already listed in a preceding 
chapter. Hence, we can fimly state that Mo-tze does not approve extreme 
:tnnatism, which we mentioned as the first theory 0 
Neither was he in accord 'With the second theory, extreme acquisitionism. 
In fact, Mo-tze clearly denounced conventionism. in morals. Morals, for him, 
is something above human agreement. We have pointed out in the earlier part 
of this treatise 16 Mo-tze t s demonstration that such a common agreement may be 
made in disregard of moral principles, in 'Which case it is not to be con-
sidered as good; if it is in accordance with moral principles then it is to 
be called good not because of the authority of such a conventional agreement 
but because of the natural authority of moral principles, 'Vilich, in our pres-
ant day, we call "natural laws." Mo-tze cited, as a typical example, the 
tradition of a certain cannibal tribe south of China. Cannibalism in certain 
d.etennined circumstances was approved and even enforced by the civil laws of 
that tribue. But, he pointed out, it is only too obvious for us (that is, 
-
16 Chapter II, section 3. 
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the Chinese), to see that this is morally wrong. Therefore, custom, tradition 
common agreements and even civil laws cannot justify anything that is t'Per sett 
l!1Orally wrong. 'Mo-tze used this argument against the super-expensive funerals 
of his time. If the description of Mo-tze was faithful, then we will all ad-
mit that there was l.mnecessary waste of useful material goods and unnecessari-
lY exaggerated manifestations of sadness which ~re close to self-starvation 
and other means of endangering one 1S own health. To waste goods and to hurt 
one's O?ln health unnecessarily is morally wrong; therefore even tradition of 
the ancients or agreement of the common people cannot justify the funeral CUB 
toms of his time.17 Thus, it is quite evident that 'Mo-tze does not belong to 
the group of supporters of extreme acquisi tionism, which we mentioned as the 
second theor,y. Hence, even by way of exclusion we may reach the same conclu-
sion; namely, that Mo-tze maintained the third theory we have mentioned above, 
a theoIY in 'Which the value of human intellect in morals is stated as follows: 
1) .A priori and by its awn nature, it a) understands ~ll and definite 
what is meant by morally right and what is meant by morally wrong;18 and b) 
sees clearly and understands perfectly a few moral principles, which are 
17 For more details coni. original text, ch. 25, "On Simplicity in Ftmerals," 
Mei translation, pages 123 and sqq. 
18 Samuel Clarke, an English follower of Descartes, has expressed this point 
of view quite energetically and, what is more interesting, he also com-
pared it with the distinction of white and black, although we are quite 
sure that he never read Mo-tze or any other Chinese philosopher's works. 
llr. Clarke wrote in his ! Discourse concern~ the UnchanRable Oblire-
tiona of Natural Religion, London, 1706, ". 5: "Though t may perp ex 
UB to define them, yet right and wrcng are nevertheless in themselves 
totally and essentially different, even altogether as much as white and 
black, light and darkness. 
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evident to it, i.e. persuasive by themselves and hence do not need proofs. 
2) A posteriori and because of the conplicated circumstances involved 
in many practical moral problems, it may form wrong jud~ents and reach wrong 
conclusions • 
Since this defect is "8 posteriori, It we may correct it via a posteriori. 
And this is to be done by the three tests, which are, in other words, as we 
have seen above: to study the case or the problem carefully, following sound 
logical rules and solid dialectics using historical facts and experiences as 
materials to help our decision. 
This is, as we believe, the moral value of human intelleet according to 
),{o-tze. 
--
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c) HUMAN PASSIONS - PLEASURE - VIRTUE AND VICE 
After hav:ing considered the role of will and intellect, we must not for-
get the important place in morals occupied by human passions. In fact, we 
WlY say that it "Was human passions 'Which furnished the "raison dtetre" of 
ethical studies. Without passions, we would probably all be saints, and 
ethical discussions 'WOuld seem at least unnecessary if not exactly a waste 
of time. 
Evidently Mo-tze admitted the existence of passions and advised us to 
control them: 
Mo-tze said: the six peculBrities must be removed • ••• 
Pleasure, anger, joy, sorrow, love- 'and hate are to be 
removed; and magnanimity and righteousness are to replace 
them. When hand, feet, mouth, nose, ears an<l eyes are 
employed for righteousness, then one 'Will surely be a 
sage.19 
Six passions are named here by Mo-tze, because these six are considered 
as standard passions at that time. The English translator has called them 
peculiarities, but their names ver,y evidently indicate that they are what 
Western philosophers call human passions. The verb ttremovett used here is 
obviously' to be understood as "to controlft since first of all it is impossiblE 
to remove the passions; secondly, Mo-tze, promoter of universal love, cannot 
logically demand us to remove our passion of love. We remember well that he 
merely asked to have us universalize our love and in a right way equalize it. 
Mo-tze noted that "When the passions are well controlled, one might become a 
sage. 
We have seen how Mo-tze wished us to control our passions of love and 
19 Conf. original text, ch. 41, Mei translation, p. 224. 
nate. Hate is to be restrained as much as possible, because it is diametri-
cally opposed to the will of Heaven, who "abominates to have them (men) hate 
20 
and harm one an other. II As for love, we have discussed:i:tl.adequately in our 
preceding chapter. The passion of love is to be guided by reason. Thus man 
shOuld not love as he pleases, but Should love as he must. That is, in other 
VlOrds, we must practice universal love Which is based on reason and we must 
reject partial love which is basedon passion. 
Pleasure here is named as one of the passions, but it is also the common 
name for all passions, and in this sense it is almost a synonym for passion. 
Mo-tze discussed pleasure \nlder the latter signification. Hence we will follo Ir 
him in considering passion in general, because what 'We want to do here is to 
determine the general principles used or rather followed by Mo-tze, and not 
those particular counsels concerning how to control a given passion, such as 
"Count to ten before you burst out in anger." 
We must note that the term pJ.e asure rea~ means the satisfaction of 
hunab paSSion; hence, if one be satisfied w.i..th his passion of anger, he does 
have the pleasure of such a given satisfaction. Mo-tze admitted that passions 
are natural demands of human beings, and that these natural demands must be 
satisfied, but satisfied reasonabl.y and not blindly, leading to excessive 
pleasure. Mo-tzets philosophy of life is not a pessimistic one as one au-
thors wish us to believe. The aim of his doctrine is to promote peace, pros-
perity, happiness and also pleasure, but in a well determined sense. 
According to Uo-tze, as we have seen above, Heaven created or made every 
20 Conf. original teJit, ch. 4, Mei translation, p. 14. 
-252 
thing in the universe (including the top of a bair) for the benefit of human 
beings. Therefore men are given by Heaven the right to enjoy all the crea-
tures of Heaven. Like a loving father, Heaven is somewhat even anxious to 
see that men enjoy themselves with the benefits furnished by other creatures 
Hence, there is nothing DlOrall:y wrong if men shall have the pleasure of en-
joying the benefit provided by Heaven's love. However, Mo-tze has given a 
rather strict rule over the limits of such enjoyment: 
Mo-tze said: Before the art of building houses and 
palaces was knOlm, primitive people lingered by the 
mounds and lived in caves. It 'Was damp and injurious 
to health. Thereupon the sage kings built houses and 
palaces. The guiding principles of the buildings were 
these: The house shall be built high enough to avoid 
the damphess and moisture, the walls thick enough to keep 
out the wind and the cold; the roof strong enough to stand 
snow, frost, rain and dew; and the walls in thep!Llaces 
high enough to observe the propriety of the sexes. These 
are suffiCient, and any e:xpenditures of money and energy 
that does not bring additional utility shall not be 
permitted •••• 
Before clothing was known, the primitive people wore 
coats of furs and belts of straw. There were neither 
light and warmth in winter nor light and cool in SUImller. 
The sage kings thought this did not satisfy the needs 
of man. So, he taught the women to produce silk and flax 
and linen therewith to make clothing for the people. 
The guiding principles for clothing were these: In 
winter the underwear shall be made of spun-silk so as to 
be light and warm. In summer it shall be made of coarse 
flax so as to be light and cool. And this is sufficient. 
Therefore the sages made their clothes just to fit their 
stature and size, and not for the purpose of pleasing the 
senses or to dazzle the common people • ••• 
Before the art of cooking was known, primitive people 
ate only vegetables and lived in separation. Thereupon 
the sage king taught the men to attend to farming and to 
plant trees to supply the people with food. And the sole 
purpose of securing food is to increase energy, satisfy 
hunger, strengthen the body and appease the stomach. 
He (the sage king) was frugal in spending wealth and simple 
in habits of living, and ~ the people become rich and ~ 
oountry orderly. 
Before the primitive people lmew how to make boats and 
oats, they oould neither carry a heavy load nor travel 
a great distanoe. Thereupon the sage king made boats and 
carts to faoilitate the people. The boats and oarts were 
made durable and oonvenient so that they would oarry much 
and travel far. Such an lmde1rmg takes little wealth 
but produces many benefits.... . 
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From. what we have quoted above, we may see clearly that Mo-tze did pro-
vide a rather sound and reasonable prinoiple to be the rule of our enjoyment 
even in the neoessities of living. Housing, olothing, food and transporta-
tion must be provided to satisfy the natural needs of men. But to seek what 
is beyond this modest satisfaction is to overstep the purpose of those oreat-
urea which we enjoy. This is to go beyond the demands of our nature. There-
fore the pleasure resulting from such an aotion is considered by Mo-tze as 
illegal and inmoral, that is, morally wrong. Henoe, the general prinCiple of 
Jlo-tze is to enjoy material goods acoording to the purpose of the same, and 
onl;y inasmuoh as to satisfy our natural needs. To act acoording to this 
prinCiple is to be virtuous. Vice is any act against suoh a prinoiple. 
Mo-tze did not teach self denying and rigid ascetism, although he 'Ol'I)O&,[)-I 
ly practiced it with his disoiples. His words to the public, suoh as we have 
quoted above, did not urge them to do mortification. On the contrary, he ex-
pressed positively that he wished them. to be comfortable and enjoy those 
material means provided for us by a loving Heaven. He wanted the houses to 
have a basement to avoid dampness in living rool'lll$; thick walls and safe roofs 
to make them weather proof. He wanted winter clothes not only to be warm, 
Cont. original text} ch. 61 Mei translation, pages 22-26. The term 
"palace" here used oy the ~ranslator really means a kind of oolleotive 
rather people who cannot afford to buy or build an 
......... ~ ....... house l' exclusive use of their own fafuily. It should be 
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pOor and denounce material goods; at least, it is not necessarily so, because 
be hase~licitly stated that a superior man may well be also a wealth1' man. 
tiThe way of the superior man makes the individual incorruptible in poverty 
and righteous when wealthy."23 
His effort to provide material satisfaction for all men is also quite 
obvious. He urged the rulers to benefit the people and to enrich them. Ho.-
ever, 1I0-tze did wish to set a limit to man f s enjoyment. The limitation was 
that it must be reasonable. One must seek to satisfy natural demands only 
inasmuch as the purpose of such a natural demand is reached. More than this is. 
according to Mo-tze, more than reasonable, and is therefore vice. The general 
term used to indicate such a vice may be translated into English (rather 
litera~) as fflUXllI'Y." 
Mo-tze understood very well that "luxuries" please the senses, flatter the 
passions, yet he fiI'll1ly condemned them. His doctrine of "Anti-music" is real-
~ a doctrine of "Anti-luxury." 
Mo-tze said: The reason 1I0~tze condemns mnsic is not that 
the sounds of the big bell~ the SOtmding drum, the Ch' in 
(piano) and the se (Violin) and the yu and the sheng 
(flute) are not pleasant, that the carving and the ornaments 
are not delightful, that the fried and boiled meats of 
the grass-fed and the grain-fed animals not gratif'ying, or 
that the high towers, grand arbours, and quiet villas are 
not comfortable. Although the body knows they are com-
fortable, the mouth knows they are gratifying, the eyes 
know they are delightful, and the ears know they are pleaSing, 
yet they are found not to be in accordance with the deeds 
of the sage kings of antiquity and not to contribute 
to the benefit of the people at pres~rrt, and so, Mo-tze 
proclaimed: To have music is wrong. 
23 Conf. original text, ch. 2, Mei translation, p. 7. 
24 Conf. original text, ch. 32, Mei translation. 
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After this, Mo-tze proceeded to develop his arguments against such 
luxuries. Ho.er, the text hereafter gives only the arguments against music; 
the 11lX1lI'Y of sight and that of taste is missing or purposely dropped since it 
is quite obvious that the same arguments 'Which are used against the luxury of 
hearing (i.e. excessive pleasure in hearing) are to be adopted to condemn the 
others. This is perhaps why the chapter is entitled "Anti-musico" 
Summarizing Mo-tzet s. arguments, we may find that he had two principal 
reasons to condemn music or other luxuries. 
1) Because, as a matter of fact, the ones who are enjoying such luxuries 
are the rulers and politicians. And moreover, in order to be able to enjoy 
such luxuries, they deliberately deprive many poor people of mat is necessary 
for their living. 
Now, the rulers take to music and deprive the people of 
their means of clothing and food to such an extmlt l 
Therefore Mo-tze said: To have music is wrong.~!;) 
2) Because, 'While man must work to honestly eam his living, he is never-
theless by nature capable of being very easily induced to laziness by exces-
Sively enjoying music (or other luxuries). Thus, there would be social and 
economic chaos. 
Man is different from the birds, beasts and insects. The 
birds, beasts and insects have their feathers and fur for 
coats, have their hoods and claws for sandals and shoes, 
and have 'Water and grass for drink and food. Therefore 
the male do not sow seeds or plant trees, neither do the 
female weave or spin, yet food and clothing are provided. 
Now man is different from these. Those 'Who use their 
energy- will live. Those lIiho do not use their energy cannot 
live. When gentlemen do not attend to government diligently 
25 Conf. original text, Mei translation, p. 177. 
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jurisdiction will be in chaos. When the common men do 
not attend to work, supplies will not be sufficient •••• 26 
Therefore, Mo-tze did not condemn mpsic simply as such, but disapproved 
of it lmder certain circumstances. In other words, it 1985 excessive enjoyment 
of music against which Mo-tze protested. The same is to be said about all 
other sensual pleasures. 
Man's sensitive faculties naturally tend to pleasure which is nothing but 
the satisfaction of their demands. However, it is a matter of fact, which we 
learn from experience, that excessive pleasure will eventually work against 
general prosperity and happiness. Therefore such excess must be morally wrong,; 
for, Heaven has given man sensitive faculties with their innate tendencies 
precisely to facilitate him in providing his general good. Hence, the parti-
cular enjoyment of sensitive faculties is naturally subordinated to the pur-
suit of general good as such. Now, as is demonstrated by Mo-tze, such parti-
eular sensual enjoyment endangers the pursuit of general good; therefore it is 
to be condemned. 
We noticed that Mo-tze has followed a technique which we may call a 
methodic .f:inism. Everything and also every action has its natural purpose. 
And Mo-tze even goes further, to observe that among many things and many dif-
farent actions there is a certain subordination of purposes. This is not 
merely to say that there are principal and secondary purposes, but that there 
are some purposes whose very uraison dfetre" is dependent upon the realization 
of some higher purposes. This dependency is natural. Therefore, we may con-
elude that some actions are essentially dependent upon some other actions 
26 Ibidem. 
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In this quite exfiensive description, we may note: 
1) That Mo-tze also insisted on removing immoral desires: "Nor enter-
liS-in any idea of injuring somebody •••• There is nothing in his mind that goes 
beyond love •••• " Hence, not only action but the desire of action may qualifY 
a person as virtuous or vicious. On another occasion, Mo-tze demonstrated 
that the intention of performing some action has its own moral value even 
though the action has not yet followed, and, of course the effect of such ac-
tion is farther from being realized. 
said: 
Suppose a con£1agration is occuring. One person is 
fetching -water to extinguish it, and another is holding 
some fuel to reinforce it. Neither of them has yet acco~ 
plished anything, but which one do you value? 1'Iil Ma-tze 
answered that he approved the intention of the person who 
fetches water and disapproved the intention of the person 
who holds fuel. Mo-tze said: In the same manne~8do I 
approve of D\V intention and disapprove of yours. 
Yet, what is internal seemed to be even more important for Mo-tze for he 
J:n.y virtue that does not spring from the heart 'Will not 
remain and any (result of) action that is not aimed at 
by one t s self will not stay. The superior man2gegards his body but as the vehicle for his oharacter. 
Virtue is really something rising from the interior of man. The body is 
a vehicle for one t s character, that is to say, a means of external expression 
of what is in the interior. Thus the seat of virtue or vice lies in the in-
terior and not in what the body is actually doing. 
2) Mo-tze believed that virtues may be improved or strengthened day by 
day, and they are to be perfected with time and e:xperienceo 
28 con£. original text, oh. 46, Mei translation, p. 214. 
29 con£. original text, ch. 2, Mei translation, p. 8. 
There;fore" the superior men are daily more energetic in 
performing their duty, but weaker in their desires. 
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This belief of Yo-tze is but the traditional belief of ancient Chinese" hence 
it is really not 'WOrthy o;f special note; but, as a supplement to our discus-
sion" it is not entirely useless to bring it out. 
Finally, we wish to note that although, as it has been demonstrated, Mo-
tze was not an extreme ascetic, to whom all pleasure is criminal and the onlJr 
good is privation and renouncement, nevertheless many relatively ancient doc 
ments have criticized him as teaching and practicing such a doctrine. 'Be-
cause of the importance they held in Chinese literature, we must give some o;f 
these documents serious consideration. For instance, in the book of Chuang-
Tze" 'Who lived onlJr a few years after Mo-tze" we may find the ;following 
criticism: 
Mill tzu (i.e. Mo-tze) and Chlu hus. Li (a disciple of 
Mo-tze) became enthusiastic followers of Tao, but they 
pushed the system too far, carrying their practice to 
excess. The ;former wrote an essay ttAgainst Musictt and 
another which he entitled "EconontV. tI There was to be 
no singing in lii'e, no mourning after death •••• He would 
have men toil through life and hold death in contempt. 
But this teaching is altogether too unattractive.. It 
would land mankind in sorrow and lamentation. It would 
be next to impossible as a practical system, and can 
not" I fear, be regarded as the Tao of the true sageo 
It would be diametrically opposed to human passions and 
as such would not be tolerated by the world. Mih tzu 
himself might be able to carry it out; but not the rest 
of the world. And when one separates himself from the 
rest o;f the world, his chances of developing an ideal 
state became small indeed.30 
Chuang-Tze then reported how Mo-tze described the hardship willingly 
undertaken by the great Emperor Yu; thus all his disciples are to follow such 
30 Book of Chuang-Tze, ch. 33" H. Giles translation" pages 440 sqq. 
an example: 
And because he (Yu) thus sacrificed himself to the common-
wealth, ages of Mihists to come 'WOuld also wear short 
serge jackets and straw sandals, and toil day and night 
without stopping, making self-mortification their end and 
aim, and say to themselves If If we cannot do this, we do 
not fo11W the Tao of Yu and are unworthy to be called 
Mihists.JO 
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Another important and supposedly trustworthy document, the ttShe-Kee" by 
the flfllOus historian Szu Me. ChIen (~5-1B6 B.S.) has described Mo-tze as 
.follows: 
Mo Tzu lived in a very small thatched hut built of rough, 
unworked timber. His utensils were of earthenware, his 
food of the coarsest kind. In the summer he wore garments 
of coarse, yellow cloth, and in the winter he wore a coat 
of deer-skin. When be was buried, he was laid in a coffin 
of thin boards.32 
According to our opinion, it is hardly possible to find anything in the 
original text of Mo-tze which would make us believe that Mo-tze did urge 
.. 
people to work and toil day and night without stopping or to make self-morti-
fication their end and aim, or to live in a small hut of rough timber and 
wear deer-skin as winter clothing. On the contrary, we find him saying: 
''When the city walls are repaired with regular labor, the people may feel 
tired but there is no exhaustion. ,,33 This is to caution the rulers that they 
must not let the people overwork themselves even in important matters such as 
repairing the city wall. As to living comfort, we have seen that Mo-tze 
wished houses to have a basement, thick walls, and a strong roof. He wishes 
that winter clothing be made of spm-silk so as to be light and warm. And 
31 Ibidem. 
32 This EngliSh translation is quoted from Micius, A Brief Outline of His 
Life and Ideas, by S. Holth, pages 11 and 12. - - -
33 COiif.Origina1 text, ch. 6, Mei translation, p. 22. 
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he referred to primitive people's wearing of furs as a defect. 
There must be a satisfactor.y explanation for the fact that these two 
later, but not less authentic, documents almost contradicted the original 
text of uo-tzet s teaching; but for the present we will settle it by contend_ 
ing that the original text of Mo-tze really represented Yo-tzet s teaching, but 
that, however, a sect of his early disciples did go to extremes and preached 
and practiced self-mortification. And, in order to convince their contem-
poraries, they attributed both the teaching and the practice to their master 
Mo-tze personally. And it happened that this particular sect survived longer 
and became more influential than other sects among the disciples of MO-tze. 
Now, making a special note an the fundamental virtues, such as the 
cardinal virtues of the scholastics, we find that Mo-tze did not name any vir--
tue as fundamEJltal except perhaps charity, which he e:xplained under the doc-
trine of universal love. There are many foms in naming cardinal virtues in 
ancient China; almost every philosopher has his own choice, but strangely 
they are all four in number, although there was no reason given to limit the 
number of fundamental virtues necessarily to four. The most common formula 
adopted by the Confucianists liaS: 1) Magnanimity, 2) Righteousness (or 
justice) 3) Good manners" and 4) Prudence. But Mo-tze, who considered his 
doctrine the antithesis of Confucian teachings, naturally would not follow 
this classification; thus he did not once mention these four cardinal virtues 
of Confucius. He did mention maunanimity and righteousness together, but 
never the four together. On the other hand, Mo-tze did not name another four-
some to replace them. Hmce if we shall insist upon knowing what YJ>-tze 
would have named as the four fundamental virtues if he were asked to do so" 
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,re should have to discover, from the now existing original texts, the four 
~rtues Mo-tze has ccnsidered most important. and most flmdanental. 
These we will attempt to name as: 1) Charity, 2) Justice, 3) Temperance 
and 4) Fortitude, or Bravery. Charitl is the practice of his doctrine of 
universal love, which is of course the most important issue in morals. 
Lustice is so much emphasized by Mo-tze in his preaching against offensive 
war, aga:inst fatalism, and against nepotism in politics, that we may say that 
next to charity, justice is most fmdamental for Mo-tze. Teq>erance is for 
Mo-tze the perfect control of human passion, particularly in sensitive 
pleasures. His teachings on economy in expenditure, simplicity in f'tm.erals, 
and his attitude on music are all based upon his persuasion of the 1mp~rtance 
of temperance. Finally Fortitude or Bravery is also a chief virtue emphasis 
by Mo-tze. We have seen that Chuang-Tze reported that Mo-tze taught con-
tempt of death. Mo-tze indeed has believed that everyone should give his 
life without any hesitation for the principle he follows.34 In answering ob-
jections against his doctrine of universal love, Mo-tze acknowledged that thi 
is difficult to practice; but he stated Energetically that we must 
practice it no matter how difficult it might be, because we know this is the 
right way. Believing in fighting for justice, he encouraged defensive war; 
even a ver,r small nation must resist the aggression of a large and strong 
Con!. original text, ch. 47. "Suppose we say to a person ••• we shall give 
you the whole wo rId on condition th9. t you let us kill you. Would he agre 
to this? Of course he would not agree. Why? Just because the world is 
not so valuable as one's own person (ioe. life). Yet people have strug-
gled aga:inst one another for a simple principle. This shows righteous-
ness is even more valuable than one's person (i.e. life). Mei transla-
tion, p. 222. 
a 
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D) MORAL SANCTIONS 
An ethical doctrine without any discussion on moral sanctions is incom-
plete. It is not because we maintain that men must be encouraged to do good 
by rewards and must be prohibited from doing evil by punishmants. We think 
the very notion of justice demands the real existence of moral sanctions. Of 
course, though we do not want the sanction to be an essential part of justice 
it is nevertheless to be recognized as an integral part. In other words, 
for a very practical and concrete reason, that is under the present and 
real sitution of moral subjects, without admitting the real existence of mora 
sanctions, the notioe of justioe itself would be simply incomplete. And, it 
is but obvious that an ethical doctrine lIith such an incomplete notion of 
justice is vitally paralyzed. 
Mo-tze emphasized highly the importance and the necessity of moral 
sanctions by eivil authority, but mostly he insisted upon the fact that Heav-
en and the spirits will supply what the civil authority cannot do on this 
matter. For Mo-tze, civil authority alone is not sufficient either to satis-
:f:y the demands of justice as to the retributions of past dOings, or to pre-
vent, by certain punishments, future misbehavior, or to enoourage, by oertain 
rewards, virtuous deeds. To reoognize Heaven 1 s knowledge and power conoern-
ing this matter is vital to morals; henoe Mo-tze has selected disbelief of 
Heaven's intelligence as the f'irst of four dangerous points among Confucian 
teachings: 
Mo-tze said: In the teachings of the Confucianists there 
are four principles sufficient to ruin the empire. The 
Confucianists hol~9 that Heaven is unintelligent and the 
ghosts inanimate. 
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Against -this, Mo-tze emphasized the intelligence of Heaven and attribut-
ad to Him an unlimited knowledge of our deeds. 
Heaven clearly discerns it (the human deed) even if it 
be in the l'Qods,- valleys, or solitary caves where there 
is no man.40 
And l!Jeaven certainly rewards the good and punishes the evil. «41 By say-
ing "certainly" Mo-tze meant that the rewards and punishment s from Heaven 
are inevitable, since Heaven knows everything that passes on earth, even in 
solitary caves. Yet it is most universal, i.e. includes every human being 
no matter how noble or how rich he may be because no man can exempt himself 
from the domination of Heaven. "Now all mm live in the world and under 
Heaven. When a man sms against Heaven there is nowhere to seek shelter.,,42 
Not even the Emperor is exempted from this all-including jurisdiction of 
Heaven. Mo-tze pUlj?osely cited ancient historical documents to show how 
Heaven rewarded the ancient sage kings ani how He punished the wicked emper-
ors. 
How did Chieh, Shueu, Yeu and Lee incur their punishments? 
Mo-tze said: In the highest sphere they blasphemed against 
Heaven, in the middle sphere they blasphened against 
the spirits, and in the sphere below they oppressed the 
people. Thereupon the will of Heaven proclaimed: 'From 
those whom I love these turn away and hate and those whom 
I want benefit they oppress. Their hate of men is without 
limit and their oppression of men is mst severe. 1 Alid 
so they were not permitted to finish out their lives 
(meaning to die unnaturall:y), to survive a single 
39 Conf. orig:inal text, ch. 48, Mei translation, p. 237. 
40 Conf. original text, ch. 26. 
41 Cont. original text, ch. 28. 
42 Con!. original text, ch. 28. 
generation (meaning their dynasty finished with their 
personal death). And peoPU3 condemn them unto this day, 
calling them wicked kings. 
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In insisting upon Heaven I s all-including knowledge and all-including 
justice, Mo-tze implicitly admitted that no matter how sage and how imparlia 
the king (or other rulers) is, it is still to be said that the civil authori 
ties are "per sen not sufficient to provide just retributions for human deeds 
Besides this point is quite clear to all moralists, Chinese as well as 
Westerners. If a just retribution for all human deeds must exist, then it 
must com from a super-human source of intelligence and power. It must be 
made by a most perfect intellect, for it is necessary to this intellect to 
know all human actions both internal and external. It must be absolutely . 
just, for such judgment must be guaranteed not only as infallible in essen-
tials but also in the most minute details. It must be executed by most 
eminEnt authority, for such a just retribution must be carried out without 
resistance fran the part of subjects and without handicap from the part of 
executive power. Mo-tze has found a perfect source for such an ideal moral 
sanction in the person of Heaven. 
Heaven, according. to Mo-tze, is "really the most honorable and most 
wise.,,44 Although his proofs for this statement are not of much value as far 
4.3 Conf'. original text, ch. 26. Here what the translator meant to say by 
"In the highest sphere ••• m the middle sphere ••• and in the sphere below' 
is not explained. But in the original text it was simply these three 
'WOrds: "above, in the middle, and below, n by Which Mo-tze means that 
HeaVEn is above all in dignity, the spirits are between Heaven and human 
beings. This triple gradation also represents three degrees concerning 
their respective perfections of entity, Heaven most perfect, the spirits 
less perfect, and human beings perfect in a still lower degree. 
44 Conf. ol1.g:inal text, ch. 26. 
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as metaphysical reasons are concerned, he nevertheless has provided a few 
good arguments to conv:ince the people of his time that: 
1) Heaven is most intelligent and knows everything that is done by 
anyone on earth. 
2) Heaven is most just, because He is the ultimate and absolute stand-
ard of right and wrong. What He judges as right or wrong, must automatically 
and necessarily be so. Yet, Heaven is most impartial, because: "Heaven 
loves man universallyt.45 and lfHeaven does not discriminate among the poor 
and rich, the honorable and humble.n46 Even the Emperor, who is t'the most 
honorable in the 'WOrld and the richest in the 'WOrldu47 is simply subjected 
to Him, for "When the emperor has done good, Heaven rewards him. When the 
emperor has comitted wrong, Heaven punishes him. 1I48 These show sufficiently 
that Heaven answers perfectly the description of an ideal source of intelli-
gence, justice and power that guarantees the realization of ideal moral 
sanctions. 
However, in comparison 'With the doctrine of western moralists, particul-
arlyamong Christian philosophers, Mo-tze comitted a surprisingly unusual 
negligence by omitting completely any real retribution in man t s future life 
'While he ~1icitly demonstrated the real existence of human souls even after 
the death and corruption of the body.49 He called such separately existing 
45 Conf. original text, ch. 16 
46 Ibidem, ch. 16. 
47 cant. original text, ch. 26. 
4B Conf. original text, ch. 28. 
49 Conf. original text, ch. 31, "On Ghosts." Mo-tze eJCplained: "The ghosts 
and spirits of all times may be divided into spirits of heaven, spirits 
of hills and rivers, and ghosts' of men after their death.u The whole 
chapter reveals clearly that human souls really, although not physically, 
existed after the separation with the body. 
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souls "the ghosts." They do really exist, although not physically; therefore 
one cannot see or otherwise sense their presence.50 Nevertheless they do 
see us and know what we are doing and watch over us everywhere. UThere1'ol'e , 
Mo-tze saidt tOne may not act disrespectfully eV'eD. in lIOods" valleys, or 
solitary caves 'Where there is no man. Spirits and ghosts are watch:ing ever.r-
'Where.,,51 The intelligence of such a separated soul is much superior to that 
of the physically living man: UMo-tze said: The ghosts and spirits are 
wiser than the sages by as much as the sharp-eared and keen-sighted surpass 
the deaf and blind. ,,52 Yet, Mo-tze never discussed 'Whether these separated 
souls remain responsible for acts and deeds accomplished while still liVing 
in the body, and hence whether they mayor my not be subjected to the retri-
butions of Almighty Heaven. This was a complete "laisser passer, It as we be-
liw'e, deliberately done by Mo-tze, because he was not sure what was best to 
say. He could avoid the issue quite easily because the people of his time 
were m:>re or less influenced by the attitude of Confucius, who refused to dis-
cuss the Ifmodus essendi" of ghosts and spirits although 18 admitted their exis-
tence. He even considered such a discussion a waste of time since" according 
to him, it is simply impossible for us to know m:>re about them than that they 
do exist. And even about their existence Confucius was not much concerned. 
As a result" later Confucianists no longer believed in the real existence of 
ghosts and spirits, although they still observed the traditional ceremonies 
50 Conf. original ten, ch. 39, "Anti-Confucianists.n Mo-tze mocked the 
Confucianists of his time for their stupidity in searching for the ghats 
of deceased ones by climbing on roofs, peeping in mouseholes, etc., as if 
the ghosts existed p~sical1y. 
51 Conf. original text" ch. 31. 
52 Conf. original text" ch. 46, Mei translation, p. 2130 
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of sacrifices.53 Therefore it was possible that there was no one who had 
asked Mo-tze to explain whether these ghosts are still responsible for the 
deeds comnitted in union wi. th the body and thus whether they should be re-
warded and punished accordingly. In one lrord, moral sanction for Mo-tze is 
limited to IOOrely our present life, except, pemaps, for a historical judg-
mente 
Analyzing his descriptions of the various punishInent s and rewards re-
ceived by the ancient wicked kings and sage kings respectively, we may 
enumerate Me-tzets moral retributions as follows: 
1) Bodily (or personally physical) retributions: 
reward: Long life, health, riches. 
punishment: Untimely and brutal death, pain, loss of riches. 
2) other (non-personal) physical retributions. 
rewards: Prosperity in posterity (sons and relatives). 
punishm3nts: Miseries in posterity. 
3) Mental retributions. 
rewards: Happ:iness, good fame, love from all. 
punishments: Worries, bad fame, hate f'roIl!. all. 
4) Social retributions. 
rewards: harmony 'With fellow man, peace under his jurisdiction, 
'Which may mean respectively.father o.f a .family, mayor o.f a town, 
ruler o.f a state, or emperor o.f the nations. 
53 "Kung Men-tze said that there were no ghosts and spirits; again he said 
that the superior man must leam sacrifice and worship. Mo-tze said: 
To hold that there are no spirits and learn sacrificial ceremonials is 
comparable to making fish:ing nets while there are no fish." Coni'. 
original text, ch. 48, Mei translation, p. 236. 
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pmishment: discord and chaos, in the same ways respectively. 
5) Historical retribution. 
reward: Praise from posterity. 
punishment: Condemnation from posterity. 54 
Eviderrlily, except this last one, that is, historical. retribution, none 
of these will deal nth us directly after our death. And even historical 
judgment is of very little value; first, because it is obviously only for the 
notable ones who will have their names in history, whereas the nass of people 
is denied such reward or exempted from such punishment; secondly, because it 
is further, possible that historical documents may be lost or altered by pos-
terity. Hence it is sone"What uncertain and poorly limited to a mere handful 
of persons among the great mass of human beings. Thus it may be recognized 
only as a supplementary retribution for some special cases. 
Christian philosophers are aware of the fact that in most cases a 
completely just moral retribution is often greatly wanted during one's life 
and inclucling the circumstances of his death. It is even more common to see 
good ones suffer and wicked ones prosper in this world than to see the 
54 Speaking of the sage kings, Mo-tZ€ said: ''Besides thiS, it is recorded 
also on bamboos and silk (our ovm note - there was no paper yet), cut in 
metals and stones, and engraved on the dishes and cups to be handed dom 
to posterity. 'What is this for? It is to mark out those who loved the 
people and benefited them, obeyed the will of Heaven and obtained reward 
from Heaven.1t Then, continuing his speech, Mo-tze Ca.m3 to the ancient 
wicked kings: "Now who are those that hated the people and oppressed 
them, opposed the will of Heaven and incurred punishment from Heaven? 
They are the ancient wicked kings of the three dynasties: Chieh, Shueu, 
Yeu and Li •••• And they were called the enemies of Heaven. The most evil 
names :in the world 'Were written upon them •••• Besides this, it is also re-
aorded on the bamboos and silks, cut on the metals and stones, and en-
graved on the plates and cups to be handed down to posten ty. U Conf. 
original text, ch. 27. 
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contrary. Therefore, they concluded, if there must be a completely just re-
tribution, as demanded by our reason, it must be necessarily done after our 
death. Hence the existence of a future world is admitted. Heaven and Hell 
sre accepted as a I1Btter of fact. Mo-tze did not go far enough to reach this 
pOint.~~ The Buddhist doctrine, 1Vhich came from India, is credited with the 
inauguration of the idea of the future world among Chinese thinkers. It is 
now a very cormnon belief of Chinese people that Heaven and Hell really exist. 
At any rate, Mo-tze was satisfied with the theory of temporary rewards 
and punishIoonts, and so were the people in general of his time. How this was 
possible is surely beyond our ability of guessing, especial~ 'When we know 
with certainty that Mo-tze, as well as the people in general, did believe in 
the real existence of human souls after separation from the body. 
In conclUding, we nsh to say that Mo-tze has positively trusted to the 
absolute justice of God in matters concern:ing moral retribution. But he also 
insisted upon tm necessity of civil law with its sanclional power maintained 
by human rulers. 
The ancient sage kings published laws and issued orders 
to be standards of rewards and punishmants, and to encourage 
the virtuous and to obstruct the evil. And so the 
people were filial to their parents at home, ~d respect-
ful to the elders in the village or district.!>o 
And the fatalists were absurdly wrong 'When they tried to deny the intra-
cical value of such civil laws by saying: 
5, Father Paul Geny, S.J., professor of Philosophy at the Pom. University 
de Gregoriano, discussing the notion of moral sanctions among ancient 
Chinese moralists, wrote t ttNumquam est sarmo de judiciis post mortem 
subeundo, nec de poenis." Conf. Synopsis Historiae Phi10sophiae, Rome, 
1929, p. 0 Also cont. Dictionaire Apologetique de 1& Foi Catholique, 
"CHINE." 
56 Conf. original text, ch. 35, Mei translation, p. 185. 
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Whoever is rewarded by the superior is destined to be 
rewarded. It is not because of his virtues that he is 
rewarded. Whoever is punished by the slIpet'ior is dest:ined 
to be p~shed. It is not because of his vice that he is 
plIDished.57 
As for the origin and the limit of the value of civil laws, we shall 
discuss these in a subsequent chapter on Mo-tze t s politico-social principles. 
57 Conf. original text, ch. 35, Mei translation, p. 185, note 56. 
CRAPl'ER v: 
ETHICAL PRINCIPLES ON SOCIAL ECONOMY 
A) THE RIGHT USE OF WEALTH 
We 'Wish to remind our readers that this thesis deals merely with the 
moral principles 'Which one may find in the teachings of Mo-tze. As to his 
technical methods for "Benefiting or enriching the people" (such as how to s~ 
seeds and plant trees in order to increase the harvest, or how to build a 
fortificcrtion to defend the town) are obviously out of our sphere. Hence, in 
this present chapter, one must not expect to see all problems of social econo-
m:r solved or even mentioned; our sole purpose here is to expand a few moral 
rules that Mo-tze wanted to be observed in economical affairs. 
Since wealth is the primary material object of economic science, we shall 
try, in the first place, to detennine what role Mo-tze had given to it~ But 
:in order to determine this, it is most proper to know first Mo-tzets defini-
tion for wealth, or, in other words, 'What things Mo-tze would consider as 
wealth. 
The notion of wealth is certainly one of the earliest and most original 
concepts of mankind. By his natural instincts, man knows what is good for his 
physical welfare and thus naturally tends to pursue it and to enjoy the pos-
session of it. Thus, the very primitive idea of wealth was not much different 
from the material goods that are pursued by brute animals. However, with the 
llLUltiplication of primitive men, and the rising of a more complicated social 
life as a necessary result, the notion of wealth became more developed in its 
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eJtte..'rlsion and eventually included whatsoever 'WOuld provide directly or in-
directly (by means of exchange) sore sort of satisfaction of human desires. 
mus, gold, pearls, jade, etc., became leading articles in the list of ob-
jects of wealth. However, even in the early days of civilization one finds 
some wisemen who have reminded the people that true wealth is not represented 
by expensive objects of l~. Our philosopher has precisely done so: 
Mo-tze said: The jade of Ho, the pearl of Duke Sui and 
the nine things -- these are what the feudal lords value 
as excellent treasures. Can they enrich the country, 
nru.ltiply the people, put the government in order and 
place the state in safety? Of course they cannot. Excellent 
treasures are valued for their efficacy. Now, since the 
jade of Ho, the pearl of Duke Sui and the nine thj.ngs 
cannot benefit men, then they are not the treasures of 
the world. On the other hand, if righteousness is employed 
in the government of state the population will be increased, 
the government will be in order and the state will be 
secured •••• So righteousne ss is the treasure of the world. 1 
Righteousness is to replace jade and pearls as the top values of wealth, 
because it really, although indirectly, provides benefit for human beings by 
securing peace and order, hannony and mutual aid to increase production, 
avoid waste and promote comfort and happiness. Thus, Mo-tze even went so far 
as to condemn all scientific e:x;periments which apparently do not bring iIlllled-
iate benefit to mankind: 
Kung Shu-tze constructed a bird from bamboo and when it 
was completed he flew it. It stayed up in the air for 
three days. Kung Shu-tze was proud of his supreme 
skill. Vo-tze said to him: Your accomplishment in 
constructing a bird does not compare with that of the 
carpenter in making a linch-pin. In a short 'While he 
could cut out the piece of wood of three inches. Yet 
it would carry a load of fifty Tan (a Tan is about 150 
pounds) • For, any ac~evement that is beneficial to man 
is said to be clu.m.sy. 
1 Conf 0 original text, ch. 46, "Keng Chu, If Mei translation, pp. 2l5~. 
2 Conf. ibidem Ch. 48. 
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If this incident is authentically recorded, then Mo-tze might have been 
responsible for setting impediments to the progress of science because of 
his short sightedness in empirical matters. However, his general attitude 
was obviously favorable to scientific researches that improve the living 
standard of human beings. He condenmed the e:xperiment of Kung Shu-tze be-
cause he could not see any practical use in it, and thus believed that it 
was nerely a wate of time, an item of l'llXUt"y. 
We have demonstrated before that the right use of wealth is, for Mo-tze, 
to use it according to its natural purpose, and according to the natural need 
of the user. Thus, for instance, the purpose of clothing is to cover the bod 
y and protect it against the cold; hence, if one s.h.ould use garments in order 
to show his richness, it would be a perversion. Likewise, the pUl1lose of 
eating is to nourish the body and increase its strength, but, if one should 
eat excessively and merely for the enjoyment of taste, it would be a perver-
sion. This is the fundamental moral principle in econoIttY'. 
By their own nature, jade and pearls cannot satisfy any natural demands 
of man; therefore, for Mo-tze, they are simply not wealth at all. It is only 
because of human perversity in seeking luxuries that they were considered 
wealth. The virtuous man will not, of course, consent to such popular (or 
rather vulgar) ideas, and surely will not permit himself to pursue such 
objects.3 
At any rate, Mo-tze himself would not accept anything more than what was 
needed for his natural necessities of living, even though it was given to him 
3 We find a modern naturalist who echoes this opinion of Mo-tze: "Si 
Ithomme etrlt sage, ecrit Montrlgne, it prendrait 1e vrai prix de chaque 
~~~!e selon qu'ell~. I?~rait. ~e plus'L~t~le et propre a la vie." Quoted ~ eo..~ '~~n; jt'l~nnn;_aues DV Andre-cresson. Paris. 1835. 
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in recognition of his great service in securing peace and order in a nation. 
After Mo-tze has paid Kung Shang-kuo a visit, Kung 
Shang-kuo recommended him to the Lord of Yueh. The Lord 
of Yueh was greatly pleased, saying to Kung Shang-kuo: 
t Sir, if you can induce Mo-tze to come to Yueh and instruct 
me, I shall offer him five hundred li square of land lying 
in the former state of WU •••• t Mo-tze said to Kung Shang-
kuo •••• If the Lord of Yueh will listen to my word and 
adopt my way, I shall come and ask only for food according 
to the capacity of my stomach and clothing according to 
the stature of my body. I shall be just one ot the 
ministers. What is the use of any commission?4 
However, we should not think that Mo-tze has limited man's use of wealth 
strictly to the bare necessities of living. We find that he would also pel'-
mit a little extra enje>ym3llt of what he called luxuries provided that all the 
men in 'the world already have enough wealth for -what is necessary to life. 
He was quoted as fo1lows: 
Mo-tze asked Chting Wa-ly (one of his disciples): 
ISuppose during a famine some one shall offer you a strict 
alternative choice between the famus pearl of the Duke 
of Shieu and a sack of rice, so that if you shall choose 
the pearl then we will be deprived from havingihe rice, 
and vice versa. Which one of them, then, will you take? 
Ch'ing Wal-ly answered: t Of course I shall take the sack 
of rice, for it will satisfy my need 1 Mo-tze said: 
'Very well. Then why should men g:> after luxurious 
objects? They are useless but; to promote luxurious 
desires. The true sage will not care about them. There-
fore, I said, in eating we must first see that there is 
enough food to feed all men for a long time to come; 
only when this is secured, then we may pursue enra 
delicateness in rare tastes. In matters of clothing 
we must first see that there are enough clothes to keep 
warm all men for a long time to come; only 'When this is 
secured, then we may pursue enra beauty in fashions. 
In the matter of housing, we must first see that there are 
enough dwellings to house all men for a long time to come; 
only men this is secured, then we may pursue e:xtra comfort 
on luxury items. The sotmd principle in these matters 
is that we must always first accomplish what is substantial; 
Conf. original ten, ch. 49, Mei translation, pp. 25Q-251. 
then we are permitted to enjo~ surplus benefit. This is 
indeed an excellent doctrine. 
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Even though the authenticity of this passage my be called in doubt, it 
is, nevertheless, to be considered as representing Mo-tze's ideas. For the 
doctrine expressed in this passage is really in perfect accordance with the 
teachings of Mo-tze as a whole. Mo-tze did emphasize benefitting and enrich-
ing the people. He preached universal love and mutual aid. He did wish every: 
one to have enough food, enough clothes and a comfortable house to live in. 
He condemned music, beautiful clothes and extravagant decorations in archi-
tecture, because of the fact that at his tine the rulers were indulging them-
selves in unlimited luxuries 'While the poor people were deprived of the bare 
necessities of their livelihood.6 
Hence, if we could be made sure that all people of the world were provid 
ed with sufficient items for the necessities of life and that this were 
guaranteed for a long time to oome, then it would be permissible even accord-
ing to Mo-tze for men to indulge themselves in music or other kinds of 
luxuries, provided that they would not thereby neglect their duties or neglect 
their work. For this would again be the source of calamities, miseries and 
disorder.7 
Hence, the motto adopted by Mo-tze was "luxury after necessity,,;8 
, This passage is quoted from #.l fe., (Shieu Wei) by Lui Shaing (~ {~) 77 ~.C. 
to 6 B.S.), a great scholar of the Han Dynasty, who attributed it to the 
original works of Mo-tze. It is probable that Lui quoted this passage from 
one of the chapters of Mo-tze that we are not fortunate enough to possess 
now. From the style and the subject of the discussion this passage is 
probably a part of the orig:inal chapter twenty-two· entitled 1fEconomy in 
Expenditure, II whose text is entirely missing to us. 
6 Conf. original text, ch. 32, "Anti-music." 
7 Ibidem, same chapter. J: (Ar .4 ~. , 
8 From the passage quoted above and qualified in note 5. " 1!.J y~ ,1v /j~ ~ " 
literally means "first substance and tbm beauty." 
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evidently this was not to be applied to the case of any given individual, so 
that whenever he or she had enough for necessity, he or she would then be 
permitted to indulge in luxuries. Mo-tze was obviously against this. There-
fore, this motto is to be understood as holding good only when the necessities 
of all mankLnd are provided for and secured for a long tine to come - then 
those lilo can afford them may be permitted to indulge in luxuries. 
Wealth, for Mo-tze, is a gift of Heaven to human beings. Heaven has 
created it for the benefit of all men universally taken. 
Heaven loves the whole world universally. Everything is 
prepared for the good of men. The work of Heaven extends 
even to the smallest things that are enjoyed by men.9 
Therefore men must use them according to the will of Heaven. Now, 
Heaven desires that men love all their fellow men universally and benefit each 
other mutually. Hence, the 'Wealthy ones must not be selfish in enjoying more 
than is needed and in wasting what they cannot use properly, but they must 
help the poor ones and distribute what they cannot use properly, but they 
10 
must help the poor ones and distribute their surplus 'Wealth to them. Howeve' 
this does not imply that therefore Mo-tze is in favor of Conmnmism or Social-
ism. We shall discuss this in the subsequent chapter. According to the pur-
pose of wealth as determined by the Creator, Heaven, we must, in using wealth 
be governed by the following principles: 
1) Everything that we enjoy (i.e. wealth) is created by Heaven for the 
benefit of all men taken universally. 
9 Conf. original text, ch. 27, "Will of Heaven, II II. 
10 Speaking of the duties of a virtuous person Mo-tze said: 
sessing much wealth, he shares it 1'Ii th the poor. - Con!. 
ch. 49, "Lu Question, tf Mei translation, p. 2.52. 
•••• • When pos-
original text, 
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2) Everything is created to satisfy our natural demands, not for 
luxurious purposes. 
3) As a mtter of tact, at the present time, i.e., the time of Mo-tze, 
there is not enough wealth to supply the necessities of life to all men; ther 
fore, whoever indulges in l'UX'Uries will eventually deprive some of his fellow 
men of some necessities for their life. This is morally wrong. 
Therefore, Mo-tze said: 
The wise man should reverence Heaven and worship spirits, 
love the people and i£onomize in expenditures. Combining 
these we get wisdom. 
11 Con!. original text, ch. 47, t'l{ung Men. 11 
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B) PRIVATE OWNERSHIP 
Although it is quite clear that Mo-tze wished all men to share the bene-
£it of Heaven's creatures as tmiversally as possible, we are, nevertheless, e-
qua~ sure that Mo-tze was not in favor of Socialism or Connnmism in his 
teaching on economics. 
First of all, a mere handful of secondary writers have tried to qualify 
Mo-tze as a Comnnmist.12 Secondly, their reason for so doing is based merely 
on the superficial or literal manings of some sentences in the text of Mo-tze 
which they have interpreted in their own way in order to satisfy their own 
opinion. We acknowledge these passages or v.ords of Mo-tze, already quoted 
above, do really inform us that, according to Mo-tze, all men have somewhat 
equal rights to enjoy the benefit of Heaven's creatures, since they are equal-
ly (i.e. without discrim:ination) loved by Heaven. Furthermore, we also ack-
knowledge that Mo-tze did wish that the rich should distribute their surplus 
riches to the poor. But, we do not see that all this should therefore imply 
that Mo-tze was a Comrmmist. We have good reason to demonstrate that Me-tze1s 
doctrine here is to be interpreted properly as corresponding to Christian 
democratic principles and not to any principle of Comnnmism. Christian philo-
sophy has proved that God loves all men tmi versally and has created all 
material beings for their needs and advantages. Therefore, fundatmntally 
speaking, all men do have equal righ ts to enjoy the benefits guaranteed by 
God. However, the doctrine of Christianity is known to the whole world as the 
12 Shang-Nai-Hsi, for instance, in his History of Chinese Thought, Shanghai, 
1930. Among Westerners, we found that only Richard Wilhelm has called 
Mo-tze a Communist. See his! Short History of Chinese Civilization, 
New York, 1929. (English translation fran the original German), p. 151. 
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3rchen~ of Communism and Socialism. 
Evidently Mo-tze was not Christian at all, but his teaching is similar 
to the Christian in denouncing materialistic Conmunism because of its atheist-
ical attitude and because of its denial of private ownership in favor of an 
absolute state ownership of all wealth. 
1) Mo-tze has ccndenmed the skepticism of the Confucianists by stating 
that such an impious attitude is enough to ruin the whole world.13 
2) Mo-tze has rated the inviolability of private ownership so high that 
he has used it as t~ basis of his argument against aggressive war. Aggressiv 
Ti8r is unjust and crindnal precisely because it is similar to the acts of 
theft and robbery which are violations of the private property.14 
Therefore, Mo-tze has considered the right of private ownership as so 
natural that its violation is obviously a criminal act. Private ownership is 
more sure, so it ~ be served as the model to illustrate 'What is called state 
ownership. And thus, it is obvious that the state ownership cannot turn out 
to be so absolute as to take over completely all private ownership. And be-
sides, we also find that, according to Mo-tze, private ownerShip is so per-
sonal to the owner that even a rich man is not to be robbed or otherwise 
forced to do charity, but he is only advised by Mo-we (with good reasons) 
that he ought to distribute his surplus riches to help the poor and the needy. 
Of course, Mo-tze did not hold riches silrply in contempt; a rich man is 
not therefore a bad man. Even a wi se man may be rich and be a superior man 
13 Con!. ori ginal text, c h. 48, "Kung Men." 
14 Conf. original text, ch. 17. This has already been quoted above in our 
Chapter IT; see note a:n., p.l66. 
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(i.e. a virtuous man) while remaining wealthy.15 On the other hand, a poor 
man may be corrupted in morale just as well as a rich one may. The possession 
of wealth is not by itself a vice, provided that the 'Way of possessing it is 
legitimate and righteous. We can find nothing in the entire text of the "WOrks 
of Mo-tze that can be used properly to form any argument against private own-
ership. Yet Mo-tze seemed by all means to disagree with the idea of state 
ovmership. 
Mo-tze t s opinion on this matter is moderate and conservative. The 
state has, indeed, a certain degree of possessive right over the wealth of its 
citizen. For instance, the state has the right to enforce taxation; it has 
the right to draft its people for military services or for public labors 
in defending and promoting the common good. But, this is to be done 'With 
moderation and conSi deration of individual rights and possessions. 
When the city walls are repaired with regular labour, 
the people may feel tired but the re is no exhaustion. 
When taxes are collected according to the custom, the 
people may de deprived of sone money, but there is no 
bitterness. The real woe of tge people does not lie 
here , it lies in heavy taxes. 1 
Reasonable taxation is not the 'WOe of the people, but heavy taxation is. 
And this is precisely what most of the rulers in Mo-tze' s tim demanded. They 
were described by our philosopher as "heavily taxing the people, robbing them 
of their means of livelihood, in order to have elaborately embroidered and 
17 gorgeous garments." 
Thus, should even the legitimate authority of state levy any unreasonabl 
15 Mo-tze said: ttThe way of the superior man makes the individual incorrupte 
in poverty and righteous when wealthy." Conf. original text, ch. 2, Mei 
translation. 
Conf. or:J.g:j.nal text, c;h f P, "In9-ulgenc in Excess," Mei translation, p. 22 
284 
tax" it would rob the people of their possessions. Incidentally this was the 
~er.1 reason ~y Mo-tze condemned music and other kinds of luxurious enjoyments 
practised by the rulers. 
A supplementary argument in favor of private ownership may be found in 
his doctrine of anti-fatalism. Mo-tze condemned fatalism because it teaches 
that whoever is decreed by fate to be wealtJ:w will be wealthy, and whoever is 
destined by fate to be poor will be poor" no matter how hard they have tried 
to mrk against fate.18 Such a doctrine" Yo-tze pointed out, will make people 
lazy and cause them to abandon their work; believing in fatalism they w.ill 
ignore the natural motive of work which is based on the right of private owner I-
ship. 
The farmers set out at the daybreak and come back at the 
dusk" diligently sowing seeds and planting trees to 
produce much soil beans and millet, and dare not be 
negligent. Why do they do this? They think diligence 
w.iIl result in wealth and negligence in poverty; diligence 
will produce plenty and negligence famine. Therefore 
they dare not to be negligent. The women get up at dam 
and retire at night" diligently weaving and spinning to 
produce much silk, flax linen and cloth, anddare not to 
be negligent. Why do they do this? They:tJiink diligence 
will produce wealth and negligence poverty. 9 
If men and women are not persuaded that they might own the fruit of 
their labor, they wouJ.d have no ambition to 'WOrk more industriously in order 
to become rich. And, thus, the result would be aJ..nn st; the same as the reali-
zation of fatalism. We believe that the on1;r reason Mo-tze did not write an 
essay against Communism is that there was no Communism in China at his time. 
18 Conf. original text, ch. 35, "Anti-fatalism, 11 I. 
19 Coni. original text, ch. 37, "Anti-fatalism," Mei translation, p. 198. 
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In candenning fatalism, he certain~ brought out his firm belief in the rights 
of private ownership. 
Therefore Mo-tze was definitely not a Connnunist or a Socialist. 
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c) LABOR AND ITS VALUE IN PRODUCTION 
t'M:an is different i'rom the birds and animals,," said Mo-tze. "For the 
birds and animals have their clothes and shoes furnished by nature; and they 
drink and eat what nature produces without labor. Therefore, they do nat 
need to work. But" man must attend to i'arming in order to have i'ood and he 
l!1llSt makes his clothes and house with special efi'orts. Therei'ore" concluded 
Mo-tze" it is in the very nature oi' man that he must work and even work hard 
male hi li · ,,20 to e s nng. 
Thus, Mo-tze discovered a principle of human economy: "Those who work: 
will live, and those who do not wo~ will not live.,,21 However" our philo-
sopher did not think that this was a misi'ortune of man" i'or, he pointed out, 
wi th labor man did improve his living standards, whereas the birds and animals 
oould not improve their standard of living, because they did nat lmow what 
Jabor is. In primitive ages" men lived in the caves like animals; as this 
was not good i'or their health, the wise men used their ability at working and 
invented the house. Similarly, Mo-tze pointed out that clothes, the art oi' 
cooking, carts and boats i'or transportation were thus invented according to 
the needs oi'men. And finally" man had a much higher and much more comfortabl 
way of lii'e than the birds and animals. 22 Hence, after all, we must not be 
jealous oi' the easier life oi' birds and animals. Although we might not have 
an easier lii'e than theirs, we do have a better one. Thus, the capabilityof' 
worl'"ing is real~ rather a gift oi' Heaven, a treasure of men and a distinctive 
20 Coni'. original text, ch. 32, "Anti-music." This is not a direct quotation 
21 Coni'. ibidem. 
22 Coni'. original text, ch. 6, "Indulgence in Excess"; also chapters 20 and 
21. 
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mark between JJlEl1 and animals. 
Should labor then claim the entire fruit of production to its awn 
credit exclusively? We must acknowledge that such a modern question did not 
arise in the time of Me-tze; hence, we cannot find a formal and explicit 
answer to it, but we do find enough material in the text of Mo-tze which we 
may use as an authentic basis for suggesting what would have been Me-tze t s 
opinion if such a question had been addressed to him. 
We 'Wish to bring out this question because it is a very important issue 
in the economic theories of any moralist. Indeed, if labor may legitinately 
claim all fruit of production to itself exclusively then modem Marxism will 
be the bible of economics. 
When our philosopher solemnly stated that those 'Who labor will live and 
those who do not labor .vill not live, it seemed that he was entirely in favor 
of labor.23 However, what he called labor here is to be interpreted so that 
it does not contradict 'What Mo-tze said on ather occasions and especialJy 
what he did himself' during his l1fetine. We notice ilmnediately that Mo-tze 
was not a laborer himself; he was nat a farmer nor a carpenter nor any other 
1dnd of laborer. Although he took on some kind of manual works once in a 
while in order to support himself, he was, nevertheless, well-known at his 
time as a scholar by profession, as a man of the intellectual class and not a 
laborer. He did not waht to be considered as a laborer, and we find that Me-
tze was once criticizeclfor not laboring; he did not deny the criticism, but 
23 Cont • .22. ~., ch. 32. Meits translation goes like this: "Those who 
exert themselves will live and those who do not exert themselves will not 
live~" p. 178. The original Chinese isnlj!p;t!ttf which would be better 
translated as "those 'Who use their strength ••• " Hence we :may say: "those 
who labor ••• " 
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pointed out that labor alone is not sufficient to produce for man's benefit; 
].abor is not the only source of production. 
Among the rustic people living south of Lu there was a 
man by the name of W'u Lu. Making pottery in Winter and 
farming in Summer, he compared himself to Shun. Mo-tze 
heard of it and saw him. Wu Lu told Mo-tze: "Righteous-
ness is just righteousness. Wherefore all the verbosity?" 
Mo-tze asked him: "Now, does what you call righteousness 
p:ossess the power to serve other people and produce wealth 
to div:i.de among the people?1f Wu Lu said: "It does." 
Then Mo-tze continued: ffI have deliberated about this 
mtter. I have thought of becoming a farmer and feeding 
the people in the world. If that could be successful I 
would become one. But, mEn a farmer's produce is divided 
among the world, each person cannot get even one Sheng of grain. 
Even if he can, evidently that cannot feed all the hungry 
people in the world. I have thought of becoming a weaver 
and clothing all the people in the world. If that could 
be successful, I muld become one. But -men a weaver's 
goods are divided among the 'WOrld, each person cannot get 
even a foot of cloth. Even if he can, evidently that 
cannot keep all who are cold in the world. I have 
thought of putting on armour and carrying a weapon to 
come to the feudal lords' rescue. If that could be success-
ful I 'WOuld become a soldier. Now it is evident that a 
soldier cannot hold against a regular army. I concluded 
that none of these is as good as to familiarize myself 
wi th the Tao of the ancient sage kings, and discover 
their pr:inciples, and to understand the word of sages and 
to be clear about their expressions, and with these to 
persuade the rulers and then the connnon people and the 
pedestrians. When the rulers adopt my principles, t~ir 
state will be orderly. When the common people and the 
pedestrians adopt my principles, their conduct will be 
regulated. Therefore I think though I do not plough 
and feed the hungry £! weave and clothe the cold, ! have 
&;:eater merit than those who plough and feed, weave and 
clothe. Therefore I thInk my merrt is greater thBri that 
of those 'Who plough and weave though I do not do so." 
Wu Lu kept on saying: "Righteousness is just right-
eousness. Wherefore all the verbosity?" Mo-tze continued: 
'Suppose the world does not know how to plough, who has 
more merit? the man who teaches people to plough, or who 
does not teach people to plough but simply ploughs himself?ff 
Vfu Lu answered that he who teaches others to plough 
deserves more merit. Mo-tze said: "In case of at tacking 
an unrighteous state, who deserves more merit, the one 
who beats the drum and urges the soldiers to fight on 
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or the one 'Who does not beat the drum nor urges the soldiers 
to fight on but he himself only fights on?" Wu Lu said 
that he who beats the drum. and urges the soldiers to fight 
on deserves more nerit. Then Mo-tze said: "Now, the 
connnon people and the pedestrians in the world mow very 
little about righteo1IBlless at the present time; naturally 
those who teach them righteousness deserve more merit, 
too. Why do you not say so (in this case)? Would. not 
my righteousness be. advanced if I can encourage them 
in righteousness?n24 
From this extended passage we may see that: 
I} Mo-tze asserted that righteousness (i.e. moral pr:inciples and 
particularly the one who teaches them) does participate in the production of 
wealth. "Righteousness possesses the power to serve other people and produce 
wealth to divide among the people." 
2) Mo-tze declared that he was not a laborer, but had more merit than 
the laborers. "Therefore I think though I do not plough and feed the hmgry 
or weave and clothe the cold, I have greater merit than those who do plough 
and feed, weave and clothe. If 
3) Mo-tze pointed out that in labor the directive power of intelligence 
is more valuable than the manual part 'Which carries its plans out:.. "He who 
teaches others to plough deserves more merit." Thus, we can see clearly that 
Mo-tze, instead of over emphasiz:ing the importance of labor in production, 
was really trying to diminish the claim of labor and somewllat to belittle it 
especially before a person such as Wu Lu-tze 'Who thought that only by labor-
ing may man earn an honest living. 
24 Coni. original text, ch. 49, "Lurs Question," Mei translation, pp. 248-
250. 
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When Mo-tze speaks of lab0r=i:ng or, more literally, "exercising onets 
strength," he is nat to be understood as taking the most strict sense of the 
-word. For him, one who teaches people to plough is also exercising his 
strength (indeed mental strength); and he who teaches people the way of 
righteousness is also laboring. We may remember that when he said "those 
who exert their strength will live and those mo do not will not live," he 
then ~diately went on to point om whom he meant in each case. "When the 
gentlemen do not attend the government diligently the jurisdiction will be in 
chaos; when the common people do not attend to work, supply will not be suf-
ficient. tt25 Therefore the gentlemen who attend the government and take care 
of jurisdiction are really exercising their strength, too. Thus the rulers, 
ministers and other govemment officials are laboring too, if they do what 
they are supposed to do. 
Therefore, Mo-tze considered the intellectual class (teachers in science 
and in morals) and the governing class as workers too; and even believed 
that they are more important than the manual workers. Hence they have the 
right to live and to enjoy the f'ruit of production, namely food and clothes. 
They even mer! ted a great part as their share of the fruit of production, for 
according to Mo-tze, they are to be given more material goods than others. 
Speaking of the rules (i.e. principles) for employing virtuous persons in 
the government, Mo-tze stated: 
Therefore there should be laid dJwn three rules •••• What 
are the three rules? They are: 1) when tteir rank 
(that of the virtuous) is not high, people 'WOuld not show 
them respect; 2) men their emoluments are not liberal, 
people 'WOuld not place ccnfidence in them; 3) when their 
25 Conf. original text, ch. 32, "Anti MUSiC," Mei translation, p. 178. 
----------------.... ..--
orders are not fjnal, people 'WOuld not stand with awe 
before them. So the ancient sage kings placed them high 
in rank, gave them liberal emol1l1'lents, trusted than w.it~6 
important charges and decreed their orders to be final. 
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Considering the emoluments for the government workers of that time, we 
lJRlst say that they were quite good and much superior to those of any connnon 
laborers. But Mo-tze insisted on still more liberal emoluments; he even 
went so far as to say that such workers must be made rich, or be enriched. 
Now, if Mo-tze did not thlnk that such persons have the right to enjoy the 
fruit of production more than the manual laborers, he would not recommend 
any emoluments for them. Hence, we do not believe that Mo-tze would give 
the entire credit of production to manual labor. 
Aside from this, nature, or rather Heaven, plays a great part in produc-
tion. Mo-tze has pointed out that the materials used by manual laborers have 
their awn natural value, which the laborer cannot make or change. He said: 
In all things, first there is what is fran their own 
nature, then, 1IOrkmanship can do something about it. 
Therefore, a carpenter cannot cut metal and a funder 
can not fund ~od; this is because of the nature of the 
metal which cannot be chopped like 'WOod, and it is the 
nature of the 'WOod that cannot be funded like metals.27 
More obviously', Heaven occupies a greater importance in a¢cultural 
products. Up to our day, even with the great progress of science, weather 
26 Cont. original text, ch. 9, "Exaltation of the Virtuous," Mei translation 
p. 38. 
27 This passage ·of Mo-tze is to be found in the Appendix of the text of Mo-
tze " )I: .} Af- kit. It is not in the fifty-three chapters. It is original 
1y found in a later document called It A .f J~r. 't" which is a literal publi 
cation of the Imperial Academy, and is considered a trustworthy document. 
Since it says that it quoted Mo-tze directly, we may believe that the 
passage is probably from some chapters of Mo-tze r s original text. (As 
we noted above in our Chapter I, originally the text of Mo-tze consisted 
of at least seventy-two chapters.) 
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has still the chief control over the harvest. 1!o-tze surely did not neglect 
this all-important factor. In e:xposing his doctrine of "identification with 
the superior, If he pointed out that our ultimate superior is Heaven. Hence, 
if we do not identify our purpose with the purpose of Heaven, that is to say, 
if we do not obey the will of Heaven, then Heaven will withdraw His bless-
ings and will p1lllish us with bad weather, wann and cold, w:ind and rain storms 
so that the crops will be destroyed and the donestic animals 'Will perish. 
Therefore, we must respect and obey the will of Heaven in order to acquire 
His blessing Which, according to Mo-tze, is evidently a great factor in the 
28 
production of wealth. 
Thus, the elements (or factors) responsible for the production of 
wealth are as follows: 
1) The nature of material goods lVith its productive power. 
2) The blessing of Heaven (weather and other circumstances necessar,y 
for production). 
3) The social order, safeguard of production 'Which is secured by heads 
of the government with the help of scholars and virtuous persons, i.e., the 
moralists. 
4) Labor, i.e. the work of COImllOn people. 
Hence, the distribution of the wealth produced must be accomplished 
according to merit or importance, and to the productive factors. Heaven hea 
the list, but since It does not need wealth, for It had created all of them 
for the benefit of men, It will claim only an honorable possession of them. 
2a Conf. original text, ch. 12, ffIdentification with the Superior." 
Therefore men must make sacrifices to honor Heaven: 
Heaven claims all and accepts offerings from all. All 
states in the 'WOrld, large or snail, are cities of Heaven; 
and all the people, young or old, honorable or humble, 
are Its sub jects; for they all graze oxen and sheep, 
feed dogs and pigs and prepare clean wine and cakes to 
sacrifice to Heaven. 29 
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It was a traditional custom of ancient China that, after each harvest 
of the year, the first duty of the Emperor, other rulers, heads of districts 
and heads of families was to prepare the best they could and to offer the 
sacrifice of thanksgiving to Heaven. This is not a new doctrine with Mo-tze; 
he merely repeated the ancient traditional teachings of early wise men. But, 
we wish to nate that Mo-tze believed very sincerely in the power of Heaven 
as an all-important factor in production; while the Confucianists of his time 
became somewhat skeptical although they still maintained the necessity of 
sacrificial ceremonies. This attitude was severely criticized by Mo-tze as 
hypocrisy. 
After the claim of Heaven, the rulers may claim the fruits of produc-
tion according to their respective dignity and importance in securing peace 
and order which is a conditio sine qua ~ of productim. The scholars earn 
their right to enjoy the fruits of production by treir nerits in teaching 
moral doctrine whim is in its turn a conditio sine ~ ~ of social order 
and peace. Thus, tre laborers must contribme a better part of the total 
production to the rulers and scholars because, according to Mo-tze the latter 
have even greater merits than the forner. 
Therefore, in concluding this section, we may state that judging accord-
ing to his doctrine about labor and its value in production, Mo-tze was 
~9 Conf'. original text, ch. 4, liThe Necessity of a Standard, ff Mei translati , 
. . ts occur aIm in ch ters 26 27 and 28. 
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def:initely not a Marx:i.t. And, along with this discussion we have seen the 
synopsis of Mo-tze' s doctrine on production and distribution of wealth; as 
to its consumption, we believe that we have discovered enough while discus-
sing how, according to Mo-tze, man must pursue and enjoy material goods; and 
we believe that we have quite completely oocposed what is right use of wealth 
and what is luxurious or innnoral use of it. 
295 
D) HUMANITARIANISM VERSUS UTILITARIANISM 
We spent a great deal both in time and in effort to enable us to con-
clue our second chapter by demonstrat:ing that Mo-tze was not a utilitarian 
because he ha d quite a different ultimate principle in morals from that of 
the utilitarians and socialists. 
However, principles alone are not enough, for Mo-tze has been criticize 
as utilitarian or at least as un-humanitarian because of a few practical 
reasons. 
Mencius again headed the list in condenning Mo-tzets doctrine on the 
simplicity of funerals. The expense of the funeral, noted Mencius, is not 
a waste of wealth, although it seems to be so from the view point of utili-
tarianisn. Our filial piety urges us to make a sumptuous funeral for our 
parents, in order to show that we do wish to do the best we can for than. 
This is a case where moral necessity wins over material utility. 
Hsun-tze has given us this statement as his final judgment on Mo-tze's 
doctrine: "Blinded by utility he di d not see th e value of refinement. "30 
Chmg-tze said that, according to Mo-tze, "there 'Was to be no singing in life 
no mourning after death.,,3l 
Not only the ancient Chine se scholars but also a fEm modern ones con-
sidered Mo-tze utilitarian for this same reason. But, for us, their argument 
have little value because of the fact that either they mismderstood Mo-tzets 
doctrine or they purposely exaggerated in describing Mo-tze's practical rules 
30 Conf. Book of Hsun-tze (J~ J-- ), ch. 21. 
31 Conf. "ChUani=tze ( f;. ..}- ), ch. 33, English translation by H. Giles, p. 
440, London, 1926. 
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in order to be able to condemn his doctrine as un-humanitarian. Mencius 
once in speaking to a disciple of Mo-tze (or rather a simple follower of Mo-
tze) 'Wished to demonstrate that the teaching of Mo-tze on simplicity in 
;funerals iB unhuman, because it is against human nature. He proceeded by 
telling the story of a man vho did not care to bur.r his parent and in order 
to simplify the matter he threw the boqy of his parent in a ditch; when a.fte 
a few days he happened to pass the ditch again, he found the boqy of his 
parent was covered with .worms, flies and other insects, and some part of it 
had been eaten by animals. He felt so sorry, realizing that he had done 
something against his heart r s nat ural desire that he ran back home and got 
some instruments to dig a grave and there he buried the boqy. Hence, Mencius 
concluded, to neglect the burial of our parent and relatives is naturally 
wrong, for that man naturally felt that it is wrcng even without having been 
told so. Thus, without naming Mo-tze, Mmcius wanted to show this follower 
of Mo-tze that the so-called doctrine of simplicity in funerals is against 
human nature.32 This would be cOlTect if only we could find that Mo-tze 
has taught sonething similar to this. If we compare this criticism of Men-
cius with the original text of Mo-tze, we shall see that the criticism was 
completely without foundation. Mo-tze cited the following as his standard 
in this matter: 
The ancient sage kings authorized the code of laws 
limiting funeral expenses, saying: Of shrouds there 
shall be three pieces to be enough to hold the rotten 
flesh. The coffin shall be three inches thick in order 
to be eui'ficient to hold the rotten bones. The pit 
shall be dug not deep enough to reach the water, but 
32 Conf. Book of Mencius, Book III, part 1, ch. 5. 
just; so deep that the gases will not escape. When the 
dead is buried the living shall not mourn too long.33 
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Even to the mind of modem Christian humanitarianism, the above quoted 
prescriptions are quite acceptable as standards. It is simplicity and not 
negligence in burial. We do not see that Mo-tze can be criticized as 
"Blinded by utility" in this point. To these few modem writers who tried to 
make Mo-tze an utilitarian by citing the criticism of Confucianists as authen 
tic authority, we may shOW' that such criticism is incorrect, because it is 
based on their om description of Mo-tze' s teaching, which was grossly 
exaggerated and deformed by them. We have quoted Mo-tze's o"Wll rules for 
burial which proved to be quite humanitarian; besides, we can further quote 
Mo-tze in condemning un-humanitarian burials: 
South of Ch'u there "Was a cannibal tr:ihe. Upon the 
death of their parents, the flesh was scraped off and 
thrown away while the bones were buried. And by follmting 
this custom one became a filial son. West of the state 
of Ch'in there was the tribe of Yi Ch'u. Upon their 
death, the parEnts were burned on a bonfire and amidst 
the smoke, and this was to be said ascension to the golden 
clouds. In this way one became a filial son. The of-
ficials enbodied this in government regulations and the 
people regarded it as commonplace. They practiced it 
continually and followed it without discrimination 
(i.e. exc~tian). Is it then the good and the r.i.~t way? 
No, this is really becaus~ habit affords coDvenience and 
custom carries approva1.34 
In acknowledging the exaggeration of the Confucianists in their descrip-
tion of Mo-tze I s teachings, we also equally acknowledge the similar defect 
on the part of Mo-tze in his description of Confucian doctrine and practice. 
33 Conf. original text, ch. 21, "Economy in EJcpenditure II." A similar 
statement also occurs in ch. 2" "Simplicity in Ftmera1s." 
34 Con:f. original text, ch. 2" "Simplicity in Fimera1s.n 
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We would gladly agree with Chtmg-tze lIho was an eye-witness to the great dis-
putes between the two rival schools and hold that their attacks on each other 
were deplorable. 
The Tao is obscured by our vmnt of grasp. Speech is 
obscured by the gloss of this world. Bence the 
affirmatives and negatives of the Confucian and Mihist 
schools, each denying 'What the other affirmed and 
affirming what the other denied. But he mo would 
reconcile affirmative wi. th negative and negativ~ 'With 
affirmative nmst do so by the light of nature.3!:1 
On another occasion, Chung-tze said: "These were perfect 
men, but had they been taught by Confucianists and 
Mihists, they muld have ~ered one another to pieces 
over scholastic quibbles."3 
Another authoritative neutral observer, Han Fei-tze, who lived close 
enough to that time to be considered as a reliable witness, gave us rather a 
solid reason for favoring Mo-tze on this particular point, that is the rules 
on funerals. Thus, we find in Han Fei-tze~ 
According to the Motihist ideas of funerals, Winter 
clothes will do for shrouds inltinter am Summer clothes 
in Summer. The co:ffin shall be three inches thick. 
And morning shall last three months. This is often 
:followed because of its simplicity. The Confucianists, 
on the other hand, would reduce the family to poverty 
to hold a funeral, and mourn for three years until his 
health was greatly injured and he bad to walk with a 
cane. This is also adopted for filial sentiment. So 
then, Mo-tze would condemn Confucius for extravagancj~ 
while Confucius muld condemn Mo-tze for perversity. ( 
Here, our intention is not to discuss the proper rules for burial and mourn-
ing; we merely wish to show that Mo-tze was, after all, not 1m-humanitarian 
on this matter. He ms not "blinded by utility, If thereby neglecting the 
35 Conf. Book of Chtmg-tze, ch. II, quoted from the English translation of 
H. Giles, LonCiOn, 1926. 
36 Ibidem. 
37 Cont. Han Fei-tze, ch. I (~-;lf J- ). 
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natural sentiment of human be:ings. He positively taught humanitarianism in 
his expose of the doctrine of universal love. He suggested the elementar,y 
idea of all modern h1m1anitarian works, such as orphanages, hospitals for the 
poor and homes for the aged. He who practices the doctrine of universal 
love 'Will 
take care of his friends as he does of himself, and 
take care of his friends' parents as of his awn. There-
fore, whe n he finds his friends h'lll1gry he would feed 
them, and when he f:inds than cold he 'l'Ould clothe them, 
and when they are dead he 'would bury them. Such is the 
word and such is the deed of the advocate of tmi versal 
love.38 
Particular~ the rulers 
should first attend to his people and then to himself. 
Therefore, when he finds his people h'lll1gr,y he 'WOuld feed, 
when he find his people cold he would clothe them. In 
their sickness be would minister to them and upon their 
death he would bury th em. Smh is the word and such is 
the deed of the universal ruler (i.e. the rUler 'Who 
practices the universal love).39 
If the doctr:ine of universal love is adopted, then 
the old and those who have neither wife nor children 
wIll have th e support and supply to spend their old age 
with, and the young and weak and orphans will have the 
care and admonition to grow up in. When universal love 
is adoptes:l as the standard, then such are the ccnsequent 
benefits.40 
In one word, his teaching in the sin:q;:>lici ty qf funeral and moderation in 
mourning cannot be considered as the opinion of a cold-blooded economist 
whose concern for human welfare is pure~ materialistic and even mathematical 
38 Conf. original text, ch. 16, "Universal Love, II III. 
39 Ibidem, Mei translation, p. 91. 
40 Ibidem. 
L 
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Although his condemnation of music,Clothing, fashion, carving and other deco~ 
ative arts was, simply speaking, exaggerated so that he merited the criticism 
of tlignoring the value of fine arts, If his doctrine on the whole is, never-
theless, essentially humanitarian. After all, what can be more humanitarian 
than a doctrine '\1hich teaches reverence to God, universal love to fellow-men, 
e..~ltation of the virtuous; and on the other hand, condemns infidelity, hatre , 
accumulation of wealth for personal luxuries, aggressive war and fatalism? 
CHAPl'ER VI 
POLITICAL IDEAS 
A) THE ORIGIN OF GOVERNMENT 
Accustomed to the procedure of sociology, one might expect us to begin 
with a discussion on the family, which is the most simple, yet most funda-
mental of all societies. However, our philosopher has disappointed us by 
his silence on the matter. Indeed Mo-tze 'Was not interested in discussing 
"how" and "mats" conceming our life in the family and nth our own blood 
relations. This is, we believe, because, first, Confucius had already ex-
pounded the due relations in family affairs, and, secondly, because Mo-tze 
could not find anything wrong in Confucian doctr:ine concerning this matter 
except perhaps that its band of love and respect was so exaggerated that it 
eventually became an impediment to the doctrine of universal lave. Mo-tze, 
therefore, While he agreed in principle with Confucius on this point, felt, 
nevertheless, the necessity of anphasizing the fact that the love of our 
parents and relati vas must not be made an excuse for violating the prinCiple 
of universal love, which is the will of Heaven. We must extend the love for 
our parents and relatives to love of the parents: and relatives of other per-
sons. This is, we think, the only remark that Mo-tze has ever made on this 
very i~ortant organization, namely the "family-.n Thus, for the lack of 
material, we are excused in devoting our time and effort to politics alone. 
If there was anything that is to be considered as the first concern in 
the minds of ancient Chinese scholars, it must be the "what" and "how" of 
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a good government in order to secure peace and prosperity. The relati va lack 
of metaphysical, namely cosmological, discussions among the ancient Chinese 
thinkers is chiefly due to their an:xiety and preoccupancy 'With this important 
problem. The Rev. M. Duyvendack has noticed this fact, for he wrote: 
La philosophie Chinoise est, avant tout, une philosophie 
practique. Certes, elle renferme des systemes ontologiques, 
des speculations metaphysiques dlune importance considerable; 
c I est la cependant l' except ion p lutot que la regIe. L' esp r.i. t 
chinois s'interesse avant tout a une problem de la vie 
practique. Le bon government, VOila, Ie theme qui, dlabord, 
des les commencement obscurs de la letterature, occupe 18 
pensee des scribes anonymes, puis, des llauter des eco1es philo sop hiques , est agite dans toutes les discussions. 
Mo-tze was no exception to this criticism. He wisred to discuss this 
important problem thoroughly so he has started with the origin of government: 
Why not t hen examine the adninistration and 
theory of government of ancient times? In the begin-
ning there WiS no ruler and everybody was independent. 
Since every one was independent, there would be one 
purpose men there was one man, ten purposes when there 
were ten men, a hundred puIposes when there 'Were a 
hundred men, a thousand purposes 'When there were a 
thousand men and so until the number of the different 
pmposes became innumerable with it. And all of them 
approved their own ideas and disapproved those of others. 
And there was strife among the strong and struggle among 
the weak •••• Thereupon, Heaven wished to unify the 
standards in ~he world. The virtuous Was selected and 
made emperor. 
Here, our philosopher did not give any name of anc ient documents for the 
fOl.mdation of his lmowledge on the origin of the government. It was obvious-
ly his own imagination that was auth or of this theory m ich is also adopted 
1 Conf. "Etudes de Philo sophie Chinoise, II published in the Revue Philo-
sOPhiiue de 18 France et de ItEtranges, Tome CX, 1930, vols. 1l"'""8i1cf"12, 
pp. 3 2 sqqo 
2 Conf. original te:xt, ch. 13, "Identification with Superior III," Mei l s 
translation, p. 71. 
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bY many modern sociologists. However, Mo-tze did deserve the credit of 
being the first Chinese ancient thinker 'Who has pointed out eJeplicitly that 
the "raison dtetre" of a society is to unify the pu:rpose of its members. 
society is indeed best defined as "a moral union of two or more persons under 
the same purpose.n3 We find that Mo-tze used the term Ifpu:rposen quite fre-
quently. For him, everything has a purpose, and so has every action of man. 
He may be qualified as a "finist," who believes in the real existence of "pur-
poses" and sees the necessity of an intelligence behind the purpose, so that 
the purpose is not to be determined by blind fate. Thus, the doctrine of Mo-
tze, mlder this respect, may be called finism.. 
No one can authoritatively give us a narration as to how the first 
government was organized, for the event happened so early in pre-historic 
ages that no ancient document now existing can be considered as possessing an 
eyewitness acount of the birth of this first gover-nment; hence it is left to 
the liberty of sociologists to give us their opinion on this matter. Many 
different theories have been invented, but basically they belcng to two oppos-
ing categories of opinion. The first one believes that civil government is 
a necessity delivered fran the very nature of human beings, for men are 
naturally social animals;4 while the second opinion maintains that civil 
3 "Societas est moralis unio duarum vel plurimarum personarum sub eodem fine. 
Conf. Jus Fundamentalis, by Rt. Rev. Msgr. S. Romani, Professor of Canon 
Law in the University of S.C. de Propaganda Fide, 2nd edition, Rome, 1940. 
4 "Sciendum est autem, quod quia homo naturali ter est animal sociale, utpote 
qui indiget ad suam vitam multa quae sibi ipse solus praeparare non potest; 
consequens est, quod homo naturaliter sit, pars alicujus multitudinis per 
quam praestetus sibi auxilium ad bene vivendum. fI Conf. st. Thomas, 
~. in libros Ethicorum, Lib. I, Lect. 1, No.4. 
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government was created merely by an arbitrary agreement o.f primitive men; it 
is really even against human nature, for man naturally pursues .freedom as 
much as Possible.5 
Now it is very likely that Mo-tze would adopt the first opinion and re-
ject the second one, for he has pointed out the necessit,y of having civil 
government as something that came along inevitably with the multiplication o.f 
mankind. Besides, we can never believe that Mo-tze -.,uld have been persuade 
that civil government is something against human nature, because he in fo11 
ing the steps of ancient sages, has ultimately attributed the origin of civil 
government to the will of Heaven. 
In fact, the most ancient ~tten document in Chinese civilization has 
recorded: 
Oh 1 Heaven gives birth to the people w.ith such desires, 
that without a ruler they must fall into all disorders; 
and Heaven again gives birth to the 6man of inte1ligenc e 
whose business is to regulate them. 
Now Heaven, to protect the people on earth, appointed 
for them rulers and teachers that they might hetp God 
to secure the tranquility of the four quarters. 
Mo-tze noticed that in the very beginning when there were only handfuls 
of human beings, it was then not necessary to have civil government, but as 
manldnd multiplied, it became more and more obvious that a unification o.f 
purposes was needed in order to avoid disputes and struggles. "Thereupon, 
5 Jean J. Rousseau and many other modern naturalists hold this opinion. La 
tze was the only ancient Chinese thinker mo l:!'onsored such an idea. 
6 Conf. liThe announcement o.f Chung Hui," recorded in Shu-Chlng, Part IV, 
book 2, chapter 3. Legge translation, vol. III, part I, p. 178. 
7 The great declaration recorded likewise in Shu-Ching, part V, book 1, 
Legge translation, vol. III, part 2, p. 286. (We do not see 'Why Legge 
first used ''Ii eaven, It but later used "God.") 
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Heaven wished to unify the standards in the world; the virtuous was selected 
and made emperor." Thus, according to Mo-tze, Heaven did not establish civil 
government at the very first "genesis fl of mankind, but purposely waited until 
the time when it was needed. This has given a motive to a fEm' Chinese modern 
scholars to believe that Mo-tze favoured, or rather anticipated, the so-calle 
"social contract theory."S We 'Will simply say this, that U Mo-tze should be 
considered as favoring such an opinion, then the entire ancient Chinese wis-
dom including all ancient thinkers must be judged likewise, because none of 
them has ever taught that the civil government was established by Heaven at 
the very f:irst existence of nank:ind. All agreed at least implicitly that 
civil government was established (by Heaven) later when the increase of 
people made it a necessity. Although no ancient Chinese wiseman ever did 
state explicitly that in the very beginning there was only ~ ~ and ~ 
~ created by God, it is nevertheless sure that the Chinese believed that 
there were very few men in the very beginning, and a civil govennnent was not 
only not needed but was simply impossible to have. Moreover, Lao-tze was 
the only famous ancient Chinese whom we may find explicitly favor:ing the so-
called social contract theory. He openly criticized and contradicted all the 
wisemen of his time, and he was contradicted by all. Hence, it is untrue tha 
the ancient Chinese thinkers in general 'WOuld adopt this theory. 
The weakness of this theory is: if the civil government was basedmerely 
on a social contract, then it might be cancelled by the agreement of contract 
ing parties on their liberal desires. This is most likely incompatible with 
8 For instance Liang Ch'i-ch'ao. Conf. his Philosophy ~ Mo-tze (in Chinese, 
Shanghai, 1921. 
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the teachings of ancient Chinese philosophers. Mo-tze, and also Mencius, has 
explicitly stated that without arr:r government, the i'O r1d would be in disorder 
and chaos and men would live a life similar to that of brute anima1s.9 Hence, 
according to them (i.e. Mo-tze, Mencius and others), IOOn would be degraded 
to the state of beasts, if there were no government at all. This is practical 
ly the same as saying that men need civil government by their human nature 
itself. Therefore, as we have seen above, the armouncement of Chung Hui de-
clared that the desire and the necessity of having a civil government is 
given to us by Heaven upon our birth. Mo-tze whose anxiety and zeal in con-
serving the ancient wisdom is well-known, must have been a believer of this 
declaration recorded on the first and most authoritative among the five 
canonical books. All these add up to fortify our opinion that Mo-tze was by 
no means in favour of the so-called social contract theory. 
For atheistic scholars of our modem age, whenever God is nentioned, 
philosophy is automatically out and mythology or superstition is in. There-
fore, to say that Heavm established the first government is to narrate a 
Il\Ythologica1 legend. ThiS, of course, we will not tolerate; for, philosophy 
by definition is the study of the ultimate and universal causes of everything. 
Hence, the atheist who denies the exi.stence of the first Cause is not a philo 
sopher. Philosophy definitely can reach and must reach Almighty God, and 
discover Him as the Creator and the Supreme Ruler of the universe. If he 
9 Con!. original text, ch. 11 and 12, "Identification with the Superior, If 
and "Disorder in the Human World could be oompared to that among the birds 
and beasts. 1t Mencius said: ''flo not acknowledge the King (i.e. destroy 
the idea of govel'llllE!lt) is to be :in the state of beasts. 1t Coni. Mencius, 
Book 3, part 2, ch. 9. 
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is the Suprema Ruler, then it is metaphysically certain that civil government 
must have originated from Heaven, whom they considered as the Supreme Ruler 
of the Universe. 
However, it is regrettable that they did not develop any argument more 
accurate and more philosophically adequate to support their opinion. ThiS, 
as we think, may be eJq)lained by the same reason for which they are excused 
for not proving the existence of a personal God; namely that, as a matter of 
fact, there was no need of any proof, for, it was taken by all the people of 
that time as an indisputable reality. Thus, in ancient China, they all be-
lieved that the c:i.vil government originated from Heaven. But, what is more 
important here for us is to demonstrate that their belief was not based on 
superstition or mythology, such as that of other peoples in the Oriem. 
Take Japan for example. The Japanese people also believed that their 
civil goveI"11lleIlt Originated from HeaVEn or God; but their belief was based 
completely on superstitution and mythology. They were taught to believe that 
their Emperor is a direct descendent of the Goddess of the Sun, who is the 
Supreme among all gods. Never in China, dur:ing its five thousand years of 
Civilization, has there happ€l'led anyt'h..ing of this sort. According to ancient 
Chinese philosophers Heaven is purely spiritual and definitely has no body 
or flesh. Heaven does not have any descendent and He does not need any, for 
He is perpetual. The very same Heaven 'Who was 'WOrshipped by the 8.11c:i.ent sage 
kings hundreds of years ago is worshipped by Confucius and Mo-tze. Heaven 
does not marry and has no b lood relations. In fact, there was absolutel;y' no 
idea of the existence of any goddess among the ancient Chinese people. Not 
only the wisemen but even the common people have never had such an idea. The 
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first notion about any goddess was imported £rom India centuries after 
10 Mo-tze. 
Another fact to illustrate our belief is that no ancient Chinese philo-
sopher ever narrated the establishment of any earthly government by Heaven. 
No one ever said anything definitive about where and when Heaven established 
the first government or Who He first elected as emperor or governor. Such a 
colorful. detail would rrake it mythological; for, legends need details and 
nwths require descriptions. But, the ancient Chinese thinkers did not want 
to tell myths concerning the origin of civil government because they reached 
the conclusion by clear thinking and reasoning. Hence, while they insisted 
that the fact itself is objectively true, they nevertheless declined to des-
cribe its details, which they admitted they did not know. In fact, no one 
can know it, because there just is no such early document to be considered as 
a trustworthy first hand story of the origin of govern.nent. What we may find 
in later documents is most likely the product of someone' s imagination. 
Philosophically speaking, if we must admit that civil government origin -
ted from Heaven or God, thm there are two principal ways in Which the first 
civil authority might have been established. 1) God appeared or revealed 
10 One might, of course, point out this fact as an objection; namely, that 
Confucius, Meroius and Mo-tze did call their emperor rtthe Son of Heaven." ( "-.J- ). We think it is most unnecessary to answer it here in our treat-
ise; for it is obv.i.ous to all writers, Vlestem and Eastern (includ:ing 
Japanese), that such a title was merely conferred upon him "honoris 
causa." It is onJ.:y ridiculous to understand it in a material sense. The 
significance of this title is to show that the emperor is the most honor-
able among all men in the world , but. that he is nevertheless inferior 
to Heaven. He is elected by Heaven, and Heaven blesses him, loves him, 
and gives him the povrer to rule the world; therefore he is called not 
without reason "The Son of Heaven." In one word, the title is on1:y 
analogical and not realistic. 
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Himself to the people, who were then m.nnerous enough to require a civil 
government, and inform them that a civil authority was to be established to 
govern them in His name; then He might name the first governor or governors 
Himself, or also He might let the people choose whom they wanted.ll 2) It 
is eqmlly possible and also reasonable that there was no :revelation from 
the part of God. But God has given us such a nature that in due time (i.e. 
when there was a certain number of people) men would naturally be conscious 
of the necessity of having a civil government; thus spontaneously they formed 
the first goverrunent and chose their leaders. The essential differences 00-
tween these theories of social contract lies in the fact that a contract is 
based on the arbitrary wishes of men while a natural of instinctive desire is 
12 
based on the intrinsic necessity of human nature itself. Since it is a 
natural necessit.Y, it cannot be altered by arbitrar.y wishes. 
The ancient Chinese thinkers favored the second theor.y. We must remem-
ber what the annOimcement of Chung-Hui said: nOh 1 Heaven gives birth to the 
people with such desires that without a ruler they must fall into all dis-
orders; and Heaven again gives birth to the man 0 f intelligence whose busi-
ness is to regulate them." Thus, Heaven made this natural desire, and again 
Heaven provided prompt solution to it. Confucius has given us this definiti : 
11 Readers are to be reminded hE!t'e that we said merely that such a fact is 
philosophically speaking possible, for it does not involve absurdity or 
anything contradictory. Of course ?Ie do not want to prove the reality of 
such a fact, for we do not wish to violate the boundary of philosophy. 
However, philosophy can and does demonstrate that God exists, and that 
the revelation is possible, if God does desire it. 
12 The difference between men and other animals thcrl:. live a social life, sue 
as ants and bees, lies in the fact that men understand the reason why 
they must live a social life 'While the bees and the ants do not. But the 
are all naturally and instinctively social animals. 
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l1Wb.at is ordered by Heaven is called nature, rt13 which is accepted unanimously 
by all Chinese philosophers. Hence, if it is natural to men that they must 
have a government, it is because Heaven has so ordered. Thus, we must say 
that civil authority originated from Heaven. 
Following the ancient doctrine contained in the canonical books, Con-
i'ucius adopted this theory, and taught it to his disciples. Then Mo-tze 
preached it JlDre vividly and made Heaven more personal than in Confucian 
doctrine. Both Confucius and Mo-tze were fortunate in that no mIle ever asked 
them how Heaven established the first government. Menci us came later, but 
emphasized the personal direction of Heaven in the civil government even more 
than did Mo-tze. So he was finally asked this difficult question: 
Heaven gave it to him (i.e. the King Shun). Did Heaven 
confer its appointment on him with specific injunction?" 
Mencius replied: "No, Heaven does not speak. It simply 
showed its 1'ill by his personal conduct and his conduct 
of affairs Js14 
Although there is much to be desired in his answer, he has, neverthe-
. 15 less, e:xpressed oorrectly 'What was ~n the mind of his predecessors; namely, 
that lIHeaven does not speak, but 'Vie know He is the author of nature and what 
is intrinsically from nature is to be spoken of as originatmg from Heaven." 
In other words~ "Civil government is a natural necessity to men; and its 
authority came ultimately from God." 
13 Conf. "Doctrine of the Mean." ( t i ). Legge translation, p. 383, 
Chapter I, "'What Heaven Has Confe~1i is Called the Nature." 
14 Conf. Mencius, Book V, part I, chapter 5, Legge translation, p. 355. 
15 In this particular pomt, Mo-tze can be considered as one of the pre-
decessors of Uencius, for they agreed perfectly on this matter. 
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B) THE CIVIL LAWS 
We may discus s the value of civil laws under three different aspects: 
its aulihority, its pmpose and its prosecution. One may inquire -mat is the 
opinion of Mo-tze concerned with each and every one of these three points. 
1) Authority. We have demonstrated above that, according to Mo-tze 
the authority of civil government comes from Heaven, so that naturally civil 
laws are authorized by Heaven. We must, however, be well aware that since 
the authority of civil government is directly from Heaven, ~nd the authority 
of civil laws is directly from the authority of civil government, it is 
therefore logically obvious that the authority of civil laws is but indirect-
.!l fran Heaven. We said that we must be aware of this point, because, as a 
matter of fact, many people do not see such an important distinction. The 
great difference between natural law and civil law consists in the fact that 
the authority of God directly proclaims the former, "Where as for the latter 
it only acts indirectly. This all-important distinction e:xpJains why civil 
law is not infallible. 
Mo-tze was well aware of this distinction. Whenever he discussed a 
"good govemment ll he danonstrated very little concern about the legitimacy 
of the rulers' ascension to power, but his total attention -was clearly on 
the correctness of the laws issued by the government. If these civil laws 
were lIDrally correct, then the government was to be called "good"; otherwise 
it was to be called a "bad government. tt The standard in judging this matter, 
according to Uo-tze, was the "Will of Heaven," which is, of course, the 
absolute standard in judging all moral subjects. 
If a government is observed to be in accordance 'With the 
will of HeavEn, it is 1x> be called a good governm::mt; if it 
is in opPoSitiO~6to the will of Heaven, it is called a 
bad government. . 
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Obviously Mo-tze was not referr:ing to the legitimacy of the governing 
power, but rather to the policy of the government in ruling the people, which 
policy is shmm throughout the civil laws issued by the same. Moreover, the 
English translation here is sanewhat questionable. The term17 as it is :in 
the original ten would be more exact1;r translated into "penal laws," which 
was then used frequent1;r by ancient Ch:inese scholars to indicate all the 
civil laws issued by the government. At any rate, the contens suggested 
plainly that we must understand the above quoted passage as saying: "If 
civil laws are in accordance 'Wi. th the will of HeavEn, they are to be called 
"good, II otherwise they are nbad." 
We lmow that Mo-tze has established the will of Heaven as the nonn of 
morality; but especially in this present instance concerning civil laws 110-
tze even had a more obvious reason to demonstrate that the will of Heaven 
must be the standard. For, according to 1b-tze, civil rulers are elected by 
Heaven in order to rule thep:aople and thus to help them to secure peace and 
order. They are a sort of employee of Heaven who is the Supreme ruler of 
the universe. Hence, it must really be Heaven 'Who is the principal ruler of 
the people. Therefore, 'Whatsoever is issued or decreed by a subordmate 
ruler aga:inst the 'Will of the principal ruler, is obviously not only a bad 
16 Conf. original text, ch. 27, r"Hill of Heaven II." 
17 "-ifIJ ~t." is the original term l'hich is translated by Mei Yei-po as flgovern 
rent... II jt. Jf 'Which literally means to apply ru1es can be correctly trans 
lated into II govemment ;tI but It II is better expressed by Itpenal rules, If 
although we do acknowledge that the ancient Chinese did seem to have 
used the two terms altemati vely to signify the policy of the government. 
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policy, but also will be eve.."1tually revoked and annulled by the superior 
power. In dealing with HeavEn, we must say that any law that is against the 
will of Heaven, is not only a bad law, but it is no law at all, since it 
would automatically lose its enforcing authority. This is why 'We believe 
that any civil law or other kind of man-made rules tha t are agamst the 
natural law or any of the Divine laws positively issued, are "ipso facto" in-
valid in forcing one I s conscience, and are therefore wi thom. am.hority. 
Mo-tze also cited practical examples of existEnce of such evil laws. He 
described a certain savage tribe of the South as having the law concerning 
18 
cremation of"b:>d:Bs officially contained in their govemroont regulations. 
On another occasion, Mo-tze reported that there was a cannibal tribe, also 
in the extreme South, whose golden rule was to eat their first bom son, be-
lieving that this would bring better fortune to the second son.19 Moreover, 
Mo-tze often criticized the heavy tax established by the rulers of his time, 
condemning than as robbers of their people. Because, for Mo-tze, the civil 
law has its enforcing authority only inasmuch as it is in accordance with 
the 'Will of Heaven, 'Which is, as we have danonstrated above (in the second 
chapter of our treatise) mat the scholastics called natural law. For the 
authority of the ones mo issued the civil laws is not their 0'WIl am.hority 
but one received from Heaven precisely under the condition that they must use 
it according to the will of HeavEn. 
2) P'UIpose. The aim of civil law is evidently the same as that of the 
18 Conf. original text, ch. 25, "Simplicity in Funerals III" "The officials 
enbodied it in the government regulations •••• " Meils translation, p. 133 
19 Conf. original text, ch. 49, "Lu' s Question." 
civil government, for civil law is precisely the means which the civil govern 
malt uses to obtain its aim. HEnce, the pUl:pose of civil law is the common 
good. 
"Common goodtt was amays Mo-tze t s favorite subjectiof discussion. He 
spoke about it so extensi velJr and intensively that he was easily misunder-
stood and therefore considered a utilitarian. We call this a misunderstand-
ing because we have already analyzed the essmtiallJ of Mo-tzers doctrine and 
found out that according to him the ultimate norm of morality is the nll 
of Heaven and this nonn is to be honored regardless of the practical effects 
20 
on the cormnon good. However, the "common goodlt is a kind of norm too; it 
is to be served as the standard in judging the val 113 of civil laws precisely 
becausethe purpose of civil laws is the common good. The civil law is pur-
posely made in order to provide and secure the common good; hence, if it 
does not serve for its own purpose, then, evidently it is to be regarded as 
"no good. tI Here, we may remind our readers of tb3 finism tendency of )lo-
tze's doctr1ne.2l 
We have seen that, according to Mo-tze, everything has its own purpose. 
20 For instance, Mo-tze stated th9.t even though it benefit the 'Whole world, 
it is not right to kill an:iDnocent person. (Conf. ch. 4,.) See de-
tailed discussion in our Chapter II, p.n" and note130. 
21 The finism of Mo-tze may be illustrated in the following incident. 'tMo-
tze asked a Confucianist why the Confucianists pursued music. He replie 
that music is pursued fur music's sake. Mo-tze said: You have not yet 
answered me. Suppose I asked 'Why houses are built. If you answered tha 
because they are to keep off the cold in the w.i.nter and the heat in the 
summer, and to separate men from women, then you muld have told me the 
reason for building houses. Now, I ar'11 asking you why you pursued music; 
and you said music is pursued for music t s sake. This is to say 'Why 
houses are built - ItHouses are built for houses t sake. 11 (Conf. origina 
text, ch. 48, ffKllllg )lSn." 
Food, clothes, housing, all have their own proper PUIt'ose; so it is with all 
human actions. They must be performed in accordance with their own purpose. 
If they reach their purpose, they are good things and good acts (for instance, 
good food, good eating and drinking); otherwise they are bad. The civil laws 
must follow the same rule. If they do promote common good, they are to be 
called good, otherwise they are bad. This is not necessarily a utilitarian 
doctr:ine, fer this is also the doctrine of scholastic philos::>phy, which is 
definitely in opposition to utilitar:ianism. 
The key to the solution of this discussion is the fact that the natural 
and therefore correct purpose of any being is naturally adElquate to be adopted 
as the standard in judging its valU9. This natural pmpose or aim is called 
by Aristotle the "causa finalis. tf And, according to the scholastic philo-
sophy, this flcausa finalis" of civil law is precisely the. connnon good.22 
Obviously everybody will agree that if a civil law should prove to be against 
the common good, then it is simply no good. Therefore, no matter how erlen-
sive1y and how intensively Mo-tze emphasized the importance of adopting 
"colIDnon good" as the standard to judge the rifP-teousness of civil laws, he 
was aJ.:ways 'Within the realm of a IFoperly ordinated judgment, namely to judge 
the value of civil law 'With its own purpose as standard. For, this does not 
imply that the common good is to be cons:idered the ultimate norm of morality. 
Yet, on the other hand, Mo-tze was not silent about the ultimate norm of 
morality; he denonstrated 'With a great effort and a great conviction that the 
ultimate norm of morality is the will of Heaven. 
22 tf ••• ordinatio rationis ad bonum commune, ab eo, qui curam habet communi-
tatis, promulgata." Conf. st. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 1, 2, questio 90 
ad primam. 
----------------.. ...-
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3) Prosecution. To bring the civil law into effect if of course the 
responsibility of public officers. orten, a good legislation becam ineffec-
tive or even harmful to the people because of the fact that it was carried 
out by incapable government officers. 
Mo-tze said: The penal code of Lu, among the books of 
the ancient sage kings said: 'Among the people of Miso 
punishImnts were applied Without employing instruction 
and admonition. Th~ made a code of five tortures and 
called it laws •••• 23 
yet the same ldng of five punishments, or tortures, were used by the 
ancient sage ldngs to put the world in peace and prosperity. Therefore, 
the most essential thing for the proseculiion of civil laws is to have capable 
and competent public officers. This served to Mo-tze as the motif for his 
1:ioctrine of exaltation of the virtuous, and employment of the capable. 
Mo-tze said: Now all the rulers desire their provinces 
to be wealthy, their people to be numerous and their 
jurisdiction to secure order. But mat the,r obtain is not 
wealth but poverty, not multitude but scarcity, not 
order but chaos - this is to lose what they desire and 
to obtain what they avert. Why is this? Mo-tze said: 
This is because the rulers failed to exalt the virtuous 
and to employ the capable in their government •••• rr24 
The Nepotism in politics must be abolished. It is not only unfair, but 
also unreasonable. 
When the rulers cannot get a coat made, they will employ 
able tailors. "When they cannot have an ax: or sheep killed, 
they will employable bIltchers. In these two instances 
they do know they should exalt the virtuous and employ the 
capable for business. But when it comes to the disorder 
of the c ountr,r and danger of the state, they do not know 
23 Conf. original text, 00. 12, "Identification with the Superior II". 
24 Conf. original text, ch. 8, l'Exaltation of the Virtuous." Opening words 
of the chapter, 'Mei's translation, p. 30. 
they should exalt the virliuous and E!Ilploy the capable 
for the government. Rather, they -muld enploy their 
relatives, they would employ the rich 'Who have no merit 
and would employ the good-looking ones.2$ 
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The three essential characteristics of an ideal public officer are, 
according to Mo-tze, virtue, wisdom and ability_ The head of the state, the 
king or the great duke, must see that all the public officers of his state 
are qualified in these three character.i.stics as highly as possible. This is 
what Mo-tze called the secret of success in governnent. However, the rulers 
of his time might find an excuse by complaining that there were so few men 
of virtue, wisdom and ability to be employed. Always resolved to have the 
last mrd in a dialectical diSCUSsion, MD-tze never gave his opponents a 
chance to have an excuse for not doing what is right according to the con-
clusion of the discussion. Thus, Mo-tze wished to demonstrate that in the 
first place, it -was not because there are not enough of virtuous, wise and 
capable men, but probably because they were not discovered; hence, the head 
of states must know how to discover them. Then, secondly, even though if it 
be true that there are not enough of such perscns, then this is only because 
the head of the government did not try to encoumge his people to be virtuous 
wise and capable. When these characters are properly encouraged, there will 
be more than enough of smh perrons worthy of public offices. 
Mo-tze said: This is because the rulers failed to exalt 
the virtuous and to employ the capable in their govem-
mente When the virtuous are numerous in the state, order 
will be stable; when the virtuous are scarce, order will 
be unstable. Therefore the task of the lords lies no-
'Where but in multiplying the virtuous. 
25 Canf. ibidem. 
--------------------...... 
But vha t is the way to multiply the virtuous? Mo-tze 
said: Supposing it is de~ired to multiply good archers 
and good drivers in the country, it will be only natural 
to enrich them, honor them, respect them and commend 
them; then good archers and good d.ri vers can be eJq)ected 
to abound :in the country. How much more should this be 
done in the case of the virtuous and the excellent vmo 
are firm in morality, versed in rhetoric, and experienced 
in state craft ••• since these are the treasures of the 
nation and props of the state? They should be also en-
riched, honored, Eespected and commended in order that 
they may abound.2 
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This is because Mo-tze believed firmly that man naturally wishes to do 
good, to be virtuous, honest, and learn wisdom. The reason he became vicious, 
dishonest and crafty is that he was convinced that "de facto" this is the 
only way to become rich and to hold high rank in politics. Now this is cer-
tainly a great distortion of the truth. The true situation of this matter 
must be just the contrary. It seems only natural to ri~t human reason that 
the virtuous, wise and capable must become rich and be honored with high rank: 
in public affairs. Therefore why not correct this distortion and make it 
known to all that really ude facto" the virtuous, wise and capable will be-
come rich and will be honored with high rank? If this is effectivel3" done, 
then naturally everycne will pursue virtues and wisdom and no one will seek 
vices and hypo crises, since he is forced to see the fact that the evil man 
will never be a politician. Mo-tze surely had a good reason to say so, al-
though he was obviously a little too optimistic, for he had much confidence 
in human nature, unfortunately ignoring the fact of original sin.27 Today, 
26 Conf. original text, ch. 8, "Exaltation of the Virtuous I", Mei's trans-
lation, p. 31. . 
27 Here we do not wcnt to put original sin into philosophy. Nevertheless, 
it is a solidly based fact ~ch may help philosophy a great deal es-
pecially in studying social problems. It is not necessary to bring 
tion into hiloso h • a ood ob server of human nature through 
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after 2500 years, we still have to share the same regret with our ancierrli 
philosopher. 
Mo-tze was not satisfied with merely presenting such an idea as a guid-
ing principle, but even proposed practical methods: 
However, if there is only the principle 'While the technique 
of its application is not known, then it would seem to be 
still incomplete. Therefore there should be laid dom 
three rules. What are the three rules? They are: 1) when their 
rank (that of the virtuous) is not high, people will not 
show respect to them; 2) when their emoluments are not 
liberal, people will not place confidence in them; 3) 'When 
their orders are not final, people will not stand in awe 
before them. So, the ancient sage kings placed them high 
in rank, gave them liberal emolmnents, trusted them wi. th 
important charges and decreed their orders to be final. 28 
With the prosecution of civil laws entrusted to the hands of the vir-
tuous and the capable, it seaned to Mo-tze that the problem would be properly 
solved and only occasionally did he point out a few practical suggestions 
concerning how to prosecute the laws. We have already quoted him, on differ-
ent occasions, criticizing heavy taxes, unreasonab Ie drafting of labor, ~d 
most of all the way the contenporary rulers were oonducting war, 'Which Mo-tze 
considered the worst of all crimes and the greatest calamity of his time. 
Beside these negative admonitions, Mo-tze urged the public officers to give-
good personal example to the people, to enrich the people, or at least always 
pro"Vide them with Enough for the necessities of life. Food is among the most 
important things for the govern.ment. Mo-tze realized that a hungry man makes 
history will easily discover the effects of original sin; and, even if 
he does not believe in original sin, the effects still remain as some so 
of weakness of human nature which is quite obvious to all no matter what 
one mi~t consider its cause. 
28 Conf. original text, 00. 9, "Exaltation of the Virtuous II." 
a poor listener and that famine generates criminalst 
People are gentle and kind when the year is good, but 
selfish and vicious when many produce but few consume 
then there can be no bad year; on the contrary, when few29 
produce but many consume then there can be no good year. 
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During better years, the public officers must see that the people are 
protected from famine in the le ss fort1.m.ate seasons. The motto is: "Hope for 
the best while preparing for the rorst. If No rulers can totally avoid natural 
calamities for a long time (they must be a kind of test imposed by Heaven), 
but the prepared one will diminish, if not completely avoid, the consequences 
Could even the ancient sage kings cause the five grains 
invariably to be reaped and be harvested and the floods 
and droughts never to occur? Yet none of them was frozen or 
starved, why was it? It was becaus e they made full use 
of the seasons and were frugal in their ovm maintenance 
•••• Therefore, famine and death cannot be prepared against, 
1.m.less there are stored grains in the granaries •••• 30 
The laws 'Which reward the good am punish the wicked must be carried out 
effectively in order to convince the people of the objective value of law. 
Nevertheless, the essential motive of penalties is rather preventive than 
merely vindictive. The purpose of penal law is to promote good (i.e. common 
good) and not to torture and kill the people. Rulers must use it to protect 
the people rather than merely occupy themselves in p1.IDishing them according 
to the law. Thus, the sante written law, lhich is the blessing of the world, 
the cause of order and peace, men prosecuted by sage rulers, may become an 
instrument of persecu.tion and cause of disorder and misery. 
29 
Mo-tze said: The political leaders of the present day are 
quite d:tffermt from those of the old days. The case is 
30 Conf. original text, ch. 5, "The Seven Anxieties." 
parallel to that of the five punishments with the prince 
of Miao. In ancient times the sage kings made the code 
of the .five plmishments and put the empire in order. But 
when the Prince of 'Miao established the five punishments 
they unsettled his empire. Can it be that the punishments 
are at fault? Really the fault lies in their application 
•••• those who know how to apply punishments can govern 
the people with them. And thQie who do not know, make 
five tortures out of them •••• j 
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The prosecution of civil laws vas, to Mo-tze, a really very important 
problan, because the practical realization of his doctrine depended largely 
upon it. And 'We know well that Mo-tze vas practical minded. 
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C) "UTOPIA" 
More or less, every philosopher has his 0'WIl dt-eam of human society, the 
one 'Which is, according to ,him, the most :r::erfect and most ideal form of state 
Ever since Plato's Republic, innumerable thinkers and writers have described 
what a utopia srould be, or, rather, what kind of utopia tll:!y 'Were dreaming 
about. Some of them compiled their elaborately described best wishes into a 
special publication, whereas the great number of them were content to mention 
the matter somewhere in their writings. 
Again, there are rome of them who believe that the realization of their 
imagination is possible and even inevitable; wh ere the majority show skepti-
cism or kept a doubtful hope. Finally, most of them have imagined such a 
utopia as an earthly paradise onJ¥ for a few crosen mes, 'Which must then be 
in a rerote place, free from ccntamination by this already corrupted world; 
we may nevertheless find some mo are thinking about a utopia for all the 
people of the world. 
Mo-tze did not write any special essay on his dream country; but he has 
described 'What a perfect 'WOrld ought to be in the three chapters mere he 
explains his doctrine of flIdentification with the Superior. 1t He sincerely b 
lieved that such a state is really possible if people are properly taught his 
doctrine. And, what is more important, he did not dream of a world out of 
this world; he wanted to transfonn this very world, which is corrupted, into 
a perfect utopia for ever,r man. 
The foundat ion of such an ideal state, according to Mo-tze, is rather 
simple. First, it must have unification of purposes: all nen tmited and 
determined to nake a peaceful and prosperous world. This is not only possib 
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but even as certain as that water will always run downward.33 It is possible 
if the people are properly taught the doctrine of universal love. However, 
such a unification is not to be decided by any plebiscite; it is acquired 
simply by teaching the people that they nrust trust in their immediate super-
ior, obey him promptly and imitate his example. He must be a perfect man 
to them. And, since the :i.mnediate superior must, in his turn, trust, obey 
and imitate a higher superior, and the latter must act in the SanE manner 
toward a still higtler superior, and thus one arrives finally at the Supreme 
Superior, it is only logical that by this way, the multitude of human beings 
w.i.ll eventually be united into one world govemment. To quote Mo-tze 
directly: 
Now the head of the village is the most high-minded 
and tender-hearted man of the village. He notified 
the people of the village saying: 1upon hear:ing good 
or evil you shall report it to the head of the district. 
Wha t t he head of the district thlnks to be right, all 
shall think to be right. What he thinks to be wrong, 
all shall think to be wrong. Put away fran your speech 
that mich is not good and learn his good speech. Re-
move from your conduct that which is not good and learn 
his good conduct. How then can there be disorder in 
the district? There was order in the district because 
the head could unify the standard of the district. The 
head of the district was the most high-minded and tender-
hearted man in the district. Now, how was order brought 
to the feudal state? There was order in the feudal 
state because the feudal lord could unify the standard 
in the state. The lord of the state was the most high-
minded and tender-hearted man in the state. He notified 
the people of the state saying: 1Upon hearing good or 
evil you shall report it to the emperor. What the emperor 
thinks to be right all ::ball think to be right; what 
the emperor thinks to be wrong all shall think to be 
wrong. Take away from your speech that :is not good 
and learn his good speech. Rem:>ve from your conduct 
which is not good and learn his good conduct. How then 
33 "Like fire ten<ling up·ward and water cbwmvard--it will be 1IDpreventable in 
the world. ff Conf. cho 16 If Universal Love IIT.ft 
r 
can there be disorder :in the empire? •• If, however, the 
people all identify themselves with the son of Heaven 
but not with H(3aven Itself, t hen the jungle is still 
unremoved •••• 34 
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But, the ascension of the hierarchy will not stop on earth; it must go 
still one step higher than the emperor and thus reach Heaven, who is the 
Supreme Ruler of the Universe. 
If, however, the people all identify themselves with 
the son of Heaven, but not with Heaven Itself, then the 
jungle is still .unremoved. Now, the frequent visitations 
of hurricanes and torrents are just the punishments from 
Hea~en upon the people for their not identifying their 
standards with the will of Heaven •••• 35 
In other 'VlOrds, Mo-tze's idea of achieving unity and consequently peace 
is SOI!ewhat like the popular child-game "follow the leader." But, how can 
it be assUI'ed that the leader is always right? Although Mo-tze has secured 
the ultimate leadership by placing Heaven as the Supreme Superior, we mayy 
still inquire about the exemplary character of the rest of our superiors. 
How can it be assured that these human superiors do fbllow faithfully the 
virtues of Heaven? Even Mo-tze himself has dramatically admitted that not 
only a few but rather the majority of hunan superiors of his time were quite 
far from being exemplary. 
What, then, should be taken as the proper standard :in 
gove!1llOOIlt? How will it do for everyboqy- to imitate 
his parents? There are numerous parents in the 'WOrld 
but fevr are magnanimous. For everybody to imitate 
his parents is to imitate the unmagnanimous. Imitating the 
unmagnanimous cannot be said to be !ollOl'ling the proper 
standard. How will it do for everyboqy- to follow his 
teacher? There are numerous teachers in the world but 
few are magnanimous. For everybody to imitate his 
34 Conf. original text, c'h. 11, "Identification with the Superior I.U 
35 Con!. ibidem, ch. 12, "Identificat ion with the Superior IT. U 
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teacher is to imitate the unmagnanimous. Imitating 
the unmagnanimous cannot be said to be following the 
proper standard. How will it do for everybody to imitate 
his ruler? There are many rulers in the w::>rld but few 
are nagnanimous. For ever.Ybod;r to imitate the ruler 
is to imitate the unmagnanimous. Imitating the unmagnani-
mous cannot be taken as following the right standard. 
So then neither the parents nor the teacher nor the ruler 
should be accepted as the standard in govemment. 
What then should be taken as the standard in government? 
Nothing better than following Heaven. Heaven is all-
inclusive and inpartial in its activities, abundant and 
unceasing in its bleSSings, and lasting and untiring in 
its guidance. And so, wh:m the sage kings had accepted 
Heaven as their standard, they measured every action and 
enterprise by Heaven. VIlat Heaven demred they would 
carry out; what Heaven abominated they refrained from.36 
Shall we then accuse our philosopher of contradicting himself' Not 
necessarily, for we have a gJod explanaticn for his apparently contradictory 
statements. To begin with, i1e must remember his doctrine of the "Exaltation 
of the Virtuous." Only the virtuous may be made superior and leader. If 
this be established, then we may follow human leaders. Mo-t~e seened to have 
imposed this vitally important responsibility on the first leader on the 
earth, that is, the emperor. Of course, this presupposes that the emperor 
himself mst necessarily be a virtuous person; otherwise, the entire hope for 
a utopia is gone, or rather has no foundation to start with~ Therefore, Mo-
tze sincerely hoped that the anperor 'WOuld alway-s imitate the ancient sage 
kings in employing virtuous and capable persons to assist him in ruling the 
world. 
The ancient sage kings greatly emphasized the exalta-
tion of the virtuous and the employment of the capable. 
36 Conf. original text, 00. 4, liOn the Necessity of a standard," Mei' s trans 
lation, p. 14. 
Without spa cial cQlsiderations for reJ.atives, for the 
rich and honoured or for the good-looking, they exalted 
and promoted the virtuous, emi ched and honored them, 
and made them govemm-s and leaders. The vicious they 
k~t back and banished, depossessed and degraded, and 
made laborers and servants. Theretpon people were all 
encouraged by rewards and threatened by pWlishments 
and strove with each other after virtue~ Thus the 31 
virtuous multiply and the vicious diminish in number. 
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Thus, Mo-t.ze concludes his expose of the doctrine of the "Exaltation 
of the Virtuous tl 'With this statement: "The exaltation of the virtuous is the 
proof of the Government. n38 
But this is rather the conditio sine qua non" of the utopia of Mo-tze. 
The "status quo" of such an ideal world could be described at length and with 
much oratory; however, it may be described very briefly by saying that it is 
just the state of full realization of the doctrine of universal love, lIhich 
realization implies a complete peace and harmony among all people. Neverthe-
less, a civil government is still needed; and it seemed even to be an essen-
tial part of Mo-tze I s utopia. 
The constitution of this governnent would be as follows: The emperor 
is the chief ruler of the ..mole world. He is elected by Heaven, although Mo-
tze did not state how; neither did re demonstrate the ways and means by 'Which 
we might assure ourselves of the fact that 'this or that individual person is 
elected by Heaven as the emperor. At any rate, the emperor has the inemmpara-
ble authOrity, and also has the incomparable responsibility to choose the 
virtuous and capable in order to assist him in goveming the people. 
But the world is so large that it is difficult to reach the far comers, 
31 Conf. original text, ch. 9, "Exaltaticn of the Virtuous II," Mei's trans-
lation, p. 36. 
38 Conf. ibidem, ch. 8, 9, 10. (All three chapt era ha. va t his statement as 
a c onc1usion. 
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and the people are so many and those mo live at far distances differ so much 
that it is a necessity that the emperor divide his empire into many nations 
to facilitatefue goveming procedure. The head of each nation again must 
choose virtuous persons to assist them in governing their nations. Thus, eacl: 
province, each district, each tovm. and village must have its own govemment.35 
However, this hierarchy of govermnem. is so established that the inferior 
governm:mts must be completely swordmated to the superior ore s. Mo-tze 
called this subordination "Identificationtr inaslDllch as the inferior govem-
ment must exercise a policy identical with that of its superior government, 
so that the inferior gove~nt rea~ has no policy of its own, but simply 
carries out the policy indicalied to it by its superior. Thus, although there 
are in fact many subdivisions of governnent, it is nevertheless in reality 
one and the same government for the entire world. 
In spite of this method of divisions and subdiVisions, it seemed that Mo 
tze still favored, at least in principle, a direct handling of local matters 
by the emperor himself. The emperor must make his power extend as far as 
possible and penetrate everywhere as thoroughly as possible. 
During the reign of the ancient sage kings over the 
empire, if there was a virtuous man more than a thousand 
li away, he could reward him before the people in the 
sane district, and the village all came to know it. 
And if there was a 'Wicked nan about a thousand li away, 
he could punish him before the people of the same 
district, and the v.i.llage came to know it. Though it 
may be supposed that the sage king was keen in hearmg 
and sight, how could he see all that is beyond a thousand 
li at one Jook, an d how could he hear all that is beyond 
a thousand li at one hearing. In fact, the sage king 
39 conf. origi.nal text, ch. 1), "Identification with the Superior III." 
could see Td.thout going there and hear without being 
near •••• There is the beauty of adopt~g the principle 
of identification with the sq,erior.40 
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This form of pemment, as it is advocated by Mo-tze, is obviously 
monarchism in the strict sEnse; materially speaking, it is even nnre or less 
similar to dictatorship. However, we do believe tmt the fundamental rights 
of individuals were to be respected and lmviolated in this ideal government 
of Mo-tze. The reasons are: 
First of all, Mo-tze did not make the emperor infallible. He is human 
too, and is subject to the punishment of Hesven. Heaven may depose him from 
the throne, as in the case of the wicked kings of the three <trnasties lIhich 
were ended with the dlJPositian of their respective last. enperors. These 
wicked emperors had even lost their awn lives. Heaven punished them by per-
mitting and even inspiring a revolution headed by the virtuous person who 
eventually was to take the throne, become the new emperor, and fO'lDld a new 
dynasty. This is not a story invented by Mo~ ze, but is recorded in the most 
trustworthy ancient documents; it is accepted by Confucius as bistorical~ 
true; and later MEI1cius cited it at lEl1gth aid gave'the same connnent as }lo-
tze, namely that the w.:i.cked emperors ~re to' be punished and to be executed as 
criminals. An armed revolution against a tyrant is, according to Mencius, a 
sacred crusade to save the people from oppression. Both Mencius and Mo-tze 
believed that whenever it is needed Heaven will inspire such a revolution in 
order to punish the tyrant and thus resotre prosperity and freedom to the 
people. It seened that Mo-tze (and Jlencius) was not 1'Orried about when, how 
40 Conf. original text, ch. 13, "Identification with the Superior IIT." 
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and by whom such a revolution should be realized, for he trusted completely 
to the Providence of Heaven, the Supreme Ruler of the ror1d. 
Furthermore, in this ideal government the intere st of the connnon people 
was r-ea11y the first concern. It was precisely in order to secure prosperity 
and peace for the c omm.on poop1e that the emperor was made head of the govern-
ment. Now remembering the finism of Mo-tze, we may conclude that if the 
emperor does not serve his purpose, he is not good and is to be rejected. 
Mo-tze reall zed well that no human being iB indefectible no matter how 
virtuous he my be;41 and therefore, the Emperor and the ministers are bound 
to make sorne mistakes; in such cases, the interior should show them their mis 
takes in a polite and respectful way so that theJ1' may correct themse1ves.42 
Therefore Mo-tze did not advocate an unqualified identification with the 
superior so that one must blindly follow his leader. It is even a duty to 
advise one's immediate superior '?hen he :rm.kes a mistake.43 Thus, the essen-
tial evil of dictatorship is definitely abSEnt in Mo-tze's utopia. 
Moreover, the interest, pro~erity and comfort of too comm:m people was 
so solicited in Mo-tze's teaching that throughout his works one can never 
find anything that implies even remotely the enslavemen t of t he people. 
Madam A. David has rightly noticed: 
Un examen plus attentif nous a bientot ec1aire sur 1& 
veritable pensee de phi1osophie (of Mo-tze). I1 n'a 
nu11ernent entendu imposer aux masses populaires une 
servile sujection. Pour 1e bon ordre social i1 faut 
41 He e:xplicitly stated that no human be:ing can be the standard of morality, 
but only Heaven can furnish the unfailab1e norm. Con!. original text, ch 
4, !fOn the Necessity of a Standard." 
42 Conf. orig:ina1 text, ch. 11, nldentification with the Superior I.tt 
43 Ibidem. 
qu' elles approuvent les aetes de leurs souverain, nais 
celui-ci doit agir de fa con a s'attirer leur approbation 
spontanee. 
Lfempereur et le chef de village disant aussi: ,'Si 
nous commentions des fautes il-faut nous en avertir.,44 
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It is clear that the people are not slaves of the emperor. 
On the contrary, it seaned that according to Mo-tze the emperor must 
work himself to the limit for the benefit of the people. The ancient sage 
kings, mo are recognized not only by Mo-tze but by all ancient Chinese 
scholars as the models of good enperors, are described by Mo-tze as slaves 
themselves for the sake of the people. 
Mo-tze argued in favour of his doctrine as follows: 
Of old, the great Yu (emperor) dra:ined off the flood 
water, and ••• with his om hands he plied the bucket 
and dredger, in order to reduce confusion to uniformity until 
his calves and shins had no hair left upon them. The wind 
bathed him, the rain combed him •••• and becp.ys~ he thus 
sacrificed himself to the commonwealth •••• 45 
Thus, it 'ViaS rather the emperor mo was to be the slave of the people and not 
vice versa. 
Although, as a matter of fact, the imperial throne was, in ancient China 
a family treasure inherited from ancesters by sons or nephews, Mo-tze did not 
seem to favor such a system. According to his doctrine of the exaltation of 
the virtuous, it must have b em in his mind that the mat virtuous and most 
capable person was to be emperor. However, it might have been because of two 
practical reasons that he preferred to keep silent on the subject. First of 
all, he might have been careful not to offend the EJIlperor of his time by teach 
ing such a revolutionary doctrine. Secondly, he might also have realized that 
44 Conf. Le Philosophe Meh-ti et Idee de Solidarite, Loncbn, 1907, pp. 74-75. 
45 Conf. Chuang-tze, Chapter 33 (See bibliography) tI H. Giles translation. 
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there is practically no way to decide 'IIi th precision who is the most virtuous 
and most capable so that he may be IlBde emperor.46 Therefore, Mo-tze pre-
ferred to tolerate the actual way of naming the enperor, that is, by family 
succession. 
Aside from the emperor himself, the rest of the governing officers are 
not hereditary. They are of course named by the emperor, but the emperor 
is not free to name trem according to his ovm pleasure. He must "exalt the 
virtuous and employ the capable." We have quoted Mo-tze as saying that even 
a relative of the enperor is not to be named to public office unless he is 
capable of performing that same office. Here, the principle of democracy 
comes in. Anyone who is virtuous and capable nru.st be exalted and employed 
in gO'Vemment 'With high rank, liberal emolUIrents and great power. On the 
contrary, if one who is actuaJ..1;y- in high rank shall prove that he is not 
worthy of his office, he is to be deposed and even punished if necessary. 
llo-tze did not ~ve any consideration to the relatives of the enperor, even 
the most close. We do not find that he ever used the term "nobilit:ylt in the 
sense understood by the Western m::>narchists. Nobles for Mo-tze are those 
who are in high rank because of their virtue and ability. The relatives of 
the emperor are sinJ:>ly fellow citizens in Mo-tze t s utopia. Thus, in spite of 
the fact tmt there is an emperor, the idea state of :Mo-tze is nevertheless 
intrinsically danocratic. His Excellency, the most Reverend Paul Yu-pin, 
first Archbishop of Nanking, China, has furnished us with 1ilis statementt 
46 Even the most progressive democratic country of our days 'Will still face 
this prcblem. Who can be sure that the president elected is the most 
virtuous and most capable man for the office? 
Though China's government was monarchical in form, 
in spirit, but :in reality it was democratic. The Chinese 
seem to be by nature democratic. Probably no people has 
been less affected by their rulers. The emperor sat on 
his throne, issued exhortations and collected taxes while 
the people went about their awn business and governed 
themselves through their local comtry organization. The 
mit of strength in Ch:ina has never been the nation or 
national loyalty, but the family and its loyalty. Chinese 
government has always been a government by men, not by 
law. When the men were good, all went 'Well; when the 
men "Irere evil, they were usually deposed.47 
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Hence, Mo-tze f s idea of utopia was not so much an attempt to change the 
form of the govemnent, but rather a great wish to provide virtuous and 
capable govemors; once this be assured, the ideal government will naturally 
be produced. 
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D) WAR 
We are writing this thesis at a time 'When everyone in the world under-
stands 'What ~ is. Mo-tze was not so unfortunate as we who live in this so-
called atomic age, but he had surely enough knowledge about war since the 
time in 'Which he lived is called by Chinese historians the period of warring 
states.48 As we have mentioned early in our writings, this peculiar status 
of th~ warring states was caused by the fact that the emperor had practically 
lost his control over local governments; thus the larger and stronger govem-
mems became more and more independent, and f:lnally organized their own 
armies, and the reads of the larger states eventually became war lords fight-
ing for more territories and more power to satisfY their own ambitions. 
Our philosopher wished to stop these conflicts with his doctrine of 
universal love and also to restore the prestige of the emperor with his doc-
trine of idemification with one's superior. Either one nll satisfy his 
desire; for, if the anperor could regain real control over all state govern-
ments, then the world would be once more united in ane government and thus 
there muld be peace. And on the other han d, if the heads of the state 
governments respect each other's rights an d keep on good terms and peaceful 
relations, the war is virtually eliminated even though the feudal states 
remain independent of the emperor. Mo-tze realized that the first method is 
practically hopeless; therefore he chose the second and thus issued his con-
damnation of aggressive war. 
48 See our first chapter, page 20and note 39. 
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We must innnedi.ately notice that he only condemned offensive or aggressiv 
-war; and he encouraged defensive war even to a point so exaggerated as to ask 
women and children to participate in the fighting and to give their lives.49 
This is, of course, exaggerated and particularly 'lmllecessary at his time, for 
the warring states were not enemy nations in the sense of modern times; the 
peoN-e were of the same race, they spoke the same language (although with 
difference accents). It was obviously a war between -war lords and by no 
means between peoples. In other words, they were civil wars, as those of 
Pompey against Caesar, or the wars of the Barons in England. 
Aggressive war then is Vlbat Mo-tze condemned so vigorously. He saw its 
worse consequehces with his own eyes. He preached against it, and he would 
do anything in order to stop or prevent its happening. Once he walked ten 
days and ten nights in order to arrive in time to persuade a war lord who ha 
everything ready for an aggression except the signal for attack that his 
ambition 'WOuld eventually disappoint him, for it vould bring him no profit 
but only damages. 50 Mo-tze also solemnly declared that he and his three 
hundred disciples 'Were all ready to die if necessary to defend innocent 
people against aggressive war.5l He referred to aggressive -war as the most 
disastrous calamity of his time. It seemed as if his arguments and reasons 
for condemning this atrocious misbehavior could never be exhausted. Here a 
49 Conf. original text, ch. 52, "Defense of the City Wall," Vlbere Mo-tze 
suggested that for every fifty yards, ten nmt, twenty women and ten 
children or aged ones must be placed for defense. Again, in ch. 61, 
women and children were put into first line defense and were given arms 
to fight in hand-to-hand combat. 
50 Conf. original text, ch. 50, "Kung Shuh." 
51 Con!. original text, ch. 50, "Kung Shuh." 
, 
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a few important ones: 
1) Aggression is essentially unjust. He compared it with common robbe 
and assault; the only difference is that aggressive war is lIDre criminal, and 
more unjust, for it causes more damage, made more people suffer and took more 
lives. ''When others are caused to suffer more, then the act is more inhuman 
and criminal.,,52 'Who§lver fails to see the evidence of this comparison must 
have sonething 'Wrong with his mind, for he is like a man "who, upon seeing a 
little blaclmess should say it is black, but, upon seeing much should say it 
is 'White.n53 Therefore, it is the lowest type of perversity to applaud ag-
gressive war as a glorious and magnanimous act acoomplished by heroic leaders 
2) Aggressive war is against the purpose of the government and the duty 
of rulers, for the purpose of government is, as danonstrated by Mo-tze, pre-
cisely to secure order and peace by mlifYing the people, and thus preventing 
struggles among individuals or groups. Now, aggressive V/ar is nothing but 
to start these struggles on an even larger scale by killing more, destroying 
more and causing more miseries, more violation and more injustice. Therefore 
by starting an aggressi. ve war, a government is simply disqualified as a 
government and its leader is not only neglecting his duty but positively act-
ing against his duty. This is to avert from the right path and to go in a 
diametrically opposed direction. It is e:ither blindness or perversity. 
3) Practically speaking, -war is just as disastrous to the conquering 
state as it is to the conquered one. Mo-tze emphasized this point very con-
vincingly, for he lmew that in a time 'When the moral principle of justice 
52 Canf. ori ginal text, ch. 17, IICondemnation of Offensive War I." 
53 Ibidem. 
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does not mean much to those ambitious war lords, the only remedy would be 
the practical disadvantage; that is, if he could succeed in convincing them 
of his pointjt Mo-tze started his- argument by pointing out the fact that, 
first of all, the aggressor is not always the 1'Iinner. He may end as the 
c: loser, and thus lose what he possessed before, or even be captured and killed'. 
Secondly, even should the aggressor conquer some territories, then: 
Mo-tze said: But 'When we consider the victory as such 
there is nothing useful about it. When we ccnsider th~ 
possessions obtained through it, it does not even I1Bke 
up for the losses. Now, about the seige of a city of 
three li, or a kuo (outer city wall) of seven li, if 
there could be obtained without the use of weapons and 
the taking of lives, it would be all right. But (as a 
I1Btter of fact) those killed must be counted by ten 
thousand, those widowed or left solitary must be counted 
by thousands, before iU::ity of three li or a kuo of three 
li could be captured.~" 
Not only will the aggt'essi ve state lose many people so that the national 
economy will be hurt for the Jack of Jabor in production, but, also other 
factors in production will be missed or abused by the war. Mo-tze noticed 
that war is generally started in the ear:q spring, because the strategists 
regarded winter as too cold for the expedition of tropps. Thus fanners are 
called to war before they could sOW' seeds. 
If it is in the sprl ng, it 'WOuld t alre people away fro m 
sowing and planting; if it is In autumn, it would take 
people away .fran reaping and harvesting. Should they be 
taken away in either of these seagons, innumerable people 
would die of hunger and cold •••• 5 
54 Conf. or:i.ginal text, ch. 18, nCondemnation of Offensive War II." Mo-tze 
even named a few of the states that perished because of waging offensive 
wars, such as Lu in the East, Chen T'sai in the South and some others in 
the North. 
55 Ibidsn. 
56 Conf. original text, ch. 18, tlCondemation of Offensive War II." 
r 
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Thus, the advance of seasons was abused, the utility of soil was aban-
doned, the fecundity of seeds was not utilized and, furthennore, the horses 
and oxen were drafted and were killed; and they could not be restored to the 
fanners immediately after the war, so that fanners were handicapped for a 
long tiDe after the war, and were further deprived of many other fanning in-
struments that are destroyed during war. Hence, agricultural production, 
'Which is almost a synonym for the national econo1l\Y, is greatly damaged even 
in the state that ltOn the war. 
4) War diminishes the population. To mderstand well the value of this 
argument, ene must know that in ancient China the increase of population was 
a thing desired by all rulers and was accepted by all as one of the essentia 
eleIll3nts of national property. 
Mo-tze said: All the rulers in the ltOrld desire their 
states to be wealthy, their people to be ~, and their 
governments and jurisdiction to be orderly;?T~ 
Similarly, a numerous family meant only happines and prosperity to its 
head, namely the father. Hence, the decrease of population, either Qy posi-
tive loss, of Jiving persons,or by a lower birth rate, was considered at that 
time a calamity. 
Mo-tze showed that war kills many directJJr in fighting and many more 
indirectly by the famine which uSlally follows the war; and that, besides, 
the birth rate is necessarily diminished. 
Moreover, the rulers make war and attack some neighbor-
ing states. It may last a whole year or, at the shortest, 
several months. Thus man and 'WOIIBn cannot see each other 
'57 Conf. original text, ch. 10, "Exaltation of tb3 Virtuous III." 
for a long time. Is this not the way of diminishing 
the peoplei58 
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5) Besides these positive arguments, Mo-tze amwered quite a few ob-
jections aga:inst his doctrine of anti-offensive war, accepting no excuse 
whatsoever to justif.y aggression. 
a) Those 'Who endeavour to gloss over offensive 
wars would saYl These states perished because they 
could not gather and employ their multitudes. I can 
gather and OOlploy ~ multitudes and wage war 'With them; 
who then dares to be unsubmissi ve?59 
Mo-tze ans'Wered this objectic:n by declaring that the ability of organiz-
ing people into a war machine for aggressive purposes is not SOIoothing to be 
proud of, but rather something of which one may be ashamed. In addition Me-
tze pointed out that it is historically true that all those who loved to make 
war perished in defeat and in shame.60 
b) Now the objector also brought up historical facts: How could Mo-tze 
justify the wars started and won by the ancient sage k:ings: 
The warring lords "WOuld gloss over (their conduct) with 
arguments to ccnfute Mo-tze, sayjng: Do you condemn 
attack and assault as lmrighteous and not beneficial? 
But anciently, Yu made war on the prince of Miso, 
Ttang on Cmeh, and king Wu on Chow. Yet they are rgi 
garded as sages. 'What is your e:xplanaticn for this? 
Mo-tze answered that th e sage kings did not wage an aggressive war. 
Their wars were sacred crusades inspired by God in order to save the people 
from the slavery and tortures imposed upon them by wicked kings. Their armie 
were spontaneously welcomed by all the people everyvhere as liberators. Thus 
58 Conf. original text, ch. 20, trEcono~ in Experlditures I~" 
59 Conf.~. cit., ch. 18, IlCondelllation of Offensive War II." 
60 This causeSus to ranember Ifperiunt annes qui bella volunt." 
61 Conf. original text, ch. 19, "Condannation of Offensive War III." 
r 
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the sage kings were authorized by Heaven to defend the rights and .freedom of 
the people of the 'WOrld, and to prosecute justice against the 'Wicked kings by 
deposing them and executing them. This is not an aggressive war but one to 
carry out the will of Heaven. 
c) To carry out the will o.f Heaven seaned immediately to be an excellen 
excuse for ve.ging war. However, as always (i.e. according to mat is recorde 
in the text of Mo-tze' s work) Mo-tze had his retort. 
Prince Wen of Lu Yang sai d: 'Why should you, Sir, prevent 
me from attacking Cheng? The people of Cheng have murdered 
their .fathers (i.e. their rulers) for three generations. 
Heaven has been visiting them with punishments. It has 
caused them to be unprosperous for three years. I am only 
helping Heaven to carry out the punishments.' Mo-tze 
said: 'The people of Cheng have murdered their fathers 
for three generations. Heaven has been visiting them 
'With punishments. It has caused them to be unprosperous 
for three years. The punishment of Heaven is silfficient. 
Yet you are raising an arIr\Y' to attack Cheng, proclaim-
ing 'Illy attack on Cheng is in accordance 'With the will 
of Heaven. II Now, suppose there is a man 'Whose son is 
strang but insolent. So the father punished him with a 
ferule. But the neighbour's father struck him with a 
hemry staff saying: 'It is in accordance with his 
father' s wi~ that I strike him.' Is not this 
perversity? 
6) In addition to his arguing andrpreaching, Mo-tze also did something 
very practical in order to help force a practical conviction upon the minds 
of war lords. He encouraged defensive war. He urged an all out defense fro 
the people of a small state when invaded. He wrote ten chapters on defensi 
techniques. In many instances, he even suggested a 'Wholesome holocaust 
similar to what modern strategists call a scorched-earth policy. Most 
anxiously he urged the small states to make an alliance amang themselves so 
62 Conf. original text, ch. 49, 'tLu'''' Question," Mei's translation, pp. 24 
2 6. 
F 
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that when one 'WaS attacked, all would come to 'War against the aggressor. 
However, Mo-tze 'WaS not successful in this effort; no league of small states 
'Was organized. Nevertheless, he did succeed in at least three instances in 
stopping an aggressive war. 
a) The great king of Tsing was persuaded .by Mo-tze that the war caused 
damage even to the 1'li.nner, and thus relinquished his ambitious p lan. 63 
b) The prince Wen of Lu Yang was convinced by Mo-tze that to wage an 
aggressive war is mjust and immoral; therefore he cancelled his prepared 
attack on Cheng. 64 
c) Kung Shubai had everything ready to attack Sung; Mo-tze walked ten 
days and ten nights to reach him. After all theoretical arguments had 
failed to 'WOrk, Uo-tze showed him seomtbing that surprised him. It was a 
complete plan to defend Sung prepared by Mo-tze himself. This plan was so 
effectively made that the aggressor finally was convinced -Chat he could not 
win, and thus dropped his idea.65 
We nay notice that in these three instances, Mo-tze used three different 
methods; namely: 1) The practical reason, i.e., no one wins the war; 2) the 
theoretical reason, that aggression is mjust; 3) the practical fact; ~. 
'We will fight back and beat you. We may believe that these three are merely 
illustrative cases chosen by his disciples to be recorded in the text.66 In 
63 The incident is recorded in ch. 49, "LuI s question. fI 
64 Conf. Ibidem. 
65 Conf. original text, ch. 50, "Kung Shu." 
66 In concluding, we might say that if one should apply Me-tze l s idea in 
the present world Situation, then, Mo-tze would .:first of all advocate 
a world govemment lhich will be not merely a league of nations but a 
real unity of power that will effectively take the place of the emperor 
in the utopia of Mo-tze, so that the people of the world become united 
mder one govermmnt with one purpose, and thus oonsider national and 
reality, Mo-tze may have had even IOOre srecesses. 
local governments as one menber of the -whole body by practicing mutual aid 
and eliminating mutual hatred. If this should fail, then, Mo-tze would 
use the three methods alternatively or even all at once. And, we know 
that he vou1d finally be forced to resort to the mst practical point 
(for the principles are only recognized in papers nowadays); that is, to 
show the aggressors how the smaller and the weaker nations could and 
would fight back and eventually beat aggressors. Thus, Mo-tze rou1d be 
greatly in favor of a solid alliance of a1.1 peace-loving nations in order 
to act unanimously against any aggressor. Shall we say that our philo-
sopher anticipated the principles of the United Natims' Organization 
nearly twenty-five centuries ago? 
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EPILOOUE 
A) A SYNOPSIS OF OUR ONN CRITICISM OF MO-TZE'S DOCTRJNE 
As we have, dur:ing the course of our dissertation, expressed our criti-
cism of the philosophy of Mo-tze, we will here merely summarize our opinions 
which are already manifested either e:x;plicitly or, at least, implicitly, s 
where in the preceding texts: 
1) Mo-tze's doctrine is fundamentally theistic and therefore is not to 
be considered as utilitarian. The defect in this point is th9.t our philo-
sopher did not provide any scientific proof for the real existence of a per-
sonal God. 
2) His theism is nat a religion, but strictly a philosophical system. 
The will of Heaven, 'Which is concerned 'With humanity's welfare, is to be 
determ:ined by reason.l 
3) Mo-tze's method in discussing ethical rules, namely the so-called 
three tests, is quite similar to the method adopted by the scholastics, who 
asserted that the sources of ethical science are reasm and experience, both 
external and internal, personal and alien, present and historical. 
4) The norm of morality proposed by Mo-tze is definitely objective and 
absolute, as we have excluded all possibilitiGS of interpreting it as a sub-
jective or:relative standard. Among the theists Mo-tze belongs to the group 
of voluntarists. Although he has demonstrated that the will of God is to be 
1 This last sentEnce is quated from W. H. Long. Con! • .2£. cit., p. 28. 
Long even called Mo-tze the father of Ch:ina's rationalists, a title with 
which we do not agree. 
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the absolute norm because God is the most intelligent being, his teaching 
nevertheless is to be considered as voluntarism. 
5) His doctrine of universal love is similar to Christian humani tarian-
ism in its ftraison d' etre tl and also :in its practice. However, the great dif-
ference between the two lies in the motive. Christian hmnanitarianism is 
essentially superns;tural, although the natural motive is not excluded. 
6) Against determinism Mo-tze defends the traditional belief of "free 
w.illll, which is the basis of moral responsihility. 
7) Moral sanctions are emphasized by Mo-tze. However, according to 
him, rewards are not so much for recompensation as for encouragement, punish-
ments not so much for vindication as for prevention. A post-mortem existence 
of the human soul is admitted, but the state of such separated souls is not 
clearly described. No moral sanctions in this state are ever mentioned. 
8) His philosophy of life is realistic finism. ~ the actual reali-
ties are considered. The proper purpose is the guiding star of human acts. 
Against a good mmyauthors, 1'2 do not think Mo-tze has taught frugality and 
strict ascetism. He merely limited enjoyment to moderation. His most em-
phasized point is that no man can enjoy luxuries mile some of his neighbors 
(i.e. fellow mEn) are still suffering poverty and need help. 
9) The llDral order is s~erior to the physical. Man must rather suffer 
the loss of all physical goods and even his very life for the maintenance of 
moral principles. BeSides, Mo-tze believed that if the moral order is 
established in society, physical prosperity will necessarily follow, whereas 
moral disorder directly generates physi cal chaos. 
10) Man is a social being, but government is made for the comon good 
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of the people and not rice versa. A govermnent which does not serve its pur-
pose (i.e. connnon good of the people) is to be removed, and the rulers to 
be ptmished. 
11) Civil authority came from God; therefore, moral principles are 
prior and superior to civil laws. Civil laws are on~ good and effective 
when they are in accordance with the standard of morality, namely the will of 
God. 
12) World unity is emphasized, although Mo-tze did realize that nations 
are necessitated because of the differences in peoplets customs and languages 
A central goveI"lJ.lOOnt of the world which is capable of unifying, in theory and 
in fact, all the local governments is Mo-tze 1 s solution to the world problem. 
In these t-welve points we believe that the moral doctr:ine of Mo-tze is 
quite adequate~ oovered. Mo-tzet s teachings, as we have demonstrated, were 
philosophical and not :religious because thev were based on reason. However, 
as a philosophical system, it leaves much to be desired. First of all, it 
lacks a systematic constructim. Although many aspects of his doctrine were 
deduced from a few established principles, Mo-tze Jle'V'9rtheless did not con-
struct a whole doctrine similar to an organic body 'Which has its unity from 
the intimate connection of different elenents, but fran the faot that it has 
only ~ life for all composing elements. 
Secondly, Mo-tze t s doctrine did not c,over the entire field of human 
activities. Many 1nportant problems of both fundamental and special ethics 
were entirely ignored, such as the value of conscience, ji; s characteristics 
and incidentals, or the essentials of social justice and its practical appli-
cations. 
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Thirdly, his method of d:i.scussion was rather negative or destructive and 
offensive. Generally speaking, he 'WaS cmtent to demonstrate that the opinia 
of his opponents was absurd; thus Sel.dom did he care to provide positive 
reascns for his own opinion. 
However, we may find some reasonab1e excuses for these defects. For 
1) Mo-tze was not an ambitious scholar; he did not intend to immortalize his 
name by establishing a philosophical system which 'WOuld be a scholastic 
masterpiece; he merely wished to preach a doctrine that. ~uld in practice 
save his country from the crisis of his time. This also accounts for the 
fact that his teachings can be understood as utilitarian. At any rate, we 
can hardly expect an ethical doctr:ine as systeIll9.tical as the medieval 
scholastics at the time of our philosopher, that is 500 B.C. 2) B.v the 
same reason, Mo-tze felt no re::ponsibility to cover the entire field of human 
activities in his teachings. He expounded only what is needed to be expound-
ed, teaching and discussing according to the need of his time. 3) S:ince he 
only discussed on those points mere discussion was needed, we naturally find 
Mo-tze in a position of willing to finish the discussion as sharply as pos-
sible. 
This was most effectively cbne by demonstrating that the opinion of 
his opponents was absurd. Besides, as we noticed above, Mo-tze considered 
himself the faithful deferider of the traditional orthodox doctrine of the 
ancient sage kings. He did not like to call his teachings his own opinion~ 
even though it was really his own invention. He always attributed his doc-
trine to the ancient sage kings, and alvmys succeeded in prOVing that either 
explicitly or at least i.Iqplicitly the amient sage kings lad anticipated his 
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doctrine. Thus, considering himself mere~ as a defender and not as a build-
er, Mo-tze was satis:fied to destroy the opinion of his opponents and to demon 
strate that their doctrine was heretical. If the heretical doctrine be 
proved to be absurd, then the orthodox teaching will stand as it was. This 
is why Mo-tze did not care much to furnish positive proofs for his doctrine. 
F:i.na~, as an appendix (for our min purpose is to evaluate his moral 
doctrine), we may notice Mo-tze 1 s contribution to formal logic. As we are 
ourselves Chinese, we prefer to quote a Westerner on this pointt 
Aristoteles was born just about the time that Mo-tze 
died, and he is usually considered to be the father of 
logic as a system. But possibly this honour may yet 
have to be accorded to Mo-tze, or some other Chinese2sage not yet restored to us from the shades of antiquity. 
Another Western writer has concJnded his brief presentation of the teach 
ings of Mo-tzets as follows: 
Mo-tze is still a living thinker. The fundamental 
principles which he taught, freed from the limitations 
of their times, are as sound and as powerful for human 
good today as they were in the ancient golden age of 
Chinese philosophy. A pm-pose-govemed cosmos, a 00<1-
appo:inted moral law, spiritual personality as the essence 
of Deity, moral freedom and personal responSibility, 
the supremacy of Divine Will in social and political 
life, the law of universal love aroong men sanctioned 
by Divine Spirit , humanitarianism, the appeal to logic 
and intelligence, the progressive mind, the distinction 
between defensive and offensive yar ••• these remain pro-
fomd doctrines challenging acceptance by the mind of 
today. 
Mo-tze t B thougbliis eSSEntially one with the person-
alism and the theistic idealism of the West l'hich find 
in moral and creative Selfhood the clue to the most 
2 Quoted from~, ! Chinese Heretic, by H. Williamson, p. 16. 
real as well as the most divine, the end of3bein
g, the 
goal of education, and the hope of society. 
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It is not because we completely agree with these -writers that we wish 
to quote them. Our own opinion has been sufficiently expressed in this dis-
sertation. Readers may find easily that in many point the above quoted write 
departs from our statements. Still other points he taces merely as granted, 
where we have demonstrated our statements with elaborated and conclusive 
discussions. 
We may say this much, that among the ancient Chinese philosophers Mo-tze 
must be considered the greatest as far as the constitution of doctrine is 
concerned, although, as a matter of fact, his influence was relatively negli-
gible prior to the Chinese Republic. 
3 Quoted fran Mo-tze, China1 s Ancient Philosopher of Universal Love, by. 
W. H. wng, p. 38. 
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B) THE INFLUENCE OF MO-TZE ON MODERN CHINESE THOUGHT 
The doctrine of Mo-tze deluged the world at the tim of Mencius to , 
whom tl'e credit must be attributed of building the foundation of a Confucian 
empire in the Chinese thinking world that was to last more than twenty 
centuries. Mencius, as we said above, succeeded in wiping out Mo-tze t s 
teaching completely. And it was not until the beginning of this century tha 
Mo-tze was again discovered by the Chinese. The reaction, .from the very firs 
moment, was one of spontaneous weleome followed immediately by a great admir 
tim concerning the adaptability of his doctrine to the modern age. Such an 
admiration was then shared by the 1Vestern world as well.4 However, it is its 
influence en modern Chinese thought that concerns us most. 
The Chinese revolution in 1911 is justified by the principle which as-
serts that the government is far the comnon good of the people in general 
and" not the comfort of the rulers, that if a govemment does not serve its 
purpose, it must be removed and replaced by a capable one. This is the 
fundamental teaching of Mo-tze t s political ideas. 
In spite of its almost instinctively manifested attitude of repulsion 
toward foreign ideas, the Chinese thinking world begins to accept the Chris 
ian doctrine of universal love m::>re willingly, for it is discovered that 
an idea had its own Chinese version even earlier than the Christian era. 
Freedom of conscience is greatly challenged by the naterialism imported 
4 For instance, W. H. Long wrote: ItProbably no more surprising discovery 
concerning the achievement of antiquity is to be found than that China, 
in the fifth century before Christ, produced a philosophic minded teach-
ing that Heaven claims and loves all the people without discrimination. 1t 
Conf. 2E. Cit., p. 16, also the last two quoted passages. 
r 
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into China from the United states of Amerlca (namel:y from Columbia Univer-
sity). Aside from the Christian doctrine which reached relativel:y few of the 
Chinese the condemnation of fatalism by Mo-tze must have served as a great 
preventive factor against the public damage caused by such materialism. 
Confucius has little oredit in this matter, for he has shown little resis-
tanoe to materialistic fatalism. At least he was not as fervent as Mo-tze in 
oondemning it. 
The famus ''New Life Movement" whioh has been promoted by Generalissimo 
Chiang Kai Shek since 1930 is virtually a total adaptation of the philosophy 
of life preaohed by 'Mo-tze. The doctr:ine of universal love and mutual aid 
is propagated by the authorities of the government. The supreme principle 
in eoonomios is to be that the right use of wealth is to use it according to 
proper purposes. The "New Life Movement" teaches the people to practice 
"economy in expenditure, fI "simplicity in funerals, If and, as well, in marriage 
oelebrations; the rules given for obtaining and enjoying such neoessities as 
food, olothes, housing and transportation, are exaotl:y a copy of Mo-tze 1 s 
teachings; namely, when the main purposes are reached, enjoyment must be 
stopped, for -mat is extra is to be oalled luxury and is to be avoided. The 
New Life Movement campaigns against such excesses as sumptuous banquets, ex-
pensive fashion in clothing; it condemns drinking, smol:ing (particularl:y 
opium., but even cigarettes are desired to be forgotten), suggestive danoes 
and musio. Mo-tze should be very happy to see that his teaohings are pro-
moted seriousl:y and anxiously by the government itself; for all his life he 
wished that his dootrine 'WOuld be propagated by government officers beoause 
he believed this the only way to introduce it to the common people. 
r 
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FinallY, the most heroically determined resistance against the Japanese 
aggression which not o~ surprised but positively ~ti£ied the Western 
world £or eight long years was surely somewha:!:. inspired by Mo-tze' s urgent 
appeal to resist o££ensive war at any cost. Believing that we are .fighting 
on the side o£ justice we will de.fend the principle o£ justice with all our 
e££orts and all our resources, because justice will always triumph, for God 
is just. We are glad that our modern China has followed Mo-tzets suggestions 
, 
I 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
PART I: BOOKS WRITTEN IN EUROPEAN LANGUAGES 
I. PRIMARY SOURCES 
Mo-tze, ~ Ethical and Political Works of Mo-tze, translated from the Chinese 
byMai Yei-pao, London, 1929. 
II. SECONDARY SOURCES 
A. BOOKS 
Beck, L. Adams, ~ Histoq of Oriental Philosophy, New York, 1939. 
Brown, Brian, The Wisdom of China, Vol. I of The Wisdom of the Orient, New 
York, 1941. - - - -
Carns, paul, Chinese Thought, Shanghai, 1907. 
Chiang Kai-Shek, ill We ~ ~ All We Have, New York, 1943. 
Chiang, Madame, ~ is ~ China, New York, 1940. 
Chiang, Madame, China Shall ~ Again, New York, 1941. 
Couling, Samuel, Encyclopedia Sinica, London, 1917. 
Courant, Maurice A., ~ les pretendu monotheisme des ancient Chinois, Paris, 
1900. 
David, :Mme. Alexander, ~ Philosophe Meh-ti et ltidee ~ solidarite, London, 
1907. 
Dore, Henry, S.J., Vannal des superstitions chinoises, Shanghai, 1926. 
351 
I j 
I 
" 
! 
352 
Forke, AJ..fred., The Wor~ Conception of ~ Chinese, their Astronomical" ~­
mological and phisico-philosophical Speculations, London, 1925'. 
Fimg Yu-Lan, ! Histoq of Chinese Philosophy, translated from the Chinese by 
Derk Bodde, Peiping, 1937. 
Geny, Paul, S.J., Brevis Conspectus Historiae Philosophiae, Rome, 1929. 
Giles, Herbert Allen, Religion of Ancient China, London, 1918. 
Giles, Herbert, Chuang-Tzu, translated from the Chinese, London, 1926. 
Granet, Marcel, ~ religion des chinois, Paris, 1922. 
Groot, J. M. De., The religious System of Chine, its ancient forms, evolution, 
history and present, Leyde, 1910. 
Grousset, R., Histoire de la philosophie orientale, Paris, 1929. 
Happer, Andrew P. !.!! the Shang-Ti of the Chinese Classics the Same Being !! 
Jehovah of the SCripture?, Shanghai, 1877. 
Hirth, Frederich, ~ Ancient History of China, New York, 1908. 
Ho1th, Severe, Micius, .! Brief Outline of his Life and Ideas, Shanghai, 193.5. 
Huang, Tseng-Yuch, Etude cOlI!Parative sur 1es philOSophies de Lao-tseu, Kong-
tseu, Mo-tseu, Lyon, France, 192r. 
Janet, Paul and Gabriel Seai11es, !:. History of the Problems of PhilosophZ, 
translated from the French by Ada Monahan, London, 1902. 
Legge, James, The Anna1ects of ConfuCiUS, Vol. I of The Chinese Classics, 
.5 vola., Honkong, 1861.- -,-
Legge, James, The Book of Mencius, Vol. II of The Chinese ClassiCS, .5 vo1s., 
Honkong, m1. 
Legge, James, ~ Religion £! China compared with ChristianitZ, London, 1880. 
Legge, James, The Notions of the Chinese Concerning God and Spirits, Honkong, 
18.52. - - - - - - - -
Liang, Chi-Chao, History of Chinese Political Thought During ~ Ear!l Tsin 
Period, translated from the Chinese by L. T. Chen, New York, 1930. 
Lin, 1Iou-5heng, Men and Ideas, .!!! Informal History .£! Chinese Political 
Thought, New:rork, 1942. 
, 
353 
Long, Wilbur Henry, Mo-tee, China's Ancient Philosopher of Uhiversal Love, 
Peiping, 1934. 
Maclagan, Patrick J., Chinese Religious Ideas, London, 1926. 
Martin, William A. P., ESaar. ~ the Historz, Philosophy ~ Religion of the 
Chinese, Shanghai, 1 9 • - -
Maspero, Henri, La Chine Antique, Paris, 1927. 
Mei Yei-Pao, Me-tse, ~ Neglected Rival 2! Confucius, London, 1934. 
OtNeill, Frederick, The Quest for God in China, New York, 1925. 
Pott, William S. A., Chinese Political Philosophy', New York, 1925. 
Premare, J. Henry De, S.J., Vestiges des principaux do~s chretians tires des 
anciens livres chinois, Paris, JE7B'. - -
Rawlinson, Fr~~k Joseph, Chinese Ethical Ideas, Shanghai, 1934. 
Ryan, Thomas, S.J., China Through Catholic ~, Hongkong, 1940. 
Rosney, Leon Louis, L'idee de Dieu ~ la phi1osophie religieuse q~ 18 Chine, 
Paris, 1899. 
Ross, Jolm, The Original Religion of China, Edinburgh, 1909. 
Rudd, Herbert F., Chinese Moral Sentiments Before Confucius, Unpublished 
Doctoral Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1914. 
Scott, Latourette Kenneth, The Chinese: Their History and Culture, New York, 
1934. --
Suzuki, D. T., ! Brief History of Early Chinese Philosophy, London, 1914. 
Tstui Chi, ! Short History of Chinese Civilization, New York, 1943. 
Wieger, Leon, Texties Philosophique, Shien-8hien, China, 1906. 
Wilhelm, Richard, ! Short History of Chinese Civilization, New York, 1929. 
Williamson, H., Mo-ti,..! Chinese HeretiC, Tsi-nan, China, 1927. 
WU, ~ou-Cheng, Ancient Chinese Political Theories, Shanghai, 1930. 
354 
B. ARrICLES 
Edkins, Joseph, "Notice of the Character and Writings of Meh-tsi;" Journal 
~~~e North China Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Art. TI, May 11, 
Kennedy, Gerald, "Ethical and Social Teachings of Mo-ti," Chinese Recorder, 
November, 1931. 
Henri Maspero, rrNote sur la lOgique de Mo-tseu, Ttotmg Pao, Paris, 1927. 
Maspero, Henri, rrThe Origins of the Chinese Civilization, rr The Smithsonian 
Institutional Reporli, Washington, 1927. -
Rawlinson, Rrank, "The Ethical and Social Value of Micius, rr Chinese Recorder, 
February, 1932. 
SChindler, B., !he Development of Chinese Conception of Supreme Being," 
~ Major, Hirth Anniversary Volume, London, 1923. 
Simpson, Clifford, 'Motse and Fatalism, " Chinese Recorder, October, 1931. 
Vacca GiOvanni, rrFilosofia e religione della Cina," F!ncic1opedia ltaliana, 
X, 1933, p. 300. 
Wallace, Westwood, ~eligious Element in the Writings of Motse,"Chinese Re-
corder, September, 1931. -
Walshe, W. Gilberli, "China, If Enczc:lopedia of Religion and Ethics. 
355 
PART II: BOOKS WRITTEN Dr CH:mESE 
I. PRIMARY SOURCES 
;'f.. -J-- b Jk 
Mo-tze, The Original ~ of Mo-tze, 
~ ;t j~ 
edited by Dr. Pi-Yuan, Peiking, 1784. 
II. SECONDARY SOURCES 
~ JJ-. J.:' )f ..( ~! 
Chen-5hiu, ~ Discussions About Mo-tze, Shanghai, 1928. 
pJ.-. f:i -t_ .:J-. ~ ft. 4-
Chen-5hiu, Lao-t'~ and Chuang-tze, Shanghai, 1934. 
pi ju At 'f' I~ -); ;,~ ;Pj )~ ~ 
Chen Yuan-Teh, History of Chinese Ancient Philosophy, Shanghai, 1937. 
p~ 7~ tz. ~j ~ ~ J<,. ft 
Chen Tsin-Zi, Researches ~ the Lives of Ancient Chinese Wiseman, Shanghai, 
1933. )& ~ l' ~ fo- 1~ .} ifZ 7~ jd: ~ /~ f\C d... .$-
ChI i Ven-Hu, Social Theories of Ancient Chinese Wisemen, Shanghai, 1930. 
-% 1~ 11 )1--)~ ~ 7)~ 
Fang Hseu-.f;;u, The Source of Motiism, Shanghai, 1935. 
)~ ~ m 'f {~ ~ ~ 't- "- J4.'~ 
Fung Yu-Lan, ! Histoq of Chinese Philosophy (translated from the Chinese 
by Derk Bodde, Peiping, 1937) ~ 
~fl A '1 I~ lJ lit 'i- '-- l ~ 
!fu. Shih, An Outline ~ Chinese Philosophical Histoq, Vol. I, Shanghai, 1928. 
1~ Y! ~ :t ~ ttl ~ 1.-
Kub Ka-Poo, ~ Dialectics £f Andient Chinese, Shanghai, 1932. 
-1 P f.~ ~ " (~ "- )!f ;fY~ ~.f t-
Kub isao-iJ; History of Chinese Literature, voL I, Shanghai, 1934. 
1~ -j' t tu ~ "- it jtJu ~ L 2!!L A.. Kub Tin-Dang, The Development of the Idea Of T I ien (Heaven) in the works of 
Ancient Chinese Wisemen, Shanghai, 1927. 
i ~ 1;! ;! t )~ ~ ~ "- -f-.- Jt.'I~ ~ 11 3,6 
Lee Kee, ! criticism ~ "An Outline of Chine~e Philosophical History" El Dr. 
~hih, Shanghai, 1931. -
i ~ J, '<f ~ -J; )>\J ~ ~~ ~ >1 fit £1 
Lee Ma4fa, History of Political Theories 1:!! Ancient China, Shanghai, 1933. 
:d: ~ ~ ~ I~ t1l ~ -1' j! 
Lee Sheh-King, ~ Discussions 2!!. Chinese Phi10soFhl, Shanghai, 1935. 
~ I!~ ~ J~ ~ )-g. ~ :i.;i~g Chti-Tsao, ! Critical Study ~ Mo-tze, Shanghai, 1921. 
1! ;~ Aj~ )~ ~ ~ )' 1-
Lo Mei-Teh, HistOr"1 of Philosophy during the Dynasties Chou ~ Ch t in, Pei-
ping, 1923. 
~ YJta. ~ 'f I~ ~ Y! 'i 1-
Miura, History of Chinese EthiCS, Shanghai, 1927. 
if ~ -tl V!~ JY!j ~J J~ A )l 
Seng Gee-Ming, Histdry il Chinese Tholi@t, Shanghai, 1932 • 
.?~ t~ ~A ~ j. ~1 ~~ 
Seng I-Ran, commenlary ~ llo'-tze t s Original Text, Shanghai, 1894. 
~ /J ~ t l~ J~ A fl" 1-shkng-Nai:~i, ! Brief History of Chinese Thought, Shanghai, 1930. 
~f " J= 'f I~ ~ li~ 1---Sie Wu-Liang, ~ of Chinese Philosophy, Shanghai, 1927. 
t-:"g~'Kao, skate! Text ~:t"t.e, ~t~Int;~~tL and ~ Shang-
hai, 1932. 
J:- ~;~ '1 I~ " W A )+.~ 
Ts1ai Shan-Su, :!E Outline of Chinese Civilization, Shanghai, 1932. 
~ \3h J~ }t ;1- ~ }~ <- I, >L )J0 
Tst ai shaii-Su, !h! Philosophy of ~ According to Lao-tze and Mo-tze, Shang-
hai, 1935. 
fo:-- 1u fJ!; f!~ ;,/Jf;- Y! lJ. "-
Tst ai Yu-Pei, History of Chinese EthiCS, Shanghai, 1937. 
~t.ai...! jefl~~ ,! Ju.se Phi1os?p&, Shanghai, 1929. 
~ ,Jt ~ 'd ~~ tl 
3C /j~ PI\; J~ ~ }'~ ;~;I 
Tze Wei-Chen, Conunentary ~ Mo-tze's Original Text, Shanghai, 1925. 
357 
J-- 1~ ~ J}ft; J~ Z 1<-. )6] 
Wang Don-Ling, ! Comparative Study of Confucianism and Motiism, Peiping, 1922. 
7) s.t * ~ ~ )~ ~ )~ 'l- j~ it 
-iatinabe, ! Brief Introduction to the History of Chinese Philosophy, trans-
lated from the Japanese into Chinese by Lui Ka-Yuan, Shanghai, 1926. 
